Myths About Afghanistan
Victor Davis Hanson on whether Afghanistan is really the "graveyard of empires ..."
Victor Davis Hanson on whether Afghanistan is really the "graveyard of empires ..."
Ernie Pyle's timeless wartime columns ...
No July 4 hot dogs with the Iranian Mullahs ...
Mark Steyn, U.S. sclerotic and ineffectual, declining into societal dementia ...
Nicholas Schmidle asks some hard questions about Nawaz Sharif ...
The CIA's war against President Bush was motivated by ass covering, or by political
NSA Director Keith Alexander, a three-star general, is expected to earn a fourth star when he
NSA Director Keith Alexander, a three-star general, is expected to earn a fourth star when he
Providing electronic devices for IEDs ...
Police watched from a distance and did not intervene ...
Been there, done that in the Middle East ...
Matt Sanchez - repealing DADT would be a disaster.
Too much U.S. largesse has created corruption in Afghan government.
Dan Riehl weighs in on language, thinking and security from terrorism ...
The U.S. is seeking to hire a merchant ship to deliver hundreds of tonnes of arms to Israel
Sharif brothers on Baitullah Mehsud's hit list.
No Georgian destruction of Tskhinvali, contrary to lying Russian claims.
Nuclear yield within six to twelve months.
McNeill ties length to Pakistan tribal region, likely to be protracted anyway.
Multinational force press release on Sadr City operations and seizure of weapons and munitions.
"We will fight them to the end."
War on terror not popular with Pakistani population.
U.S. presence expanding Southward in Iraq.
Its full steam ahead for Iran.
And SECDEF Gates continues to press this issue.
Pajamas Media exclusive: how your tax dollars fund terror.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary Graduate executed in Afghanistan.
Nearly 1000 dead from harshest Afghan winter in 30 years.
Attacks in Baghdad down 80% according to Iraqi Army.
Lack of appropriate defense spending a grave situation.
Olmert claims Iran still on target to construct nuclear weapon.
Promoted to Army Vice Chief of Staff. Well deserved.
Must read on Israeli Army shame and lawyer happiness with war against Hezbollah.
Libyans joining jihad in increasing numbers.
How relevant will Maliki be to Iraq's future?
Maj. Gen. Gaskin: "The positive trends are permanent."
Abizaid questions whether Maliki can bring unity to Iraq.
From the Multinational Force, more on Operation Lion Pounce.
An important ally in Iraq has been assassinated.
Israel to show Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff nuclear intelligence on Iran.
Cabinet approves proposed agreement with U.S.
Prof. Kingsley Browne on his new book.
Major General Robert Scales: "Outcome is irreversible"
Mullen says military needs larger slice of GNP to modernize.
For siding with the U.S. against al Qaeda.
Terrorist poses as bride. Ugh!
Legislation in trouble.
Al Qaeda documents discovered near Syrian border.
Shameful people jeer disabled veterans in swimming pool.
Saudi jihadist in Iraq tells his personal story.
Concerning Iranian meddling and Quds.
Michael Yon breaks bread with General Petraeus.
Ralph Peters on the advancements in Iraq.
War between al Qaeda and Hezbollah.
Traumatic brain injury not recognized.
Ballistic Sensor Fused Munition.
High intensity electronic warfare.
Iranian weapons are a sign of continued Iranian meddling in Iraq.
U.S. forces in Iraq are using a high-resolution, thermal/infrared sensor system.
Washington Post profiles AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq, or al Qaeda in Mesopotamia).
Taiwan may not be as secure as we would like to think.
Be thankful your daughter isn't be raised in Basra.
Pastor discusses rules of engagement and sacrificial U.S. deaths.
In counterinsurgency (COIN), patience is a virtue. But violence has decreased so fast in
Regarding the Battle of Wanat that has received so much attention here at TCJ, it appears as if the field grade officers involved in the planning and decision-making for the outpost have been issued career-ending reprimands.
Myer, along with two of his superior officers who were not at the battle, have received career-ending letters of reprimand for failing to prepare adequate defenses in the days leading up to the attack.
Forty-nine Americans and 24 Afghan soldiers had been ordered to set up the outpost deep in enemy territory.
It was July of 2008, and according to Sgt. David Dzwick, they were short of not just troops, but basic necessities.
“The second day we were extremely low on water,” Dzwick said. “When you start running out of water it’s very hard to continue working through the heat of the day.
Despite warnings from villagers that an attack was imminent, an unmanned surveillance drone which had been watching over the troops was diverted to a higher priority mission.
“Not having surveillance was the concern for me,” Dzwick said. “Part of the planning is that we would have some.”
The first Apache helicopters got there an hour and five minutes after the Taliban opened fire. By then, Captain Myer was the only officer still alive.
Myer can still appeal but right now he has been both decorated and reprimanded for the same battle.
I am no fan of witch hunts, and in general I think such things are destructive of any organization which implements such tactics. Furthermore, we must allow our military to be a learning institution, and if errors cannot be silently addressed, then intransigence will win the day.
Yet … the failures at Wanat are severe. We have discussed them in detail: failure to believe local intelligence, lack of timeliness in setting up the Vehicle Patrol Base (almost one year of negotiating with the local elders to obtain their approval) allowing Taliban to plan, deploy and mass forces, lack of force protection, lack of logistics, awful terrain problems with the VPB and especially Observation Post Top Side, lack of adequate forces, and so on the list goes.
But why stop at Colonel? The same kinds of expectations are still customary in other parts of Afghanistan.
BALA MURGHAB, Afghanistan — The gunfire came as no surprise, several short volleys smacking the dirt as soldiers bounded across an open field.
The U.S., Italian and Afghan soldiers were keenly aware that by venturing just a few miles south of their base, they’d crossed into enemy territory. Taking fire was almost a given.
“They always shoot at me,” Staff Sgt. Jason Holland said in mock bemusement afterward. “I like this country, but they always shoot at me.”
Since November, the men of the 82nd Airborne’s 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment have fought pitched battles in Bala Murghab to take a small bubble of key terrain in this Taliban-controlled valley in Afghanistan’s remote west.
But the mission here is hamstrung by a shortage of forces. And except for these show-of-presence patrols, that security bubble is as far as they can go until Afghan reinforcements arrive.
Insurgents sit to their north and to their south, ready at the trigger.
For the men of Company B’s second platoon, it feels like being on the front lines of the wrong war.
“We are not doing anything right now,” said Sgt. Alfred Seddon, 24, from St. Petersburg, Fla. “All we hear is we want to push south but we don’t have enough people. So why not just stay where we are and accomplish something?”
“I was excited when I heard we were doing a COIN (counterinsurgency) mission,” he added. “I thought, ‘Yeah, great, we are gonna achieve something.’ But now it feels like a facade.”
Bala Murghab is not a priority under Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s strategy of focusing on main population centers to combat the insurgency. So unlike in the south, where a new surge of U.S. forces is pouring in, the 82nd Airborne soldiers here are stretched thin, manning this valley that they like to describe as a Taliban vacation spot with a small contingent of forces and just barely enough supplies …
“This is just no man’s land crawling with Taliban, and one small platoon sitting right in the middle of it,” said Hand.
“There’s a definite line,” said Holland. “The minute you cross it, they open fire.”
While it appears that they have dealt with the terrain issues, they are ready-fodder for a massed assault. So where does the accountability end up the chain of command, and how does this get balanced with the need to be a learning institution? Expectations clearly continue to point in the direction of insufficient troops to meet the demands being placed on them.
Prior on the Battle of Wanat and Kamdesh:
Second Guessing the Battles of Wanat and Kamdesh
Taliban Tactics: Massing of Troops
Kamdesh: The Importance of Terrain
The Battle of Wanat, Massing of Troops and Attacks in Nuristan
The Contribution of the Afghan National Army in the Battle of Wanat
There are still lessons to be learned from the Battles of Wanat and Kamdesh in the Kunar and Nuristan Provinces of Afghanistan, respectively.
The Executive Summary of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the complex attack at COP Keating has been released. It begins:
On 3 October 2009, Soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry, repelled an enemy force of 300 Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) fighters, preserving their combat outpost and killing approximately 150 of the enemy fighters. US forces sustained eight killed in action and 22 wounded, all but three of whom returned to duty after the attack. The Soldiers distinguished themselves with conspicuous gallantry, courage, and bravery under the heavy enemy fire that surrounded them.
Combat Outpost (COP) Keating, originally established as a base for a Provincial Reconstruction Team in 2006, was located deep in a bowl in Nuristan Province, surrounded by high ground, with limited overwatch protection from nearby Observation Post (OP) Fritsche. The mission for COP Keating during the rotation of B Troop was unclear to the Soldiers of B Troop who understood counterinsurgency doctrine and the need to engage with and protect the local population. But owing to limited manpower and tactical reach off of the compound, the mission devolved into one of base defense and by mid-2009 there was no tactical or strategic value to holding the ground occupied by COP Keating. As a result, the chain of command decided to close the remote outpost as soon as it could. (bold added)
But while this summary hints at population-centric procedures, COP Keating was intended to patrol and oversee a stretch of Pakistani border to interdict the flow of insurgents coming into Afghanistan. By any account, being located on a transit route for insurgents brings legitimacy to the outpost. A command decision was made, however, to close the COP due to lack of proper manpower. This delay caused additional problems.
The delayed closing of COP Keating is important as it contributed to a mindset of imminent closure that served to impede improvements in force protection on the COP. There were inadequate measures taken by the chain of command, resulting in an attractive target for enemy fighters. Over time, and without raising undue concern within the US intelligence system, the enemy conducted numerous probing attacks, learning the tactics, techniques and procedures of B Troop, and pinpointing location of weapons systems and key infrastructure and material, such as generators and barracks.
Compounding the situation for the Soldiers on COP Keating, intelligence assessments became desensitized to enemy actions over several months. During the five months of B Troop’s deployment to COP Keating, the enemy launched approximately 47 attacks – three times the rate of attacks experienced by their predecessors. On several occasions intelligence reports in advance of an attack indicated there was a large enemy force that would strike, but the attack that followed generally consisted of a few number of fighters who used indirect and small arms fire for an engagement that averaged five to ten minutes in duration. Owing to this experience with the enemy in vicinity of COP Keating, the perception prevailed that reports of massing enemy forces were exaggerated and improbable.
Approximately eight months ago (and approximately four months before the attack on COP Keating at Kamdesh) I outlined in detail six different battles in Afghanistan where the Taliban has massed between 100 and 400 fighters, or close to half a Battalion size force. There is absolutely no reason to have assumed that massing of enemy forces was improbable. In fact, there is never again a reason to assume that in any engagement in Afghanistan. As for the intelligence failures, John Brookins notes of previous testimony on Capital Hill about Kamdesh:
Gen. Burgess explained in testimony to the committee that the military had three intelligence reports on the issue, but that the reports were among many human-source reports that had not been verified by other means, such as electronic intelligence. As a result, the reporting was not deemed “actionable” intelligence, said defense officials familiar with the testimony. We don’t trust our human intelligence people to make a call. We rely way too much on sigint more than anything. If it’s not in a signal some don’t think it’s real. It’s as if someone can’t lie over the radio or phone.
Recalling our analysis of the Wanat engagement, intelligence failed the 2nd Platoon, Chosen Company by ignoring the signs of an imminent attack by massed Taliban forces. The Vehicle Patrol Base (COP) Kahler was located in low terrain, and worse still, the insufficient force protection at Observation Post Top Side took eight of the nine who perished that fateful night (including Soldiers who attempted relief of Top Side). The video below (from approximately 1:00 to approximately 2:00) shows the terrain and natural features of the location at Wanat.
Military Historian Douglas R. Cubbison has written an extensive and smart study of the Wanat engagement, and provides some useful insight into the circumstances surrounding the battle. But as smart as his study is, I diverged from his conclusions when he pointed towards the lack of nonkinetic engagement with the population as a significant contributor to the failure at Wanat. Rather, I see this counsel being implemented at a different phase of the campaign for Eastern Afghanistan, with the problems being more directly related to combat tactics. Marine officer and commenter Slab noted of my remarks concerning terrain:
The platoon in Wanat sacrificed control of the key terrain in the area in order to locate closer to the population. This was a significant risk, and I don’t see any indication that they attempted to sufficiently mitigate that risk. I can empathize a little bit – I was the first Marine on deck at Camp Blessing back when it was still Firebase Catamount, in late 2003. I took responsibility for the camp’s security from a platoon from the 10th Mountain Div, and established a perimeter defense around it. Looking back, I don’t think I adequately controlled the key terrain around the camp. The platoon that replaced me took some steps to correct that, and I think it played a significant role when they were attacked on March 22nd of 2004. COIN theorists love to say that the population is the key terrain, but I think Wanat shows that ignoring the existing natural terrain in favor of the population is a risky proposition, especially in Afghanistan.
COP Keating at Kamdesh suffered from the same sort of force protection and terrain problems. The best video I have found of COP Keating has been removed, but another useful one can be seen below (the video is obviously being taken from Observation Post Fritsche.
This is an issue for all such Combat Outposts in this part of Afghanistan.
Combat Outpost Michigan, Kunar Province, Afghanistan
The full AR 15-6 apparently found that a series of command errors occurred at COP Keating. There is a larger push to hold field grade officers accountable for these kinds of tactical errors.
The military does not release figures on disciplinary actions taken against field commanders. But officials familiar with recent investigations said letters of reprimand or other disciplinary action have been recommended for officers involved in three ambushes in which U.S. troops battled Taliban forces in remote villages in 2008 and 2009. Such administrative actions can scuttle chances for promotion and end a career if they are made part of an officer’s permanent personnel file.
The investigations are a departure for the U.S. military, which until recently has been reluctant to second-guess commanders whose decisions might have played a role in the deaths of soldiers in enemy action. Disciplinary action has been more common in cases in which U.S. troops have injured or killed civilians.
In response to the recent reprimands, some military officials have argued that casualties are inevitable in war and that a culture of excessive investigations could make officers risk-averse.
“This is a war where the other side is trying, too,” said one Army officer who commanded troops in Afghanistan and requested anonymity in order to speak freely.
As many as five battlefield commanders have received letters of reprimand in the past month or have been the subject of an investigation by a general who recommended disciplinary action. A sixth commander received a less-severe formal letter of admonishment. None of the investigations or letters of reprimand has been released publicly.
Regarding COP Keating, leaving Soldiers garrisoned at an ill-defended outpost that (contrary to claims, did serve a purpose) is intended to be abandoned is a huge error in judgment and points to inept logistics and planning. Regarding COP Kahler, poor terrain, poor force protection, poor intelligence and a delay of almost 12 months (allowing the Taliban to do their own intelligence work and mass forces) again points to horrible errors in judgment. But the idea of using smaller, less defended Combat Outposts to put Soldiers and Marines more in touch with the population comes from counterinsurgency doctrine, and it is here that the failure is occurring.
When a particular location has not been subjected to intensive kinetics to place the insurgents on the defensive and reduce their influence and power, it is naive to plan population-centric tactics and procedures. We are attempting to employ the later phases of the campaign in earlier phases (contrary to the claims of the certainly still grieving David Brostrom, father of 1st Lt. Jonathan Brostrom). Counterinsurgency is being practiced absent a conventional mindset, leading to poor force protection. We can wish for the utmost in contact with the population. But winning hearts and minds won’t work unless and until the insurgents’ control over their hearts and minds is challenged with kinetics. The enemy is certainly telling us that when they can mass forces of nearly half a Battalion against platoon size U.S. forces. The population has no reason to side with the U.S. when the Taliban are stronger.
Four important lessons can be learned from the deadly engagements at Wanat and Kamdesh. First, terrain is of critical importance to far flung Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts in the rugged, mountainous regions of Afghanistan (or anywhere else there is undulating terrain). Second, the Taliban have shown the propensity and capability to mass troops to near half a Battalion size force. The proper force protection must be planned and implemented to prepare for such engagements. Third, as a corollary to the second, FOBs and COPs must be properly manned with U.S. combat forces to accomplish the mission. Thus far, U.S. command has demonstrated a predilection to underestimate proper manning of smaller outposts. Fourth, our intelligence apparatus has shown a predilection to intransigence. The response time and sensitivity of our intelligence must improve or more lives will be lost due to inept analysis.
Prior:
Systemic Defense Intelligence Failures
Taliban Tactics: Massing of Troops
Kamdesh: The Importance of Terrain
The Battle of Wanat, Massing of Troops and Attacks in Nuristan
The Contribution of the Afghan National Army in the Battle of Wanat
From Stars and Stripes, we are headed back to the Waigal Valley, Nuristan and Kunar Provinces.
The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment is heading back to the same region where it took part in the Army’s deadliest battle in Afghanistan.
While the rest of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team is heading to Logar and Wardak provinces for its upcoming deployment, the 2-503rd will be assigned to the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, said Maj. Thomas Gilleran, 173rd public affairs officer.
The 4th Brigade Combat Team is serving in Kunar province, the same region where the 2-503rd served in 2007-2008.
During its 14-month tour, “The Rock,” as the unit is known, engaged in hundreds of contacts with enemy forces, including the battle of Wanat, in which hundreds of insurgents attacked a small, remote Army outpost. In the hours-long battle, nine 2-503rd soldiers were killed and more than two dozen were wounded.
The region is still volatile.
Since the beginning of October, 12 soldiers assigned to the 4th Brigade Combat Team have died, including eight who were killed Oct. 3 in Kamdesh district in an attack similar to the one at Wanat.
Kamdesh is in Nuristan province and northeast of Wanat. Kamdesh is one of a collection of isolated valleys near northeastern Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan where U.S. troops have faced fierce resistance in recent years. Military and outside analysts have described the insurgency in northeast Afghanistan as a hybrid of local, tribally based fighters loosely allied with the Taliban and other insurgent networks. The military initially ascribed the Kamdesh attack to tribal militias but later blamed the Taliban.
Battalion leaders confirmed the 2-503rd’s upcoming assignment.
The Captain’s Journal will follow this deployment. Let’s hope that we have learned the many lessons of Wanat and Kamdesh – controlling the high ground, sufficient logistics, properly resourced and manned deployments, adequate force projection, taking the initiative concerning the population instead of waiting for their approval, adequate force protection, and so on. This is a chance to prove that we have.
Prior: Battle of Wanat category, Kamdesh catetory
In Wanat Video we saw from the U.S. perspective what the Battle of Wanat looked like, especially from the air. Courtesy of the NEFA Foundation, ABC News aired a video of the battle from the perspective of the Taliban. Taliban commander Maulvi Mandibula claims to have orchestrated the attack, but there some significant propaganda in this video. He claims that the locals “tipped off” the Taliban to the location of VPB Wanat.
This makes it sound like an ad hoc operation by the Taliban. In reality, the U.S. had planned VPB Wanat for approximately one year and the Taliban began massing troops long before the fight. As to the locals tipping off the Taliban, maybe. Perhaps they did long before the attack, since it’s obvious that they began massing troops weeks and even months before the fight.
But locals also warned U.S. troops that a Taliban attack was imminent. The Taliban listened to the locals – while we did not. Finally, there is some inaccuracy in the ABC report. The estimate of 150 Taliban fighters is low, and better estimates point to 200 – 250 fighters. Take note of the specifics of the fight that can be gleaned from the video (poor choice of terrain, initiation of the fight in hours of darkness, etc.). It isn’t often that one can get as much information on a single battle as we now have on Wanat. The first video combined with this one, along with the written accounts, add much to our stable of knowledge on the conditions and choices leading up to that fateful morning. The ABC News commentary accompanying the video adds little to nothing.
Prior:
The Battle of Wanat, Massing of Troops and Attacks in Nuristan
The Contribution of the Afghan National Army in the Battle of Wanat
CBS News has come into possession of video taken before and after the Battle of Wanat that in my opinion adds a significant amount to our understanding of the physical circumstances and surrounding terrain of the outpost. It also contains an interview with Sergeant David Dzwik and David Brostrom, Jonathan Brostrom’s father.
David Brostrom cogently questions the tactics (i.e., he questions the heavy kinetics as does the Cubbison report), but I seriously doubt whether he is correct in saying that “you just lost that village.” Protecting the population meant heavy kinetics early on in the campaign for Anbar (and even later in 2007), and it certainly meant having more troops than they had at Wanat.
In fact, this sad story is a testimony to silly, religiously-held counterinsurgency doctrine and what it can mean to a campaign. The notion that deploying a platoon of Soldiers amongst hundreds of Taliban will invite anything other than heavy kinetics is absurd. It certainly won’t invite the confidence of the population.
Prior: Battle of Wanat category
Prev | List | Random | Next · Join Powered by RingSurf! |