Since the invention and widespread adoption of smokeless powder bolt-action center-fire rifles as military long arms during the late 1880s and thereafter, the major nations of the world and their military forces had concentrated upon first identifying and then mastering the fundamentals of marksmanship in the field and the well-aimed rifle shot. Such notable battles/engagements as the Battle of Spion Kop on 23-24 January 1900 SW of Ladysmith in the Boer republics of South Africa, and the Battle of San Juan Hill (San Juan Heights), Cuba, on 1 July 1898, during the Spanish-American War, demonstrated the ability of well-armed riflemen using accurate, long-ranged fire to inflict disproportionate casualties upon an opposing force. In South Africa, it was Boer irregulars who inflicted outsized causalities upon approaching British Army forces from their positions atop Spion Kop Hill, thus winning the engagement for their side. In Cuba, Spanish regulars inflicted heavy casualties upon the American forces attacking up San Juan Heights, albeit in a losing cause. Whereas iron-sighted black-powder rifles had been accurate and reliably lethal to perhaps 250-300 yards, smokeless powder long arms roughly doubled – and sometimes even tripled – that distance. In World War One, French Army observers were astounded at U.S. Marine riflemen using aimed fire to take out attacking Germans advancing through the wheat fields toward them at ranges of up to 800 yards. The presence and ultimately the dominance of fast-firing field artillery, emplaced water-cooled machine guns, barbed wire, and the use of such new weapons as poisoned gas and aircraft, were seismic chances in the conduct of war as it occurred on the western front. Slaughter on an industrial scale ensued. However, the individual rifleman and his rifle was still sacrosanct in most armies of that time. Well-aimed fire was still the order of the day. It took World War Two to significantly alter the thinking of the major powers when it came to the virtues of precision riflemanship. Although institutions such as the United States Marine Corps still clung tightly to their ethos as skilled riflemen – “Every Marine is a Rifleman” – others began to notice changes in how land warfare was conducted. In particular, on the Eastern Front in the struggle between the USSR and Germany. Astute observers on both sides noticed that massed firepower was often decisive in infantry engagements. In particular, how significant a volume of fire could be brought to bear upon the enemy. Submachine guns were already well-established in many armies by this time, and they proved to be extremely effective weapons in the hands of such troops as Soviet tank riders. But SMGs were somewhat limited in range and power since they used pistol cartridges. Many – not all – machine guns were too heavy or bulky for fast-moving mobile operations. Traditional infantry rifles, though hard-hitting, long-ranged and accurate, often did not lay down enough volume of fire to prove decisive. Around the same time, observers in three nations – the USSR, Germany and the United States –… Read more »

@Georgiaboy61 : Those are all excellent points, especially the final ones. And, they give a window into what and why the *.mil keeps going around and around (in circles) for a lot of reasons. Simply put…”Sectional Density” over distance. The battle field specifies distance. So, the distance factor, as you indicate, is (sometimes) where it’s at. If we go back in time to the M96 6.5mm Swede, and then the M95 and M16 7mm Mausers that pervaded South America (and Spain) armament up to the Spanish American conflict in Cuba we see what’s going on. The Krag failed in an uphill turkey shoot for a lot of reasons (the most important of which was actually the magazine feed), one (the other) of which was the projectile and external ballistics. On the other hand the bolt 8mm Mauser in the hands of a relatively larger number of good marksmen fared well in the theater where it was deployed. Then, we have the 6.5mm JAP (0.268…wtf were they doing?) that was derived/contracted from the European thinkers (hint: Carcano/Swedes) and worked so well (over distance and **especially soft tissue**) that they adopted the very same projectile in the top fed LMGs with great success, at the expense of the 7.7mm 31-32 caliber “Americanized” projectile (meaning the Type 99). In terms of the open bolt SMGs there are quite a few differences in form/function/battlefields between something like a 9mm KP-31 Suomi and a 7.62mm PPS-43. They both have nasty cycle rates and kill real good at short distances. The “manual of arms”, or instructions given to respective gunners, however, was quite different. KP31 gunners were instructed to only use the “auto” mode in “urgent” situations. The KP31 was one of the first select-fire SMGs (absolutely amazing FCG). Not so with PPS gunners–“spray and pray”. Hand those to Serbian conscripts, give them vodka, and let them go in the snow. PPSs were mass produced to use the 7.62 30 cal Toks because they could use the same equipment to manufacture and rifle the barrels as the Mosins, and unskilled people could rivet them together in a couple of minutes and test fire them out the factory window toward the Germans outside. The KP-31s with SAKO barrels were extremely over-engineered and actually made like watches, and the gunners were issued two rapid swapable barrels that were matched at 1 MOA to the platform’s rear iron sights. (That’s right…1 MOA on a .356 bullet with 5 or so grains of semi smokeless at 100 yards). The squad KP-31s were intended to kill Soviets **working together with longer range Mosin Nagants** and also provide “meat in the pot” for the soldiers that carried them. And here get back to full circle today with all of the strange derivations of the same thing…6mm-6.5mm-6.8mms-Whatever mms for longer distances. Spray and pray pills of any size for shorter distances. What becomes more and more obvious is that the damn size of the AR magazine is a more constraining factor to the… Read more »

A quote from a posse leader in the late 1880s: “get on them sights. getting shot at don’t scare these guys.”
Only hits count.

@ Don Curtom

Re:”Trying to install expert marksmanship in the draftees of the day was getting more difficult, thus the lure of spray and pray. The thinking being if these kids can’t shoot straight, at least they can shoot a lot. Bound to hit something sooner or later.”

Undoubtedly, you are right. The quality of conscripts and volunteers joining the military was quite high, vis-a-vis FA use and handling, at the time of WWI. Most Americans came from rural backgrounds, and were already accustomed to using firearms in civilian life. That was also the case in WWII and Korea, but less so as the nation had become more urbanized. By the 1960s, many kids came of age in homes, communities and places in which they’d never been outdoors to any great extent, or even fired a gun, let alone owned one or mastered it’s use.

The armed services have adapted to this by enhancing their training and also by adapting such innovations as optical sight on long arms, such as the famous Trijicon ACOG and the Aimpoint red-dot optic. But basic skills in this area remain an issue for the modern military, especially since so many recruits are now women. The AMU or Army Marksmanship Unit has also done a great deal to enhance institutional skill and knowledge, as well as its counterparts in the other branches.

And now that warfare is being automated to such an extent, the ability to drive and operate drones and UAVs is becoming paramount.

It is also germane to note, vis-a-vis the assault rifle vs. battle rifle debate, that the massed volume of fire implied by the adoption of select-fire assault rifles is contingent upon the substantial logistical tail necessary to supply the large amounts of ammunition such a strategy entails.

Whereas the professional soldier supplied by an enormous logistical tail and manufacturing base may be able to fight in this manner, “wasting ammunition” as he saying once went, the guerilla, irregular or other less-wealthy fighter may have to adopt a more-disciplined and less-profligate approach to fire, using a precious shot only when it is assured of a hit. Or, for that matter, the professional soldier cut-off and isolated from resupply. “Shoot only when you can see the whites of their eyes, boys!” would seem to be the guiding principle.

There is a series of interviews he did and one seems to get the impression that he thought the original version was perfect. And will I would agree that the early rifles were certainly fine rifles and ahead of there time to dismiss any incremental improvements out of hand seems a bit ridiculous. Kept harping on it being light weight and any changes would ruin that, not taking into consideration the changing needs/requirements of the world. Guess that happens with most of us and our creations.

a very interesting watch as well
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaIU0nCxwGg&list=PLOSc8D2U-Hf6i9FT7ZzVpKZVDBsS6b3Ub

@ BAP45

Regarding Eugene Stoner, he was without a doubt a genius as a firearms designer and engineer. However, that is not to say without occasional biases or flaws in his thinking. In my humble opinion, he was a bit myopic in expecting the U.S. military not to tinker with the ammunition for his rifle at some point along the way, and thereby designing in sufficient robustness and flexibility to handle such deviation from his specified parameters.

Stoner and his team designed the rifle to function using a specific combination of a 55-grain FMJ .224-caliber projectile, bottleneck rifle case, primer and stick propellant. His new rifles ran like Swiss watches using this ammo – at least if historical reports are accurate: They were accurate, worked to a high degree of reliability, and ran fairly cleanly and without generating too much heat whether in single-shot or select-fire mode.

However, when the ammunition manufacturers ran short on the specific stick (extruded) propellant and substituted a ball (spherical) powder instead, which burned hotter and had a different pressure curve than the one specified originally, all sorts of problems ensued.

The fault was not Stoner’s – he did not make the change – but it caught him off-guard I think, and it should not have done so. The military and War Department had changed the 30-06 cartridge without consulting John C. Garand, from a 173-grain slug to the new 150-grain (~152-gr.) FMJ round that became M2 Ball.

When Garand found out about the proposed change, he was unhappy with it since his rifle had been optimized to work with a heavier bullet, but he adapted to the design change and so did his rifles.

It does little good to design an infantry rifle which is the military equivalent of an Italian sports car which when it works, performs fabulously, but is down for maintenance so often that it can’t be relied upon to run. Better to make it less-sexy but more-reliable, sort of like a plain-Jane Chevy sedan that starts right up every time and runs, albeit not as well as that sports car.

In the end, Stoner’s design was properly sorted out and his vision was vindicated. But it was rough-going for a while there in its first years of service in Vietnam….which is probably why so many grunts from that long-ago war hated the “black rifle” so much. Above all, an infantryman’s primary weapon has to go “bang” when he pulls the trigger. If it doesn’t – then all of its other qualities, whatever they may be, fade into relative insignificance.

I still say that the AR-18 was Stoner’s answer to the Army. A gas piston that could handle whatever crap ammo the Army came up with. Most other armies agreed and copied the system in their service rifles.