I have long known about the prevalence of brain injury in boxers.  The harmful effects of boxing, regarding especially the brain, can be studied here and here (and many other places).  Many my age can remember the incredible, superhuman performances of Mohammed Ali and his opponents (Joe Frazier, George Foreman, etc.).  It isn’t by accident that there is such a thing as the Mohammed Ali Boxing Reform Act.

When a blow lands to the head, the brain disconnects from the skull, or in other words, tissue tears, and in its place fluids and scar tissue develop, causing many other problems.  I’ll let a brain surgeon explain it better than I can.

Well, sustaining repeated blows by IEDs and other explosive ordnance is having similar effects as that of boxing, and it is happening in apparently significant numbers of GIs in Iraq.  Brain injury is the “signature wound” of the war in Iraq.  It is good that body armor has become as robust as it has, but the downside of this is that of those who would otherwise have perished, many live.  But this living comes at a cost.  The Gaurdian gives us the story.

By JORDAN ROBERTSON

Associated Press Writer

PALO ALTO, Calif. (AP) – Lance Cpl. Sam Reyes bears scars from three horrific attacks in Iraq, but his most debilitating wound cannot be seen.

He recovered from the chest wound delivered by a machine gun-toting insurgent and the bullet wound to his back that came during an ambush. He survived the severe burns and broken ribs inflicted by a suicide bomber who struck a lightly armored 18-wheeler he was riding in – an explosion that killed 12 of his fellow Marines.

One injury initially went undetected. It continues to cripple him long after he arrived home with a clean bill of health.

Reyes suffered a traumatic brain injury in the truck explosion. The blast sent a powerful shock wave through his brain tissue, bursting blood vessels and smacking his brain against the inside of his skull.

“I thought I was a mess-up, just damn near dumb,” Reyes, 22, said about the mysterious fogginess that plagued him long after his physical wounds healed. “I thought I was just a failure at this. I was recognized before as being the best. I knew my stuff real well. It made me feel like I wasn’t a Marine no more.”

Doctors say traumatic brain injuries are the signature wound of the Iraq war, a byproduct of improved armor that allows troops to survive once-deadly attacks but does not fully protect against roadside explosives and suicide bombers.

So far, about 1,000 patients have been treated for the symptoms, which include slowed thinking, severe memory loss and problems with coordination and impulse control. Some doctors fear there may be thousands more active duty and discharged troops who are suffering undiagnosed.

“People who were hit by lightning, a lot of energy goes through their systems and their brains are cooked,” said Dr. Harriet Zeiner, a neuropsychologist at the VA hospital in Palo Alto. “A lot of that happens in (improvised explosive device) blasts. Your brain is not meant to handle that energy blast going through it.”

The injury, a loss of brain tissue, shares some symptoms with post-traumatic stress disorder, which is triggered by extreme anxiety and permanently resets the brain’s fight-or-flight mechanism.

Battlefield medics and military supervisors often fail to spot traumatic brain injuries. Many troops don’t know the symptoms or won’t discuss their difficulties for fear of being sent home.

“Most of us are used to the Vietnam War, where people didn’t trust the government,” Zeiner said. “That’s not going on here. A lot of these guys want to go back, they want to go help their buddies.”

The most devastating effects of traumatic brain injuries – depression, agitation and social withdrawal – are difficult to treat with medications, said Dr. Rohit Das, a Boston Medical Center neurologist who treats injured troops at the VA Boston Healthcare System.

Certain symptoms, such as seizures, can be treated, but after that “we just draw a blank,” Das said, adding that doctors are just beginning to cope with the mounting volume of brain injuries as the war drags on.

“We’re just unlocking the secrets of the brain,” he said. “And when they have memory problems, leg weakness, arm weakness – there’s no quick fix for that. We’re probably decades away from regrowing brain tissue. Once you lose that, it’s permanent.”

In Reyes’ case, the Purple Heart recipient didn’t recognize his father and closest friends when they picked him up at the airport. His math and reading skills had deteriorated to a child’s level.

A machine gun operator in the war, he taught recruits while healing at Camp Pendleton, but was relieved of the position after he started to forget the differences among weapons.

After his injury was discovered, he was sent to the Palo Alto VA hospital, where his treatment includes exercises to improve his speed and attention and to control his angry outbursts.

But his memory may never fully recover: He’ll watch half of a movie before remembering he has already seen it multiple times. He forgets basic tasks without Post-it note reminders and alerts programmed into his cell phone.

He feels “like I’m back to a little kid,” he said. “I’ve got to go through the whole process. It’s frustrating, depressing and very overwhelming.”

The spike in traumatic brain injury cases is forcing the Department of Veterans Affairs to expand its treatment. The VA operates four hospital trauma centers specializing in treating traumatic brain injuries, and is creating 21 smaller regional facilities, said Secretary of Veterans Affairs R. James Nicholson.

“This is very high priority,” he said. “It’s a very serious injury to those young heroes that suffer it. We’re pulling out all the stops.”

The patients need a combination of psychiatric, psychological and physical rehabilitation that can be difficult to coordinate in a traditional hospital, Nicholson said.

In troops with brain injuries, the loss of brain function is often compounded by other serious injuries.

Eric Cagle, a 26-year-old Army staff sergeant from Arizona, lost his right eye and was paralyzed on his left side when an IED exploded under his patrol Humvee two years ago.

A concussion he sustained in the blast left him with a brain injury that makes math difficult and triggers inappropriate outbursts. He feels its symptoms caused his divorce.

Treatment has improved his outlook, he said. He’s been using a wheelchair, but took his first tentative steps last year. He wants to study forensic science and hopes to work in an FBI crime lab.

“I’m getting part of me back here,” he said in Palo Alto. “I’m getting my life back.”

Years from now, when few people remember the sacrifices of the boys we sent over to Iraq, it will be tempting to ridicule growing Defense Department budgets.  But the costs associated with the war in Iraq have yet to fully unfold.

And my repeat readers know what position I will take.  We cannot forget our boys.  They are sons of America.  We cannot forget them, for it would be immoral to do so, and God will judge us accordingly.

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani has gone on record stating the obvious, i.e., that Iraq will need troop presence for some protracted period of time to protect against aggression from its neighbors (and it is presumed he is speaking mainly of Iran).

“The American presence has always prevented any kind of foreign invasion to Iraq,” Talabani said.

“That’s one of the main reasons why we think that we need an American presence, even symbolical, in the country to prevent our neighbors attacking us,” he said at a forum at the Woodrow Wilson Center, a Washington think thank (sic).

Talabani also said Baghdad could not “further tolerate” neighbors’ interference in its internal affairs.

“I think that our neighbors must understand that our patience is limited,” he said, refusing to single out countries but adding “we mean all of them.”

Iraq shares borders with Syria, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Asked if there was concern over aggression from Turkey, Talabani said: “I don’t think there is any danger for invasion by Turkey to Iraq.”

But as soon as he said this, dissenting voices began to howl back at this proposal, including specifically Sunni clerics and generally the Shia.  It is no mistake that Talabani, a Kurdish politician who has reached out to the Sunni in an attempt at reconciliation, has made these statements.  The Kurds and the Sunni population know exactly what the Shia majority is capable of given the recent revenge killings by Shia death squads.

I’ll go out on a limb and say that if the U.S. doesn’t have a strong military presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future, U.S. deaths will have been in vain.  Our operation in Iraq will amount to nothing more than the overthrow of the Sunni strongman so that Iran could then wield its influence.  That is, we will have done Iran’s work for them at the expense of U.S. lives.

Threats Watch picked up an interesting study done at Stanford entitled An Uncertain Ceasefire Takes Hold in Lebanon.  The salient quote is:

International sources—the news departments of CNN, ABC, and CBS, et cetera—widely agree that Iran feeds Hezbollah upwards of $250 million in direct funding annually. This may be an overestimation, but the low-end estimate of the Center for Strategic and International Studies places Iranian aid to Hezbollah at a quite considerable $50 million annually. Even according to this most conservative figure, Iran spends, as a fraction of GDP, nearly three times as much arming Hezbollah as the United States spends arming the Marine Corps under the 2005 Navy budget. This astonishing comparison exposes the hopelessness of disarming Hezbollah with a strategy that does not include Iran.

This is interesting on several levels.  First, it shows the commitment that Iran has to the spread of its influence around the region.  As I have pointed out before, Iran sees itself at the head of a new regional Caliphate.  This amount of money is not trivial, especially for a country that is widely acknowledged to be in some degree of economic trouble in spite of its oil revenue stream.

But second — and most interesting — is that this amount is not truly spent “arming” Hizballah.  To be sure, a significant fraction of this is used directly for armaments and munitions.  But a significant fraction is also spent as largesse in southern Lebanon … schools, medical care, welfare for the high numbers of unemployed, etc. … leading in no small part to the political influence of Iran, via Hizballah, in Lebanon.

Paralleling a theme in my posts on Iran, the study does come to the correct conclusion.  We will not win in a battle to disarm Hizballah, the Shia militia in Iraq, or anywhere else where Iran has influence, unless and until we muzzle Iran — politically, militarily, or both.

We have worked hard to defang the Sunni extremists (al Qaeda, Taliban), but sooner or later we will have to face off the Shia extremists.  If it is later, the costs will be higher.

From the Gulf News:

A major Sunni group is holding talks with the Iraqi government over disarming of the Shiite militia belonging to Moqtada Al Sadr, Iraqi political sources said.

Adnan Al Dulaimi, head of the Iraqi Accordance Front who is holding the talks with the government, has also called for the government to resign if it fails to handle the issue of disarming Shiite militias, like the Mehdi Army, which is led by Al Sadr.

Sunni locations in Baghdad, such as Saydiya, Hurriya and Doura, are witnessing attacks by men in black clothes, believed to be members of the Mehdi Army.

Al Dulaimi, in direct contact with the Americans, asked them to disperse a special military force in Hurriya to put an end to the Mehdi Army attacks.

Sources in the Iraqi Accordance Front are negotiating with Iraq Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki to chalk out procedures to disarm militias and deter the Mehdi Army in Baghdad.

“Al Maliki is ready to take additional … procedures against the Mehdi Army. But apparently is under pressure from religious Shiite leaders to stop …taking serious measures in this respect,” said a source in the Front.

The same sources told Gulf News there is an Iraqi-American military plan to tackle the Mehdi Army, which attacks Sunni locations, carries out abductions, tortures and killing.

However, Al Maliki seems reluctant to implement the plan. Also, the contacts between the Iraqi Accordance Front and the Shiite coalition headed by Abdul Aziz Al Hakim has reached a dead end, after the Shiite coalition and Al Sadr refused to admit the responsibility of some of their members in killing tens of Iraqis daily.

“Al Maliki wants to conduct a political dialogue with the Al Sadr group. He wants to be backed by religious Shiite leaders to resolve the Mehdi dossier peacefully,” Abbas Al Bayati, a Member of Parliament, told Gulf News.

However, sources in Meshaan Al Jubouri’s group, a Sunni Member in Parliament, told Gulf News Al Maliki’s plans to rid the Ministry of Interior of Al Sadr elements is greatly criticised by religious leaders in Najaf and Karbala.

I have made the point that the degree to which the U.S. wins the war in Iraq is a linear function of the degree to which we disarm and muzzle both the Shia militia and their proximate leaders, Iran.

Rewind … repeat.  I say again.  If we do not disarm the Shia militias and muzzle Iran, we will lose the war.  Period.  No amount of reconstruction and good will can change this axiom.

Late Monday evening, September 25, 2006, I received the following e-mail from Michael Fumento:

I head out Tuesday, should be in the IZ by Saturday and probably will send out my first blog then. Then will catch first helo to Ramadi. Hooah!

Michael Fumento
www.fumento.com
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

Michael and I then exchanged some more pleasant e-mail, and I told him to say hello from a Marine father to the young warriors he meets in the al Anbar Province.

I have said Michael Fumento, in my opinion, is the closest thing we have to a contemporary version of Ernie Pyle.  Check out his blog from the al Anbar Province (or if you don’t, rest assured that I will remind you in my posts).

God bless Michael, the Marines, the Soldiers and all of our other boys under arms in al Anbar and in Iraq generally.  You fight.  We pray for your safety and victory.  All I can do is blog and pray, so that’s what I do.

Semper Fidelis.

Top al Qaeda leaders have been killed in Southern and Western Iraq.  Omar Faruq, expert bombmaker, was killed in Basra, and senior al Qaeda leader Khalid Mahal is reported to have been killed in al Anbar.

It has been a bonus week in Iraq.  Al Qaeda operative and expert bombmaker Omar Faruq has been killed in Basra.

BAGHDAD: British troops in Iraq said yesterday they had killed one of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s top global lieutenants, who escaped from a US prison in Afghanistan last year.

Omar Faruq was shot dead while resisting arrest yesterday during a pre-dawn raid by about 200 British troops in Iraq’s second biggest city, Basra, British military spokesman Major Charlie Burbridge said.

US leaders have described Faruq as the top Al Qaeda operative in southeast Asia. He was caught in Indonesia in 2002 and held at a high-security detention centre at Bagram airbase north of the Afghan capital Kabul until his escape last year.

“The individual had been tracked across Iraq and was in hiding in Basra,” Burbridge said, calling him a “very, very significant man”.

In fact, the British and Iraqis attempted to arrest Faruq, but during the arrest fighting apparently ensued and he was killed.  He would have been a gold mine of information had they been able to effect the arrest.

In other news, Bill Roggio is blogging on senior al Qaeda leaders in the al Anbar Province having been killed:

BAGHDAD, Sept 26 (KUNA) — A joint Iraqi-US force killed Tuesday Al-Qaeda leader in Anbar and one of his aides in the western Iraqi area of Tharthar, said Iraqi state television (Iraqiya).

The television said the joint force killed Al-Qaeda’s Amir in Anbar, Khalid Mahal, and one of his aides, identified as Nasif Al-Mawla.

Iraq security forces had earlier announced over the past few days arrest of Ansar Al-Sunna group leader in Diyala.

Several observations:

In Comments on the Death of Umar Faruq at the Counterterrorism Blog, Kenneth Conboy states that:

“It has long been suspected that Faruq, who was born of Iraqi parents, would attempt to join the insurgency in Iraq. This speculation was supported by reports in recent months that his Indonesian wife had been receiving frequent cell phone calls from unidentified persons in Iraq. It is not known if these calls played a role in tracing his whereabouts.”

I would add that he was born of Iraqi parents in Kuwait, not Iraq.  This is interesting and I may be making too much of it, but it seems that southern Iraq is a dangerous place for al Qaeda.  With the influence of Iran in southern Iraq and their Shia surrogates, and based on the knowledge the police had of the whereabouts of Faruq, it would seem that if there is violence to be done in the Shia territories, the Shia will do it.  I would also add that it is obvious that Iraq is a magnet for this kind of terrorist, and so it continues to be true that the Iraq war is pivotal in the GWOT.

Bill Roggio says that “Task Force 145 … is conducting a full court press in Iraq.”  The reports don’t say yet who conducted the operation to kill Mahal, but Bill may know more about this than has been published in the press.  Either way, killing al Qaeda in al Anbar is a good thing and will help to pacify the troubled region (although like Faruq, I am sure that the coalition forces would have loved to have captured them for the intelligence value).

Finally, al Anbar will continue to be a dangerous place, and the Sunni insurgents will not give up the fight because al Qaeda continues to be targeted.  Killing top al Qaeda in Iraq is a positive move, but the Sunni who will not reconcile to the government, still believing that the Sunni should be running the country, will be problematic even in the absence of al Qaeda leaders.

Even after the recent NATO efforts at ridding the troubled regions in Afghanistan of Taliban, the Gulf Times is reporting on a changed nation-state due to Taliban influence:

PASHMUL: “It is very dangerous here because the Taliban have not been driven out and Nato is still here,” says a villager in this part of Afghanistan’s Kandahar province.

Days after Nato forces declared they had defeated insurgents entrenched in Panjwayi and Pashmul, worried inhabitants still fear the Taliban and some even sympathise with the rebels.

And life cannot return to normal.

“It is impossible to go back to our village because our house has been destroyed, unless the coalition forces help us,” continues villager Haji Bilal-jan, referring to Nato’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

“My house was bombed and burnt. I lost 4,000 kilos of raisins that were ready for market,” says the 48-year-old with a black turban and thick beard.

“ISAF was cruel, they bombed our houses when there weren’t even any Taliban here.”

Another villager, Namatullah, interrupts. “Why did you allow the Taliban to come here?” demands the 45-year-old, who does not wear the traditional turban, unleashing a bitter debate. “We have to call a shura (council) in every village to appoint someone to tell the strangers – Taliban or other – to go on their way,” he says.

But says Haji Bilal-jan, “We do not have the power to stop the Taliban from coming to our village or to ask the coalition not to bomb our houses.”

“The government must pardon everyone and let them return,” he says, apparently referring to the Taliban, whose main leaders have found refuge in Pakistan.

Namatullah recalls meeting some of the Taliban who had moved into the area. “One day I was working close to a stream where women were washing clothes with the children. A hundred metres away, I saw a group of Taliban.

“I told them to leave, that they were going to get these women and children killed. They replied, ‘No we have orders.'” His house was destroyed by a bomb and his loft, which contained Rs25,000 worth of opium, was hit by a rocket, he says.

But he is not complaining. “I am happy because the Taliban deserve punishment, even if it cost the destruction of my house.” “If Pakistan is helping them, the Taliban will come back. If it drops them, they will not come back,” he says. 

The Taliban are patiently awaiting the tiring of the coalition forces ensuing in their final departure, which would mark their opportunity to retake at least part of Afghanistan.

In other news, Musharraf apparently hopes for the same thing.  The things he is doing and saying do not help the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.  Musharraf’s demuring to a book contract the other day when faced with questions at the White House is more than just clownish behavior.  It is designed to undermine the war effort.

Iran has designs on a regional Caliphate, and has positioned special operations forces in Iraq.  These troops, along with the Shia in Iraq, could pose more than just a theoretical threat later down the road.  If desired, they could cut or at least cripple the U.S. lines of supply in Iraq.

In Iran’s Iraq Strategy and Iran Muscles in on Iraq, as well as my posts in the Iran category, I outline what I believe to be Iran’s strategy for Iraq.  The peace cannot be won with al Qaeda by any amount of politics.  The same can be said for the Sunni diehards in al Anbar, as well as those Sunni fighters filtering into the Baghdad area.  I have long held that one key to the security of Baghdad is peace in the Sunni triangle.  If the peace was secured in the Sunni triangle, there would be few Sunni insurgents left to wreak violence in and around Baghdad.

The Shia militia are perhaps even more important than the Sunni or even al Qaeda, and whether peace can be won by political means is a salient question.  I hold that peace can be won with the Shia, but only if their power broker — Iran — has been muzzled.  The Shia in Iraq will seek peace and stability if they see Iran on the ropes, politically and militarily.

Leaving behind the question of the propriety of the war in Iraq for a moment and thinking critically about unintended consequences of our presence in Iraq, there is a sobering and statement in Time, July 24, 2006, by Joe Klein (The Iran Factor):

The U.S. “has been Iran’s very best friend,” a diplomat from a predominantly Sunni nation told me recently.  “You have eliminated its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.  You have even reduced yourselves as a threat to Iran because you have spent so much blood and treasure in Iraq.”

The Shia in Iraq are closely connected to Iran as I have pointed out in my posts, but there is very interesting and troubling assessment of Iranian and Iraqi Shia capabilities that was published on July 21, 2206, by Patrick Lang in the Christian Science Monitor, entitled The vulnerable line of supply to U.S. troops in Iraq.  In it, he observes:

American troops all over central and northern Iraq are supplied with fuel, food, and ammunition by truck convoy from a supply base hundreds of miles away in Kuwait. All but a small amount of our soldiers’ supplies come into the country over roads that pass through the Shiite-dominated south of Iraq.

Until now the Shiite Arabs of Iraq have been told by their leaders to leave American forces alone. But an escalation of tensions between Iran and the US could change that overnight. Moreover, the ever-increasing violence of the civil war in Iraq can change the alignment of forces there unexpectedly.

Southern Iraq is thoroughly infiltrated by Iranian special operations forces working with Shiite militias, such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades. Hostilities between Iran and the United States or a change in attitude toward US forces on the part of the Baghdad government could quickly turn the supply roads into a “shooting gallery” 400 to 800 miles long.

At present, the convoys of trucks supplying our forces in Iraq are driven by civilians – either South Asians or Turks. If the route is indeed turned into a shooting gallery, these civilian truck drivers would not persist or would require a heavier escort by the US military.

It might then be necessary to “fight” the trucks through ambushes on the roads. This is a daunting possibility. Trucks loaded with supplies are defenseless against many armaments, such as rocket-propelled grenades, small arms, and improvised explosive devices. A long, linear target such as a convoy of trucks is very hard to defend against irregulars operating in and around their own towns.

The volume of “throughput” would probably be seriously lessened in such a situation. A reduction in supplies would inevitably affect operational capability. This might lead to a downward spiral of potential against the insurgents and the militias. This would be very dangerous for our forces.

Final victory in Iraq will be a function of the degree to which we muzzle Iran.  In the mean time, let’s hope that this assessment exaggerates the danger Iran poses, but I fear that it is spot on.  This is made darker still with the newfound respect the U.S. military has for the Iranian military.

Official Iraqi army hinders U.S. efforts due to commitment to tribes over Iraq nationalism.  Heavy reliance on proxy fighters is unwise and unproductive.

I have commented (negatively and disparagingly) on the tendency to rely too heavily on proxy fighters to accomplish U.S. mission objectives.  In the case of the tribal commitments in the al Anbar province, the concern will be that these troops do not have training, command and control, commitment to nationalism, or self-confidence.  It appears that in the Shia-controlled areas, some of the same problems exist, even among the offocial Iraqi army.

The plan was simple: Iraqi troops would block escape routes while U.S. soldiers searched for weapons house-by-house. But the Iraqi troops didn’t show up on time.

When they finally did appear, the Iraqis ignored U.S. orders and let dozens of cars pass through checkpoints in eastern Baghdad _ including an ambulance full of armed militiamen, American soldiers said in recent interviews.

It wasn’t an isolated incident, they added.

Senior U.S. commanders have hailed the performance of Iraqi troops in the crackdown on militias and insurgents in Baghdad. But some U.S. soldiers say the Iraqis serving alongside them are among the worst they’ve ever seen _ seeming more loyal to militias than the government.

That raises doubts whether the Iraqis can maintain order once the security operation is over and the Americans have left. It also raises broader questions about the training, reliability and loyalty of Iraqi troops _ who must be competent, U.S. officials say, before America can begin pulling out of Iraq.

Last week, for example, Sgt. 1st Class Eric Sheehan could barely contain his frustration when he discovered that barriers and concertina wire that were supposed to bolster defensive positions had been dragged away _ again _ under the noses of nearby Iraqi soldiers.

‘(I) suggest we fire these IAs and get them out of the way,’ Sheehan, of Jennerstown, Pa., reported to senior officers, referring to Iraqi army troops. ‘There’s nothing we can do,’ came the reply.

U.S. soldiers from the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment eventually blocked the road again while Iraqi troops watched from a distance.

Some Americans speculated the missing barriers were dragged off to strengthen militia defenses in nearby Sadr City, a sprawling Shiite neighborhood that is a stronghold of anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

This may not be justification for turning back the hands of time and dismissing the Iraqi army, but it certainly warns against heavy reliance on the use of either the official Iraqi army or groups of tribal recruits in al Anbar to effect U.S. mission objectives.

The U.S. is in an intricate dance with Pakistan, balancing concerns over a potentially unstable regime armed with nuclear weapons with the need for access to troubled provinces as well as A. Q. Khan, the father of the nuclear program in Pakistan.  This dance must end at some point, and the Taliban must be defeated while information is also mined concerning the Iranian nuclear program.

Since the intense pressure in 2001 on Pakistan to take sides in the GWOT, the U.S. has been in a tricky and tenuous dance with Musharraf.  Pakistan is armed with nuclear weapons, and the father of this program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, is widely regarded as a hero in Pakistan for putting Pakistan on even ground with India.

Pakistan also has strong elements of radical Islam in its intelligence services, but Musharraf has claimed that its nuclear weapons are under strict custody and will not fall into the wrong hands.  But the U.S. administration has taken the position that Musharraf, while weak in his handling of the radical elements in Pakistan, is better than the alternative should a coup topple his government.

It was a made-for-main-stream-media confession that Musharraf gave recently concerning their nuclear proliferation:

Musharraf claims he only suspected that Khan was passing secrets to Iran and North Korea until the then CIA director George Tenet confronted him with proof at the United Nations in 2003.

“(Tenet) passed me some papers. It was a centrifuge design with all its numbers and signatures of Pakistan. It was the most embarrassing moment,