The Paradox and Absurdities of Carbon-Fretting and Rewilding

Herschel Smith · 28 Jan 2024 · 4 Comments

The Bureau of Land Management is planning a truly boneheaded move, angering some conservationists over the affects to herd populations and migration routes.  From Field & Stream. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) recently released a draft plan outlining potential solar energy development in the West. The proposal is an update of the BLM’s 2012 Western Solar Plan. It adds five new states—Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming—to a list of 11 western states already earmarked…… [read more]

The Right Prescription for the Taliban

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 8 months ago

Admonitions to spin off factions of the Taliban or Taliban-sympathizers against the so-called “hard core” Taliban are becoming commonplace.  But who are the Taliban?  We have already discussed the disaggregation of the Taliban into drug runners, war lords, petty former anti-Soviet commanders, criminals, Afghan Taliban, Pakistan Taliban, al Qaeda, and other rogue elements in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Drug runners, local war lords and other criminals can be dealt with differently than the Taliban.  Drug runners will likely not have strong inclinations to Islamic fundamentalism and certainly not the global expansion of the same.  On the other hand, the religiously motivated fighters within Afghanistan likely number as many as ten thousand fighters, including 3000 or so full time insurgents.

Then there is the Afghan Taliban who are not located within Afghanistan but who are indigenous to Afghanistan, under the leadership of Mohammed Omar who is probably in or around Quetta, Pakistan.  They continually resupply Taliban fighters and give them rest and sanctuary within Pakistan.  Quetta is a revolving door of support for Afghan fighters.

This group is organizationally disconnected with the Tehrik-i-Taliban, or Pakistan Taliban.  These are groups of Taliban who are led by various commanders, the most powerful of whom are Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, and Mullah Fazlullah in the SWAT valley.  The Tehrik-i-Taliban number tens of thousands more fighters.  It is estimated that Mehsud alone owns 20,000 fighters.

The Tehrik-i-Taliban are different than the Afghan Taliban in that they have brought a hard core global expansionist focus to their radical religious views.  It is what Nicholas Schmidle calls the Next-Gen Taliban.

Some Afghan Taliban have laid down their weapons and taken up the Taliban cause in politics.  They have not changed their belief system – the same one that allied itself with the Taliban fighters and al Qaeda prior to 9/11.  The Afghan fighters who remain active in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have not laid down their weapons and still harbor hopes of regaining the leadership of Afghanistan.  The Tehrik-i-Taliban are hard core radicals, and shout to passersby in Khyber “We are Taliban! We are mujahedin! “We are al-Qaida!”  There is no distinction.

Not a single group or subgroup listed above can be violently turned against the active Taliban fighters, mostly because their are ideologically aligned.  In Anbar, Iraq, the more secular Sunni tribes had the religiously motivated al Qaeda thrust on them from the outside with all of the oppressive violence, and it didn’t take long for them to rebel.  The same is not true of either Afghanistan or Pakistan.  The proof is pre-9/11 history in Afghanistan where the hard core fighters – including al Qaeda – had safe haven.

There are repeated instances of misdiagnosis of the problem.

Given this state of affairs, Karzai and his foreign allies will not be in a position to do much against the Taliban and its supporters unless they work on three main objectives simultaneously. One is to address their political and strategic vulnerabilities; another is to widen and speed up reconstruction. A third is to re-establish a stable Afghan-Pakistan border by pressuring Pakistan  to halt all support for the Taliban.

True enough for potential future Taliban fighters whom we wish to keep in the fold, this prescription is wrong for the existing Taliban because the ailment has been misdiagnosed (and besides, pressure has already been put on Pakistan, to no avail).  For the Taliban, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum has the right suggestion: “NATO forces must be united in their commitment to wage war against the Taliban.”  No single group can be spun off to fight the Taliban in lieu of Western military operations against them.

Al Qaeda Withdrawal from Iraq

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 8 months ago

In Resurgence of Taliban and al Qaeda we relied on the CTC Sentinel at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point to show that there had begun a steady redeployment of al Qaeda and foreign fighters away from Iraq and to Afghanistan and Pakistan.  “By 2007, jihadist websites from Chechnya to Turkey to the Arab world began to feature recruitment ads calling on the “Lions of Islam” to come fight in Afghanistan. It appears that many heeded the call. This was especially true after the Anbar Awakening of anti-al-Qa`ida tribal leaders and General David Petraeus’ “surge strategy” made Iraq less hospitable for foreign volunteers.”

This steady drain of fighters away from Iraq has increased lately as reported by the Gulf News.

Some groups of Al Qaida terror network in Iraq have started leaving the country towards other hot spots in Africa like Sudan and Somalia, security sources tell Gulf News.

A key reason behind the change in strategy by the so-called Al Qaida Organisation in Mesopotamia is the intensity of the latest military strikes launched by Iraqi and US forces against the network, which has been the major challenge to restoring the stability of Iraq, the sources said.

“Our intelligence information indicates the withdrawal of certain groups of Al Qaida fromIraq because of the military strikes. Many of them have escaped through the borders with Syria and Iran to hotter zones such as Somalia and Sudan,” Major General Hussain Ali Kamal, head of the Investigation and Information Agency at the Interior Ministry, told Gulf News.

“I believe this is the beginning of the complete withdrawal of Al Qaida from Iraqi territory.”

A source at Iraqi Ministry of National Security said that documents and letters found in hideouts of “some elements of Al Qaida” during search operations in Sunni suburbs in Baghdad, which were previously under the control of Al Qaida, “prove these elements left Iraq for Somalia and Sudan”.

The sources for this article are mistaken that al Qaeda has “started leaving the country.”  They had started during the campaign for Anbar and later during the initial stages of the security plan for Baghdad.  The pace has apparently increased according to intelligence obtained directly from al Qaeda.  This is very good news for Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the vigilance must not wane.  Al Qaeda left Iraq and headed for Pakistan and Afghanistan, and now Somalia and the Sudan (among other countries – AQ was already present in Libya).

The Captain’s Journal has previously recommended that the U.S. Marines be deployed to Afghanistan to support Operation Enduring Freedom, and Somali and Sudan and other countries in Africa and the Middle East will need our attention.  While Iraq must be made secure and stable, we must not forget that the long war is against a transnational insurgency which has no recognition of borders as important or even existent with respect to its ideology.

Marine Money in the Helmand Province

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 8 months ago

In U.S. Marine Style Counterinsurgency we discussed the Marines’ complaint shop after kinetic operations in and around Garmser.  The Marines pay for broken windows, dead farm animals, busted doors, and so forth.  This is the right thing to do, as well as being productive policy.  The surest way to lose the cooperation and respect of the population is to destroy their property and ignore their consequent needs from the battles.  Much money was promised, but at the end of the article it came to light that so far, the money was promised but not forthcoming.

There’s one flaw in the Marines’ campaign. While they freely issue compensation vouchers, they don’t have any actual money to give out yet. The cash, the Marines tell the villagers, will be here on July 1. The date has already slipped once, from mid-June, and some people doubt they’ll ever see the money. “If we don’t pay them on the first,” Sgt. Blake said, “it’s going to be bad.”

The Captain’s Journal responded, “the money had better be there because it affects the reputation of the U.S. Marines and the COIN effort underway in Afghanistan.  Time for the DoD to “belly up to the bar.”

True to the consistent reputation of the Marines, the money is shown below displayed nicely, just prior to be handed out to locals.

Photo courtesy of DVIDS.

The Taliban Can Be Beaten

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 8 months ago

First the British were going to show the U.S. all about proper rules of engagement, proper counterinsurgency, and right conduct in a foreign country.  As Basra headed downhill, the British were demoralized and talked of the “good war” in Afghanistan – the campaign that must be won.  This vision has evaporated, and not just because of the talk by David Miliband and Des Brown.  The support is vanishing at the grass roots level.

Britain went into Helmand two years ago on the basis of gung-ho, and gung-ho still censors public debate. Yet behind the scenes all is despair. A meeting of Afghan observers in London last week, at the launch of James Fergusson’s book on the errors of Helmand, A Million Bullets, was an echo chamber of gloom.

All hope was buried in a cascade of hypotheticals. Victory would be at hand “if only” the Afghan army were better, if the poppy crop were suppressed, the Pakistan border sealed, the Taliban leadership assassinated, corruption eradicated, hearts and minds won over. None of this is going to happen. The generals know it but the politicians dare not admit it.

Those who still support the “good” Afghan war reply to any criticism by attempting to foreclose debate. They assert that we cannot be seen to surrender to the Taliban and we have gone in so far and must “finish the job”.

This is policy in denial. Nothing will improve without the support of the Afghan government, yet that support is waning by the month. Nothing will improve without the commitment of Pakistan. Yet two weeks ago Nato bombed Pakistani troops inside their own country, losing what lingering sympathy there is for America in an enraged Islamabad. Whoever ordered the attack ought to be court-martialled, except it was probably a computer.

We forget that the objective of the Afghanistan incursion was not to build a new and democratic Afghanistan. It was to punish the Taliban for harbouring Osama Bin Laden and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for Al-Qaeda training camps. The former objective was achieved on day one; the latter would never be achieved by military occupation.

It took the U.S. Marines to pacify Garmser, and so one has to wonder at just how gung ho the Brits were, especially when a single book can cause such moribund views of the campaign.  Continuing with Jenkins’ commentary:

Two things were known about the Taliban at the time and they are probably still true. First, under outside pressure their leaders were moving from the manic extremism of their “student” origins, even responding to demands to curb the poppy harvest. The present Nato policy of killing the older leaders and thus leaving young hotheads in charge is daft.

Second, the Pashtun Taliban are not natural friends of the Arab Al-Qaeda, despite Bin Laden being given sanctuary by the Taliban’s Mullah Omar. Bin Laden helped the Taliban by murdering Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Tajik leader, but that put a Tajik price on his head, which no man wants. Then the 9/11 coup made the Taliban pariahs even within the region.

Jenkins is being foolish and making things up.  There is no strategy to “kill the older leaders and thus leaving young hotheads in charge.”  Further, to pretend that the Taliban were or are moderating their views is worse than stolid and dense.  It’s dangerous, specifically because of what Jenkins recommends.

What is sure is that Al-Qaeda, as a (grossly overrated) “threat to the West”, will not be suppressed without Taliban cooperation. This means reversing a policy that naively equates “defeating” the Taliban with “winning” the war on terror. Fighting in Afghanistan is as senseless as trying to suppress the poppy crop. It just costs lives and money.

The British view of the world has grown bizarre, or at least it has for Jenkins’ and the friends with whom he cavorts.  All the Taliban really want is their piece of the pie.  Drive al Qaeda and the other globalists out, they will.  Only, this is daydreaming.

A more hearty view comes from inside Afghanistan from warlord-turned-military commander Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum.

Following a traditional exchange of greetings and compliments, I asked the general to explain how the Taliban have managed to rebuild their support base and expand the insurgency.

“The Taliban are not unbeatable, and they do not field large troop formations,” he said. “They are a loose-knit group without a central organization in Afghanistan.

“The Taliban are equipped in Pakistan and sent into southern Afghanistan to wage an insurgency and to prevent reconstruction.”

When asked what was necessary to defeat the insurgents, Dostum was quick to respond.

NATO forces must be united in their commitment to wage war against the Taliban, and they must create a unique Afghan fighting force to help them accomplish this,” he said. “The current (Afghan) national army with its current leadership will never be efficient.”

The proposed new Afghan force would be recruited from Dostum’sown former Northern Alliance fighters, numbering about 5,000, and the general believes he is the best candidate to lead this army.

“I haven’t been defeated at any stage in time,” he boasted. “I will crush the Taliban with a complete defeat in a very short time, just six months, and push them totally outside of Afghanistan’s borders.”

Then the fledgling Afghan army would have the breathing space it needs to develop into a professional fighting force, he said.

The Northern Alliance, recall, is the group that forced the Taliban out with a slight bit of help from the U.S.  After this, we felt it necessary to enter into all manner of shady deals with Taliban-sympathizers rather than deploy forces to the theater, and thus the campaign has steadily gone downhill since (with steadily worsening security).

Rather than being the answer to the malaise in the campaign, making shady deals with Taliban and their sympathizers is what has gotten the campaign where it is today.  While it may be a most delightful daydream to imagine that we can simply leave the theater to good men who will drive out the extremists, the problem is that the men we will leave the theater to are the extremists.

Two Worthy Causes

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 8 months ago

No Greater Sacrifice

The men and women of the United States Armed Forces and law enforcement communities risk their lives every day for our country and our way of life. There is no greater sacrifice: to serve, to work, to fight – and if need be – to lay down one’s life for the cause of freedom. In making this sacrifice, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, and law enforcement official is forced to leave his or her loved ones back home.

No Greater Sacrifice (“NGS”) serves to bridge the educational development and professional mentoring gap for the children of our nation’s fallen heroes. Our job is to help finish their work by raising funds to pay for college tuition and graduate degree programs and to provide professional mentoring for their children. NGS accomplishes its mission by funding the charities that are already on the ground working on behalf of this noble cause, including:

The Marine Corps – Law Enforcement Foundation
The Special Operations Warrior Foundation
And other local charities that support the NGS mission

Operation Worship

You don’t have to be for or against war to support someone who has volunteered to defend your freedom and your country. Being in harm’s way takes its toll on the individual and the serviceperson’s family. You can encourage them with a personal note and a spiritual help.

Open Window Foundation, a non-profit ministry, created Operation worship to serve U.S. military people around the globe.

Tyndale Publishing House designed a Bible especially for deployed military people that includes a special page for your personal message of encouragement or prayer.

Stop by your local Christian store for a $4.99 Bible, write your message and we’ll ensure it’s delivered free to a deployed soldier or soldier’s spouse.

100,000 Bibles for our troops in 100 days.

Escalation in Afghanistan

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 8 months ago

Both the size of the ISAF and the insurgency are growing in Afghanistan, but the the rates of growth are disparate.

Each year since 2002, the number of U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan has grown. And each year, during the “fighting season” of spring and summer, the number of attacks by the Taliban has also increased, prompting commanders to conclude that still more troops are needed. This year is no exception. There are 66,000 foreign troops from 40 countries in Afghanistan, including 37,500 Americans; the force under NATO command has grown by 20,000 in 18 months. But Taliban attacks are up 40 percent in eastern provinces this year compared with 2007, and there has been another spike in coalition casualties. In May and June, more Western soldiers died in Afghanistan than in Iraq. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that “at least” three additional brigades, or about 10,500 more troops, are needed for combat operations and training of the Afghan army.

Will the escalation never end? The war in Afghanistan sometimes appears to suffer from a syndrome that also plagued the United States in Vietnam: incremental increases in troops that are never enough to turn the situation around. Had former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld deployed 60,000 troops in 2002 — rather than 5,000 — Afghanistan might have been pacified. Now it seems that a “surge” of troops, like that successfully applied to Iraq last year, might be needed to turn the tide of the war.

The problem is that large numbers of fresh troops are unavailable. The U.S. military currently lacks the reserves, and NATO nations can’t or won’t provide them. Germany, Britain and France have recently pledged more soldiers, but the numbers are relatively small.

There have been more U.S. and NATO troops killed in Afghanistan in June than in Iraq for the second straight month.  But more to the point, many of the NATO troops aren’t allowed in kinetic engagements, so deploying more German troops doesn’t help if their mission is unnecessary.  To comprehend the full force of the report, it should be realized that some troops are taking a disproportionate level of the burden (e.g., U.S. troops), and the Marines’ deployment to Afghanistan has been bloody.

For the Marine Corps this year Afghanistan has proven a deadly and treacherous place.

Whereas 18 months ago the service was absorbing dozens of casualties per month in attacks throughout the once-restive al Anbar province in Iraq, today the bloodletting is in Afghanistan, where a resurgent Taliban insurgency and an undermanned, politically-constrained NATO force has lead to a sharp rise in leathernecks killed or wounded.

In June alone — when seasonal thaws lead to increased attacks from insurgent groups — the force of some 3,200 Marines there suffered 10 killed in action, including one Navy corpsman. By comparison, of the 23,000 Marines in Iraq, six were killed in June.

So far this year 13 Marines have been killed in combat in Afghanistan while 17 have been killed in Iraq. 

And for the Marine battalion commander in Afghanistan who lost nine of those killed in action in June, the deaths are hitting his unit hard.

Note again that the Marine Corps had in Afghanistan 167% of the casualties it took in Iraq, with roughly seven times as many Marines deployed in Iraq.  This is a remarkable statistic, and states clearer than any other argument where the “tip of the spear” should be deployed.

There is action on the political front with Pakistan, who is apparently getting edgy with their territorial rights (seasoned with a big dose of fear of the Tehrik-i-Taliban).

When Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani meets President George W. Bush at the White House on June 28, he will tell the US leader that Islamabad will tolerate a US incursion into Fata if it is directed specifically against Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden or Ayman Al Zawahiri – but nobody else, says a report published on Friday.

Quoting senior US and Pakistani officials, the Time magazine reported that the prime minister, however, would also tell Mr Bush that Pakistan would not allow incursions into its territory for any other Al Qaeda or Taliban leaders.

“If they do a raid and they find No. 3 or No. 4 or No. 5 but don’t get Bin Laden, it’s going to be a realproblem,” said the report, quoting a senior Pakistani official.

Ahead of the events again, The Captain’s Journal had previously said that Afghanistan would remain the focal point for kinetic operations against the Taliban, and that Pakistan could not be counted as allies in the fight.  This remains true despite arguments to the contrary.  “Expert” Jeremy Shapiro (Brookings Institution, RAND, Georgetown) stated to Spiegel that there is no need for additional troops.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Policy-makers in the US and Europe are shocked by the gloomy Pentagon assessment for Afghanistan. You, however, are pleading for more optimism. Why?

Shapiro: There is ample reason for gloom, but we need to keep in mind that in the best of circumstances, Afghanistan is a long-term mission. We are talking about a commitment of 10 or 20 years. I believe we have fundamentally the right strategy in place, but even if that is so it will take some time to show progress. I don’t believe we need the major review people are talking about.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Everyone seems to be asking for more troops in Afghanistan, though. President George W. Bush, John McCain, even Barack Obama.

Shapiro: More soldiers could be put to good use there, but they wouldn’t fundamentally change the situation. Let’s assume we would send in 10,000 more, as is contemplated: They could improve the local situation in a few areas for a time, but they would not rectify the problem of the Pakistani border areas and their ability to infiltrate insurgents into Afghanistan. As long as we don’t solve that problem, you could put 100,000 soldiers into Afghanistan and you would still have asymmetric attacks in various parts of Afghanistan and a rate of civilian and military casualties similar to the current one. And I have not yet heard viable suggestions on how to deal with the problem of the Pakistani border areas.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: But isn’t it understandable that security is paramount to people in Afghanistan?

Shapiro: Of course, but we can’t solve that problem simply by increasing forces. Achieving overall security in Afghanistan will be a slow process and unfortunately we will have to tolerate violence in the country for a long time.

Some expert.  So that there is no confusion, The Captain’s Journal unequivocally states that the argument above is idiotic.  The population will not “tolerate violence in the country for a long time,” and this is ridiculous counterinsurgency policy.  Additionally, it is immoral and counterproductive.  NATO (and the U.S.) will not be welcome for a “long time” if we continue to tolerate violence.  Shapiro doesn’t understand the ebb and flow of counterinsurgency campaigns.  Also, recognizing that the nature of insurgencies is to engage in asymmetric warfare is correct and has absolutely no relevance to the argument concerning force size.  Shapiro should stay on point.

Again, Syria has been a problem with respect to infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq, but the surge and security plan (along with other events such as the Anbar awakening) has slowed the river of fighters to a trickle.  While harder and more costly, it is possible to fight a transnational insurgency in a local battlespace, as long as global pressure is brought to bear.

Pakistan is a thorny problem, and obviously their pact with the Taliban cannot be honored by the U.S.  But Pakistan’s recalcitrance is no argument for under-resourcing the campaign in Afghanistan.  Recall the words of one Taliban commander: “If NATO remains strong in Afghanistan, it will put pressure on Pakistan. If NATO remains weaker in Afghanistan, it will dare [encourage] Pakistan to support the Taliban.”

We’ll take the admonition of the Taliban over the pontification of Jeremy Shapiro.  More troops will indeed “fundamentally change the situation.”  Similar to other RAND studies (which advocate a very small footprint for COIN), Shapiro behaves as if the last two years in Iraq never occurred and the gains never happened.  The quickest gains in Iraq were at the hands of the U.S. Marines (the experience on which, at least in part, the security plan in Baghdad was based).  They now stand ready to be at the tip of the spear in Afghanistan.

The “Economy of Force Campaign”

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 9 months ago

Marines do seven month tours.  Changing this is a big deal.  A big deal has occurred, and the 24th MEU has had their tour of Afghanistan extended by one month.

In a decision reflecting the shortage of available combat troops, more than 2,000 Marines fighting the Taliban will be kept in Afghanistan 30 days beyond their original seven-month tour, the Marine Corps said yesterday.

The decision by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to extend the Marines’ tour was confirmed a day after Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that more troops are needed in Afghanistan but that he didn’t have more troops to send.

Gates had said several times in recent months that he had “no plans” to extend the Marines’ tour. But U.S. officials, including Mullen, have said recently that the situation in Afghanistan is worsening and that the Taliban-led insurgency is gaining ground and influence.

At present there are 32,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, of which 14,000 are assigned to work under the International Security Assistance Force, the 40-nation coalition led by U.S. Army Gen. David McKiernan.

The other 18,000 U.S. troops are fighting directly under U.S. command, mostly in eastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan, where violent attacks by insurgents have risen 40 percent from a year ago, according to a U.S. commander there.

In addition to U.S. forces, about 29,000 troops from 40 countries are serving in Afghanistan, although some are restricted by their home commands from combat.

Maj. David Nevers, a Marine Corps spokesman, confirmed that Gates had authorized an extension for up to 30 days for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, an air-ground task force that deployed to Afghanistan in February and March.

The unit’s air squadron of jet fighters and attack helicopters, and its reinforced infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, have been fighting Taliban and other extremists around the southern Helmand province town of Garmser, a major poppy-growing region and insurgent stronghold, since late March.

Nevers said the Marines are needed “to continue full-spectrum operations as they have been doing” in southern Afghanistan.

The Captain’s Journal has noted too many times to cite that Operation Enduring Freedom needs forces and force projection.  The more acceptable way to say it this.

The nation’s top military officer said yesterday that more U.S. troops are needed in Afghanistan to tamp down an increasingly violent insurgency, but that the Pentagon does not have sufficient forces to send because they are committed to the war in Iraq.

Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said insurgent Taliban and extremist forces in Afghanistan have become “a very complex problem,” one that is tied to the extensive drug trade, a faltering economy and the porous border with Pakistan. Violence in Afghanistan has increased markedly over recent weeks, with June the deadliest month for U.S. troops since the war began in 2001.

“I don’t have troops I can reach for, brigades I can reach, to send into Afghanistan until I have a reduced requirement in Iraq,” Mullen told reporters at the Pentagon. “Afghanistan has been and remains an economy-of-force campaign, which by definition means we need more forces there.”

This sounds so much nicer than the way we have described it.  “Economy of force.”  But then Mullen, who cares about both the troops and the campaigns, felt that he needed to say it bluntly like The Captain’s Journal does … “which by definition means we need more forces there.”

While The Captain’s Journal has many tears invested in Iraq (specifically, Anbar), there is a half life to insurgencies – and conversely, counterinsurgencies.  They can only go on so long.  Columbia hates the FARC, and their doom is sure to come.  Marines have handed over control of Anbar to Iraq, and while we have noted our objections to the failure of the Maliki administration to reconcile with the Sunni awakening movement, the Marines have completed their work in Anbar.  There will be no further Marine engagement in that province.  It isn’t a matter of wishes or needs.  It’s a matter of the nature of the campaign.  It’s finished in Anbar.

The Marines must move on, and while the Commandant wants an MEU focus (and we understand this desire), Afghanistan needs the troops.  A month won’t do it.  One month might close out the summer fighting where the Taliban won’t come back in during 2008 and kill those in the Helmand province who cooperated with the Marines.  Maybe.  But we’re talking about slicing the salami pretty thin here.  Economy of force indeed.  It’s time for Gates and Mullen to recognize that the Marines’ mission in Iraq is essentially completed, and to turn them loose in Afghanistan.  The world will understand.

Anticipating the Insurgency

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 9 months ago

So I’m reading Robert D. Kaplan’s Imperial Grunts.  The Prologue – Injun Country – might very well be the best twelve pages I have ever read.  It should be required reading in all professional military training.  No matter how much reading you have done, no matter who you have met, no matter what your experiences have been, there is no replacement for a careful study of this Chapter.  You cannot understand the current state of affairs in the world today, the so-called global war on terror, until you have read these pages.  Kaplan sums up in a tidy and small package a wealth of knowledge and wisdom concerning the nature of imperial defense of the homeland.  Enough said.  Buy the book and read it.

Kaplan also has much wisdom concerning the nature of embedded reporters and journalists in later pages of the book, but this is a dialogue for another time.  Being an aficionado of the Small Wars Journal myself, I am disappointed that it took reading Kaplan’s book to remind me of several important observations found therein.  On page 270 of Kaplan’s book we read the following:

As if foreseeing the situation in Iraq, the Manual notes that after major fighting:

… hostile forces will withdraw into the more remote parts of the country, or will be dispersed into numerous small groups which continue to oppose the occupation.  Even though the recognized leaders may capitulate, subordinate commanders often refuse to abide by the terms of the capitulation.  Escaping to the hinterland, they assemble heterogeneous armed groups of patriotic soldiers, malcontents, notorious outlaws … and by means of guerrilla warfare, continue to harass and oppose the intervening force in its attempt to restore peace and good order throughout the country as a whole.

Then Kaplan notes other sections of the Small Wars Manual, citing it to recommend that:

To countervail such hostile forces, numerous presence patrols must be organized with the help of the native militias, and outposts erected that are “dispersed over a wide area, in order to afford the maximum protection to the peaceful inhabitants of the country.”

So much for the detractors of the Small Wars Manual.  Seriously.  Summed up in these words are reasons for rejecting any supposed lack of knowledge or anticipation of a developing insurgency after toppling the Iraqi regime, foresight into dismounted patrols, and prediction of the utility of combat outposts.  All the planners had to do was read the Small Wars Manual.  Further, the Marines were the first to employ the concept of combat outposts in Iraq (specifically in Ramadi), and while this evolved to combination outposts / police precincts in Fallujah in 2007, the idea was basically the same (and even more in tune with the Small Wars Manual than in Ramadi).

There is nothing new under the sun.  Combat outposts are not new to Iraq COIN.  They have been employed by the Marines for decades.  And recollecting the nature of the initial combat operations, major urban areas were avoided and bypassed.  MOUT (military operations on urban terrain) has always been hard on any armed forces, and it was left to the subsequent counterinsurgency effort.  Ramadi, Fallujah, Mosul, and many other areas were left untouched for months while the assumed center of gravity was targeted – Baghdad and the center of government.

No matter how much group think was present in the Pentagon prior to the invasion of Iraq, there is simply no excuse for not anticipating the insurgency.  It’s right there in the Small Wars Manual.

Inside the Taliban Jailbreak

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 9 months ago

We have previously discussed the Kandahar jailbreak by the Taliban (including the subsequent combat action in and around Kandahar), but at the time there were many unanswered questions.  While the main stream media foolishly focused their attention on the evolution of the Taliban into well-organized guerrilla fighters, The Captain’s Journal likened it more to a Mad Max movie.  The Taliban relied on a few RPGs, a small amount of command and control on the ground, and 30 or so motorcyclists with rifles.  The fault was with the Afghan police and ISAF forces, we surmised.  We posed the question(s):

Where was the force protection?  Where were the vehicle barriers (you know, those mechanically operated devices that flatten your tires if you go over them the wrong way)?  Where were the concrete truck barricades?  Where was the training?  Where was the supervision?  Forget expensive UAVs and road construction for a minute.  What about spending a little money on teaching the Afghan police about combat and force protection.  Failure to do so has cost us the freedom of 400 Taliban – and potentially U.S. lives to capture or kill them again.

Many of these questions have been answered in a recent Globe and Mail article entitled Inside the Taliban Jailbreak.  Read carefully near the end of the citation below to see just how the Canadians have approached management of this prison.

The prison cells that once held Taliban sit almost empty, with little remaining except rubbish: plates of rice ready for meals never eaten, and sandals discarded by fugitives who ran away in bare feet. Some of the debris inside Sarpoza prison offer hints about what happened amid the chaos last month when the Taliban accomplished one of the largest jailbreaks in modern history, freeing at least 800 prisoners and rampaging into Kandahar without facing any serious resistance from Canadian troops or the other forces assigned to protect the city.

A chunk of metal the size of a picnic table sits 125 metres away from the site where a truck bomb hit the gate, testifying to the force of the explosion. In a room where prison officials believe the inmates planned their escape, bullet casings on the floor suggest the prisoners had smuggled at least one handgun into the cells.

With those scattered bits of evidence, and a dozen interviews with witnesses, a picture emerges of the way security collapsed in the largest city in southern Afghanistan on the evening of Friday, June 13. Details of the attack show not only why the city defences fell apart; they also illustrate how the notorious problems of the Afghan mission – corruption, poor intelligence, a distrustful population, weak Afghan security forces, a lack of foreign troops – made the ingredients of a disaster.

The Canadian military has not escaped blame. In a private session two days after the attack, Kandahar’s provincial council strongly criticized the foreign troops for arriving at Sarpoza roughly two hours after the jailbreak started. They demanded to know why Canadian soldiers watched the prisoners run away and failed to chase them. Witnesses say that hundreds of inmates spent their first night of freedom camping in the fields only a few kilometres south of the prison, within easy reach of the Canadian soldiers sent to investigate.

Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, the top Canadian commander in Kandahar, confirmed that NATO surveillance tracked the fugitives as they fled. But he said it’s not Canada’s job as part of the International Security Assistance Force to hunt down escaped prisoners.

“You can ask yourself the rhetorical question, what if we find 100 fugitives in the fields?” Gen. Thompson said. “What is ISAF’s duty in that circumstance? Is it to go arrest people?”

The commander continued: “We’re not policing this country, right? It’s not our role to police this country. Our role is to stand behind our Afghan partners and assist them.”

But the Afghan forces stationed nearby did not consider themselves capable of standing up to the Taliban that evening, as police in three outposts around the prison hunkered down behind their fortifications and refused to intervene.

Local and foreign intelligence agencies also failed to understand glaring signs of trouble at the jail in the weeks before the attack, including a mass poisoning of prison guards just eight days beforehand. Taliban fighters warned local shopkeepers about an impending battle in the hours before they struck, but nobody passed the warning to the correct authorities.

Corruption likely helped the Taliban that night, too, as some indications have implicated a senior Afghan official in the jailbreak planning.

Sifting through the rubble at Sarpoza prison, it’s obvious that the attack was not just a successful Taliban operation. It was a failure of the institutions that protect Kandahar city, despite the Canadian money and lives expended to build a zone of security here in the past two years …

Let’s stop this sorry and pitiful tale for a moment and play “what wrong with this picture?”  It is certainly the case that there is corruption and ineptitude within the Afghan police.  It is currently more a cabal than an institution.  “The effectiveness of the police and other local officials is growing in importance as the Taliban moves to regain territory in southern Afghanistan this summer. Afghan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops battled the Taliban on Wednesday for control of villages around the city of Kandahar, about 220 miles east of Farah.  Throughout the country, police officers often have been little more than hired guns who raise money for local warlords through illegal taxes, shakedowns and corruption. Many policemen and district officials sell weapons and opium. Some collude with the Taliban.”

But even with the wild card of the Afghan police, the event never had to occur – or at least, it could have been mitigated.  The Canadian military made the same mistake seen in the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  For much of the campaign in Iraq the byline was to stand down when the Iraqis stood up.  Security was not assumed to be the precondition for the construction of institutional infrastructure.  Rather, the assumption was that the institutional infrastructure was there to begin with, and the mission is to assist it.

Of course, this is wrongheaded, but seeing the results of such an assumption (the prison break) won’t even allow mission creep, much less a complete revisiting of the doctrine brought to the theater.  There is an intransigence in NATO that refuses to allow a consistent or comprehensive strategy.  This will consume the nighttime thoughts of General Petraeus for months into the future.

This intransigence caused the Canadians to rhetorically question why they should apprehend the enemy.  This statement sounds stunning to the casual observer, and indeed, it requires daily numbing by a recalcitrant command to be so cynical.  But the enemy sat in a field after escape, at least long enough to catch a little sleep (according to the Globe and Mail report).  But wait.  There are problems further upstream in the chain of events.

… the Canadians could not be accused of neglecting the prison itself. One of the key tenets of “clear, hold, and build,” as a method of counterinsurgency is the idea that investing money and improving the lives in a particular spot will make the locals more likely to deliver useful intelligence. By that measure, the guards and prisoners at Sarpoza should have been excellent sources for the Canadians, who had been pouring money into the jail.

In the year before the prison break, the Canadians paid for new septic systems, solar-powered lighting, new doors and windows, an infirmary, landscaping, guard towers and washroom facilities, among other improvements. Painted walls replaced the rough stone surfaces; where chunks of masonry used to fall on prisoners as they slept, the ceilings now arched smoothly.

The current budget for all prison upgrades stands at $4-million, and Canadian officials visited the jail regularly to check on the progress.

Despite the Canadians’ focus on the prison, however, they failed to understand the trouble brewing inside.

A report by the U.S. magazine Newsweek claimed that the planning started when a disgruntled prisoner telephoned insurgent leader Mullah Berader and complained about prison conditions, but that story was dismissed by Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi.

“The Taliban in jail were always calling us, asking us to release them,” Mr. Ahmadi said. “Especially our commanders who were sentenced to 20 years or execution.”

Several sources say the planning started in earnest after accused Taliban prisoners launched a hunger strike in May, trying to obtain sentences in cases that remained undecided. Some suspected insurgents had languished in the prison for years without a conviction, and they described themselves as frustrated with a justice process that they claimed was designed to keep them in jail indefinitely.

They struck a committee of seven Taliban prisoners, who gathered every day inside one of the nicest cells of the national-security wing, a sunny room on the north side with a view of a garden.

They posted a sign on their door, saying: “No interruptions from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m.”

So now The Captain’s Journal has had our questions answered.  Rather than concrete barriers, concertina wire, vehicle immobilizers, mentoring and supervision of the police, the Canadians spent their money on landscaping, paint and solar-powered lighting.

Said one Taliban of the operation, “I thought that there would be big fighting, aerial bombardments, and many Taliban would be killed some arrested,” said a Taliban fighter, now enjoying freedom with his family in Kandahar city. “But when we reached our safe houses we were surprised, because there was no fighting, nothing.”  He added: “I didn’t think we would succeed like we did.”

Actually, it isn’t surprising at all.  It’s Like Mad Max and the Keystone Cops.  Mad Max will win every time.  Unless and until NATO acquiesces to a comprehensive and sensible strategic approach to Operation Enduring Freedom, we should expect to see more of the same.

RAND Monograph: Prewar Planning and Occupation of Iraq

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 9 months ago

RAND has published a monograph entitled After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq.  Similar to the Leavenworth study On Point II (which The Captain’s Journal could only review it in small bites), a few citations will be made below.  Similar to the Leavenworth study, some of the RAND report focuses on organizational issues.  This bores us.  To be sure, there are some issues of organizational instransigence that become so burdensome that change must occur in order to accomplish the mission.  This is seldom the case.

Corporate America has a habit of reorganizing.  It reorganizes when the organization fails, and sometimes even when it succeeds.  It reorganizes when the management wants to, or for financial gain.  It reorganizes in order to grant promotions, and in order to take them away.  The U.S. military might do well to study corporate America concerning some things, but organizational structure (and change of such) is not one of them.  The workers go on working in spite of the organization – and its constant change.  The story of Iraq is not one of organization.  It is one of heart, soul and mind.

We’ll supply a few quotes and then offer some comments.

Page xx: Two particular sets of assumptions guided U.S. prewar planning for the postwar period. First, administration officials assumed that the military campaign would have a decisive end, and would produce a stable security situation. They intended to shrink the U.S. military presence down to two divisions—between 30,000 and 40,000 troops—by the fall of 2003. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz succinctly expressed this assumption during congressional testimony on February 27, 2003, when he stated, “It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army.”  Second, they assumed that the Iraqi population would welcome U.S. forces. Three days before the war, Vice President Richard Cheney clearly articulated this view by stating, “My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.” Iraqi exiles supported this belief by emphasizing that the Iraqis would greet U.S. forces with “sweets and flowers.”

Page xxvi: Looking back, we can see that the failure to plan for and adequately resource stability operations had serious repercussions that affected the United States throughout the occupation period and continue to affect U.S. military forces in Iraq. Because U.S. forces were not directed to establish law and order—and may not have had enough forces for this mission anyway—they stood aside while looters ravaged Iraq’s infrastructure and destroyed the facilities that the military campaign had taken great pains to ensure remained intact. Because Iraq’s own police and military evaporated shortly after Saddam fell, ordinary Iraqis lived in a basically lawless society for months, during which, among other things, insurgents, terrorists, and criminal gangs assembled with impunity. And because U.S. forces have had to focus on providing security for their own personnel (both military and civilian) as much as for Iraqis, the buildup of coalition forces did not bring the degree of safety and security it might have brought had order been imposed from the start.

Page xxvii: … few military voices besides that of Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki called attention to the possibility of a major, long-term security challenge in post-Saddam Iraq. One reason other military voices remained muted was that the military operated within the prevailing assumptions set by senior civilian officials, which did not identify security as a problem. Also, as General Franks makes clear in his memoirs, the senior Army planner for OIF was reluctant to take responsibility for security and stabilization missions in the aftermath of major combat. This was not seen as the military’s role or mission.

Page xviii: Although CENTCOM’s commander, General Tommy Franks, refers to Phase IV frequently in his memoirs, for example, he never identifies the specific mission that U.S. forces should have had during that time. To the contrary: He expresses the strong sentiment that his civilian superiors should focus on postwar operations while he focused on the war itself. He goes on to argue that civic action sets the preconditions for security rather than the other way around. And he justifies his decision to retire right after combat ended because the mission was changing and a new commander should be there throughout Phase IV.

What the hell is Wolfowitz talking about?  Where did he hear that assertion?  Who taught him that?  It isn’t at all difficult to imagine that it would take more troops to maintain order than to topple the regime.  Wolfowitz simply asserted axioms in his testimony and took them to be fact.  Actually, it’s worse than that.  Wolfowitz had heard before that it would take more troops than planned from General Eric Shinseki and General Anthony Zinni, and then had to go back in front of the press again and insult Shinseki in order to save his axiom.

There were two failures here.  The first was with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz and their group think mentality in which they bullied generals to agree (or at least stay silent).  What is indeed difficult to imagine is that men would have reached the age Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld and Cheney were and still have been unable to think critically.  The second failure is with generals who are equally unable to think critically.  Jumping to the last quote, the notion (viz. Tommy Franks) that civic actions set the preconditions for security is directly contrary to what we have argued in too many articles to cite: security sets the preconditions for civic actions and reconstruction.  This seems so basic that any child experienced at playing on a schoolyard would know it.

A test was performed by criminals immediately upon the fall of the regime.  This test ascertained whether the U.S. troops could maintain security, law and order.  It is easy to argue that more troops would have been better early on (and we have many times argued just that point), but this issue requires a more nuanced understanding.  The ROE (rules of engagement) and RUF (rules for the use of force) essentially follow the SCOTUS decision in Tennessee v. Garner, and disallow deadly force for anything but self defense.

Here, more troops to watch as looters took what they wanted wouldn’t have helped.  It was left to individual property owners to take up arms and – you guessed it – use deadly force to protect their belongings.  Thus, since nothing will change regarding the ROE or RUF, the Iraq experience has shown us a gaping hole in our ability to provide law and order in a society which is accustomed to the use of deadly force (like Iraq).  The notions of restrictive ROE/RUF and maintenance of post-invasion law and order in a society such as Iraq (or many other Middle East or African countries) might be irreconcilable.  To date, The Captain’s Journal is the only voice speaking on this issue.  In the future, it should be understood that the ROE/RUF will change, or there will be anarchy after a regime is toppled.  Take your pick.

The one place that the military can learn from corporate America is rejection of the notion of group think and also of unchallenged assumptions.  It was too easy for Tommy Franks.  Given the military assets in the possession of the U.S. at the time of the invasion, our grandmother could have led the toppling of the Saddam regime.

Critical thinking, challenging of assumptions, elevation and highlighting of disagreements rather than agreements, and scholarship.  These are the elements of the Armed Forces of tomorrow – if it is to be successful, whether in near-peer or counterinsurgency warfare.


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