An interesting report from the WSJ (h/t Spencer Ackerman):

“How many people do you bring in before the Afghans say, ‘You’re acting like the Russians’?” said one senior military official, referring to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. “That’s the big debate going on in the headquarters right now.”

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said publicly during his campaign for the approaching Aug. 20 elections that he wants to negotiate new agreements giving the Afghan government more control over the conduct of the foreign troops currently in the country.

Gen. McChrystal, however, says too many troops aren’t a concern. “I think it’s what you do, not how many you are. It’s how the force conducts itself.”

Regardless of how he resolves the internal debate on troop numbers, Gen. McChrystal’s coming report won’t include any specific requests for more U.S. troops. Those numbers would instead be detailed in a follow-on document that is set to be delivered to Washington a few weeks after the assessment.

The timing of Gen. McChrystal’s primary assessment remains in flux. It was initially due in mid-August, but the commander was summoned to a secret meeting in Belgium last week with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and told to take more time. Military officials say the assessment will now be released sometime after the Aug. 20 vote.

The shift came amid signs of growing U.S. unease about the direction of the war effort. Initial assessments delivered to Gen. McChrystal last month warned that the Taliban were strengthening their control over Kandahar, the largest city in southern Afghanistan.

American forces have been waging a major offensive in the neighboring southern province of Helmand, the center of Afghanistan’s drug trade. Some U.S. military officials believe the Taliban have taken advantage of the American preoccupation with Helmand to infiltrate Kandahar and set up shadow local governments and courts throughout the city.

“Helmand is a sideshow,” said the senior military official briefed on the analysis. “Kandahar is the capital of the south [and] that’s why they want it.”

First of all let’s deal with this issue of acting like Russians with too many troops.  If this debate is actually “going on in headquarters right now,” wherever headquarters is (the report doesn’t say – CENTCOM, the Pentagon, Kabul, Kandahar Air Field, etc.), whomever is in charge should tell the boys to get back to work and quit wasting time.  We won’t be acting like the Russians unless we cloister in the cities, refuse to engage the countryside, turn over the road to the Taliban, fail to beat the Taliban in fire fights, and fail to provide the population security.  More troops will get us further away from being like the Russians, not more like them.  Such childish debates are a sign of a military establishment which refuses to tell the administration the truth.

Second, Spencer Ackerman responds by saying:

“Helmand is a sideshow,” said the senior military official briefed on the analysis. “Kandahar is the capital of the south [and] that’s why they want it.”

That’s your Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment right there. We sent thousands of Marines to a sideshow? Thousands of Marines, a meager complement of civilians, and barely any Afghan capacity? For a sideshow? A place McChrystal recently called a “critical area“? The general tells Dreazen and Spiegel that Helmand was, in fact, critical to focus on first, in order to disrupt the opium trade in the province that helps bankroll the Taliban. But then how could any halfway-responsible military official come away thinking that Helmand is a sideshow?

Perhaps even more alarming is this analysis:

Some U.S. military officials believe the Taliban have taken advantage of the American preoccupation with Helmand to infiltrate Kandahar and set up shadow local governments and courts throughout the city.

To begin with, this kind of comment (“Helmand is a sideshow) is profoundly insulting and troubling to parents, spouses and loved ones of Marines who are fighting in the Helmand Province.  So it’s simply inappropriate to let such loose words slip from the tongue.  “Anonymous” sources are cowards who like to see their words in print, but the words of these cowards sometimes hurt.  As for the issue of allowing the Taliban to come in and set up a shadow government, they have already had that in Kandahar for over a year.

More troops are needed, and taking them away from Helmand is not the answer.  To be sure, allowing the Taliban to come into an urban area and go uncontested is poor strategy, but this strategy calls for a stronger force.  Given the problem of Kandahar v. Helmand, the stupid argument over force size and being like the Russians sounds rather adolescent, doesn’t it?

Continuing, is Helmand really a side show?

The Helmand Province is the home of the indigenous insurgency, the Afghanistan Taliban, and its capital is Lashkar Gah.  Without hitting the Taliban’s recruiting grounds, fund raising and revenue development, training grounds, and logistical supply lines, the campaign cannot be won.  Focusing on the population centers is a loser strategy, doomed to sure failure.  Controlling the cities as some sort of prison while the roads are all controlled by Taliban is just what the Russians did, only to withdraw in ignominy.  The Marines are in Helmand because just like Anbar, Iraq at the time, it is the worst place on earth.

Yochi J. Dreazen and Peter Spiegel wrote an interesting article, but it is badly flawed because they got poor contacts and resources.  Even if Kandahar is of interest, taking and securing it will be but a temporary notch in our belts unless the insurgency is defeated in his own back yard.  Helmand is his back yard.

Prior: Operation Khanjar category

U.S. Marines with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, RCT 2nd Battalion 8th Marines Echo Co. move into position while they were under enemy fire on July 17, 2009 in Mian Poshteh, Afghanistan.

There is now not even a hint of an effort to make the narrative on Afghanistan consistent.  From the AP:

President Barack Obama’s national security adviser did not rule adding more U.S. forces in Afghanistan to help turn around a war that he said on Sunday is not now in crisis.

James Jones, a retired Marine general with experience in Afghanistan, said the United States will know “by the end of next year” whether the revamped war plan Obama announced in March is taking hold.

The administration is redefining how it will measure progress, with new benchmarks that reflect a redrawn strategy. An outline is expected next month.

Making the rounds of the Sunday talk shows, Jones did little to dispel the growing expectation that Obama soon will be asked to supplement the 21,000 additional forces he already approved for Afghanistan this year.

“We won’t rule anything out,” but the new strategy is too fresh for a full evaluation, Jones said.

“If things come up where we need to adjust one way or the other, and it involves troops or it involves more incentives … for economic development or better assistance to help the Afghan government function, we’ll do that.”

The Obama plan is supposed to combine a more vigorous military campaign against the Taliban with a commitment to protect Afghan civilians and starve the insurgents of sanctuary and popular support. It envisions a large development effort led by civilians, which has not fully happened, and a rapid expansion of the Afghan armed forces to eventually take over responsibility for security.

“If we can get that done … we will know that fairly quickly,” Jones said.

The system to measure progress is several weeks from completion. It reflects creeping congressional skepticism about the war and its costs. The United States has spent more than $220 billion since the U.S.-led invasion of 2001, plus billions for more toward aid and development projects. By the United States’ own admission, much of the aid money was wasted.

Members of the House Appropriations Committee wrote recently that they are worried about “the prospects for an open-ended U.S. commitment to bring stability to a country that has a decades-long history of successfully rebuffing foreign military intervention and attempts to influence internal politics.”

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said Sunday he does not know how Congress would react to a new request for additional troops.

“It depends on what the facts and the arguments are,” said Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich. “It depends what our commanders in the field say. It depends also I think in part what our NATO allies are willing to do.”

So to summarize, the strategy involves a few more troops and a lot of civilian NGOs, these civilians not having been deployed yet because it’s too dangerous since there is little to no security, but we will know fairly quickly if this strategy works, er … um, that is, within 18 months.  There may be more troops and if so we’ll provide them, but the White House is going to have a fit if the Generals ask for more troops.

Well, there you have it.  But if Jim Jones is a stooge and a fool, Carl Levin is a liar.  The commanders in the field have already said they are light on troops and need more.  Brigadier General Nicholson has said that he doesn’t have enough forces to go everywhere, counterinsurgency-speak for “the insurgents will be left to run amok in various places.”

If lives and the existence of a transnational religiously-based insurgency weren’t at stake it would make for great theater.

Prior:

Mullen Pops Jones in the Back of the Head

Calling on National Security Advisor James L. Jones to Resign

Vampire 06 blogging at Afghanistan Shrugged has an important account of a recent engagement that provides a good barometer for the way business is being conducted in Afghanistan.

The sweat under my IBA and in my ACUs is starting to freeze, I can feel it against my skin.  I’m wishing right now that I’d put on some long underwear before we’d come out here, it’s too late for that now.  Currently, we’re holding about 200 meters short of the target khalat, it’s aprox 2330. The moon has finally risen giving us better illumination than when we started this about 4 hours ago.

In this shallow wadi are a platoon of US infantry, a company of ANA infantry.  We’re watching the khalat from a defilade position waiting for the ANP, Afghan National Police., who are making their way across about 400 meters of plowed fields.  As soon as they get here we’re going to jump off on the last stage of this operation.

In a small cluster are the US platoon sgt, Kandak Commander, one of my captains and me.  As we talk in hushed whispers about how we’re going to move up this khalat and search it, we each look like something out of a scifi movie.  All of the US personnel have night vision monocoles on giving one eye the green hue of night vision and the other peering into the Afghan darkness.  My ANA counterpart has no night vision, thus we have to describe things to him through the terp and then try to show him by having him look through our night vision device (NVD).

The ANP come stumbling across the field and reach our position.  We brief them on what we’re going to do, make sure they understand and get ready to move.

“Everyone ready”? I ask

“Roger” replies the platoon sgt

“Seis” say the afghans, meaning yes.

“Alright lets move”, and we begin to push forward on line toward the target building

Four hours earlier this mission started because the TOC observed four suspected ACM about 700 meters north of our FOB through a thermal site.  The ACM were located behind a wall near some woodpiles just outside the bizzare area.  We’ve taken serveral rockets from this location in the last three days.  We gathered in the TOC and discussed our course of action.  We think we’re about to get the guys that have shooting at us.

Our joint decision is that the ETTs will move to the bizzare mounted in vehicles and then dismount, clearing through these woodpiles; catching or killing these guys.  The US forces will move to a support by fire position to our east and cover our dismounted movement.  The end of the wall the ACM are hinding behind is the ANA limit of advance, beyond the end of that wall is an open field extending for several hundred meters.  So, if the ANA and ETTs don’t get the bad guys, they’ll be forced to move out into the open field for the US forces to get them.

The ANA have no night vision capabilty, so a key piece of this plan is that the US will fire illumination rounds via 60 milimeter mortars once we dismount allowing the ANA to see as we move through the woodpiles.  All of the ETTs have night vision.

Sounds great, we’re going whack these guys that have been trying to kill us for three days.  Yeah Team!!

We roll out and as we move an F-15 comes on station, with rover capability.  Our plans demise has now arrived.  Rover is a feed that allows TOCs on the ground to see what’s the plane is observing via digital link.  One of the TOCs getting this feed is the battalion headquarters for the US forces. This TOC is located about 100 miles from us.

The ANA reach the dismount point and we all get out, prepping to move through the wood piles.  These piles could hide anythig, giant stacks with limbs and logs sticking out everywhere, trying to see a person in this is going to difficult at best.  Once we’re all ready I call for the illumination rounds.

DENIED!  Because the battalion commander 100 miles away thinks it’s to dangerous.  His concern is that the canister that the illum round is in will land on a khalat in the area, this canister weighs about 8 pounds.  Disregard the fact that without this illum the ANA can’t see anything.  8 pounds hitting a house or us not being able to see?  I’m coming down on the side of us being able to see the enemy.

I call for the illum round again.  DENIED!  What the…?  This guy is 100 miles away and making decisions that should be made by us on the ground, we’re the ones closing with the enemy.  I guess empowering subordinates and letting ground commanders make the call isn’t taught anymore.

We now have a serious problem.  The ANA can’t see but the ETTs can, guess we’ll now have to move in front of the ANA clearing through the piles of wood.  So that’s what we do.  The ETTs get in front and start moving forward.  There are about 50 of us in this position and only four of us can see anything.

Later review of a videotape from the thermal site will show that as we move through; we come within about 100 meters of the enemy before they pick up and run into the open field.  With the illum we would have had these guys dead to rights and either captured or killed them.   We can’t see that far without illumination, but we didn’t hit a house with an 8 pound canister.  Justice is served!  I feel better about myself already.  100 miles must give some other perspective I’m missing.  I can barely see 50 feet.

We reach the limit of our advance.  The F-15 is back on station and says he’s seen the ACM run to a house which he’s illuminating with an IR laser.  I can see the laser coming out of the sky, but I can’t see any backscatter off the traget meaning it’s pretty damn far away from where I’m holding.  These bad guys must be on roids because they ran about 5 kilometers in roughly 10 minutes.  Afghanistan has a bright olympic future with these guys.

After holding here for another 10 minutes we decide to remount the vehicles and move to the target house the aircraft  spotted.  We still have no illumination and the ANA are stumbling around in the dark trying to get back to their vehicles.  Their pissed, I’m pissed but not as pissed as I’ll be when I see the video and how close we were originally.  I still haven’t told the ANA how close we were.

Finally after much cussing in Dari and English we get back to the vehicles and move out to the target.  As we drive, I think to myself, there is no way they ran this far, no way.

Now we’re moving toward the target house.  My clothes are freezing to me and the ANA can see a little bit more due to the moonlight.  We get a radio call to hold short again.

The 100 mile commander has called on the radio trying to telling us how the ANA/ANP are supposed to search the house and what they can and cannot do.  Who the hell is this guy?  He’s telling the armed forces and police of a sovereign nation what they can do in their own country.  He’s not even here on the ground and this is now an Afghan operation.  He must have missed the part about Afghanistan being it’s own country.

We give him the infamous, “Yeah Roger” and start moving again.  I’m amazed and galled by this guys audacity.  He’s a battalion commander, so what, I’m standing in a field in the cold and dark with an Afghan Battalion Commander.  He’s running the show and oh by the way we don’t even think this is the right house.  But 100 mile is telling us it is.  Good God!

We knock on the door and after some time an Afghan farmer answers the door, he’s been asleep.  The ANA/ANP search despite the direction of 100 mile and we don’t find jack.  No duh, it’s three miles away from where this all started.  Luckily at this point we don’t know how close we were to getting these dudes.

The ANA, ANP, US and ETTs trudge back across the field to our vehicles.  Defeated not by the ACM but our own commanders.

Tim Lynch of Free Range International makes the following observation.

You cannot successfully deploy little detachments of infantry in a large geographical space and expect them to fight and behave within the frame work of their commanders intent unless they know their commander trusts them to do the job.  The commander can tell them he trusts them all he wants but actions speak louder than words.  If he insists on micro managing units when they are in contact the message he is sending is “I do not trust you and do not think you will make the right calls in combat.”  The first step towards being able to fight a proper counterinsurgency is to deploy units in the field whom you trust and do not micromanage.  There is no other way and I do not care how many Colonels in Bagram tell you differently using all sorts of anecdotal stories to illustrate why they are compelled to control fights from on high. In the counterinsurgency fight  junior leaders have got to be left alone to do what junior leaders are supposed to do – fight when they have to and figure out how help the local population when they are not fighting.

Analysis & Commentary

I hope that Vampire 06 keeps on blogging, and I know that Tim Lynch will.  Along with Michael Yon, they are must-reads for the person who wishes to understand what’s going on in Afghanistan.  While not ostensibly oriented towards ROE, the report by Vampire 06 and Tim’s comments fairly well summarizes the problems that I have had with the rules of engagement – both standing and local – ever since I have been covering and commenting on this issue.

First, every actuarial or practitioner of probabilistic risk analysis knows what risk is.  Quite simply, it is the product of probability and consequences:

Risk = P X C

When evaluated this way, each evolution or sequence may then be evaluated against another to assess relative risk between options, or designs, or situations, or circumstances.  There is of course a risk associated with wanton destruction in a counterinsurgency campaign, that being that the rate of creation of insurgents is greater than the rate of destruction of insurgents.  Yet upon General McChrystal’s implementation of his recent tactical directive which essentially changed the ROE for Afghanistan, some old warriors claimed that the net result of such a change would probably be more, not fewer, civilian casualties.

The tension is in tactical versus strategic concerns, and it’s foolish to believe that this is an easy balancing act, or that only one choice involves risk.  McChrystal’s new tactical directive which prohibits firing upon buildings or other locations (especially with the use of air power) if it is possible that noncombatants could be harmed is at least prima facie in the strategic interests of the campaign.  Yet this same directive has caused Marines in Helmand to refuse to engage certain buildings with direct fires, the end result being that Taliban fighters later escaped.  These same Taliban fighters will likely cause various distress to the local population, and may be involved in the development or emplacement of roadside bombs which will blow the legs off of Marines.  Assessment of risk only in terms of immediate danger to the population ignores the very real risk from the affect of prolonged operations with Taliban fighters who know that they can hop into any available domicile for protection against U.S. fires.

Second, the proceduralization of rules and tactical directives tends to press decision-making upwards in the organization.  It invariably involves lawyers who have deployed with their assigned units, or at least staff level officers who have been trained by the lawyers.  It’s an attempt to convert war into a clinical, riskless enterprise, with success depending more on risk-free deployments for staff level officers than on-the-ground results.

One thing that separates Western Armies (and in particular the U.S.) from the balance of the world is not only the strong officer corps, but more specifically the strong non-commissioned officer corps.  Decision making should be pushed downward in the organization rather than upward.  The people best suited to balance the tactical versus the strategic concerns are those who are in the field doing the hard work of counterinsurgency.  The preferred model is training, education, assistance and especially trust, rather than regulations, rules, lawyers and staff officer decisions 100 miles away.

Vampire 06 is fully capable of performing the risk calculations without help from superiors.  He, like all field grade officers, does this intuitively and on the fly.  The goal is balanced risk, but we must reject the notion that we can eliminate all consequences in war.  There is no such thing as riskless war.

Prior:

Follow and Kill Every Single Taliban

More on ROE in Afghanistan: Refusing the Chase

Concluding Thoughts on Afghanistan ROE Modifications

Afghanistan Rules of Engagement Redux

Update on ROE Changes for Afghanistan

Changes to Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan

Recon by Fire

Rules of Engagement Category

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From Bloomberg:

President Barack Obama and top U.S. military commanders are being pressed by senators and civilian advisers to more than double the size of Afghan security forces, a move that would cost billions of dollars.

In letters and face-to-face meetings, the lawmakers and the advisers have urged Obama, National Security Advisor Jim Jones and the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan to boost the Afghan National Army and police from current levels of 175,000 to at least 400,000.

“Any further postponement” of a decision to support a surge in Afghan forces will hamper U.S. efforts to quell an insurgency in its eighth year, Senators Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, and Carl Levin, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, wrote to the White House in a July 21 letter obtained by Bloomberg News.

General Stanley McChrystal, the new U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, will recommend a speedier expansion of Afghan forces beyond current targets in an assessment he will give within a month to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, according to a senior military official familiar with the review.

McChrystal’s report won’t propose how many additional U.S. or NATO troops may be needed to train those Afghan forces or to boost the U.S. fighting effort, the official said, adding that any discussion of U.S. and NATO troop strength will come later.

U.S. intelligence agencies, in a document submitted to the Senate Intelligence Committee April 24, estimated the Afghan Army alone would need to grow to 325,000 — more than triple its current strength — to mount an effective counterinsurgency.

We’ve seen all of this before.  In Iraq instead of targeting the insurgency the way it should have been in 2004 and 2005, we increased the size of the ISF and stated that we would “stand down when they stood up” (excepting the Marines in Anbar who were in a bloody counterinsurgency operation beginning in 2004).  It wouldn’t have mattered if we had increased the size of the ISF to a million troops.    With incompetence, sectarianism and desertion, it would be (and will continue to be) a long time before the ISF is a legitimate armed forces on par with the balance of the nations of the world.

A brief rundown of the problems include a culture of entitlement, culture of dishonesty, mistrust and corruption that seems to dominate the Middle East and Central Asia.  This manifests itself in an officer corps that lords it over the enlisted ranks and the lack of a viable NCO corps (see Norvelle B. De Atkine, Why Arabs Lose Wars and Concerning the Importance of NCOs).  In Afghanistan the problems appear to be even worse, with lack of a nationalistic infrastructure or culture, drug addiction, and corruption so bad that it makes the population prefer Taliban rule to the Afghan National Police.

Dr. John Nagl, no more than about six months ago, advocated approximately 600,000 troops for Afghanistan.  When CNAS (which is advising the Obama administration) released its study on Afghanistan, it became obvious that they had dropped their advocacy for large additions of U.S. troops to Afghanistan.  Instead, it now appears that the plan is to increase the total force to around 600,000 by rapidly increasing the size of the ANA and ANP.

For the record, while we have advocated larger U.S. troop additions for Afghanistan (and also did so before it was popular for Iraq), The Captain’s Journal has never believed that defeat of the insurgency in Afghanistan would require 600,000 troops, and certainly won’t require 400,000 Afghan Security Forces.  We’re pushing numbers when we should be pushing quality.  There is even question whether Afghanistan can support a national security force which requires half of its GDP.

As troop strength gradually decreases in Iraq, it will need to be increased in Afghanistan, perhaps as high as 125,000 troops or even more (at least twice the current U.S. force size), and certainly better supplied with logistics and helicopters.  But the goal should be a smaller Afghan Security Force than 400,000 troops, vetted, free of drug addiction, well trained, and disciplined to fight rather than run away from the Taliban.  Such a force would make quick work of the Taliban.  But developing this force is long term work, requiring taking and holding terrain, both physical and human.  As General Petraeus said, Afghanistan will be the longest campaign of the long war, and in order to bring it to an acceptable conclusion, the Obama administration must begin to see it that way rather than searching for a rapid exit strategy.

Prior on the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police:

The Contribution of the Afghan National Army in the Battle of Wanat

Concerning that Robust Afghan National Security Force

The Marines Must Hold Helmand

The Sorry State of the Afghan National Police

Where is the Afghan National Army?

Afghan National Army in Operation Khanjar – Or Not

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During the Battle of Wanat, nine U.S. Soldiers perished and twenty seven were wounded, while no Afghan National Army troops died and five were wounded.  This metric needs clarification, in that eight of the nine who perished that fateful night did so either defending or attempting to relieve Observation Post Top Side.  But further clarification of this metric shows us that the ANA troops apparently wouldn’t have been assigned to OP Top Side anyway specifically because of qualifications and reliability.  Additionally, the wounded were mainly applicable to COP Kahler, the main base at VPB Wanat.  The ratio of U.S. to ANA wounded is an instructive metric.

All over Afghanistan, First Lieutenants and Captains are assessing the reliability of the ANA troops with whom they patrol and fight.  This is a daily affair, and occurs through anecdotal evidence, via collaboration with fellow officers, and by various other means.  The model of understanding developed by these officers can be amended by other data points, and thus the model is a learning and evolving model as it should be.

The model The Captain’s Journal has developed thus far takes a fairly dim view of the capabilities and reliability of ANA troops thus far.  On the whole they have not performed well.  This doesn’t impugn all of the troops, but of course metrics don’t do that; they are normative and broadly applicable to general  questions.

This model has apparently been fairly consistent with the witness of the officers – both commissioned and NCOs – involved in the battle of Wanat.  First, 1 Lt. Brostrom weighs in on how he saw the ANA, stating that the ANA he was taking with him he considered not to count towards combat power.  Next, the NCOs and enlisted men weigh in (unpublished study).

… the ANA Company remained in their fighting positions, in the middle of the COP, and to the south at the southernmost TCP.  Numerous Chosen Company soldiers complained of their inactivity. One soldier with the 1st Squad TCP claimed that: “The ANA had fled from their position.”   Another Sergeant stated, “I also remember ANA not shooting that much and never leaving their foxholes.”  Sergeant _____ was not professionally impressed with the ANA performance:

They never got out of their holes. They only had four wounded, which tells me that the enemy directed their fire at the Americans, not the Afghans. The Afghans sprayed and prayed. That’s about it. To be honest, though, it was more than I expected. The other numerous occasions I’ve been on with Afghan soldiers as our backup, they ran.

Sergeant _______ summed up what most of the Chosen soldiers felt, “they were still pretty much totally useless.”

The ratio of U.S. to ANA wounded doesn’t prove the point concerning ANA reliability and viability, but it is yet another data point that confirms the suspicions and fails to change or challenge the model of the ANA as highly problematic as an independent fighting force, or even a reliable embedded fighting force.

Prior:

Investigating the Battle of Wanat

Analysis of the Battle of Wanat

Battle of Wanat Disputed?

Michael Yon weighs in on ROE in Afghanistan.

I’ve witnessed too many missions (several in the last week) wherein British or Americans refused to fire because they could not positively spot a weapon, despite it being flagrantly obvious that we were tracking actual enemies.  It’s very frustrating for me at times because I want to say to an American or British commander…Take the shot!  This is too obvious! But that is not the place of a writer.  The strategic wisdom behind the Rules of Engagement can be difficult to contest, though tactically, those same ROE can be fantastically frustrating.  Tactically, the restrictive ROE endanger our troops every day, but strategically there is no doubt that strong ROE save the lives of even more.

Ah, and that’s the question, isn’t it?  In the end, which contributes the most towards conclusion of the campaign and the safest prosecution of the effort?  I have exchanged e-mail with Michael about this, respectfully of course, since I so admire Michael and his work.

The tension is between tactical interests and strategic interests.  I will not divulge the situation or the sources, but I know of instances in which I would differ with the conclusion that the strategic interests were served with a less robust ROE.  I have detailed a more public instance of robust ROE before, and noted that lack of this approach might have led in the end to more Marine casualties.

But since the tactical directive has been issued by General McChrystal, it may be moot to debate the point.  Let’s move ahead to unintended consequences.  Lack of more robust ROE has even recently caused Taliban fighters to escape from buildings because it could not be demonstrated that there were no noncombatants.  Yet lack of logistical support with helicopters, along with doctrinal reticence concerning distributed operations in the Marine Corps, cause the inability (or refusal) to pursue escaping Taliban.

Yet later, we are told by local Afghans that the Marines should follow and kill every single Taliban.

“It is still just the beginning,” said Mullah Shin Gul from Nad Ali district. “The Americans need to begin reconstruction, by agreement with the people. They should establish centers here in the districts, and they should follow every single Taliban and kill him. In a short while it will be too late. The people will lose trust.”

ROE is a situation specific issue, and no one set of ROE is most efficiently applied in every situation.  Perhaps it’s advantageous to implement the specific tactical directive that McChrystal has given us in Afghanistan.  Perhaps.  Time will tell.  But what is clear at this juncture is that there aren’t enough troops or logistical assets to conduct the chase that ensues when the current ROE is implemented.  Afghanistan is too large, the mountains are too numerous, and the terrain is too forbidding to BOTH implement the current rules of engagement AND refuse the chase.

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A disturbing report from the Daily Mail.

Thousands of British troops cannot be sent to Afghanistan because they are too fat to fight, a leaked army memo revealed.

The war effort is being hampered by the number of front-line troops who are either obese or too unfit to be deployed to Helmand in the south of the country.

The news comes at a time when commanders are desperately fighting for more troops to be sent to the province to replace those who have been injured or killed.

According to the emergency memo, a ‘worrying trend of obesity’ is preventing soldiers from being deployed to the province.

It raises concerns that soldiers are failing to carry out the basic minimum of two hours physical exercise a week.

The document, obtained by the Observer, also warns that Britain’s ‘operational effectiveness’ is being undermined by low levels of fitness and raises concerns that lives could be lost because some soldiers are not fit enough to cope with the challenging conditions in Afghanistan.

‘The numbers of personnel unable to deploy and concerns about obesity throughout the army are clearly linked to current attitudes towards physical training,’ the memo from Major Brian Dupree of the army physical training corps in Wiltshire states.

He called for the army to ‘reinvigorate a warrior ethos and a culture of being fit’, concluding that it had ‘not consistently maintained our standards of physical fitness’.

To tackle the problem, the army is introducing a ‘body composition measurement’ in October to target overweight soldiers. It will also enforce a minimum of three physical training sessions a week.

The news comes as military commanders are demanding more British troops be sent to Afghanistan to protect ground recently gained from the Taliban in Operation Panther’s Claw.

An extra 125 troops have already been sent to replace those injured or killed in the offensive which has seen the highest number of British casualties since the conflict began.

There are currently 3,860 army personnel classified as PUD – personnel unable to deploy – with a further 8,190 classified as ‘of limited deployability’ for medical reasons.

The MoD said it could not provide a breakdown of these figures.

The current army fitness policy states that to be fit to fight requires a minimum of two to three hours of physical activity per week.

In the memo, which is dated July 10, Major Dupree said: ‘It is clear that even this most basic policy is not being implemented.

‘To cope with the demands of hybrid operations in Afghanistan and future conflicts the army needs personnel with that battle-winning edge that sustains them through adversity. It is clear this message has been diluted recently and this attitude must change.

‘The increasing PUD list and concerns over obesity in the services are clearly linked to this indifferent attitude.’

Patrick Mercer, head of strategy at the Army Training & Recruiting Agency, said: ‘This lack of personal fitness is a disgraceful state of affairs. The army is desperately undermanned anyway and for obesity to be a problem is extraordinary.’

The memo comes three years after the army relaxed its rules to allow recruits with a higher body mass index (BMI) to join after research found that two thirds of British teenagers were too fat to meet fitness requirements.

Applicants with a BMI of 32 – two points above the World Health Organisation’s definition of obesity – can now enlist.

Is this a joke?  I hesitate even to link and comment on this article because I wonder if it’s going to be proven a hoax.  Perhaps some British reader can weigh in and tell us if this report is legitimate.

Even if the condition is ameliorated, two hours of physical training per week is a preposterous level of training for Solders.  By the end of the day today, between weight training (today was bench press, inclined bench press, and curls, Tuesday it’s legs, Wednesday it’s back and posterior deltoids, etc.) and my aerobic activity, I will have put in more than two hours of physical training, and I am 50 years old.  Again, I put in more than two hours per day, not per week.  Surely this report is in error.  Surely.  Can one of our loyal British readers confirm or deny this report, or at least place this in context for us?

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A recent review of the U.S. efforts in Iraq has yielded quite a negative assessment.  The following is taken from the text of a memorandum from Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq.

” … we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected.” The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

The Colonel goes on to outlines the problems with the Iraqi Security Forces.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system e) Laziness is endemic f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm g) Lack of initiative is legion h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

And in what could be the most telling testimony of the increased danger to U.S. forces, as well as the expenditure of U.S. reputation to no avail, Colonel Reese goes on to outline the changes in atmosphere and attitude since the signing of the SOFA.

It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

As an initial comment, the first Middle Eastern Army that is able to develop and implement a strong NCO corps will dominate the region.  We have tried exceedingly hard to instill this concept into the ISF, only to fail it would appear.

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive isn’t appreciative of Colonel Reese’s position.

Amidst all of his caterwauling, and again I’m not saying that hs (sic) complaints don’t have merit, but he fails to consider that one gargantuan reason for us to stay a bit is to avoid leaving a power vaccuum (sic) that would undoubtedly be filled by Iran. That means we have a huge incentive to put up with the endemic craptasticness of the nascent Iraqi institutions and work to form a long term strategic relationship. We need to be their number one ally or Iran will be and that would negate many of the security gains a free deomcratic (sic) Iraq represents. So suck it up sir, and drive on with your mission.

Well, I appreciate the sentiment, and my own son risked his life in Fallujah in 2007; but it just isn’t that simple.  We have previously discussed the actual increased danger to U.S. troops stemming from Iraqi interpretations of the SOFA.

U.S. officials told the Post there have been numerous disagreements between the two forces. The newspaper reported one clash in which a U.S. unit wanted and failed to get permission to send out a patrol to trap insurgents allegedly planning a mortar attack on a U.S. base from an adjacent Iraqi neighborhood named Amiriyah. “I understand you have your orders,” the Iraqi commander told the American commander, “but I have my orders, too. You are not allowed to go inside of Amiriyah.” Iraqi soldiers have blocked American convoys, U.S. officials said.

So there is a very real danger to U.S. troops with the increased ISF chest-thumping.  But beyond the near and present danger, there is the very real diminution of U.S. reputation that we predicted would occur.  As for Iran, the current SOFA restricts the ability we have to be a counterbalance to its power.  Just recently, ISF attacked the home base for the MEK, an anti-Iranian group within Iraq The Captain’s Journal had been watching for some time.  This attack was a nod to Iranian influence and power in Iraq.

Should we leave?  Not exactly.  We had previously recommended that we withdraw the logistical and air support for the ISF to see if they are capable of holding terrain.  There are current reports of violence in Haditha.  Contra the views of Pollyanna Iraq analysts like Nibras Kazimi (who believes that the Shi’ites have defeated the Sunnis in Iraq), I have long believed that despite the fact that the Sunnis comprise only 15% of the population, rejection of the Sons of Iraq program would lead to further violence and potential undermining of the Maliki government.  Then again, I have always thought of Maliki as a stooge who is too driven by sectarian interests even to see threats to his own administration.

We had suggested that U.S. focus be the Iranian border and training operations.  Along with a standdown of troops over the next 24 months in order to supply troops to the campaign in Afghanistan, this should be sufficient to keep U.S. troops busy.  Keeping busy and doing the minimum we can to prevent cross border operations may be all that we are capable of doing.  Bush’s failure to see and address this as a regional war is only exacerbated with the new administration and the SOFA.

Let’s not fool ourselves into thinking that we are able to do the things we have in the past in Iraq.  We are under new rules, and these rules have a draconian affect on even our ability to ensure force protection.  Actions have consequences, and the SOFA should never have been signed.  Left impotent inside the cities, in order to ensure force protection, we must withdraw to the countryside and focus on different things.  I believe that Colonel Reese understands this.

Prior:

Redux on U.S. Troop Restrictions in Iraq

House Arrest for U.S. Forces in Iraq

Iraqi Commanders Move to Restrict U.S. Troops Under SOFA

The Violence Belongs to Iraq Now

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We have previously dealt with the apparent desire for an Afghanistan SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) on par with the Iraq SOFA.  Bad idea, said we.  It has made U.S. forces in Iraq virtually impotent to conduct missions, even when their own force protection is involved.

U.S. officials told the Post there have been numerous disagreements between the two forces. The newspaper reported one clash in which a U.S. unit wanted and failed to get permission to send out a patrol to trap insurgents allegedly planning a mortar attack on a U.S. base from an adjacent Iraqi neighborhood named Amiriyah. “I understand you have your orders,” the Iraqi commander told the American commander, “but I have my orders, too. You are not allowed to go inside of Amiriyah.” Iraqi soldiers have blocked American convoys, U.S. officials said.

The campaign in Iraq is at a more advanced stage than in Afghanistan, and a SOFA for Afghanistan would have literally disastrous consequences for the campaign.  A recent Congressional Research Service Report details considerations and history for both the SOFA in Iraq and “agreements” thus far in Afghanistan.  For Afghanistan, the SOFA Study notes (lengthy quote):

An agreement exists regarding the status of military and civilian personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense present in Afghanistan in connection with cooperative efforts in response to terrorism, humanitarian and civic assistance, military training and exercises, and other activities. Such personnel are to be accorded “a status equivalent to that accorded to the administrative and technical staff” of the U.S. Embassy under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.  Accordingly, U.S. personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities, and are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction except with respect to acts performed outside the course of their duties. In the agreement, the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) explicitly authorized the U.S. government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, and the Government of Afghanistan is not permitted to surrender U.S. personnel to the custody of another State, international tribunal, or any other entity without consent of the U.S. government. Although the agreement was signed by the ITGA, the subsequently elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan assumed responsibility for ITGA’s legal obligations and the agreement remains in force. The agreement does not appear to provide immunity for contract personnel.

The agreement with Afghanistan does not expressly authorize the United States to carry out military operations within Afghanistan, but it recognizes that such operations are “ongoing.”  Congress authorized the use of military force there (and elsewhere) by joint resolution in 2001, for targeting “those nations, organizations, or persons [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001…. ” The U.N. Security Council implicitly recognized that the use of force was appropriate in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and subsequently authorized the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan. Subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions provide a continuing mandate for ISAF , calling upon it to “work in close consultation with” Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF—the U.S.-led coalition conducting military operations in Afghanistan) in carrying out the mandate. While there is no explicit U.N. mandate authorizing the OEF,
Security Council resolutions appear to provide ample recognition of the legitimacy of its operations, most recently by calling upon the Afghan Government, “with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, other extremist groups and criminal activities…. ”

In 2004, the United States and Afghanistan entered an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) is an agreement providing logistic support, supplies, and services to foreign militaries on a cash-reimbursement, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of equal value basis. After consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter into an ACSA with a government of a NATO country, a subsidiary body of NATO, or the United Nations Organization or any regional international organization of which the United States is a member. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense may enter into an ACSA with a country not included in the above categories, if, after consultation with the Secretary of State, a determination is made that it is in the best interests of the national security of the United States. If the country is not a member of NATO, the Secretary of Defense must submit notice, at least 30 days prior to designation, to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

On May 23, 2005, President Hamid Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” outlining a prospective future agreement between the two countries. It envisions a role for U.S. military troops in Afghanistan to “help organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces” until Afghanistan has developed its own capacity, and to “consult with respect to taking appropriate measures in the event that Afghanistan perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk.” The declaration does not mention the status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but if an agreement is concluded pursuant to the declaration, it can be expected a status of forces agreement would be included. In August 2008, shortly after U.S. airstrikes apparently resulted in civilian casualties, President Karzai called for a review of the presence of all foreign forces in Afghanistan and the conclusion of formal SOFAs with the respective countries. However, to date, it appears that formal negotiations have yet to begin between the United States and Afghanistan.

The lack of restrictive framework for our engagement in Afghanistan suits The Captain’s Journal just fine.  But Hamid Karzai keeps pressing for such an agreement with the U.S.

The language is veiled and cloaked, but it’s there.  Karzai wants a SOFA.  It is imperative that the U.S. reject such a notion outright, no matter what stage of the campaign the current administration wishes we were in or what stage they believe exists.  Again, an agreement would effectively mean the end of the campaign as we know it.

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