@ George 1 Re: “This highlights the fact that the Germans were destined to lose the war as soon as they invaded Russia. They were never going to be able to maintain a two front war.” That’s quite right. Germany, an incipient super-power, fought the western Allies to a stand-still, but once her forces were divided after Barbarossa, she was over-extended, not just by the fighting on the “Ostfront” as it was called, but by other theaters of war which relentlessly drained her men, material and resources. The Battle of the Atlantic; the Air War over Europe and Germany proper; North Africa and when that was lost, Sicily and Italy. Plus the need to maintain coverage and defense of occupied Europe, “Fortress Europa.” After Dunkirk, Britain – weakened precipitously and alone – had turned to unconventional warfare and air raids as a means of the taking the fight to Germany. Prime Minister Churchill loved anything having to do with daring-do and the unconventional arts of warfare, and he ordered his general staff to devise means of “Setting Europe Ablaze.” The prime minister was famous for dashing off dozens of directives per day – succinct orders to be acted upon with utmost dispatch (some of which were inspired, some of which were not) – and this one had merit. The idea of the commandos was to strike when/where the enemy didn’t foresee being hit, and force him to divert men, material and supplies to defending those areas, even the ones hundreds or even thousands of miles from the nearest front-line fighting. The Special Operations Executive did much the same thing, only using indigenous personnel from occupied Europe for most of her operational personnel. Resistance movements all over occupied Europe forced Hitler and his generals to divert badly-needed men, material and equipment to holding territory the Germans already thought they owned. Later, when America entered the war, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and elite commando-inspired units like the U.S. Army Rangers and 1st Joint Special Service Force (U.S.-Canadian) added even more capability. Historians to this day debate the wisdom of following Churchill’s preferred route back into Europe through the “soft underbelly” of Southern Europe – but time seems to have vindicated the wisdom of blooding heretofore inexperienced and combat-untested forces of the U.S. Army in North Africa and then in the Sicilian-Italian campaigns. Despite the zeal of certain general officers and politicians for the opening of a second front in Northern Europe in 1943, the U.S. and her allies simply were not yet ready. In light of the fact that it was going to take time to prepare the thrust back into the heart of Europe, it made a certain degree of sense to siphon off German assets to the defense of Africa, Sicily, Italy, and other Axis-held places. If for no other reason, than to placate Josef Stalin – whose insistence upon the second front was growing more strident by the day. Hitler did a great service to his adversaries… Read more »