Articles by Herschel Smith

The Department of the Navy provides corpsmen and other medical support to the Marines, and similarly, Chaplains are provided to both the Navy and Marines from the Department of the Navy.  When the Department of the Navy has problems, it can effect two branches of the military.

And the Department of the Navy is having Chaplain problems.  The problems with Chaplains have not been restricted to the Navy.  And to be more specific, the problems are not per se with the Chaplains, but with societal changes (and to some degree political correctness) that have made their way into policy, policy that effects the way Chaplains do business, e.g., the freedom to evangelize, to pray in the name of Christ, to preach sermons publicly that are exclusive (‘this’ is true and ‘that’ is false).  The Air Force recently attempted to regulate such things by issuing the Air Force Interim Guidelines on the Free Exercise of Religion.  The Presbyterian and Reformed Joint Commission on Chaplains and Military Personnel responded with a stinging ‘knock-down’ critique of the guidelines (other parties responded as well).  The Air Force subsequently issued Revised Interim Guidelines.  As a result, further responses ensued, and it appears that the Air Force guidelines have been permanently rescinded.  But this action was taken only after major legal battles were conducted by one Gordon James Klingenschmitt, who literally waged a one-man war to retain previously recognized rights.

But the problems don’t end with the Navy (and Air Force) waging internecine warfare against the religious among them.  There are forty one “evangelicals” who are involved in a class action law suit against the Navy for things related to the oversight, promotion and freedom of Navy Chaplains.  The charges include things such as favoritism of so-called ‘liturgical’ Chaplains over evangelicals, illegal quotas, blackballing, prejudice, etc.  To the best of our knowledge, this law suit has not run its course.

But reminiscent of the keystone cops, the Navy is not finished.  In the next volley, Strategy Page is reporting that Navy Chaplains are being reprogrammed.

October 18, 2006: The U.S. Navy is sending its chaplains back to school. The navy believes that new chaplains, sent to a ship, and serving with that ship for many years, get out of touch with the rest of the Chaplains Corps (over 800 clergy, from dozens of different faiths). To make the training program possible, about fifty chaplains will be withdrawn from serving on  ships. This will leave some smaller ships without a chaplain. And this has caused some chaplains, and sailors, to complain that the training program would mean that chaplains, coming out of the training, would be assigned to a different ship than they had come from. This would break continuity. Chaplains often serve with the same ship for many years, and thus get to know the officers, crew and families very well. Thus it is believed that all the reassignments required to carry out this training program will destroy this continuity. The navy won’t back down, especially since there have been lawsuits of late by groups of chaplains (usually from the same faith), protesting real, or imagined, injustices. The training program is meant to make sure all the chaplains are at least on the same page with what they are supposed to be doing for the navy.

The Navy just keeps blowing it.  The Navy does ships right, and Chaplains poorly.  The Navy might benefit from a common understanding of what the Chaplain is supposed to be doing.  It is not the job of the Chaplain to stay in touch with other faiths, or to do anything, per se, for the Navy.  The service of the Chaplain is directly to the Sailor, whether enlisted or officer.  It is the people whom the Chaplain serves, not the Navy or the U.S. government.  Until the Navy learns this, the internecine warfare will continue, and the real loser will be the Sailor and Marine.

The Department of the Navy provides corpsmen and other medical support to the Marines, and similarly, Chaplains are provided to both the Navy and Marines from the Department of the Navy.  When the Department of the Navy has problems, it can effect two branches of the military.

And the Department of the Navy is having Chaplain problems.  The problems with Chaplains have not been restricted to the Navy.  And to be more specific, the problems are not per se with the Chaplains, but with societal changes (and to some degree political correctness) that have made their way into policy, policy that effects the way Chaplains do business, e.g., the freedom to evangelize, to pray in the name of Christ, to preach sermons publicly that are exclusive (‘this’ is true and ‘that’ is false).  The Air Force recently attempted to regulate such things by issuing the Air Force Interim Guidelines on the Free Exercise of Religion.  The Presbyterian and Reformed Joint Commission on Chaplains and Military Personnel responded with a stinging ‘knock-down’ critique of the guidelines (other parties responded as well).  The Air Force subsequently issued Revised Interim Guidelines.  As a result, further responses ensued, and it appears that the Air Force guidelines have been permanently rescinded.  But this action was taken only after major legal battles were conducted by one Gordon James Klingenschmitt, who literally waged a one-man war to retain previously recognized rights.

But the problems don’t end with the Navy (and Air Force) waging internecine warfare against the religious among them.  There are forty one “evangelicals” who are involved in a class action law suit against the Navy for things related to the oversight, promotion and freedom of Navy Chaplains.  The charges include things such as favoritism of so-called ‘liturgical’ Chaplains over evangelicals, illegal quotas, blackballing, prejudice, etc.  To the best of our knowledge, this law suit has not run its course.

But reminiscent of the keystone cops, the Navy is not finished.  In the next volley, Strategy Page is reporting that Navy Chaplains are being reprogrammed.

October 18, 2006: The U.S. Navy is sending its chaplains back to school. The navy believes that new chaplains, sent to a ship, and serving with that ship for many years, get out of touch with the rest of the Chaplains Corps (over 800 clergy, from dozens of different faiths). To make the training program possible, about fifty chaplains will be withdrawn from serving on  ships. This will leave some smaller ships without a chaplain. And this has caused some chaplains, and sailors, to complain that the training program would mean that chaplains, coming out of the training, would be assigned to a different ship than they had come from. This would break continuity. Chaplains often serve with the same ship for many years, and thus get to know the officers, crew and families very well. Thus it is believed that all the reassignments required to carry out this training program will destroy this continuity. The navy won’t back down, especially since there have been lawsuits of late by groups of chaplains (usually from the same faith), protesting real, or imagined, injustices. The training program is meant to make sure all the chaplains are at least on the same page with what they are supposed to be doing for the navy.

The Navy just keeps blowing it.  The Navy does ships right, and Chaplains poorly.  The Navy might benefit from a common understanding of what the Chaplain is supposed to be doing.  It is not the job of the Chaplain to stay in touch with other faiths, or to do anything, per se, for the Navy.  The service of the Chaplain is directly to the Sailor, whether enlisted or officer.  It is the people whom the Chaplain serves, not the Navy or the U.S. government.  Until the Navy learns this, the internecine warfare will continue, and the real loser will be the Sailor and Marine.

In Baathists Make Overture to U.S.: Now What?, we mentioned that Ibrahim al-Shimmari of the Islamic Army of Iraq made an offer, via Al-Jazeera television, to negotiate with the U.S.  Specifically, he said:

“We are prepared for any negotiations, whether secret or public, on the condition only that they are sincere. We have no objection to mediators with international credentials, and it is possible to exchange letters.

On July 26, 2006, David Frum posted on “Iraq: New Plan Wanted.”  David set before us the current situation in Iraq, and then taking off of Peter Galbraith’s op-ed piece in the NYT, recommended a backup plan for Iraq that involves a redeployment of troops to northern Iraq in Kurdish territory.

As an alternative to using Shiite and American troops to fight the insurgency in Iraq’s Sunni center, the administration should encourage the formation of several provinces into a Sunni Arab region with its own army, as allowed by Iraq’s Constitution. Then the Pentagon should pull its troops from this Sunni territory and allow the new leaders to establish their authority without being seen as collaborators.

Seeing as we cannot maintain the peace in Iraq, we have but one overriding interest there today — to keep Al Qaeda from creating a base from which it can plot attacks on the United States. Thus we need to have troops nearby prepared to re-engage in case the Sunni Arabs prove unable to provide for their own security against the foreign jihadists.

This would be best accomplished by placing a small “over the horizon

Thematic in our discussions here have been that the best counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is to provide the people with security.  Mothers want to know that their children can go to school and play in the yards and streets without fear of harm.  To use a heavily worn expression, the way to “win the hearts and minds of the people” is to give them peace.  This is true in Iraq at least of tribes and sects (the Sunni want protection from the Shia, the Shia from the Sunni, etc.).

We have shown that the force size to effect this security has been too small in Iraq, and that trust in local troops yields both uncertain results and an impedance to U.S. troops.  Moreover, constantly offensive operations against guerrilla forces is a tactic that has a proven track record.  Contrary to this, forces in Iraq, after the initial campaign to overthrow the regime, redeployed to well-gaurded bases, while failing to share the risk with the people and consistently conduct COIN operations against the enemy.  As an example of the success of properly conducted COIN operations, our good friend Michael Fumento has recently blogged directly from Ramadi concerning the strategic success of Combat Operation Posts.  These posts, scattered throughout Ramadi, ensure that the U.S. troops are close to both the people and the enemy, while also forcing daily operations against the enemy.

Contrary to this proven COIN strategy, UPI is reporting that troops in Afghanistan are redeploying to their barracks, thereby committing the same mistake we made in Iraq.

More than a month after Pakistan inked a peace deal with local leaders in the restive tribal region straddling its frontier with Afghanistan, some NATO troops are trying the same tactic on their side of the border, redeploying to barracks and relying on tribal militias to keep Taliban insurgents in check.

The truces are part of a new “hearts and minds” strategy on both sides of the border, as coalition and Pakistani authorities attempt to engage local tribal leaders and woo them away from Taliban extremists.

But the NATO deal, in four northern districts of Helmand province, comes as evidence mounts that the Pakistani truce in Waziristan has failed to reduce cross-border infiltration by Taliban fighters looking to engage coalition troops in Afghanistan.

So the strategy here is to let the tribes in Afghanistan send their fathers and sons to wage war against better trained and equipped fighters, potentially losing their lives, with these fighters being of the same or similar religious persuasion, while the U.S. troops redeploy to their barracks in safety.  Stunningly, this is the strategy employed as part of the doctrine to “win the hearts and minds of the people.”  The UPI article does make mention of one very important factor.

“The effort to engage the Taliban’s tribal base makes sense,” said Haqqani, “if at the same time you are degrading the ideological leadership through a military campaign.”

It is difficult to see how NATO forces will wage a military campaign while redeployed to their barracks.

When pressed as to why he had not requested more troops to deal with both the al Anbar Province and the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad at the same time, General Abizaid responded with the following retort: “Where would you like me to get them from?”  He continued by pointing out that the U.S. currently  has about 500,000 ground troops, and some 390,000 of them are deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Abizaid has given an extremely spirited defense of the idea that the U.S. has just the right number of troops.

Contrary to this, we have argued in Force Size and other posts that the U.S. has needed more troops than are currently deployed in order to effectively and efficiently achieve security and stability, and that force projection will be inversely proportional to the amount of force that actually has to be exercised.  But Abizaid’s question is salient.  If we increased force size in Iraq, where exactly would these troops come from?  Actually, Abizaid knows, but saying it would be unacceptable because it would involve policy changes.  Generals like Abizaid should be able intelligently to discuss policy, but the policy changes needed to free troops are of a nature that would require White House and Joint Chief’s of Staff involvement and approval.  So these changes are above Abizaid’s head.

There are approximately 100,000 troops deployed in Europe, another 32,000 in South Korea, and 35,000 in Japan.  But the cold war is over, and the troop deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo are at the same time not onerous and unnecessary.  NATO could take more burden in the absence of U.S. troops.  The burden, both financial and in manpower deprivation to other parts of the world, of troop deployments in Japan is significant, and it is time to reconsider whether the U.S. can and should be the protector of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.  Victor Davis Hanson argues for a multi-pronged approach in dealing with the North Korea situation, including a new and robust push for missile defense, as well as clear threats against North Korea.  But one interesting piece of his theoretical construct involves troop force reductions in South Korea.

To work with South Korea, we need to start withdrawing troops to Pusan—and well beyond. Much of the present mess arose from the appeasement of the Sunshine policy—in part, fueled by the revisionism of Korean ingrate leftists who rewrote the Korean War in populist terms of American imperialism and their own victimization. This was, in part, due to Korean nationalism that envisioned an eventual pan-Korea state birthed by slow and insidious osmosis from the south; and, in part, a result of strategic complacence of a half-century made possible by American subsidies and deployments. It made sense to garrison Americans on the DMZ when Seoul was weak and nascent, but not now when its population and economy dwarf the North’s. Getting America off the DMZ would give us more strategic options through air power, and wake up the South Koreans, reminding them that cheap triangulation with the United States has real costs. They can either play Churchill or Chamberlain—but it’s their call, not ours, since we have wider worries protecting Japan and Taiwan that transcend South Korea’s Sunshine nonsense.

We have also made it clear that Japan should make preparations for its own self defense.  Given troop force reductions in Europe, Japan and South Korea, the U.S. should be able to redeploy enough troops to Iraq to achieve security and in Afghanistan to deal with a resurgent Taliban.

Shia Islamic cleric Moqtada al Sadr has issued orders to his loosely organized militias by calling for an end to Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence.

BAGHDAD – Radical cleric Moqtada Al Sadr ordered his militia on Friday not to take part in the wave of sectarian bloodshed sweeping Iraq, as the head of the British army called for his troops to be brought home.

The Shia firebrand issued the order amid what a US military spokesman called a “tremendous spike

In lieu of Friday night music, here are two pictures.  The first is taken from Grandfather Mountain, North Carolina.  The second is of Daniel in his dress blues.  It takes a lot to get a Marine into his dress blues.  This was a lot.  Daniel’s best buddy, Andy Strickland, got married.  Andy and Daniel went through MEPS, Boot Camp and SOI together, were picked up by the fleet together and are in the same platoon at Camp Lejeune.  They will deploy together.  There isn’t any doubt in my mind that either one would die for the other.

There is much bluster over counterinsurgency operations; what it means, how to do it, what causes these operations to succeed, and what causes them to fail.  There are even washed-up Generals who want the U.S. to jettison the “kill-kill” warrior ethos of the military in favor of a different approach as part of our COIN strategy.  [As an editorial note, there are so many things misrepresented and misconstrued in the “kinder and gentler soldier” article linked above that the real confusion is where to begin with debunking them.  The Generals misrepresent when the warrior ethos was introduced into the military and focus on the history of the Army rather than the Marines, they ignore the more than 300 engagements the USMC has had over its history in which for many of these operations they have successfully executed COIN operations in spite of the washed-up Generals, etc.]

It is simply not helpful to talk counterinsurgency and “winning the hearts and minds of the people,” without giving examples of its execution so that the strategy can be taught and implemented.  Good friend of the Captain’s Journal, Michael Fumento, is blogging from Ramadi, and he is giving us good and instructive COIN discussion material with his post Cop-ing out in Ramadi.

A COP is a combat operation post, and such posts are starting to play a crucial role in pacifying Al Anbar. In the Ramadi area, at least, COPs comprise an undersized company of four companies and about 80 soldiers. (Although Anvil has considerably more than that.) Anvil also has four M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles attached to it, each of which has a .25 caliber fully automatic gun and lesser guns along with an anti-armor capability. Anvil has three American platoons and one Iraqi Army one, but one of the American ones and the IA one are being loaned elsewhere right now. No matter, a COP can operate at half strength for awhile.

COPs are tiny compared to FOBs like Corregidor, which had a full battalion plus numerous support elements or about 800 men in all. In fact, this place comprises just two houses leased from Iraqi civilians. First Armored Division has put in 11 COPs so far, I believe, and is building a 12th. There will probably be many more to come.

In any counterinsurgency effort, a key to pacifying an area is to plop fortifications with interlocking communications into enemy territory and send out patrols. For example, King Edward I of England (the guy who had Braveheart drawn and quartered) used castles to subdue Wales. Nowadays we call this “grab and hold.” Originally we started doing that in Vietnam but gave it up in favor of search and destroy missions from large base camps, which helped contribute to losing the war.

One value of a COP versus the much larger FOBs and the huge camps such as Camp Ramadi is that this is an enemy that inflicts most casualties and damage with IEDS, greatly restricting movement. But missions from COPs are inherently short-range; you’re already almost there. That’s less road to be on and fewer IEDs to worry about.

In Habitually Offensive Operations Against Guerrillas, we discussed the re-deployment of U.S. troops to large, well-gaurded bases and the reduction of patrols allowing the growth of the insurgency, in contrast with the recommendation of the Small Wars Manual.  Michael Fumento is documenting a case in which the Small Wars Manual COIN strategy is working.  Continuing:

Another advantage of a COP is a shorter reaction time for one unit to support another, although that’s rarely necessary because the enemy just doesn’t mass in large units. They don’t have the men to do that like they used to. This inability to mass also makes COPs possible. In Vietnam, the enemy had lots of soldiers and highly-trained and motivated sappers that could cut through concertina wire barriers, throw satchel charges, and wreak havoc while the VC infantry came up behind them. This allowed them to inflict heavy casualties on small units, such as those manning howitzers. On a few occasions, they completely overran those positions. But the chance of a COP being overrun is essentially nil.

The impact of the FOB system was shown to me on a map. The foreigners who come into this area do so along a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail from the west, namely Jordan and Syria. And the foreigners tend to be better trained. Certainly any good sniper will come from that route, because Iraqis are terrible shots and hence crummy snipers.

From this road the terrorists would then literally fan out in the area where the COPs have been inserted. That is, their area of operation was shaped like a fan. But the troops from the COPs have rolled them up in a counter-clockwise pattern such that the only major activity left now is in a slice near the Tigris. Areas that Capt. Sapp would originally only send full platoons into, sometimes even with armor, he will now allow a squad of perhaps 12 men to enter. At some point, the bad guys will be pushed out of this last piece of the fan. Where they’ll go, who knows. The point is that they’ll have been denied their first choice of an operating area. It’s like knocking off the head of a terrorist cell. Yes, he’ll just be replaced. But the man originally chosen for the job is now dead and the cell weakened to that extent.

Any counterinsurgency operation is likely to fail without the right force projection.  We have argued that force size is the critical element to successful pacification.  If we know that the enemy (foreign fighters, most certainly al Qaeda) is coming into Iraq along a “mini-Ho Chi Minh” trail, this information immediately redounds to the question “why can’t we stop this traffic?”

The answer is that we can with the right force projection.  If the means of ingress into Iraq are turned into a shooting gallery where the foreign fighter faces certain death should he attempt to cross the border, then one of two things happens, leading to a consequent.  Either the foreign fighter dies at the border, or if he is smart, he doesn’t attempt to cross.  The consequence is that the existing foreign fighters do not get reinforced.  As U.S. forces share the risk of the people and protect the population, and as the foreign fighters (and Sunni Mujahideen) are killed, the pacification of the region finally ensues, and mothers can trust in the security of their homes and schools.  This, rather than the “kinder and gentler soldier,” is the road to “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (also known as the Chatham House) in Britain recently released a report essentially charging that the U.S.-led war in Iraq has strengthened Iran.

The United States, with Coalition support, has eliminated two of Iran’s regional rival governments — the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in April 2003 — but has failed to replace either with coherent and stable political structures. The outbreak of conflict on two fronts in June –July 2006 between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, and Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon has added to the regional dimensions of this instability.

Consequently, Iran has moved to fill the regional void with an apparent ease that has disturbed both regional players and the United States and its European allies. Iran is one of the most significant and powerful states in the region and its influence spreads well beyond its critical location at the nexus of the Middle East, Turkey, the Caucasus, Central Asia and South Asia.

This influence has a variety of forms but all can be turned against the US presence in Iraq with relative ease, and almost certainly would heighten US casualties to the point where a continued presence might not be tenable. Sources in Iraq are already warning that the major cities (including Basra and Baghdad) have witnessed a rise in the activities of Iranian paramilitary units and the recent bout of violence and instability in Basra is now considered to be a small display of what would happen if Iran itself was targeted.

This is certainly an unintended consequence, but for the purpose of precision in our analysis, it should be made clear that this is not directly a function of the global war on terror.  Rather, if Iran has becomed stronger as a result of the broader war, it is a function of the strategy the U.S. has chosen to implement the war.  As we have previously discussed, the conduct of the war has been marked by brilliant command decision juxtaposed with lurching and stumbling.  The initial ground campaign was magnificent, but it bypassed large urban areas leaving huge numbers of Mujahideen alive to fight another day.  The force size was perfect for the initial ground campaign and woefully inadequate for the maintenance of security.  The U.S. troops too quickly transitioned from conventional operations to counterinsurgency, and rather than share the risk with the Iraqi people, they reflexively cloistered on well-gaurded bases and stayed there the more that IEDs became the primary means of warring against them.  As a result, the homes, schools and streets became more dangerous, and the high level of danger brought more power to those who can cause the danger and inflict the pain.

But the things directly under our control at the present cause us to have no excuse for any further strengthening of Iran.  One such instance of having no excuse is the State Department.  In a jaw-dropping example of the reticence at the State Department, the U.S. has just yesterday approved the sale of aircraft parts to Iran, and has given us this reasoning for its support.

“Our recommendation is consistent with the US government’s commitment to promote international safety-of-flight standards and ensure the safety of all aviation passengers, including the citizens of Iran,” the State Department said.

The US Federal Aviation Administration recommended immediate overhaul of US-made engines on certain Airbus planes, some of which are used by Iran Air, the statement said, and the US Departments of Commerce and State reported to Congress their recommendations to allow the sale.

“Therefore, despite our grave concerns regarding the Iranian regime’s activities, we believe this decision is consistent with our commitment to support the Iranian people and to use US sanctions to target the regime, not the Iranian people.”

To set this in context, imagine for a moment that it is 1944, and the State Department is proudly waltzing onto stage to announce that we have just approved the sale of U.S. steel manufacturing and fabrication technology to Germany because we care about the people.

Until and unless the State Department is coerced into actually contributing to the global war on terror (that is, on behalf of the U.S., we are constrained to mention), we are fighting with one hand tied behind our back.