As you know the SCOTUS has granted certiorari to US versus Rahimi.  It’s interesting to see just how this debate is framed by the likes of Vox.

Last February, the far-right United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a federal law prohibiting individuals from “possessing a firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order” is unconstitutional. On Friday, the Supreme Court announced that it will hear this case.

It is fairly likely that the justices will reverse the Fifth Circuit’s extraordinary decision — as many as six current members of the Court have signaled that, while some of them support an expansive reading of the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rahimi goes too far. Justice Brett Kavanaugh has endorsed some prohibitions on gun possession by people who have not been convicted of a felony, including laws prohibiting people with serious mental illnesses from owning guns. Justice Amy Coney Barrett, meanwhile, wrote when she was still a lower court judge that “legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.”

A more uncertain question is whether the Court will use the Rahimi case to impose some coherence on the incomprehensible approach to the Second Amendment that it announced just one year ago in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022).

Bruen held that huge swaths of US gun laws must fall unless the government can prove that “the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” And it instructed judges to determine whether a particular challenged gun law is consistent with this tradition by searching for “historical analogies” in early American firearm regulations.

In practice, however, it is often impossible to draw precise analogies between today’s gun laws and those from two centuries ago, because both American society and firearms technology have changed so much since the Second Amendment was ratified.

[ … ]

Or consider, for that matter, the law at issue in Rahimi, which prohibits many individuals who are “subject to a court order” that restrains them from “harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner” from possessing a gun. Notably, this law applies to individuals who have not yet been convicted of a crime, but who have had a court proceeding that determined they are a danger to their partner or their partner’s children.

The dummy who wrote this tripe for Vox has framed the question the wrong way.  I don’t know the likely outcome of the decision at the supreme court when they write it, but this isn’t the way it works.  Leaving aside the issue of whether this was a criminal or civil case (it was a civil case), there is the issue of how the retraining orders are typically issued.

They don’t decide the case before it’s tried.  That would violate due process rights.  So courts don’t simply restrain the offending party (whomever that is – that is yet to be determined because the case hasn’t been adjudicated).  Restraining orders are issued for both parties.  The fifth circuit spoke directly to that issue.

But “[t]hese judicial assessments have often led to the issuance of unmerited mutual restraining orders, namely in situations where one party is the abuser and the other party is a victim.” Id. (emphasis added). As a result, “both parties are restrained even if only one is an abuser.” Id. at 1055 (emphasis added). See also Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not, 67 Ind. L.J. 1039, 1055–56 (1992) (“[J]udges often issue a mutual protection order without any request from the respondent or his lawyer. . . . [J]udges and lawyers . . . may be tempted to resort to mutual protective orders frequently. However, when they do this in cases where there truly is one victim and one batterer, they ignore some of the real difficulties of mutual protection orders.”). See generally David Hirschel, Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., Domestic Violence Cases: What Research Shows About Arrest and Dual Arrest Rates (2008).

The net result of all this is profoundly perverse, because it means that § 922(g)(8) effectively disarms victims of domestic violence. What’s worse, victims of domestic violence may even be put in greater danger than before. Abusers may know or assume that their victims are law-abiding citizens who will comply with their legal obligation not to arm themselves in self-defense due to § 922(g)(8). Abusers might even remind their victims of the existence of § 922(g)(8) and the entry of a mutual protective order to taunt and subdue their victims. Meanwhile, the abusers are criminals who have already demonstrated that they have zero propensity to obey the dictates of criminal statutes. As a result, § 922(g)(8) effectively empowers and enables abusers by guaranteeing that their victims will be unable to fight back.

Perverse indeed.  But the controller who wrote this silly commentary doesn’t care about a victim’s right to fight back and duty to self defense because controllers hate people, themselves included.

So if the supreme court falls for this and curtails 2A rights, they’ve fallen victim themselves to the treacherous behavior of the thug AG for this administration.