Myths About Afghanistan
Victor Davis Hanson on whether Afghanistan is really the "graveyard of empires ..."
CBS News has come into possession of video taken before and after the Battle of Wanat that in my opinion adds a significant amount to our understanding of the physical circumstances and surrounding terrain of the outpost. It also contains an interview with Sergeant David Dzwik and David Brostrom, Jonathan Brostrom’s father.
David Brostrom cogently questions the tactics (i.e., he questions the heavy kinetics as does the Cubbison report), but I seriously doubt whether he is correct in saying that “you just lost that village.” Protecting the population meant heavy kinetics early on in the campaign for Anbar (and even later in 2007), and it certainly meant having more troops than they had at Wanat.
In fact, this sad story is a testimony to silly, religiously-held counterinsurgency doctrine and what it can mean to a campaign. The notion that deploying a platoon of Soldiers amongst hundreds of Taliban will invite anything other than heavy kinetics is absurd. It certainly won’t invite the confidence of the population.
Prior: Battle of Wanat category
On October 7, 2009 at 9:08 am, Warbucks said:
The video clarifies (a) surveillance was withdrawn to a “higher priority” (b) air support took 1 hour and 5 minutes to arrive on scene. (c) and this is significant… our forces were “one platoon short” of manpower according to the good Sargent, manpower that would have been dispatched into the upper terrain to cover the high ground.
On October 7, 2009 at 9:19 am, Herschel Smith said:
Well, that’s all true, but these things only compound the problem. Due to terrain this VPB should never have been there to begin with. A better location should have been selected.
I consider them to have been more than a Platoon short. They needed several companies to do the job they were sent to do (minimum) plus open roads and/or good air logistics and support.