U.S. Marine Corps Combat Action in Sangin
BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 12 months ago
From NPR:
The first time U.S. Marines went on patrol from this base in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban were ready. The militants shot and killed a 21-year-old lance corporal just 150 feet from the perimeter.
The Marines patrolling through the green fields and tall mud compounds of Helmand province’s Sangin district say they are literally in a race for their lives. They are trying to adjust their tactics to outwit Taliban fighters, who have killed more coalition troops here than in any other Afghan district this year.
“As a new unit coming in, you are at a distinct disadvantage because the Taliban have been fighting here for years, have established fighting positions and have laid the ground with a ton of IEDs,” said Lt. Col. Jason Morris, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. “You have to evolve quickly because you have no other choice.”
[ … ]
“We kind of snuck our nose in the south to see what the south was about and we found out real quick that you don’t go south unless you have a lot of dudes,” said Sgt. Adam Keliipaakaua, who was leading the patrol.
[ … ]
The Marines now have a better idea of where they will be ambushed around their base and have doubled the size of their patrols to increase the amount of firepower they can direct toward the Taliban. On Thursday, the Marines killed 15 militants in an hourlong firefight, according to NATO.
Those who patrol through the main bazaar in the district center now know to look to the skies. They said the Taliban often fly white kites over the local mosque to signal the presence of the Marines.
The Taliban like to attack using so-called “murder holes” — small holes carved into strong mud walls that allow the insurgents to shoot without exposing themselves …
To avoid walking into a firefight, the Marines look to see whether kids are around. Their absence could mean an impending attack, but the Taliban also use children as spotters, so the tactic isn’t foolproof.
“A little kid will run around the corner and run back, and a minute later you are being shot at,” said Keliipaakaua.
But the threat of an ambush pales in comparison to the biggest danger lurking in Sangin and much of Afghanistan: the scores of IEDs buried in roads, trails, compounds and even canals. Many are largely constructed out of wood or plastic, making them very difficult to detect.
Three days after Ceniceros was killed, another member of 3rd Platoon, Cpl. David Noblit, stepped on an IED in a compound located in dense vegetation across the street from Patrol Base Fulod. Noblit survived the explosion but lost both his legs (for a discussion of Ceniceros, see portions of the article edited for length).
The battalion has been hit with about 40 IED attacks and has found more than 100 other bombs before they exploded.
“You want to vary up your routes to go where the enemy doesn’t expect you to travel,” said Esrey, 33, of Havelock, North Carolina. “I can walk through water ankle-high, but the bad guys probably know that’s where I want to go, so I want to go somewhere the water is chest-high.”
But the Taliban are always watching and adapting as well. One of the last Marines from the battalion who was killed stepped on an IED buried underwater in a canal.
“The tactics keep changing because they’re smart and they watch us,” said Esrey. “They don’t have TV here. We’re their TV.”
Analysis & Commentary
First, spotters and signalers are a common problem with the Taliban, as they were in Ramadi, Iraq. They have not been dealt with as harshly as I have recommended. A spotter or signaler is no different than a combatant, and they were treated as combatants by Marines in Iraq whether they held a weapon or not. Then again, dealing with the spotters as I have recommended (and the Marines actually did in Iraq) would require a change to the rules of engagement. Our generals are smarter than those successful Marines in the Anbar Province, and so we don’t do things like that anymore.
Second, having a “lot of dudes” is the equivalent of my recommendations in previous coverage of Marine combat action in Sangin. There are many locations in Afghanistan that need attention and additional troops, from the Paktika province to Kunar and Nuristan, and indeed, the whole Pech River Valley area. The border needs more mentored ANP, and even the North is coming under increasing Taliban attention.
I have made no secret of my full court press for more troops. But in this case, the U.S. Marines have the Helmand Province, and it makes no sense to have Marines on MEUs pretending that they are going to conduct a major, full scale, water-borne amphibious assault against some unknown (or non-existent) near-peer enemy while their brothers lose their legs in Afghanistan. In fact, I would suggest that it is immoral to send Marines into harm’s way without the requisite support and manpower. The support and manpower exists. It’s currently located at Camps Lejeune and Pendleton preparing to board amphibious assault docks and waste millions of dollars floating around the seas and stopping at every port so that Marines can get drunk. We can do better than that for the Marines under fire in Afghanistan.
Finally, it makes sense to fight the Taliban where they are. If we don’t they will simply relocate to the areas we are trying to secure (such as Kandahar) and fights us there. It is conducive to minimum noncombatant casualties to conduct combat operations in Sangin rather than in Kandahar if possible.
Herschel,
To the best of my knowledge the United States has approximately 500 rifle companies. Even if every single one of these were in Afghanistan, they would be insufficient for proper counter-insurgency and counter-infiltration operations in a country of that size and terrain. This gross lack of infantry is evident in every account of platoon-to-company level operations that I have read including the one linked in your post.
Well, we didn’t technically have enough Marines in Anbar either. If you’re referring to the requirements of FM 3-24, I never bought into that ratio. We did better than that in Iraq, and we can do better in Afghanistan. But there is a tipping point where there is enough troops, and we aren’t there yet.
Captain, in Al Anbar the Marines were augmented by 7th and 1st IADs [8 IA combat maneuver brigades] plus over 10 thousand provincial Iraqi Police . . . all trained and mentored by the Marines. This is was what crossed the tipping point in Al Anbar [know we don’t see eye to eye on this.]
The way to cross the tipping point in Helmand is by increasing the size and quality of 215th ANA Corps and provincial AUP. BG Ghori’s 3rd Bde, 215th ANA Corps, proves this can be done. And they didn’t even have the advantage of Marine training and mentors for the most part. ;-)
Yes, anan, and there were U.S. NG troops in Ramadi as well. I am not minimizing their role. But as for the deaths, there were more than 1000 Marines who perished there. It was a Marine Corps operation through and through.
As for the IPs, I know all about them. But the IPs would have been summarily executed were it not for the Marines. Again, setting up a security apparatus required killing lots of bad guys and making it clear that more would die except for peace-making on the part of the indigenous insurgents. Only then was it clear to them that the foreigners had to go.
Anan, you know my view. Less ANP, not more. Less ANA, not more. Make this a battle for incentive and we will be on our way to meaningful security forces. Caught smoking hash? Good. You’re fired without pay. Caught sleeping on duty? Good. You’re fired without pay. Caught refusing to go on night patrol? Good. You’re fired without pay. Your pay goes to the people who do their jobs.
Outfitting the ANP and ANA with more trash and scoundrels doesn’t accomplish anything. It’s playing make-believe.
Captain Smith, maybe we don’t disagree that much. I favor far longer training cycles for ANP and ANA officers and NCOs; who generally speaking are a motivated and enthusiastic lot. I also favor longer basic training for enlistee applicants. To achieve this, MG Karim’s ANA Training Command and MG Pattang’s ANP Training Command need to be able to train several times as many ANSF at any given time. On ANSF officers: Only a small percentage of applicants are accepted for officer training currently and those who get accepted tend to be highly motivated. My proposal for be would be to admit many tens of thousands of ANSF officers in “two in the box” training. Partner two officers together, assign them to the same position in the same ANSF unit [i.e. a platoon would have two commanders, a company would have two deputy commanders, or a battalion HQs would have two G2s]; have one attend college/training while the other fights, then reverse, then reverse again, then reverse again. Both officers would be in continual contact and collaborate on local relationships and combat execution. -1-6 months . . . both A and B are in training -7-12 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -13-18 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -19-24 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -25-30 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -31-36 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -37-42 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -43-48 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -49-54 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -55-60 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -61-66 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -67-72 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -73-78 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -79-84 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -85-90 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -91-96 months . . . A in the fight, B in the fight After 8 years you have two college educated ANSF mid grade experienced officers, each with 4 years combat experience. Ideally, all ANSF officers should have to go through a two in the box until they get a bachelor degree. Standards should be exceptionally high and enforced. An ANSF officer with a bachelors degree is more likely to be respected by Afghan civilians, Taliban, Pakistan and the region. More ANSF officers increase regional perceptions about the likelihood of ANSF victory over the long run against the Taliban. NCOs: Both the ANA and ANP have many exceptional NCOs. Problem is they are not respected by ANSF mid grade officers, or Afghan civilians, or Pakistanis because most are not well educated and are not allowed to go through… Read more »
Typo:
-1-6 months . . . A in training, B in training
-7-12 months . . . A in the fight, B in training
-13-18 months . . . A in training, B in the fight
-19-24 months . . . A in the fight, B in training
-25-30 months . . . A in training, B in the fight
-31-36 months . . . A in the fight, B in training
-37-42 months . . . A in training, B in the fight
-43-48 months . . . A in the fight, B in training
-49-54 months . . . A in training, B in the fight
-55-60 months . . . A in the fight, B in training
-61-66 months . . . A in training, B in the fight
-67-72 months . . . A in the fight, B in training
-73-78 months . . . A in training, B in the fight
-79-84 months . . . A in the fight, B in training
-85-90 months . . . A in training, B in the fight
-91-96 months . . . A in the fight, B in the fight
In two years, two mid grade officers with 4 years college and 4 years experience.
By contrast current officer candidate school candidates only get 20 weeks training, which is fine if they already have a bachelors degree. Unfortunately most officer candidates only graduated 12th grade, albeit with good grades in many cases.
I would force all officer candidate school applicants to go through “two in the box” training until they get a bachelors degree.
Why isn’t this done now? Because you need to be able to train 8 times as many ANSF officers at any given time to give every ANSF officer applicant “two in the box” training versus 20 weeks training. In other words, “two in the box” training costs a lot more money than ISAF and the international community are willing to spend on MG Karim’s ANA Training Command and MG Pattang’s ANP Training Command.
Interesting ideas for training, Anan. But even assuming the absolute brilliance of a better training regimen, it will never happen because the U.S. is not in A-stan in anything like the significant numbers needed to take the fight to the bad guys and (with some apparent exceptions like Helmand) the combat forces we have in theater are confined to FOB’s or otherwise hamstrung by tactical limits. (And, of course, by the president of A-stan who is calling for further restrictions on ROE’s and use of force and the confinement of U.S. forces to bases… lovely, that). President Obumble is not going to increase forces or resources into A-stan; we will be lucky if he does not start cutting forces in just 10 months’ time! So, bottom line, there will be no training of anyone that is going to take anywhere near 4 years let alone 8 years’ time. I really am not disparaging the training plan. It is just academic, that’s all. Possibly brilliant, but like most things academic, disconnected from reality because the U.S. lacks the will and– most importantly– the leadership to put it into action. But let’s consider something the Marines in Helmand are doing that is actually a force-multiplier that is happening now and with apparent success. According to Tim Lynch over at Free Range International: [Quote]The Marines took the funds from the “Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure” and stood up armed neighborhood watch groups organized by blocks. The ISCI program was apparently designed to allow commanders to hire local “security contractors” for guarding critical infrastructure which is stupid. The Marines view the people as the most “critical infrastructre” they have in their AO so they spend those program funds on armed security of the people by the people. On blocks with ISCI guards ( identified by the arm bands) there are no Taliban. [End Quote]. Sound familiar? Sounds awfully like the Sons of Iraq program. Of course, the fact that the Marines have to do this in work-around fashion rather than as a fully-funded and supported initiative from Petraeus is telling. Notice that the goal of keeping out the Taliban is achieved without any expensive and multi-year training. These are simple townspeople who are willing to defend their own neighborhoods at the ample risk of their own lives. Read the entire article. It is clear that the people are desperate for the Marines to stick around so the Taliban cannot come back and do the usual head-chopping of collaborators. We simply do not have the time or resources to pour into large-scale training of the ANA and ANP. It will take 10 years or more to get anything like a professional army in A-stan. And why does A-stan need it anyway? It is a largely de-centralized nation that inherently distrusts central authority. (and with good reason given the corruption and brutality of central government cronies and thugs). We are hanging on in A-stan by a thread. We should be putting every nickel and dime we… Read more »
“it will never happen because the U.S. is not in A-stan in anything like the significant numbers needed to take the fight to the bad guys and (with some apparent exceptions like Helmand) the combat forces we have in theater are confined to FOB’s or otherwise hamstrung by tactical limits. (And, of course, by the president of A-stan who is calling for further restrictions on ROE’s and use of force and the confinement of U.S. forces to bases… lovely, that). President Obumble is not going to increase forces or resources into A-stan; we will be lucky if he does not start cutting forces in just 10 months’ time! So, bottom line, there will be no training of anyone that is going to take anywhere near 4 years let alone 8 years’ time.” Who says that the trainers have to be American? Taliban/AQ threaten other countries more than the US. Turkey wanted to do more on the training side from the start but didn’t want to be saddled with the long term bill for ANSF operations costs. Fact is that the US and NATO didn’t cooperate with Turkey on ANSF training. Turkey, today, plans to train about one third of all Afghan e-5 NCOs, or 900 out of 2700 of the E-5 NCO training slots . . . which are 14 weeks long per training cycle. Turkey is probably willing to train several thousand ANSF at any given time on Turkish soil. Turkey already trains 600 ANP officers per cycle [Turkey has indicated that they are willing to increase this number], 100 ANA Commandos per cycle, and many others inside Turkey. India has repeatedly offered to train ANSF inside Afghanistan and within India. Gates asked India not to train ANSF this year . . . again. Russia has repeatedly offered to train ANSF, including large numbers of ANSF inside Russia. They have been repeatedly turned down. The reason some ANA officers are trained at all is thanks to Turkey, India and France, which played a large role in founding the ANA 4 year training academy or NMAA. “the U.S. lacks the will and– most importantly– the leadership to put it into action” The US will have to pay a large part of the bill, but most of the trainers will likely not be American. The entire NATO Training Mission Afghanistan only has 3,500 people today and 5,200 planned at end state. Of the 5,200 at end state, one thousand with be Canadians, many will be Turks, French and Brits; a majority will not be American. South Korea could easily provide another two thousand trainers if asked. Obama, to my knowledge, has not asked them. [South Korea contributes the Parwan PRT and helps the AUP manage the Parwan battlespace. There is no ANA in Parwan.] South Korea and Japan both want American help on North Korea and China; and are willing to do things for America to get it. If India contributes 3 thousand trainers, South Korea and Turkey another 2 thousand… Read more »
Anan, I will not argue the particulars of training ANA or ANP. As I said previously, I am willing to grant you, arguendo, that your training plan is perfection itself. So far as that goes. But you did not address the main gist of my argument which renders yours academic: we are on a fast track to losing in A-stan and there is no time, not even the 2 years that you claim might be possible under ideal conditions, for the kind of training regimen to make any, timely difference. If you have read much of the Captain’s Journal you will note the number of posts detailing the atrocious state of the ANA. Drug use. Desertion. Infiltration by Taliban sympathizers. Refusal to engage the enemy. The ANP do not even rise to the level of the ANA. It will be a very, very long time before the ANA is anywhere close to being an effective, counter-insurgent force. As I said above, the most effective counter-insurgent force we can get up and running in a short period of time is the kind of neighborhood militias that the Marines are putting together in Sangin. You make a point about these militias lack of firepower and sophistication, particularly against the more deadly insurgent groups. I got news: that’s a feature, not a bug. We don’t need the militias to take on large formations of Taliban; we don’t WANT them having that kind of weaponry or organization. The Marines have more than enough firepower that they have been itching to use if only the Taliban would take the battlefield in larger formations. No, the problem has been the same one we faced in Iraq: we can effectively clear out a city but cannot effectively prevent the bad guys from seeping back in and exacting retribution against the population. Population control measures– including neighborhood militia– allow us to actually make progress in securing ground and gaining the cooperation of the locals. My point about the not needing a large-standing Afghan army is entirely geared to the short term. Yes, obviously, if the U.S. can prevail decisively against the Taliban in the next 10-12 months (which about the limit of time we have in A-stan), then, maybe just maybe, we can start thinking in the medium term about the next adversary in the form of the Pakistani army. But most indicators are that there will not be a free A-stan 2 years from now. My comments are all geared toward the main point that the Captain made in his post: we have too few Marines on the ground right now. And the world’s most brilliant training plan is not going to change anything about the lack of Marines anytime soon, or soon enough to make a difference. As far as your comment, “No strategy can work without the full support of Karzai and his ANSF. Much the way MNF-I could do didley squat in Iraq without the support of Maliki and his ISF.” Sorry, it just… Read more »
[…] is a great must-read from The Captains Journal. It is an account of some of the USMC efforts in Afghanistan. And this […]
“we are on a fast track to losing in A-stan and there is no time, not even the 2 years that you claim might be possible under ideal conditions, for the kind of training regimen to make any, timely difference.” Things are far from as grim as you think. For Russia, India and Iran, the Taliban/AQ pose a larger threat than they do for America. Turkey is also threatened. Unlike other NATO members, Turkey isn’t in Afghanistan for NATO or America; Turkey is in Afghanistan for Turkey and will remain in Afghanistan no matter what America does. Karzai knows this, and believes that these other countries will step in and help him fight the Taliban regardless of what America does. The ANSF aren’t as bad as you think either. Some examples: -203rd ANA Corps [granted they and their Rakkasans partners fight against the toughest fighters on either side of the Durand . . . Siraj Haqqani, LeT, TTP, TNSM, IJU, and some of Iyas Kashmiri’s Lashkar al Zil] This is the only good Corps in the ANA -Khost and Paktia AUP . . . some pretty tough fighters among them -9 ANA combat commando battalions [all planned to have 4 combat commando companies each . . . to my knowledge they have never lost an engagement even if Karzai wastes them on Afghan ego along the Pakistani border to fight Pakistani Taliban] -Kabul AUP [fully in the lead with the ANA in strategic overwatch] -Panjir and Bamiyan AUP [fully in the lead with no ANA in their provinces . . . and major success stories] -Parwan AUP [close to taking complete lead, no ANA in province, South Koreans mostly focus on development in the province] -Kapisa AUP [some parts of them are quite good . . . other parts suck . . . all mentored by French lead ISAF] -some of the Kunduz AUP . . . they fight some pretty high end international Taliban . . . however the Kunduz AUP want artillery and heavy weapons which Karzai isn’t giving them -1st Bde, 209th ANA Corps [German/Swede mentored . . . maybe some Finns as well although I think the Fin embedded advisors have transferred to another brigade] . . . Kept the Taliban away from their part of Northern Afghanistan -BG Ghori’s 3-215 Bde in Helmand -Australian/Dutch mentored 4-205 ANA -ANA Special Forces -22 ANCOP combat battalions A major step up in ANSF development would likely impact the battlefield in a significant way within 12 months. [6 months worth of graduates from 6 months NCO course, and 6 months worth of new officers, 7 or 8 months of new combat ANA battalions] “number of posts detailing the atrocious state of the ANA. Drug use. Desertion. Infiltration by Taliban sympathizers. Refusal to engage the enemy. The ANP do not even rise to the level of the ANA. It will be a very, very long time before the ANA is anywhere close to being an effective, counter-insurgent force.” I track… Read more »
There is almost too much here to address, but I’ll weigh in again with a synopsis of the comments. First, I agree with TSAlfabet’s comments. And I’ll also say that I have sent him about fourteen e-mails asking him if he would like to be a blogger on TCJ, only to get no response thus far. In reality, being a clear-headed thinker comes with responsibilities, one of those being the duty to advocate and analyze such that one convinces others to see things in a way that they otherwise would not have. There is no other reason for blogging. I’m still waiting on TSAlfabet’s response. Second, anan, some of your arguments are effective, some are not. You might help yourself by addressing main themes in a little more succinct fashion, where the comments don’t become longer and more involved than the original article. It would also add a lot to your comments if you would source your information. You supply a lot of data, and sometimes I find your data questionable. It would not be so if you would provide sources. Third, as I said, some of your arguments stand on their own, others do not. Take for example your idea of greater involvement of India in Afghanistan. I support this, TSAlfabet supports this, and every clear-thinking man should. But that doesn’t solve the problem, and not even nearly. Empowering Russia, whom I still take as an enemy of the U.S. and who will eventually invade Georgia again and harm the U.S. in any way it thinks it can, is not the right approach to any problem. But your prose escapes reality and shoots off into a dreamland of hyperbole and gross exaggeration when you respond to criticisms of your views. Take for instance your claim that: ” … no strategy can work without the full support of Karzai and his ANSF. Much the way MNF-I could do didley squat in Iraq without the support of Maliki and his ISF.” Good heavens. Good grief. This is almost a laughable statement, and clouds the remainder of your prose, detracting from its value because of this outlandish comment. The U.S. was invader, occupier, controller, logistics supplier, military giant, supplier of governance and about everything else in Iraq for a very long time. The notion that we couldn’t do didley squat without the support of Maliki is simply ridiculous. The only reason that the Iraqis didn’t finally turn on him is because, quite stupidly in my opinion, we reaffirmed our support of him. Now we have a man in office who won’t let go, a clear winner who cannot be seated in the office of PM (Allawi), and political chaos, with Iraq aligning more with Iran than it should. Further, let me give you at least one indication of the interaction of U.S. Marines and the ISF in Fallujah in 2007. The U.S. Marines, after only brief interactions with them, saw them as treacherous, lying, stealing, cowardly, abusive scumbags who would turn on… Read more »
Captain,
Have been reading you for years, and we disagree on many things. ;-)
You can e-mail me offline on sources since links tend to crash blogposts.
The total size of NTM-A is only 3,500 right now and a projected 5,200 at end state. A majority at end state of the 5,200 will likely not be American. The total training side of CSTC-A [NTM-A’s predecessor organization] was about one thousand when Pres Obama was elected. Note that back then CSTC-A use to include OMLTs, POMLTs, advisors, so these are being backed out.
India, Russia, Turkey and South Korea, could substantially boost the size of NTM-A above 5,200. This would make a major medium term difference in the ANSF. A 50% surge in the size of NTM-A would allow approx. 50% more ANSF to be trained at any given point of time. To break these countries down:
Turkey is in the process of boosting their commitment [and would likely do more if the EU would stop insulting Turkey.] To convince the Turks to do more, the Turks should only be asked to send trainers while NTM-A funded the training facilities and equipment and ANSF TO/E on their own dime [a long standing discussion between the Turks and NATO.] Turkey would argue that they will be training one third of the 1U ANA NCOs [14 week course for E-5 NCOs], many of the ANA officers, one of the 4 ABP schools, many of the ANP officers and that they want more credit for what they do . . . etc. This can and should be done, even if Obama as to visit Turkey again to get another Turkish surge.
India, well it goes without saying. Indians are very good at training large numbers of college educated officers [who are good] and 12th grade NCOs [who are so so] on the cheap.
South Korea . . . they need America right now and are trying to win America over to their and Japan’s side with respect to North Korea and China. South Korea isn’t that good at training NCOs. But they would be good at ANSF officer training, specialty training, and Afghan Air Force training.
Russia . . . well we disagree. I support a Russian/US and Russian/NATO partnership. I even support Russia joining NATO. Whatever our differences, Russians hate AQ and the Taliban worse than we do. Zawahiri fought in Chechnya. OBL and Mullah Omar have been complicit in terrorist attacks against Russian civilians.
Agree with you on the value of NCOs. But even with a weak NCO corps, officer training does make a big difference. Look at the ROK forces, and the Pakistani Army for that matter. The ANA can be as good or better than the Pakistani Army even with a mediocre NCO corps. That should be the goal.
Building a good NCO corps is hard. The ANA has many good enlisted soldiers. Ideally these would be promoted to NCOs. Part of the problem is that ANA mid grade officers disrespect NCOs as do Afghan civilians. Some of this might be because Afgans over value education and credentials [or are snobbish on education.] The real reason for increasing NCO training to 6 months with intensive literacy training would be to convince ANA mid grade officers, Afghan civilians and junior ANA enlisted to respect NCOs since they would now be “educated” and would now have gone through an officer selection type of course.
How to identify good potential NCOs? Look at existing ANA units. Identify the top few percent of their enlisted, the ones with heart, and put them in NCO school. Do the same with graduates from basic training [granted, it is tougher to identify good NCOs in the short length of basic training.].
Captain, have yet to encounter an ANA mentor who couldn’t identify many good ANA enlisted who would be great NCOs. The problem was getting the mid grade ANA officers to respect their NCOs and give them responsibility. If you have talked to ANA advisers who had different experiences, would love to hear about it.
Another reason for 6 months NCO training [currently 1,200 E-4 NCOs get 4 weeks training, a planned 2,700 NCOs get 14 weeks E-5 training, a planned 200 get senior NCO training at Bridmal ADU] is because putting the best of the best together for a prolonged period of time and segregating them from mediocrity, has value. It raises the expectations that NCOs set for themselves and their units and increases their self confidence.
But even all of this will not get the ANA get NCOs, it merely improves what is.
We have disagreed on Iraq for many years. Still read you nonetheless. Much of the ISF was junk. Much of it was good. Major divergences in quality between units in the early years.
Agree with you that Sadr didn’t voluntarily stand down, he was forced to. He was forced to in large measure for the following reasons:
-substantial improvement in the quality of the ISF and a strong eagerness on the part of the ISF to go after him [part of why LTG Uthman’s 8th IAD in the 5 provinces of the upper south was mentioned, and why I emphasize Najaf/Karbala/Babil Iraqi Police]
-the fact that the ISF were much more popular and legitimate among Iraqis than JAM and that Mookie would be politically killed to confronting the ISF
-Maliki and the Najaf Marjeya were more popular than Sadr and Sadr felt a confrontation would them would hurt him among his base
-Mookie was upset that Khamenei was using him and that Mookie was not in command and control of “his own” forces. Mookie publicly bashed Khamenei for supporting Al Qaeda in mass murdering Iraqis while living in Iran.
-There was a wave of anti Iranian sentiment among Iraqis
-JAM was militarily being defeated by ISF and MNF-I. [Petraeus gets credit for this]
We disagree on the contribution of the ISF towards victory in Iraq in 2007. Most MNF-I operations were joint in 2007. Already broken down what ISF units I thought stepped up in 2006, 2007 and 2008.
[…] The Captain's Journal » U.S. Marine Corps Combat Action in Sangin […]
First of all, the man who said ” a lot of dudes” I know personally and this is his 4th combat deployment and he has been to Iraq twice and also Afghanistan. One of his deployments was the Al-Anbar province in Iraq. I agree with you that that they need to deploy more units to the area instead of wasting so much effort and money on missions to nowhere useful. In my mind, if you go to war, go to war right. They are completely robbing most of these young men of the resources that are available to them. Also, as long as the Taliban is crossing over from Pakistan every minute, they will never cease to multiply and that blood vessel needs to be cut quickly. For every Taliban these men kill, another hundred cross the border to replace them. The fundamental strategy of this war is faulty, and it saddens me to see the young, brave men of the infantry, in particular, have to pay the price with their lives. -0311 Vietnam
[…] response to U.S. Marine Corps Combat Action in Sangin, Old Warrior said: … in my mind, if you go to war, go to war right. They are completely […]