From Iraq News:

Baghdad, Oct 1, (VOI) – A coup almost toppled Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki’s government over the last two days, the Iraqi legislator Baha’ al-A’raji said on Sunday.

“Al-Malki’s government has survived a coup planned by Saddamists and Islamic extremists who wanted to send a clear message to the Iraqi government of their presence in Iraq,

In my post Musharraf Unhinged, I cited reports that Musharraf is asking for help in Pakistan, and that there is strong political pressure to bring the Taliban into politics as a remedy for the violence that has overtaken the Taliban-controlled areas of Pakistan.  In a statement apparently designed to parrot Musharraf’s position, Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist has encouraged the same:

QALAT, Afghanistan U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist said Monday that the Afghan guerrilla war can never be won militarily and called for efforts to bring the Taliban and their supporters into the Afghan government.

The Tennessee Republican said he had learned from briefings that Taliban fighters were too numerous and had too much popular support to be defeated by military means.

“You need to bring them into a more transparent type of government,” Frist said during a brief visit to a U.S. and Romanian military base in the southern Taliban stronghold of Qalat. “And if that’s accomplished we’ll be successful.”

Frist said asking the Taliban to join the government was a decision to be made by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Sen. Mel Martinez, a Republican from Florida accompanying Frist, said negotiating with the Taliban was not “out of the question” but that fighters who refused to join the political process would have to be defeated.

“A political solution is how it’s all going to be solved,” he said.

At the Counterterrorism Blog (and also in the Boston Globe), Lorenzo Vidino has the following salient comments concerning democracy in Muslim world:

IN RECENT WEEKS, President Bush has delivered a series of major speeches outlining his strategy against terrorism. We have come a long way from the nebulous rhetoric of the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001.

The foe is no longer defined as “terror,” which is simply a tool used by a well-defined adversary. The new “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” acknowledges that America’s enemy is a “transnational movement of extremist organizations . . . which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.” The report then outlines measures to confront that challenge. While short-term measures such as denying terrorists sanctuary or tracking their funds seem logical , the administration’s long-term strategy is less straightforward.

The obvious cure to the problem is tackling radical Islam, the ideology that motivates terrorists. But the administration believes firmly — almost blindly — that democracy is the right medicine. According to the report, democracy “diminishes the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit.” Promotion of democracy is, therefore, the key element in the administration’s long-term approach.

Yet democracy does not always have these healing powers. The administration contends that individuals who enjoy political participation and can freely express themselves are less likely to embrace fundamentalist messages. The truth is that today democratic societies are spawning terrorists no less than dictatorships are.

Continuing with the recent mantra, Musharraf adds to the political blitz by saying:

“They don’t know the realities on (the) ground. They’re not conscious of the reality I’m seeing – the extreme danger of this becoming a people’s movement.”

Frist was clearly referring to the Taliban (rather than the Pashtun tribes), as he told us this directly.  Mushaffar is implying that the Talibanization of the tribes will occur if the Taliban are not brought directly into the political process.

So the logic is as follows:

1. The enemy attacked the U.S. on 9/11 when they were in complete control and responsible charge of the government of Afghanistan.
2. Being in complete control of the government, there was no possibility that the Taliban were under-represented or disenfranchised, so this could not have been the reason or even a catalyst for their attack on the U.S.
3. We have fought the enemy, and he has been driven out but not defeated.
4. The enemy is too numerous and enjoys some degree of political support, and thus they cannot be defeated.
5. The solution to our failure to defeat the enemy is to give the Taliban some power in the political process so that they won’t be disenfranshised; for if they are disenfranchised, they might continue to attack us.

So there you have it.

Remaining highly recommended is the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (large PDF document).  The war in Afghanistan is more than 4.5 years old, and the war in Iraq is about 3.5 years old.  The SWM has something to way about timeliness that will edify and enrich our understanding of the various blunders that have been made in these wars so far.  By way of editorial note, I would comment that there seems to be an undercurrent among supporters of the war(s) that is unhealthy and unproductive for the prospective of evolution in our doctrine, strategy and tactics based on our mistakes.  Analysis, assessment and constructive criticism are generally taken to be opposition to the war or to our warriors.  To be seen as patriotic and supportive of our troops, one almost has to be jingoistic.  This is not a mature attitude, but more importantly, it is not supportive of the necessary changes that will mark the future of warfare and thus the warriors who will be participating in those wars.  Proceeding now to the SWJ and what we may learn about timeliness (italics and bold are mine):

” … when forced to resort to arms to carry out the object of the intervention, the operation must be pursued energetically and expeditiously in order to overcome the resistance as quickly as possible.  The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.  National Policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples be maintained on a high moral plan (sic).  However, the military strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the commander in the field must be adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the mission without delay.” (Page 34)

“The force must be of sufficient strength and so proportioned that it can accomplish its mission in the minimum time and with minimum losses.” (Page 113)

From the modern days of Blitzkrieg forward, speed and surprise were useful as a strategy to prevent the enemy from implementing a coherent defense.  Leaving behind the issue of conventional war versus COIN, rural operations versus MOUT, and all of the other issues that can cloud simple evaluations and make the lessons poignant for us, allowing a protracted period of time for [a] al Qaeda to recruit and train more foreign fighters to enter the fray, [b] al Sadr’s militia to strengthen from Iranian funding, and [c] the Baathist diehards to wreak havoc unimpeded, has caused the U.S. strategy to become muddled and weakened.  It has also added to the perception of the U.S. as an occupying force rather than a liberator.

No matter what tactics were employed, if the strategy had included defeat of the known enemy with dispatch, the U.S. forces could have focused more on COIN operations for smaller groups of poorly-trained and poorly-led insurgents.  The current U.S. mission in Iraq is not apparently one of defeating the enemy.  Rather, it is training proxy fighters to defeat the enemy.  This is strategically smart only to the degree that it is successful, useful, helpful and effective to accomplishing the final goals.  Altruism (i.e., in this case, nation-building) is not particually useful as a military strategy.

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf made some stunning remarks recently:

Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf said on Saturday that the United States and its allies will fail in the “war on terror” without the support of Pakistan and its intelligence service.

“You will be brought down to your knees if Pakistan doesn’t co-operate with you. That is all that I would like to say. Pakistan is the main ally. If we were not with you, you would not manage anything. Let that be clear,” he said.

“And if the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) is not with you, you will fail. Let that be very clear also. Remember my words: if the ISI is not with you and Pakistan is not with you will lose in Afghanistan.”

Earlier this week, a leaked document from a Britain’s Defence Ministry think-tank accused Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI, of indirectly supporting extremism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Britain by backing the MNA coalition of Pakistani religious parties.

Musharraf strongly denied the claims.

“From 1979 to 1989 we fought the Soviet Union for you. We won the Cold War for you,” he said, explaining that the Pakistan army and ISI played a part in training the tens of thousands of mujahideen fighters to resist the Soviets.

But after the Soviet withdrawal, the West left Pakistan “high and dry”, he said, leading to the creation of the radicalised Taliban and Al Qaeda from the remnants of the mujahudeen resistance.

In U.S. Dance with Pakistan and Iran Over Nuclear Programs, I pointed out how it would be impossible for A. Q. Khan to have given Iran nuclear technology and equipment without the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) of Pakistan knowing, and perhaps even assisting, in this proliferation.

It is commonly known now that the Pakistan military tired of battling the tribes and Taliban, leading to the autonomy of Waziristan and potentially other provinces.  This autonomy is allowing the Taliban to recruit and train large numbers of troops, as well as launch special operations-size raids across the border.  Now, we learn from India that the ISI was behind the Mumbai bombings, and apparently, India knows a great deal about the details of their involvement.

Musharraf is in under some political pressure in his own country, and the Waziristan accords enjoy support not only in the effected provinces, but in the media as well.

The stunning nature of Musharraf’s comments have to do not with their timing, nor their recipient.  The comments were intended to be heard by both his own people and the international community.  He wants to convince his own people that he is their savior, and the international community that Musharraf’s involvement is essential.

But recent history is showing that while Pakistan is important to the GWOT, Musharraf is increasingly irrelevant to the it, and thus Musharraf’s need to go on the offensive to show otherwise.  The most troubling aspect of Musharraf’s remarks is that either [a] he believes these things, or [b] he doesn’t.  If he believes these things, then he is delusional and mentally unstable and thus his regime is sure to fail, leaving a rogue nuclear state in the hands of Islamic facists.  If he doesn’t believe these things, then Musharraf proves the opposite of what he wants.  He proves that it is so manifestly obvious to the international community that Pakistan is so powerless against the Taliban and the ISI that a massive and embarrassing public relations campaign is warranted.

Musharraf is trying to save his regime, and thus we should be concerned over its viability.  Musharraf essentially said so to the BBC:

“Now, without understanding, everyone blames us for what is happening in Pakistan. It is something that is happening, understand it and help us.”

Michael Fumento is back in Iraq.

More ominously, the enemy has also obviously brought in crack snipers from other countries. The last death in 1/506th was from sniper fire. Closer to home (in a personal sense), last month an embed with 1/506th took what was presumably a sniper round in the ribcage that tumbled a bit and popped out his chest. I think he got out of the hospital in Landstuhl, Germany just last week. The photographer embedded with 1/506th who was shot right before I got there in April was definitely sniped, suffering two broken legs. Incidentals like machine gun fire, rifle fire, IEDs and mortar barrages just add a bit of spice. My efforts in returning, therefore, have revolved around snipers.

… my physical training this time comprised jogging with full armor and all the gear I’ll be wearing on patrol plus a bit extra. Contrary to Hollywood portrayals, a sniper cannot put a scope on a rapidly-moving target. The men of the 101st know that and whenever they aren’t under cover, they jog or go at a dead run. Nothing can provide perfect protection; sometimes you have to expose yourself to get a good shot whether with a rifle or a camera. But I can cut the odds.

Read his whole entry at Back to Iraq, by Michael Fumento. It is worth the read.

This little nuggert from an article otherwise focused on Iranian funding of the violence in Iraq:

“You see them enabling all comers,

In Taliban Preparing for Major Spring Offensive, I cited a report that the Taliban were readying for large scale operations against Kabul:

In a recent telephone interview with a Pakistani reporter, senior Taliban leader Dadullah Akhund said he had told local Taliban members to cease attacks in Pakistan but to continue their fight “abroad” against the U.S. military. He said that he had 500 suicide bombers and 12,000 fighters at his disposal and that by next spring the Taliban would have enough force to launch major attacks on Kabul, the Afghan capital.

This might be bluster, but it also might be a revelation of the long range plan for the Taliban.  Either way, it appears as if the interim period will see smaller, lighter and more dedicated incursions into Afghan territory:

In North Waziristan, a ruggedly mountainous region where foreigners are banned, the Taliban are in control and the mood following the peace deal was buoyantly militant. Residents said there was a general expectation that the peace deal with Pakistan’s ruling army will let the militants step up fighting in Afghanistan.

In one village a few miles from the Afghan border, men said Taliban officials have declared that the jihad now will be more organized and disciplined. Men who volunteer to fight must now cross in smaller groups and stay for longer periods – at least 40 days, according to one source. Fighters will be required to hand their identity documents to the Taliban commander in their village to ensure that they will not be identifiable as Pakistani citizens.

This is the tactic of special operations: small units, silent operation, no identification, with sustenance being derived from the land or the people.  It is certainly not the case that these fighters will be the equivalent of SEALs, Delta Force, or Marine Recon, but the point is that this might signal a temporary change in tactics.

If it is deemed too risky to directly attack Waziristan due to instability in the Musharraf regime and the nuclear weapons in Pakistan, then plans must be made for operations of increased intensity along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

In my post Brain Injury: Signature Wound of the War in Iraq, I discussed IEDs and brain injury as being the wound that many GIs were coming home with, and I encouraged our support — over the long haul — of these disabled troops.  There is more at the two links below.  I must confess that I read these pieces under some emotional distress.  These boys have made a sacrifice that will be with them the balance of their lives.  But read these stories you must.  Don’t turn away from them.  Even if you know the drill, read the stories anyway.  You will be a better person for knowing the struggles that the families of these young boys endure.

Army explores issue of living wills as more return from war in comas

Families bear catastrophic war wounds

In a stark admission of the casualty rate for al Qaeda in Iraq, al Masri has divulged enemy intelligence to the coalition:

CAIRO, Egypt — The new leader of al-Qaida in Iraq said in an audio message posted on a Web site Thursday that more than 4,000 foreign insurgent fighters have been killed in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. It was believed to be the first major statement from insurgents in Iraq about their losses.

“The blood has been spilled in Iraq of more than 4,000 foreigners who came to fight,” said the man, who identified himself as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir – also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri – the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. The voice could not be independently identified.

The good news is that Iraq, while not being touted as such, is important to the GWOT because, if nothing else, it has become a place where literally thousands of terrorists can be killed.  The notion that this is a bad thing is a political talking point, but militarily, is nonsensical if we see the GWOT as being a larger, regional, and protracted campaign that must be won on soil other than America.

Of course, there is bad news, and the bad news is sobering.  In my post Afghanistan, Talibanistan, Waziristan and Kill Ratios, I conservatively calculated a kill ratio in recent Afghanistan action of 50:1.  Considering U.S. mortalities of 3022 as I write this post, and using a value of 4000 al Qaeda in Iraq, the Iraqi situation is much worse.  I calculate a kill ratio of 1.324.

A kill ratio is not simply a clinical number.  These are the sons of America, and it behooves us to understand the difference between Afghan fighting and the war in Iraq.

While it is easy to second-guess each strategic decision and tactical blunder that has been made, several things can be pointed out that might have contributed to this stark difference.  While there is a resurgence of the Taliban in Waziristan, at least initially, the enemy was routed and driven out of Afghanistan.  Conventional operations did not cease until the territory was relatively secure.  The enemy, even now, is being fought primarily on terrain other than urban, and in Iraq, the prevalence of MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) is noteworthy.

As I have pointed out in previous posts, bypassing large urban centers on our drive to Baghdad put a quick end to conventional operations and a start to counterinsurgency operations, but this cessation was likely premature.  Fallujah was taken with relatively few casualties compared to the continually increasing casualty count in the al Anbar Province.  We have left the enemy in Ramadi, Haditha, al Haqlaniyah, Habaniyah, and other highly urbanized parts of al Anbar, and consistently use COIN tactics to effect enemy casualties, but this leads also to a high casualty rate for U.S. troops.

The lesson is simple.  When a strategy of COIN is intended and employed in large urban areas where large numbers of the enemy have been intentionally left to operate, the kill ratio does not even come close to comparing with conventional operations.

This should cause us to think long and hard in the future about the cessation of conventional operations and the invocation of counterinsurgency operations.

The Taliban has taken control over Waziristan and is patiently rebuilding their ranks with plans to lauch major attacks into Kabul in the spring of 2007.  Pakistani editorials urge more involvement in politics, and Musharraf denies that any of this matters by discussing Bin Laden rather than the Taliban. 

Musharraf has denied that the Waziristan accord with the Taliban was really an accord with the Taliban, claiming that it was with the tribal leaders.  If so, then it was with the tribal leaders who were left after the execution of more than 200 tribal leaders.  Musharraf is also denying that Pakistan or the intelligence services are aiding terrorism.

LONDON – An angry Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said he would complain to British Prime Minister Tony Blair Thursday about allegations that Pakistan’s intelligence service backed terrorism.

In media interviews ahead of the London meeting, Musharraf denied the allegations in a British defence ministry policy paper, and also said that Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was alive and hiding in Afghanistan.

“Absolutely, 200 percent, I reject it,