Losing The Soul Is The Reason For Losing Wars
BY Herschel SmithSmall Wars Journal (“Why The U.S. Military Culture Leads To Defeat”).
“Sir – it’s the TEA”
The Target Engagement Authority was a US one star who sat in the joint operations center in Erbil, with the task of approving and controlling all Coalition fires in Northern Iraq. I took the headset, preparing myself for the argument that I knew was coming.
“Andy, are you firing mortars”,
“Yes sir”,
“What the hell is going on?”
“Sir, the Pesh are getting mortared in the breach. I’ve got an OP less than 500 meters away.”
“Are US personnel taking fire?”
“Not yet, sir”
“Then you’re not authorized to make that decision”
“Sir – it’s a matter of one correction before our guys get hit too — I’m not going to wait for that to happen”,
“That’s not up to you Colonel, that’s my decision — cease fire now!”
[ … ]
My introduction seems a lot to surmise from an isolated case of poor leadership, a single data point carrying by itself insufficient weight to yield such generalizations about the US military. Except, that this exchange was one of many similar incidents over my career, and the TEA, a General Officer with impressive background and unsullied reputation, was not someone I could simply dismiss as being a poor leader. Instead, he was the product of an institution imbued with a cultural preference for centralized control and procedure. It’s a culture that has evolved – as cultures often do – because of a view of the world, that appears rational to members of the organization. But that view no longer matches reality – if indeed it ever did – and the culture it has produced is proving harmful to the institution, its members – and the nation itself.
His experience doesn’t differ in the least from the awful ROE I’ve document in Iraq and especially Afghanistan. The micromanagement was astounding, and men perished because if it. As I’ve documented about the U.S. Marine Corps work in the Helmand Province, Gen. David Rodriguez, that awful imposter of a man, demanded to be at the top of the chain of approval for every artillery shell launched in combat. Every single one.
But the author is making excuses. The culture is a reflection of the men who lead it. Leaving aside the issue of whether we should have been in Iraq (we shouldn’t have) or how we conducted the campaign in Afghanistan (much differently), when men are engaged in warfare, it requires men with souls to win it.
Heartless men, men who have jettisoned their last remaining vestiges of morality, decency, belief system and love for their fellow warriors, have no business in politics or war, and yet it seems that’s all we’ve got