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Georgiaboy61
5 years ago
Re: “The superiority of tactics and training over equipment.” The late Colonel John Boyd, USAF (ret.), both during his long military career and then in retirement as a civilian employee of the Pentagon/DOD, distinguished himself as perhaps the finest military thinker and theorist this nation has ever produced. As a field-grade officer commanding an air wing in SE Asia, he had witnessed the Vietnam conflict up-close and personal. How, to use the phrase common at that time, “a bunch of peasants in black pajamas managed to defeat the most-powerful nation on earth.” Boyd sought to understand why, and after retiring, he immersed himself in the study of the history of war and conflict. One of his most-relevant insights is that superior technology is not always, or even often, the most-critical factor in who wins or loses a war. Boyd came away from his studies convinced that people and ideas matter more to the conduct of war than technology alone. Or, as he was fond of thundering at his listeners, “People, ideas and hardware – in that order!” Another was that there are levels of war, i.e., the moral, mental (intellectual) and the physical (kinetic) spheres. Conventional thinking about military affairs stressed that putting ordnance on target was all that mattered, and taking and holding ground – but Boyd’s studies taught him that the moral and mental spheres of conflict mattered just as much as the physical/kinetic ones, and oftentimes more so. The Battle of Arracourt shows a number of these truths about warfare, in the microcosm – as well as some insights which mirror more conventional military theory of Clausewitz and others. The German and Americans ways of waging armored warfare were of course similar in many ways, but different in others. It is an over-simplification, but the U.S. approach was to produce weapons of adequate-to-good quality, and in sufficient numbers to tilt the scales in the favor of the Allies. The Germans, on the other hand, tended to stress technological advancement and mechanical-engineering perfection over mass-production. Manufacturing a relatively small number of highly-advanced and capable tanks and armored fighting vehicles, rather than committing to a smaller number of designs and then mass-producing the heck out of them. “Quality versus quantity” … While it is also somewhat of an oversimplification, it is legitimate to state that the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans won the war using very large numbers of mostly 1930s-vintage weapons designs – including armor – whereas the Germans lost the war fielding much-smaller numbers of weapons with features which did not become common until the 1950s, as well as larger numbers of less-advanced designs. The Germans tended to, as the proverb states, let the perfect become the enemy of the good. A case in point was the Tiger I heavy tank, a 54-ton design which was first-fielded in Tunisia in 1942 and which rapidly gained a reputation – well-earned – as a tank able to dominate the battlefield against pretty much any other tank or armored fighting vehicle… Read more »
RCW
5 years ago
The video also notes another angle, which helped the US Shermans in the battle of Arracourt, was the German 5th Panzer’s Army not being equipped with integral scouting units, so they were forced to advance blindly against the US. Tactics, training & reconnaissance all matter; Lee suffered for this shortcoming (sans cavalry scouts) in Gettysburg, if I recall correctly. How can a general know his enemy without scouting?
Fred
5 years ago
Thanks GB. Good food for thought. In any endeavor the best leaders seek to provide the training and tools (equipment) required, but most importantly the widest possible latitude in execution of the mission to ensure the success of those doing the actual work. Of course this leadership type requires discernment in personal selection overall, and roll and task assignment based more on personality than academic history. Men who are aggressive, serious, and committed that have the general aptitude for the given mission are the best and not just for war fighting.
Georgiaboy61
5 years ago
@ RCW Re: “The video also notes another angle, which helped the US Shermans in the battle of Arracourt, was the German 5th Panzer’s Army not being equipped with integral scouting units” Good catch…. or should I say “good recon, soldier!”? … when I went back and watched the video a second time, I noticed that fact also – but you get the prize for getting there first. Patton’s men had more up-to-date information, thanks to their recon and scouting, and were therefore able to get inside the German decision-making cycle. Re: “In any endeavor the best leaders seek to provide the training and tools (equipment) required, but most importantly the widest possible latitude in execution of the mission to ensure the success of those doing the actual work.” There has developed since the Second World War what amounts to a sort of cult surrounding the purported near-mystical military abilities of the Germans during the war. That they were the finest soldiers on earth and that the only reason the Allies won is due to overwhelming material superiority. And so on. Within the military history community, there was/is even a name for it – “The myth of German military superiority,” and some years ago a historian whose name I can’t recall at the moment, did a nice rebuttal of the idea. In my view, it is closer to the truth to state that at the beginning of the war, the Allies were the students and the Germans the masters or teachers, and as the war went along, those roles got reversed. Every enemy teaches its opponents how to best defeat it by how it chooses to make war in the first place. There’s no denying that the Germans were good, very good, but to beat them, the Allies had to be better. And they were. The Germans do deserve credit, however, for something they called “mission orders,” a concept which probably originated with General Helmuth von Moltke during the 1860s, specifically in 1869 with the study, “Instructions for Large Unit Commanders,” in which he set forth the basic idea of mission orders: “There are many situations in which the officer must act according to his own judgment. It would be indeed absurd if he waited for orders in moments where often no orders could be given. As a rule, however, his work is the most profitable for the whole when he carries out the will of his superior.” In short, the overall goals of the action being contemplated are directed by the superior officer, but the precise mechanism by which the objectives are attained is left to the judgment and discretion of the junior officer(s) closest to the operation and in-command at the scene. Decision-making and responsibility are pushed downward as far as possible. The Germans may have pioneered the idea, but arguably the Anglo-Americans (and even some, but by no means all, Soviet Army units, too) surpassed them in its employment during WWII. In that conflict, the best senior… Read more »
blake
5 years ago
@ GB, I think I read somewhere front line American soldiers were also much better at getting damaged vehicles back in the fight, unlike their German counterparts, who had to wait for repair depot guys to get them going.
Georgiaboy61
5 years ago
@ Blake Re: “I think I read somewhere front line American soldiers were also much better at getting damaged vehicles back in the fight, unlike their German counterparts, who had to wait for repair depot guys to get them going.” The mechanical ingenuity and resourcefulness of the American soldier was a tremendous force multiplier during the Second World War, including the war against Nazi Germany in the European Theater of Operations. A case in point was U.S. Army Sergeant Curtis Culin, whose story is as-fascinating as it is historically-significant. In one of the major intelligence failures of the war, SHAEF invasion planners had neither known nor appreciated the tremendous obstacle the terrain immediately inland of the invasion beaches was to present to the forces attempting to break out of the beach-heads, into the Norman countryside and then into the remainder of north/north-west France proper. The Normandy region was studded with unimproved roads, small farms, pastures, and fields – each surrounded by or adjoined by hedgerows – earthen mounds of up to 8-10 feet in height, often topped with dense hedges, trees, and other vegetation. Norman farmers had built them for centuries in lieu of stone walls or wooden fences, to enclose their lands, protect their livestock and so on. Many hedgerows could be transited only by a gate or sunken lane carved through it. Otherwise, they formed a barrier quite impassible even to the largest wheeled and tracked vehicles. The hedgerow country was a defender’s dream for the German Wehrmacht, and a nightmare for the soldiers of the American, British, Canadian and other Allied forces arrayed against them. Allied photo-reconnaissance overflights and subsequent photo interpreters had not known of the hedgerows and did not see them in their photos taken from high-altitude; nor did work reach the planners via their intelligence assets on the ground. The Allies tried breaking out via infantry-supported armor attacks, but since the tanks had to attempt to crawl over the mounds, they presented their thin belly armor to waiting German anti-tank guns, panzerfaust and panzershrek launchers, and other weapons – and were easy prey. The GIs tried to blast their way through the hedgerows prior to attacking using demolition charges, but since the defenders knew precisely where the attack would come, they could mass against it. Such attacks could succeed, but Ike quipped that he doubted there was enough high-explosive in the ETO to use that tactic every time – and losses were unacceptably high anyway and the advance was still bogged down. The American breakout was stalled, and since the British-CW offensive was synced to the U.S. sector, the break-out stalled up and down the line. No solution to the problem seemed to be at hand. Enter Sergeant Culin and his fellow GIs. They came up with the idea of using cutting torches to salvage scrap steel from invasion obstacles installed on the beaches by Rommel’s defenders, and fabricating “hedge-choppers” by welding a sort of four-pronged plow-like device onto the front of M4 Sherman… Read more »
blake
5 years ago
@GB, thanks for the response and bit of history. That stuff always fascinates me.
Georgiaboy61
5 years ago
@ Blake
You bet! Check out Cooper’s book…. it is worth the time.
This article is filed under the category(s) War & Warfare and was published July 28th, 2021 by Herschel Smith.
If you're interested in what else the The Captain's Journal has to say, you might try thumbing through the archives and visiting the main index, or; perhaps you would like to learn more about TCJ.
Re: “The superiority of tactics and training over equipment.” The late Colonel John Boyd, USAF (ret.), both during his long military career and then in retirement as a civilian employee of the Pentagon/DOD, distinguished himself as perhaps the finest military thinker and theorist this nation has ever produced. As a field-grade officer commanding an air wing in SE Asia, he had witnessed the Vietnam conflict up-close and personal. How, to use the phrase common at that time, “a bunch of peasants in black pajamas managed to defeat the most-powerful nation on earth.” Boyd sought to understand why, and after retiring, he immersed himself in the study of the history of war and conflict. One of his most-relevant insights is that superior technology is not always, or even often, the most-critical factor in who wins or loses a war. Boyd came away from his studies convinced that people and ideas matter more to the conduct of war than technology alone. Or, as he was fond of thundering at his listeners, “People, ideas and hardware – in that order!” Another was that there are levels of war, i.e., the moral, mental (intellectual) and the physical (kinetic) spheres. Conventional thinking about military affairs stressed that putting ordnance on target was all that mattered, and taking and holding ground – but Boyd’s studies taught him that the moral and mental spheres of conflict mattered just as much as the physical/kinetic ones, and oftentimes more so. The Battle of Arracourt shows a number of these truths about warfare, in the microcosm – as well as some insights which mirror more conventional military theory of Clausewitz and others. The German and Americans ways of waging armored warfare were of course similar in many ways, but different in others. It is an over-simplification, but the U.S. approach was to produce weapons of adequate-to-good quality, and in sufficient numbers to tilt the scales in the favor of the Allies. The Germans, on the other hand, tended to stress technological advancement and mechanical-engineering perfection over mass-production. Manufacturing a relatively small number of highly-advanced and capable tanks and armored fighting vehicles, rather than committing to a smaller number of designs and then mass-producing the heck out of them. “Quality versus quantity” … While it is also somewhat of an oversimplification, it is legitimate to state that the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans won the war using very large numbers of mostly 1930s-vintage weapons designs – including armor – whereas the Germans lost the war fielding much-smaller numbers of weapons with features which did not become common until the 1950s, as well as larger numbers of less-advanced designs. The Germans tended to, as the proverb states, let the perfect become the enemy of the good. A case in point was the Tiger I heavy tank, a 54-ton design which was first-fielded in Tunisia in 1942 and which rapidly gained a reputation – well-earned – as a tank able to dominate the battlefield against pretty much any other tank or armored fighting vehicle… Read more »
The video also notes another angle, which helped the US Shermans in the battle of Arracourt, was the German 5th Panzer’s Army not being equipped with integral scouting units, so they were forced to advance blindly against the US. Tactics, training & reconnaissance all matter; Lee suffered for this shortcoming (sans cavalry scouts) in Gettysburg, if I recall correctly. How can a general know his enemy without scouting?
Thanks GB. Good food for thought. In any endeavor the best leaders seek to provide the training and tools (equipment) required, but most importantly the widest possible latitude in execution of the mission to ensure the success of those doing the actual work. Of course this leadership type requires discernment in personal selection overall, and roll and task assignment based more on personality than academic history. Men who are aggressive, serious, and committed that have the general aptitude for the given mission are the best and not just for war fighting.
@ RCW Re: “The video also notes another angle, which helped the US Shermans in the battle of Arracourt, was the German 5th Panzer’s Army not being equipped with integral scouting units” Good catch…. or should I say “good recon, soldier!”? … when I went back and watched the video a second time, I noticed that fact also – but you get the prize for getting there first. Patton’s men had more up-to-date information, thanks to their recon and scouting, and were therefore able to get inside the German decision-making cycle. Re: “In any endeavor the best leaders seek to provide the training and tools (equipment) required, but most importantly the widest possible latitude in execution of the mission to ensure the success of those doing the actual work.” There has developed since the Second World War what amounts to a sort of cult surrounding the purported near-mystical military abilities of the Germans during the war. That they were the finest soldiers on earth and that the only reason the Allies won is due to overwhelming material superiority. And so on. Within the military history community, there was/is even a name for it – “The myth of German military superiority,” and some years ago a historian whose name I can’t recall at the moment, did a nice rebuttal of the idea. In my view, it is closer to the truth to state that at the beginning of the war, the Allies were the students and the Germans the masters or teachers, and as the war went along, those roles got reversed. Every enemy teaches its opponents how to best defeat it by how it chooses to make war in the first place. There’s no denying that the Germans were good, very good, but to beat them, the Allies had to be better. And they were. The Germans do deserve credit, however, for something they called “mission orders,” a concept which probably originated with General Helmuth von Moltke during the 1860s, specifically in 1869 with the study, “Instructions for Large Unit Commanders,” in which he set forth the basic idea of mission orders: “There are many situations in which the officer must act according to his own judgment. It would be indeed absurd if he waited for orders in moments where often no orders could be given. As a rule, however, his work is the most profitable for the whole when he carries out the will of his superior.” In short, the overall goals of the action being contemplated are directed by the superior officer, but the precise mechanism by which the objectives are attained is left to the judgment and discretion of the junior officer(s) closest to the operation and in-command at the scene. Decision-making and responsibility are pushed downward as far as possible. The Germans may have pioneered the idea, but arguably the Anglo-Americans (and even some, but by no means all, Soviet Army units, too) surpassed them in its employment during WWII. In that conflict, the best senior… Read more »
@ GB, I think I read somewhere front line American soldiers were also much better at getting damaged vehicles back in the fight, unlike their German counterparts, who had to wait for repair depot guys to get them going.
@ Blake Re: “I think I read somewhere front line American soldiers were also much better at getting damaged vehicles back in the fight, unlike their German counterparts, who had to wait for repair depot guys to get them going.” The mechanical ingenuity and resourcefulness of the American soldier was a tremendous force multiplier during the Second World War, including the war against Nazi Germany in the European Theater of Operations. A case in point was U.S. Army Sergeant Curtis Culin, whose story is as-fascinating as it is historically-significant. In one of the major intelligence failures of the war, SHAEF invasion planners had neither known nor appreciated the tremendous obstacle the terrain immediately inland of the invasion beaches was to present to the forces attempting to break out of the beach-heads, into the Norman countryside and then into the remainder of north/north-west France proper. The Normandy region was studded with unimproved roads, small farms, pastures, and fields – each surrounded by or adjoined by hedgerows – earthen mounds of up to 8-10 feet in height, often topped with dense hedges, trees, and other vegetation. Norman farmers had built them for centuries in lieu of stone walls or wooden fences, to enclose their lands, protect their livestock and so on. Many hedgerows could be transited only by a gate or sunken lane carved through it. Otherwise, they formed a barrier quite impassible even to the largest wheeled and tracked vehicles. The hedgerow country was a defender’s dream for the German Wehrmacht, and a nightmare for the soldiers of the American, British, Canadian and other Allied forces arrayed against them. Allied photo-reconnaissance overflights and subsequent photo interpreters had not known of the hedgerows and did not see them in their photos taken from high-altitude; nor did work reach the planners via their intelligence assets on the ground. The Allies tried breaking out via infantry-supported armor attacks, but since the tanks had to attempt to crawl over the mounds, they presented their thin belly armor to waiting German anti-tank guns, panzerfaust and panzershrek launchers, and other weapons – and were easy prey. The GIs tried to blast their way through the hedgerows prior to attacking using demolition charges, but since the defenders knew precisely where the attack would come, they could mass against it. Such attacks could succeed, but Ike quipped that he doubted there was enough high-explosive in the ETO to use that tactic every time – and losses were unacceptably high anyway and the advance was still bogged down. The American breakout was stalled, and since the British-CW offensive was synced to the U.S. sector, the break-out stalled up and down the line. No solution to the problem seemed to be at hand. Enter Sergeant Culin and his fellow GIs. They came up with the idea of using cutting torches to salvage scrap steel from invasion obstacles installed on the beaches by Rommel’s defenders, and fabricating “hedge-choppers” by welding a sort of four-pronged plow-like device onto the front of M4 Sherman… Read more »
@GB, thanks for the response and bit of history. That stuff always fascinates me.
@ Blake
You bet! Check out Cooper’s book…. it is worth the time.