Follow and Kill Every Single Taliban

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 8 months ago

Readers know our position regarding the changes to the rules of engagement for Afghanistan.  While there is much to be said for the protection of the population in the development and deployment of the new revisions to the ROE, we have observed that there are operations that wouldn’t have been conducted under the recent revisions, including the highly successful operations by the 24th MEU in Helmand in 2008 (and including certain tactics in the Anbar Province of Iraq).  Their highly kinetic assault on Garmsir would not have occurred due to the fact that it could not be proven that non-combatants were not still resident in the town.

The Strategy Page gives us their view of the situation in which the Marines are engaged in the Helmand Province.

The U.S. Marine advance into Helmand province is being slowed down by the new Rules Of Engagement (ROE), which forbid the use of bombs or missiles in any situation where there might be civilians. The Taliban will typically spend the night, or longer, in a village or walled compound, and that’s where U.S. troops will typically trap them. But bombs and missiles cannot be used on these places, so U.S. troops have to besiege the place, or just move on, leaving the Taliban alone. Some marines get creative, like having the jet fighters or bombs make a high speed pass over the Taliban held buildings. The fearsome noise will sometimes unnerve the Taliban and cause a surrender, but not as much as it used to. Another favorite tactic is having the fighter (usually an F-16 or F-18) come in low and use its 20mm cannon. But these air craft only carry a few seconds worth of ammunition. Moreover, having these jets fly that low makes them liable to crashing (this has happened, at least once) or being brought down by enemy fire (has not happened yet). But the cannon fire sometimes induces the Taliban to give up, or try to flee.

The other option, when you have the Taliban cornered, and using human shields, is to go in and fight them room-to-room. That gets more Americans killed, as well as putting the Afghan civilians in danger. This room-to-room tactic has not been used much, as commanders don’t want to take the heat for losing troops in that kind of fighting. If there is a lot more of this house to house fighting, and civilians get killed, the ROE may be changed again to forbid any kind of combat if civilians are present. This reduces the anger of locals from civilian deaths involving U.S. forces, but makes it much more difficult to hunt down and destroy the Taliban gunmen. The Taliban are still vulnerable, as they have to move in order to operate, and the Afghan Army or police can often negotiate a surrender, or go in and root them out by force. But the best troops available for chasing down the Taliban gunmen are the U.S. and NATO ones.

Room clearing tactics are costly to the Marines (viz. Fallujah), and aversion to this approach is understandable.  But the best troops are of course the U.S. and NATO, since the police are mainly corrupt and the Afghan National Army is mainly drug-addicted and inept.  The police and the ANA cannot be relied upon to chase the hard core Taliban.  Regarding the Taliban that are allowed to escape because of this change to the ROE, locals have some words to the wise.

“People are withholding judgment,” said the political analyst in Lashkar Gah. “They cannot say whether this operation is good or bad. They are afraid that the (U.S.) forces will stay here for some days and then leave, so we will be alone with the Taliban again.” Many are also waiting to see what the Americans can bring in the way of real development.

“It is still just the beginning,” said Mullah Shin Gul from Nad Ali district. “The Americans need to begin reconstruction, by agreement with the people. They should establish centers here in the districts, and they should follow every single Taliban and kill him. In a short while it will be too late. The people will lose trust.”

The doctrine of population centric counterinsurgency believes, in part, that focus on the population will marginalize the insurgents, causing them to wilt away and eventually rejoin the population and side with the government.  True enough for low level insurgents, men who have willingly taken up arms for political and religious motivations don’t usually willingly lay them down.

Because of the new ROE there has been a reluctance to engage locations in which known Taliban are located, allowing them to escape and fight another day.  Such tactics may gain the support of the locals for the time being, but they ensure the continuation of the fight.  Like the locals said, we must follow and kill every single Taliban.  Taking prisoners is not productive.


Obama Administration Searching for an Exit Strategy

Marine Take the Fight to the Enemy in Now Zad

Taliban Tactics: Massing of Troops

The Coming War in the Caucasus


Over at Fabius Maximus, a site I know little if anything about, a commenter and the author presume to know something about the intentions of this article.  Let’s listen in for a few minutes.

I totally disagree with this guy’s belief that the US has no choice but to exterminate the Taliban, or even that this is a good goal: “Follow and Kill Every Single Taliban“, Herschel Smith, The Captain’s Journal, 26 July 2009.

At the same time, his analysis of how the Taliban is funded (here) seems probably correct to me …

Fabius Maximus replies: They sound just like governments everywhere. Heroin is the primary product of Helmand Province. Mother Nature made it so, and only vast sums of money wil change that. Recent US history shows that we would rather spend 10x that amount on fighting to control the area rather than a smaller sum to change its economy.

The real question is why folks read trash like “The Captain’s Journal”. There are many real experts writing about the situation in central asia, but America’s bloodlust is stirred by nutjobs yelling “Follow and Kill Every Single Taliban.” It’s a symptom of a nation increasingly ruled by its own paranoia and hubris.

Alas, so much confusion, so little time to work through the problems.  The comment was left by someone calling themselves atheist, and Fabius Maximum takes off of the remark to invite himself to criticize someone he doesn’t know and has never read.

This question of globalists and hermeneutics within Islam is a complicated issue, one I have addressed before with Professor Steve Metz of the U.S. Army War College.  The set of those who are irreconcilable enemies is certainly a subset of Islam, and even a subset of those currently engaged in fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  Recall that The Captain’s Journal strongly supported the notion of concerned citizens in Anbar, later to become Sons of Iraq.

Many of the Sons of Iraq were former insurgents, but fighting for money, boredom, political views or whatever.  Certainly a subset of the so-called Taliban fighters are fighting for the same things.  The question is not one of killing irreconcilable enemies.  War, including counterinsurgency, means doing violence.  Irreconcilable enemies must be killed, and in Afghanistan this set of fighters is comprised of globalists and those who would harbor them.

The only real question is how big is this subset of fighters?  Joshua Foust and I have politely disagreed before, with me viewing this group as moderately larger than him, and yet in the recent months it would appear that Foust’s view is that the size of this group is edging upwards, while my view is that the size might be edging downwards.  Perhaps we will eventually meet in the middle.  But all thinking men know that the insurgency is bifurcated.

Now to the specific post and its title.  I have found that it’s very hard to keep readers for more than a few minutes.  Even when linked at a large venue such as Instapundit, statistics show that most readers want to read an article within less than about three minutes.  Many of mine are longer, and the more difficult issue is that my posts comprise a narrative.  My readers are usually very sophisticated, and it appears that the readers over at Fabius Maximus haven’t paid attention very well.

Recall the issues surrounding modifications to the ROE for Afghanistan.  Without getting into the weeds on this issue again, recall that in subsequent posts I had pointed out that according to objective evidence, the highly successful Marine Corps operations in the Helmand Province (specifically, in Garmsir) in 2008 by the 24th MEU would not have been conducted under the revised ROE.  When you can point to successful operations that wouldn’t be conducted under ROE, there is a problem.

This points to unintended consequences.  Subsequent to this we pointed out that the revised ROE had allowed Taliban fighters to escape Marine Corps operations with the Marines unable to give chase because of lack of logistics.  Finally, in the article above we pointed out that the local residents had stated that the Marines would have to hold the area and chase and kill every last Taliban for the area to be safe.  This is the most amusing point of the comments left at Fabius Maximus.  They ascribe a comment made by a local in Afghanistan to me since I chose it as the title to an article.  Get the picture?  They didn’t even read the article.  I suppose that the commenter and Mr. Maximus know more about Afghanistan and the Taliban than the locals do.

There is a chain of thoughts necessary to follow my prose, from ROE to giving chase and required logistics and unintended consequences to tactical directives and local views on what it will take to make the area safe.  My prose is simply not intended for idiots.  Readers .. must .. work .. hard .. and .. try .. to .. stay .. up.

As for Fabius Maximus’ disparaging of The Captain’s Journal, we might remark at what bad form it is and what gross, hillbilly etiquette it takes to trash someone you don’t know, have never communicated with, and whose prose you have never read.  It sounds very much like he is the nutjob.  His readers can do better.

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It sure would be nice to see the same kind of videos from A-stan that we saw from Iraq, where the air controllers have the bad guys under UAV surveillance and are just waiting to unleash a missile on them when the danger to civilians is minimal.

But the joint operation of UAV’s with active Marine operations is unlikely to happen, I suppose, as the U.S. strategy seems to be flying them around in the P-stan tribal areas hoping for a shot at high-ranking T-ban and AQ. Too bad. So many bad guys and no willingness on the Admin’s part for victory. When we have a President who considers “victory” a dirty word, it is time to bring all the troops home and out of harm’s way until someone with more sense takes over.

Save the GOP » Blog Archive » Negotiated “Victory”

[…] ever strapped on a pair of new tennis shoes, picked up a Kalashnikov and fought for the Taliban, well almost no one. The point is that these so-called “second tier” Taliban aren’t really second […]

On the contrary, leaving now is basically the worst thing we can do unless your objective is to get thousands more Afghans killed. What is needed are more resources for the troops on the ground (i.e. more helo support and drones put in the hands of the units that need them most), and obviously more troops. This article is also true when it states we got a little flabby in IZ after a time, after we’d either killed off the worst of the insurgents or simply brought them into our fold. The killer instinct we had in conducting heavy combat operations in the past was eroded by the very delicate balancing act we had to play for so many years. You learn to thread a needle at a hundred miles an hour in one country and then you have to get into a standup fistfight in another, there’s going to be a bit of blood when the rubber meets the road. As I’ve pointed out on this before, Afghanistan is an entirely different place to fight than Iraq. The place is larger, there’s more people, the terrain is ugly and let’s face it, the enemy is far more experienced. Remember… Read more »
My apologies CRM, you may have missed some of the discussions on this blog about strategy in A-stan so there is some context missing. When I say, “bring the troops home,” I do not, for one, say it lightly nor in the knee-jerk, left-liberal reaction to any kind of fight. I do so only reluctantly because it is becoming increasingly clear that this Administration has already sold out the troops, first: with its declaration that 68,000 troops is the max and no more are coming, and; second: with its declaration that it’s not looking for victory in A-stan but for some kind of exit strategy. If anyone wants to try to formulate a convincing argument for why even a single, good American soldier should die for an “exit strategy” I would like to hear it. I fully believe that A-stan CAN be won with the right COIN adapted to A-stan BUT that would require far more troops and the kind of resources that you are talking about CRM and I think we all know that this Admin is not going to do what it takes. I pray that I am wrong. Leaving A-stan to hang in the wind would be… Read more »
I appreciate your clarification on the previous statement. My guess, and this is just a guess, is that as we draw down in IZ (which is technically an exit) will free up more combat troops for Afghanistan. Their deployment, of course, will become more of an issue as two things happen: an election year approaches and other allies commit more troops. Of course diplomacy would also help some, getting Russia to help secure the border instead of throwing fits over a base in Kyrgystan that’s been there for years and they basically gave to us in the first place. Getting Pakistan is of course a big problem, one that the 68,000 troops we have in Afghanistan isn’t going to be able to help much with if they implode and we have another Taliban-controlled state on our hands with nukes. I’m not running around to apologize to the world for the “sins” of the United States or anything, but it’s not too hard to realize that invading Afghanistan in 2001 caused major problems for Pakistan, a nation that shares a significant number of native Pashtun as well as displaced Afghanis that have been there since the Soviets invaded. Pakistan didn’t do… Read more »
I think that I am on the same page as you, CRM, or at least the same chapter. Allow me to treat your last comment first. There is a world of difference between an “exit strategy” mentality and a victory mentality. My reference to Obama was in connection to his recent interview in which he not only said he was looking for an “exit strategy” but specifically eschewed the term, “victory” as somehow neo-colonial (using, in fact, a historically flawed example of Hirohito surrendering to MacArthur). I do not intend to turn this post specifically political, rather, I point out that the C-IN-C cannot be allergic to the notion of victory or we forfeit moral principle and military morale. Obama has never been comfortable with any use of the word “victory,” particularly in connection with the U.S., not now and not in his public life. President Bush, on the other hand, constantly spoke of victory in the war on terror (another term that Obama cannot bring himself to use, although I would prefer that the term be switched to something like the war against Islamofascism or Neo-totalitarianism to be more precise). Bottom line, I do not believe that Bush had… Read more »
The thing I’ve found I like the most about this site is that, in order to effectively respond to comments on here, I have to do a little fact-checking before I open my binary mouth. Okay, TSA, I’ll bite. In regards to your assertion of verbage used in the administration is useful for anything, I’d just like to point out that the public is who he caters that message for, not necessarily the military. President Bush talked about having Victoryin IZ all the time, right up until he figured out that it’ll take more years than he had left in the White House to finish the job he’d started. Of course Afghanistan was also put on the back-burner until this administration took over (minus the whole Pat Tillman thing as a temporary media blip in 2004, but that was only a scandal). While we were busy smoking out AQI, the Taliban was able to re-form itself in Pakistan and the unoccupied parts of Afghanistan and reconstitute itself. Speaking of friendly wagers, I’ll in turn bet you that a lot of this “soft image” campaigning they’re now doing is in direct response to their own lessons learned in IZ. Of course… Read more »

Sorry, one last thing. It would be a lot easier to use India to pressure Pakistan if we didn’t have our Secretary of State running around there telling them to spend money retarding their economy in the name of climate change.


I can only hope that CRM is right and the Administration listens to the commanders requesting more troops.

Like the good Captain here, I believe that it will require many lines of effort to achieve anything like victory in A-stan. More intel assets is a good thing. But without boots on the ground to hold onto the villages that the Marines clear, there will always be more bad guys ready to move back in and chop the heads of anyone who cooperated with Americans.

Agreed that the U.S. cannot afford to needlessly offend our allies and friends in the world.

The Captain’s Journal » Why we must chase the Taliban

[…] Follow and Kill Every Single Taliban we covered and commented on the view of the local Afghans we are trying to protect in this […]

The Captain's Journal » The Battle for Bomb Alley

[…] this sound like Follow and Kill Every Single Taliban?  Yes, Tim is right, but here is my concern.  Recall the warning from the elder in Sangin near […]

The Captain's Journal » Withdraw From Afghanistan

[…] pointed out the right way to do it in lieu of night time raids by snake eaters.  I have argued for following and killing every single Taliban fighter into the hinterlands of Afghanistan, while the strategists under General McChrystal withdrew to the population centers just like the […]

The Captain's Journal » Dishonesty About Afghanistan

[…] on the horrible Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.  I repeatedly called for chasing the insurgents, just like Lt. Col. Davis expected would happen, but General McChrystal withdrew troops to the […]

The Captain's Journal » Lessons To Draw From Afghanistan (Or, How Obama Really Lost The Campaign)

[…] Killing the enemy wasn’t a priority.  Rajiv even says so later in the article, exclaiming “the military’s counterinsurgency strategy was supposed to place troops near civilian population centers to protect residents from insurgents, not chase bad guys in the desert or remote valleys.”  But arguing for doing just that, I observed that the insurgents who destabilized Kandahar and other areas of Afghanistan came from Helmand, Kunar, Nuristan and other far flung places where we needed to chase and kill them. […]


You are currently reading "Follow and Kill Every Single Taliban", entry #3452 on The Captain's Journal.

This article is filed under the category(s) Afghanistan,Featured,Marines in Helmand,Operation Khanjar,Taliban and was published July 26th, 2009 by Herschel Smith.

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