Bill Lind’s Iranian Nightmare

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 11 months ago

Bad dreams are scary things.  The sweats, the shakes, the bad memories, or whatever.  I don’t know.  I have never actually had a nightmare before so I wouldn’t know (except maybe the one about failing to turn in my last senior exam and failing to graduate college, thus having to start over again – it was indeed a bad, bad night for The Captain’s Journal, very little sleep).  But Bill Lind gives us one to consider.  It begins in Iran, with the pitiful U.S. Army and Marines running for cover and trying to escape the horrible wrath of mechanized divisions of the powerful Iranian guard.

Now, to be clear, we have not advocated all out ground war with Iran, but rather, selected air strikes against insurgent training grounds, enhanced border security, more aggressive tactics against Badr (SIIC) and Sadr (actually, we have advocated the assassination of Sadr) and his so-called Mahdi Army, and the fomenting of a full blown insurgency in Iran.  But Bill Lind sees a nightmare if we launch air strikes into Iran.  Courtesy of a Small Wars Journal discussion thread, here is is.  Gird your loins or run for mommy, for it is a bad situation indeed.

The purpose of this column is not to warn of an imminent assault on Iran, though personally I think it is coming, and soon. Rather, it is to warn of a possible consequence of such an attack. Let me state it here, again, as plainly as I can: an American attack on Iran could cost us the whole army we now have in Iraq.

Here’s roughly how it might play out. In response to American air and missile strikes on military targets inside Iran, Iran moves to cut the supply lines coming up from the south through the Persian Gulf (can anyone in the Pentagon guess why it’s called that?) and Kuwait on which most U.S. Army units in Iraq depend (the Marines get most of their stuff through Jordan). It does so by hitting shipping in the Gulf, mining key choke points, and destroying the port facilities we depend on, mostly through sabotage. It also hits oil production and export facilities in the Gulf region, as a decoy: we focus most of our response on protecting the oil, not guarding our army’s supply lines.

Simultaneously, Iran activates the Shiite militias to cut the roads that lead from Kuwait to Baghdad. Both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades — the latter now supposedly our allies — enter the war against us with their full strength. Ayatollah Sistani, an Iranian, calls on all Iraqi Shiites to fight the Americans wherever they find them. Instead of fighting the 20% of Iraqis population that is Sunni, we find ourselves battling the 60% that is Shiite. Worse, the Shiites logistics lie directly across those logistics lines coming up from Kuwait.

U.S. Army forces in Iraq begin to run out of supplies, especially POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants], of which they consume a vast amount. Once they are largely immobilized by lack of fuel, and the region gets some bad weather that keeps our aircraft grounded or at least blind, Iran sends two to four regular army armor and mech divisions across the border. Their objective is to pocket American forces in and around Baghdad.

The U.S. military in Iraq is all spread out in penny packets fighting insurgents. We have no field army there anymore. We cannot reconcentrate because we’re out of gas and Shiite guerrillas control the roads. What units don’t get overrun by Iranian armor or Shiite militia end up in the Baghdad Kessel. General Petraeus calls President Bush and repeats the famous words of Marshal MacMahon at Sedan: “Nous sorrune dans une pot de chambre, and nous y serron emerdee.” Bush thinks he’s overheard Petraeus ordering dinner — as, for Bush, he has.

U.S. Marines in Iraq, who are mostly in Anbar province, are the only force we have left. Their lines of supply and retreat through Jordan are intact. The local Sunnis want to join them in fighting the hated Persians. What do they do at that point? Good question.

As I have warned before, every American ground unit in Iraq needs its own plan to get itself out of the country using only its own resources and whatever it can scrounge locally. Retreat to the north, through Kurdistan into Turkey, will be the only alternative open to most U.S. Army units, other than ending up in an Iranian POW camp.

Even if the probability of the above scenario is low, we still need to take it with the utmost seriousness because the consequences would be so vast. If the United States lost the army it has in Iraq, we would never recover from the defeat. It would be another Adrianople, another Manzikert, another Rocroi. Given the many other ways we now resemble Imperial Spain, the last analogy may be the most telling.

Waking from the cold sweats, we can now evaluate this nightmare.  We re-wrote part of this scenario over the discussion thread something like the following:

“Iran sends two to four mech divisions across the border, and to their surprise are awaited by so many U.S. aircraft monitoring, bombing and firing cannon at their slow, lumbering vehicles that the roads become another “highway of death,” with Iranian dead and vehicles littering roads for miles, great columns of smoke filling the skies, Iranian students protesting in the capital city, and the government in virtual collapse …”

The air power (AF, Navy, and Marines) desperately wants to be unleashed.  They ache for it.  They pant for it.  So, give them the Iranian and Syrian borders.  Tell them that unmitigated war makes trade and population migration unreasonable, and so anything that comes across the border is fair game to be utterly destroyed.  The AF will unleash their fighters, and their A-10Cs with its faster kill chain (please send us the video).  The Navy air craft carriers will be busy.  U.S. air power will have a good day, which is about how long it will take to destroy four mechanized divisions and send them to eternity.  Literally, all hell would be unleashed upon Iranian forces were they to be sent across the border.

Next, to suppose that the Army could not regroup from counterinsurgency into a conventional fighting force quickly enough is preposterous.  From combat outposts they would come from all around, excited with anticipation, and the only question is who could get to the forces of Badr and Sadr the fastest – the Army or Marines in Anbar.  The Marines would make a good show of it, making proud to saddle on backpacks, body armor, hydration system, ammunition, weapon and MREs from all over Anbar and using HMMWVs and foot power to get to the fight before the Army did.  Patton, the architect of the relief of Bastone, would be proud.

The Marines are bored, bored, bored in Anbar.  Any chance to get back into the fray would be met with approval from the rank and file.  Lind’s nightmare is scary indeed, but hopefully he is awake now and things look better than they did before.  The notion of Marines running for the Jordanian border seems far removed from reality now.  It’s better to be awake and in reality than not.  The Marines don’t run, Bill.


  1. On March 26, 2008 at 12:45 am, jbrookins said:

    I’m certainly glad you responded to this silliness. I don’t know where it began but this idea that we will or could be so easily overrun continues to pop-up regularly. Every single time the US military has actually engaged in combat the only surprise has been the speed in which it decisively destroys it’s enemies.

    The nightmare is that some poor CPT or SGT will face a court martial while trying to fight enemy forces and insurgents because too many lawyers are allowed to dictate policy. Far too many Americans still don’t understand that war involves killing and we are pretty damn good at it when allowed.

  2. On March 26, 2008 at 4:46 am, jth0526 said:

    Utterly ridiculous. An Iranian “sneak” attack is about as likely as Mexico trying to take back Texas. With all the surveillance we currently have on Iran (and every other country in the Middle East) we would know if a single tank tried to cross the border and then we would kill it. Also, dont forget who is in jump distance of Iran…..I wonder what the haji version of “they came in like devils in baggy pants” would sound.

  3. On March 26, 2008 at 8:52 pm, thedean said:

    You’re awfully glib about starting WWIII there. Bill Lind seems like a pretty knowledgeable observer. I’d think twice before ridiculing him.

    Sure the US military can win a straight-up fight with another army, but the scenario you’re talking about pits 150,000 guys against a whole country. Go rent Black Hawk Down if you don’t know what I mean.

    We don’t have any troops for reinforcements if it comes to that. Are you willing to start up a draft, and maybe pay some taxes? Bush hasn’t seemed willing to ask for that kind of sacrifice so far.

    That’s before we even get to the prospect of starting a world war right on top of the world’s oil supply. The Chinese would take away Bush’s credit card before he can threaten their oil. The US economy would crash before we got the first infantry division into Iran.

    And what’s the point? If we decide we’re just going to declare war on the whole country, we’ve totally lost the idea of liberating and democratizing Iraq. Better to let the civil war burn itself out and save ourselves the blood and treasure.

  4. On March 26, 2008 at 9:23 pm, Herschel Smith said:

    Good grief. Give me a break. Iran’s divisions wouldn’t even make it into the country. Their proxy fighters are there already, and thus Iran is at war with the U.S. [irregular warfare] as she has been for at least two decades.

    The U.S. wouldn’t be starting anything. Note what TCJ has advocated: responding to the already existent Iranian involvement in Iraq. Right? Understand? We are already at war with Iran, or more correctly, Iran is already at war with us (weapons, training, Badr [SIIC], Sadr, Quds, IRG).

    As for the draft, I think that this is not necessary if the U.S. decides to get on a war footing and pay our warriors what they’re worth. Finally, you apparently didn’t read the commentary. This is typical for first-time readers reacting to something they read without viewing the entire context.

    I didn’t say that the U.S. was going to or should send divisions into Iran. I oppose a land war with Iran for reasons too numerous to outline here. I said that any Iranian divisions sent into Iraq would die within a day if they tired a conventional land war with U.S. troops. Air power would end it within a day. This is still true despite your protests.

    Finally, what I DID ADVOCATE in the commentary is the fomenting of an insurgency inside of Iran and regime change. This has been the position of TCJ since our inception.

    Go back and study the commentary with this in mind. It was written off of Lind’s outlandish and ridiculous commentary, not a U.S.-initiated land war with Iran. Context is everything, so if you drop your own and adopt the one here it might help the article make more sense to you.

  5. On March 27, 2008 at 12:50 pm, thedean said:

    I’ll back up and explain my context for you. I agree with Lind that air power alone won’t get it done.

    If we get into a fight with Iran, we’ll have to be prepared to invade and occupy. We have to be prepared for attacks on the homeland. We have to be prepared for retaliation from other countries, like China. It’s not like Vietnam, when we could bomb a country and sit comfortably on our side of the ocean.

    Dropping some bombs and hoping for the best is not a plan.

  6. On March 27, 2008 at 12:54 pm, Herschel Smith said:

    Context, again. I am still asserting the obvious. You said “if we get into a fight with Iran.” Sir, we are already in a fight with Iran, and have been for twenty years. Your protests about what Iran might do are twenty years late. They are already doing it.

  7. On March 27, 2008 at 4:46 pm, thedean said:

    Oh, certainly, we’re in a low-level conflict with Iran. The question is whether to escalate it into a more open conflict. You think that’d be relatively easy, I say it wouldn’t be.

    You guys also said Iraq and Afghanistan would be relatively easy. All things considered, I’m going to listen to William Lind.

  8. On March 27, 2008 at 4:51 pm, thedean said:

    Also … “fomenting an insurgency inside of Iran” … ?

    Last time we overthrew the government of Iran, in 1958, we ended up with the Ayatollah 20 years later. Pretty much every time we overthrow a government, we end up with something worse. Read some history and learn some lessons.

    Look, Iran’s been living in a theocracy for 30 years. Large portions of the population are sick of it. Iranians have the best impression of Americans of anyone in the middle east.

    What we need to do is contain Iran, then give the theocracy time to collapse on its own. That’s what we did with the Soviet Union.

    The war on terror is a war of ideas, just like the Cold War was. The way we win is by sticking to our values and proving our way of life is better.

  9. On March 27, 2008 at 5:19 pm, Herschel Smith said:

    I’m going to respond one final time, and then you are going to drop this. Don’t lump me in with “you guys” said anything. You don’t know my position on the campaigns in which we are now engaged, because you didn’t ask me and I didn’t say. You’re making that up, unacceptable over this web site.

    Next, I never said that the work to accomplish regime change in Iran last time was done well or for the right reasons or the right way. You don’t know my position on that because you never asked and I didn’t say. You’re just making that up.

    Next, regarding reading. I suggest one for you: Michael Ledeen’s book “The Iranian Time Bomb.” In fact, like Ledeen, I oppose an all-out land war with Iran because I think it can be done simpler and easier. Since Iran is already at war with us, it would be prudent to reciprocate the favor. We won’t win the campaign in Iraq until and unless we do.

    Finally, when I responded to Lind’s commentary, I never weighed in on whether to “escalate” the conflict, to use your words. I weighed in on one thing: whether Iran would be able to pull off the kind of thrashing Lind talks about. Conclusion? Lind is a dolt. You can side with him if you wish. Birds of a feather …

  10. On March 31, 2008 at 5:46 pm, thedean said:

    You know, you’re right. For all I know you opposed the wars alongside Pat Buchanan. I’m sorry to make an assumption, and I apologize.

    I never said you supported the 1958 coup in Iran. I just mentioned it as an illustration of unintended consequences.

    Near as I can tell, you favor some kind of bombing campaign inside Iran. Could you give me some more specifics?

    For the record, I never said Iran’s armored units would make it into Iraq. Really what I’m concerned about is other unintended consequences. For example, several of our big allies in Iraq (SCIRI, Dawa) are aligned with Iran. If we bomb Iran, do we have to fight them, too? Are we then fighting elements of the Iraqi army?

    Secondly … are there ways we can appeal to Iran’s rational self-interest? They don’t want chaos on their borders. They want to protect their co-religionists. They may have helped negotiate a partial cease fire over the weekend. (Note: I’m not giving them a lot of credit for good intentions).

    There are a lot of unknowns in this scenario. Who knows? It might all work out fine, like you say. Personally, given the experiences of the last few years, I’m calling for restraint and diplomacy.

  11. On March 31, 2008 at 6:05 pm, Herschel Smith said:

    I was ambivalent concerning the initial invasion of Iraq (concerning WMD, viz. chemicals, while nuclear is a different and more complex question that would take some time to work through). But once done, the COIN campaign had to be carried out until the end. Once the regime was overthrown, in order to prevent radicalism from sweeping in thus with Iraq becoming a future danger to the U.S. – whether Shi’a or the Sunni style Wahhabism / Salafism – U.S. forces became necessary. There is no love loss between The Captain’s Journal and Donald Rumsfeld. We don’t like him, and if he knew us, he wouldn’t like us. He went in with too few forces and an Army / Marine Corps that had been emaciated over three administrations. He didn’t care. He believed his own press and ignored his own generals. Therefore, COIN had to be re-learned and the timeliness in the campaign was lost long ago. The campaign has been hard.

    It will be lost unless Iran is confronted. My claim all along is that Iran is at war with the U.S., and the U.S. is silent / disengaged. Short of an all-out land war – which I oppose – there are many things that can be done, including the targeting of Sadr / Badr leaders, political pressure on Iran (the State Department roundly opposes the GWOT), the disarming of the various Shi’a factions, and the fomenting of an insurgency inside of Iran. There are the even tougher actions, such as air strikes against known insurgent training facilities, and the Newt Gingrich proposal of targeting ports. These actions would certainly be last compared to the relatively easier actions of fomenting an insurgency in order to topple the regime (it’s already there is seed form anyway among Kurds in Iran and others). I don’t see it as possible that whatever regime comes in behind the radical Mullahs could be worse. I recommend Michael Ledeen’s book The Iranian Time Bomb.

    If we decide that we do not have the political will fully to engage the GWOT, then let’s circle the wagons, close down the ports, and bring all troops home now, without so much as another drop of blood shed. Message: win it or get out!

RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URL

Leave a comment

You are currently reading "Bill Lind’s Iranian Nightmare", entry #1014 on The Captain's Journal.

This article is filed under the category(s) Army,Badr Organization,Iran,Jaish al Mahdi,Marine Corps and was published March 26th, 2008 by Herschel Smith.

If you're interested in what else the The Captain's Journal has to say, you might try thumbing through the archives and visiting the main index, or; perhaps you would like to learn more about TCJ.

26th MEU (10)
Abu Muqawama (12)
ACOG (2)
ACOGs (1)
Afghan National Army (36)
Afghan National Police (17)
Afghanistan (704)
Afghanistan SOFA (4)
Agriculture in COIN (3)
AGW (1)
Air Force (40)
Air Power (10)
al Qaeda (83)
Ali al-Sistani (1)
America (22)
Ammunition (275)
Animals (279)
Ansar al Sunna (15)
Anthropology (3)
Antonin Scalia (1)
AR-15s (371)
Arghandab River Valley (1)
Arlington Cemetery (2)
Army (86)
Assassinations (2)
Assault Weapon Ban (28)
Australian Army (7)
Azerbaijan (4)
Backpacking (2)
Badr Organization (8)
Baitullah Mehsud (21)
Basra (17)
BATFE (217)
Battle of Bari Alai (2)
Battle of Wanat (18)
Battle Space Weight (3)
Bin Laden (7)
Blogroll (3)
Blogs (24)
Body Armor (23)
Books (3)
Border War (18)
Brady Campaign (1)
Britain (38)
British Army (35)
Camping (5)
Canada (17)
Castle Doctrine (1)
Caucasus (6)
Center For a New American Security (8)
Charity (3)
China (16)
Christmas (16)
CIA (30)
Civilian National Security Force (3)
Col. Gian Gentile (9)
Combat Outposts (3)
Combat Video (2)
Concerned Citizens (6)
Constabulary Actions (3)
Coolness Factor (3)
COP Keating (4)
Corruption in COIN (4)
Council on Foreign Relations (1)
Counterinsurgency (218)
DADT (2)
David Rohde (1)
Defense Contractors (2)
Department of Defense (209)
Department of Homeland Security (26)
Disaster Preparedness (5)
Distributed Operations (5)
Dogs (15)
Donald Trump (27)
Drone Campaign (4)
EFV (3)
Egypt (12)
El Salvador (1)
Embassy Security (1)
Enemy Spotters (1)
Expeditionary Warfare (17)
F-22 (2)
F-35 (1)
Fallujah (17)
Far East (3)
Fathers and Sons (2)
Favorite (1)
Fazlullah (3)
FBI (39)
Featured (189)
Federal Firearms Laws (18)
Financing the Taliban (2)
Firearms (1,756)
Football (1)
Force Projection (35)
Force Protection (4)
Force Transformation (1)
Foreign Policy (27)
Fukushima Reactor Accident (6)
Ganjgal (1)
Garmsir (1)
general (15)
General Amos (1)
General James Mattis (1)
General McChrystal (44)
General McKiernan (6)
General Rodriguez (3)
General Suleimani (9)
Georgia (19)
Google (1)
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (1)
Gun Control (1,623)
Guns (2,296)
Guns In National Parks (3)
Haditha Roundup (10)
Haiti (2)
Haqqani Network (9)
Hate Mail (8)
Hekmatyar (1)
Heroism (4)
Hezbollah (12)
High Capacity Magazines (16)
High Value Targets (9)
Homecoming (1)
Homeland Security (3)
Horses (2)
Humor (72)
Hunting (30)
ICOS (1)
IEDs (7)
Immigration (104)
India (10)
Infantry (4)
Information Warfare (4)
Infrastructure (4)
Intelligence (23)
Intelligence Bulletin (6)
Iran (171)
Iraq (379)
Iraq SOFA (23)
Islamic Facism (64)
Islamists (98)
Israel (19)
Jaish al Mahdi (21)
Jalalabad (1)
Japan (3)
Jihadists (81)
John Nagl (5)
Joint Intelligence Centers (1)
JRTN (1)
Kabul (1)
Kajaki Dam (1)
Kamdesh (9)
Kandahar (12)
Karachi (7)
Kashmir (2)
Khost Province (1)
Khyber (11)
Knife Blogging (7)
Korea (4)
Korengal Valley (3)
Kunar Province (20)
Kurdistan (3)
Language in COIN (5)
Language in Statecraft (1)
Language Interpreters (2)
Lashkar-e-Taiba (2)
Law Enforcement (6)
Lawfare (14)
Leadership (6)
Lebanon (6)
Leon Panetta (2)
Let Them Fight (2)
Libya (14)
Lines of Effort (3)
Littoral Combat (8)
Logistics (50)
Long Guns (1)
Lt. Col. Allen West (2)
Marine Corps (280)
Marines in Bakwa (1)
Marines in Helmand (67)
Marjah (4)
Media (67)
Medical (146)
Memorial Day (6)
Mexican Cartels (41)
Mexico (61)
Michael Yon (6)
Micromanaging the Military (7)
Middle East (1)
Military Blogging (26)
Military Contractors (5)
Military Equipment (25)
Militia (9)
Mitt Romney (3)
Monetary Policy (1)
Moqtada al Sadr (2)
Mosul (4)
Mountains (25)
MRAPs (1)
Mullah Baradar (1)
Mullah Fazlullah (1)
Mullah Omar (3)
Musa Qala (4)
Music (25)
Muslim Brotherhood (6)
Nation Building (2)
National Internet IDs (1)
National Rifle Association (94)
NATO (15)
Navy (30)
Navy Corpsman (1)
NCOs (3)
News (1)
NGOs (3)
Nicholas Schmidle (2)
Now Zad (19)
NSA (3)
NSA James L. Jones (6)
Nuclear (62)
Nuristan (8)
Obama Administration (221)
Offshore Balancing (1)
Operation Alljah (7)
Operation Khanjar (14)
Ossetia (7)
Pakistan (165)
Paktya Province (1)
Palestine (5)
Patriotism (7)
Patrolling (1)
Pech River Valley (11)
Personal (72)
Petraeus (14)
Pictures (1)
Piracy (13)
Pistol (4)
Pizzagate (21)
Police (647)
Police in COIN (3)
Policy (15)
Politics (968)
Poppy (2)
PPEs (1)
Prisons in Counterinsurgency (12)
Project Gunrunner (20)
PRTs (1)
Qatar (1)
Quadrennial Defense Review (2)
Quds Force (13)
Quetta Shura (1)
RAND (3)
Recommended Reading (14)
Refueling Tanker (1)
Religion (491)
Religion and Insurgency (19)
Reuters (1)
Rick Perry (4)
Rifles (1)
Roads (4)
Rolling Stone (1)
Ron Paul (1)
ROTC (1)
Rules of Engagement (75)
Rumsfeld (1)
Russia (37)
Sabbatical (1)
Sangin (1)
Saqlawiyah (1)
Satellite Patrols (2)
Saudi Arabia (4)
Scenes from Iraq (1)
Second Amendment (658)
Second Amendment Quick Hits (2)
Secretary Gates (9)
Sharia Law (3)
Shura Ittehad-ul-Mujahiden (1)
SIIC (2)
Sirajuddin Haqqani (1)
Small Wars (72)
Snipers (9)
Sniveling Lackeys (2)
Soft Power (4)
Somalia (8)
Sons of Afghanistan (1)
Sons of Iraq (2)
Special Forces (28)
Squad Rushes (1)
State Department (23)
Statistics (1)
Sunni Insurgency (10)
Support to Infantry Ratio (1)
Supreme Court (52)
Survival (185)
SWAT Raids (57)
Syria (38)
Tactical Drills (38)
Tactical Gear (14)
Taliban (168)
Taliban Massing of Forces (4)
Tarmiyah (1)
TBI (1)
Technology (21)
Tehrik-i-Taliban (78)
Terrain in Combat (1)
Terrorism (96)
Thanksgiving (13)
The Anbar Narrative (23)
The Art of War (5)
The Fallen (1)
The Long War (20)
The Surge (3)
The Wounded (13)
Thomas Barnett (1)
Transnational Insurgencies (5)
Tribes (5)
TSA (24)
TSA Ineptitude (13)
TTPs (4)
U.S. Border Patrol (6)
U.S. Border Security (18)
U.S. Sovereignty (23)
UAVs (2)
UBL (4)
Ukraine (10)
Uncategorized (98)
Universal Background Check (3)
Unrestricted Warfare (4)
USS Iwo Jima (2)
USS San Antonio (1)
Uzbekistan (1)
V-22 Osprey (4)
Veterans (3)
Vietnam (1)
War & Warfare (412)
War & Warfare (41)
War Movies (4)
War Reporting (21)
Wardak Province (1)
Warriors (6)
Waziristan (1)
Weapons and Tactics (79)
West Point (1)
Winter Operations (1)
Women in Combat (21)
WTF? (1)
Yemen (1)

February 2024
January 2024
December 2023
November 2023
October 2023
September 2023
August 2023
July 2023
June 2023
May 2023
April 2023
March 2023
February 2023
January 2023
December 2022
November 2022
October 2022
September 2022
August 2022
July 2022
June 2022
May 2022
April 2022
March 2022
February 2022
January 2022
December 2021
November 2021
October 2021
September 2021
August 2021
July 2021
June 2021
May 2021
April 2021
March 2021
February 2021
January 2021
December 2020
November 2020
October 2020
September 2020
August 2020
July 2020
June 2020
May 2020
April 2020
March 2020
February 2020
January 2020
December 2019
November 2019
October 2019
September 2019
August 2019
July 2019
June 2019
May 2019
April 2019
March 2019
February 2019
January 2019
December 2018
November 2018
October 2018
September 2018
August 2018
July 2018
June 2018
May 2018
April 2018
March 2018
February 2018
January 2018
December 2017
November 2017
October 2017
September 2017
August 2017
July 2017
June 2017
May 2017
April 2017
March 2017
February 2017
January 2017
December 2016
November 2016
October 2016
September 2016
August 2016
July 2016
June 2016
May 2016
April 2016
March 2016
February 2016
January 2016
December 2015
November 2015
October 2015
September 2015
August 2015
July 2015
June 2015
May 2015
April 2015
March 2015
February 2015
January 2015
December 2014
November 2014
October 2014
September 2014
August 2014
July 2014
June 2014
May 2014
April 2014
March 2014
February 2014
January 2014
December 2013
November 2013
October 2013
September 2013
August 2013
July 2013
June 2013
May 2013
April 2013
March 2013
February 2013
January 2013
December 2012
November 2012
October 2012
September 2012
August 2012
July 2012
June 2012
May 2012
April 2012
March 2012
February 2012
January 2012
December 2011
November 2011
October 2011
September 2011
August 2011
July 2011
June 2011
May 2011
April 2011
March 2011
February 2011
January 2011
December 2010
November 2010
October 2010
September 2010
August 2010
July 2010
June 2010
May 2010
April 2010
March 2010
February 2010
January 2010
December 2009
November 2009
October 2009
September 2009
August 2009
July 2009
June 2009
May 2009
April 2009
March 2009
February 2009
January 2009
December 2008
November 2008
October 2008
September 2008
August 2008
July 2008
June 2008
May 2008
April 2008
March 2008
February 2008
January 2008
December 2007
November 2007
October 2007
September 2007
August 2007
July 2007
June 2007
May 2007
April 2007
March 2007
February 2007
January 2007
December 2006
November 2006
October 2006
September 2006
August 2006
July 2006
June 2006
May 2006

about · archives · contact · register

Copyright © 2006-2024 Captain's Journal. All rights reserved.