Myths About Afghanistan
Victor Davis Hanson on whether Afghanistan is really the "graveyard of empires ..."
Victor Davis Hanson on whether Afghanistan is really the "graveyard of empires ..."
Ernie Pyle's timeless wartime columns ...
No July 4 hot dogs with the Iranian Mullahs ...
Mark Steyn, U.S. sclerotic and ineffectual, declining into societal dementia ...
Nicholas Schmidle asks some hard questions about Nawaz Sharif ...
The CIA's war against President Bush was motivated by ass covering, or by political
NSA Director Keith Alexander, a three-star general, is expected to earn a fourth star when he
NSA Director Keith Alexander, a three-star general, is expected to earn a fourth star when he
Providing electronic devices for IEDs ...
Police watched from a distance and did not intervene ...
Been there, done that in the Middle East ...
Matt Sanchez - repealing DADT would be a disaster.
Too much U.S. largesse has created corruption in Afghan government.
Dan Riehl weighs in on language, thinking and security from terrorism ...
The U.S. is seeking to hire a merchant ship to deliver hundreds of tonnes of arms to Israel
Sharif brothers on Baitullah Mehsud's hit list.
No Georgian destruction of Tskhinvali, contrary to lying Russian claims.
Nuclear yield within six to twelve months.
McNeill ties length to Pakistan tribal region, likely to be protracted anyway.
Multinational force press release on Sadr City operations and seizure of weapons and munitions.
"We will fight them to the end."
War on terror not popular with Pakistani population.
U.S. presence expanding Southward in Iraq.
Its full steam ahead for Iran.
And SECDEF Gates continues to press this issue.
Pajamas Media exclusive: how your tax dollars fund terror.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary Graduate executed in Afghanistan.
Nearly 1000 dead from harshest Afghan winter in 30 years.
Attacks in Baghdad down 80% according to Iraqi Army.
Lack of appropriate defense spending a grave situation.
Olmert claims Iran still on target to construct nuclear weapon.
Promoted to Army Vice Chief of Staff. Well deserved.
Must read on Israeli Army shame and lawyer happiness with war against Hezbollah.
Libyans joining jihad in increasing numbers.
How relevant will Maliki be to Iraq's future?
Maj. Gen. Gaskin: "The positive trends are permanent."
Abizaid questions whether Maliki can bring unity to Iraq.
From the Multinational Force, more on Operation Lion Pounce.
An important ally in Iraq has been assassinated.
Israel to show Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff nuclear intelligence on Iran.
Cabinet approves proposed agreement with U.S.
Prof. Kingsley Browne on his new book.
Major General Robert Scales: "Outcome is irreversible"
Mullen says military needs larger slice of GNP to modernize.
For siding with the U.S. against al Qaeda.
Terrorist poses as bride. Ugh!
Legislation in trouble.
Al Qaeda documents discovered near Syrian border.
Shameful people jeer disabled veterans in swimming pool.
Saudi jihadist in Iraq tells his personal story.
Concerning Iranian meddling and Quds.
Michael Yon breaks bread with General Petraeus.
Ralph Peters on the advancements in Iraq.
War between al Qaeda and Hezbollah.
Traumatic brain injury not recognized.
Ballistic Sensor Fused Munition.
High intensity electronic warfare.
Iranian weapons are a sign of continued Iranian meddling in Iraq.
U.S. forces in Iraq are using a high-resolution, thermal/infrared sensor system.
Washington Post profiles AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq, or al Qaeda in Mesopotamia).
Taiwan may not be as secure as we would like to think.
Be thankful your daughter isn't be raised in Basra.
Pastor discusses rules of engagement and sacrificial U.S. deaths.
In counterinsurgency (COIN), patience is a virtue. But violence has decreased so fast in
Normally I enjoy reading the posts by John Hinderaker at Powerline, but his recent post is an exception. With a strange bit of melancholy or resignation, John argues that it is time to pack up and quit Afghanistan. I will detail this in a bit, but suffice it to say that I found most of his arguments shallow and unpersuasive.
Even so, I would not bother making John’s post the subject of my own, but for two things that alarm: (1) Powerline has one of the highest levels of readership in the blogosphere, so its opinions reach a lot of people, aggravating the damage; (2) this recent post seems to be indicative of a growing opinion among conservatives (as shown by the large, positive response it has received so far).
So here goes.
Here are the reasons supplied by John Hinderaker for calling it quits. After stating that he supports the initial attack to chase Al Qaeda out of its bases in Afghanistan, he sees the ensuing efforts differently:
Since then, for going on nine years, we have pursued a somewhat half-hearted peacekeeping/democracy policy in Afghanistan. The Bush administration was right, I think, not to devote excessive resources to Afghanistan, which is virtually without strategic significance compared with countries like Iran, Iraq and Egypt. Moreover, the country’s human natural and human raw material could hardly be less promising.
Afghans are not just living in an earlier century; they are living in an earlier millenium. Their poverty, cultural backwardness and geographic isolation–roads verge on the nonexistent–are hard for us to fathom. They are a tribal society run by pederasts whose main industry is growing poppies. If our security hinges on turning this place into a reasonably modern, functioning country, we are in deep trouble. But I don’t think it does; and, in any event, I don’t think we can do it.
In large part, our effort in Afghanistan has been devoted to protecting normal Afghans against extremists like the Taliban. But, as the current rioting in Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif and elsewhere reminds us, there there may not be a lot of daylight between the Taliban and more moderate Afghan factions.
For Hinderaker, Afghanistan and its people are pretty worthless, to put it bluntly. No “strategic significance compared with…Iran, Iraq and Egypt.” The country is devoid of raw materials or human potential. In his view, it is such a backward, black hole of inhumanity that any change is hopeless. Even Obama, presumably, wouldn’t try to sell his snake oil there. The rioting there over the Koran burning is proof of sorts, he says, that the country is hopeless.
I hate to say it, but this is just lazy, generalized thinking.
It is very tempting thinking, however. There is certainly alot of things about Afghanistan that repulse our cultural sensitivities and it is indeed easy to see the depths to which the country has sank and believe it has always been this way, but this is not a reason for leaving, in and of itself. It is just letting our prejudice show. It is hard to remember as far back as the 1960′s, but Afghanistan had a functioning monarchy with a tolerable standard of living in Kabul and prospects for reform and political rights up until the communist takeover in 1978. What Afghanistan has become, after 30 years of war, brutal totalitarian rule and the importation of strict, Islamic codes, is not what is has always been nor its eternal fate.
As for the claim that Afghanistan has no strategic value, that is at least a debatable point. If we had a coherent and consistent foreign policy that looked at the broader interest of the U.S. in the region, Afghanistan has significance. If, for example, we had a foreign policy that recognized the dire threat that the Iranian regime poses to the entire Middle East (and beyond), the ability to stage forces on both sides of Iran— in Iraq and Afghanistan– would enable the U.S. to effectively aid insurgents and opposition groups in Iran.
Having a presence in Afghanistan also gives the U.S. a key leverage point and access to Pakistan. Like it or not, nuclear Pakistan is a major threat to the U.S. so long as it teeters on the edge of political instability and the possibility of the Islamofascists getting their nukes. The U.S. has a natural affinity with India that could be cultivated into a strategic partnership in the region as a counterbalance to China and the growing Islamofascist threat in Pakistan. Afghanistan is valuable to that partnership as well and we could be doing much more to involve India.
Hinderaker believes Afghanistan is worthless, a view not shared, however, by Alexander the Great, the Mongols, the Muslims, the Tsarist Russians, the British Empire and the Soviet Union.
I think that the heart of the problem for Hinderaker and other conservatives when it comes to Afghanistan is the notion of “turning this place into a reasonably modern, functioning country…” In many circles, you can add in “democracy” to that list. This has been the great mistake of our involvement in Afghanistan.
Our first and primary goal in Afghanistan should always have been to establish security, period. Without security first, every, other goal is like piling up sand on the beach. Security against the Taliban and Al Qaeda is a limited, achievable goal. It is measurable victory. And, once established, it creates the necessary space and stability for the kind of investments and social reforms that, over the long term, can make a real difference in the development of the country. The problem for the U.S. has been that we have been way too ambitious, trying to establish security and establish a democratic government and re-build their infrastructure and make it into a “modern, functioning” country.
This is analogous to a man, near starvation, who is rescued and then force-fed a king’s banquet: it will kill him. His shriveled stomach is not ready for that. After such deprivation, he needs a little bit at a time, slowly and carefully. Afghanistan is the same way. After over twenty years of ruin and oppression, we cannot descend upon the country and begin force-feeding it with hundreds of billions of dollars in aid for every conceivable project, no matter how well-intentioned. We have almost literally been killing Afghanistan with kindness. Funny how they don’t appreciate it.
The mistake that Hinderaker makes is looking at the process and concluding that the entire enterprise is worthless or hopeless. They seem to have gotten discouraged because all of our ‘force-feeding’ has not brought a miracle cure. Their answer, to throw the hapless man back in the desert to starve again, is absurd. Rather, they should see our actions to this point in Afghanistan as the excessive blunder it has been.
If the U.S. had been single-mindedly pursuing security and the elimination of the Taliban since 2001, we might well have drawn down our troop levels there to some border outposts to interdict insurgents from Pakistan while leaving the interior to ANA forces that would have had almost a decade of solid training by now. Even if you view the ANA as a hopeless project, at the very least we would have had time to establish local militias that would keep the peace in their locale and govern themselves. We would not have diverted billions of dollars to a corrupt, central figurehead like Karzai. All of these things feed the disenchantment that Hinderaker and others feel.
But just because mistakes have been made– even terrible mistakes– should not give way to careless analysis and spotty observations. It should, instead, be a call for better policy.
When Hinderaker turns to the consequences of quitting Afghanistan his view is rather limited:
Is there a danger that if we leave, the Taliban will re-take control and, perhaps, invite al Qaeda or other terrorist groups to join them? Yes. However, it it not obvious that, after what happened in 2001, the Taliban will be quick to make its territory, once again, into a launching pad. If they do, one would hope that drones, bombs and perhaps the kind of small-scale insertion of troops that we mounted in 2001 will be an adequate response. In any event, when it comes to harboring terrorists, I am a lot more concerned about Pakistan than Afghanistan.
The war in Iraq is over, and has been for some time. Our mission there has been a success; how important a success depends not on us but on the Iraqis. For a predominantly Arab country, Iraq is doing well. At this point, we have done about all we can do. Our troops are no longer in a combat role, and we should bring them home, and honor their victory, on schedule.
There are several problems in these paragraphs.
First, as John admits, it quite possible (I would say likely) that the Taliban will allow Al Qaeda and its affiliates to set up shop again in Afghanistan. For him to say, however, that we should “hope that drones, bombs and perhaps the kind of small-scale insertion of troops… will be an adequate response” is fanciful.
Those “drones” and “bombs” have to come from somewhere. If we pull out, there will no longer be any bases from which to fly the drones and the “secret” bases in Pakistan will likely be closed down as well once it is clear to the Pakistanis that we are done. As for the “small-scale insertion of troops,” I assume he is referring to the SOF and CIA teams that partnered with the Northern Alliance forces and rained down smart munitions on the Taliban positions. Trouble is that there will be no Northern Alliance forces for these teams to partner with if we pull out.
Second, if the U.S. pulls its forces out as John suggests, there is very little likelihood that those forces will ever return again. Even if the U.S. was capable of flying in sorties of long-range bombers and sending in cruise missiles, Al Qaeda has learned a thing or two since 2001 about nullifying the effects of long-range munitions. Al Qaeda can expand into the remote areas of Afghanistan where the U.S. will be increasingly helpless to affect. With the bombing option of little use, what chance is there that the American people will want want to re-commit troops after having gone through the national trauma of pulling forces out in disgrace? (And I dare anyone to say that doing so at this juncture would be anything other than a U.S. humiliation). It is not going to happen.
Third, are we willing to face the unbelievable humanitarian crisis that will result when the Taliban regain control of Afghanistan? Are we willing to accept into the U.S. as refugees the hundreds of thousands of Afghans that Hinderaker denigrates as “pederasts” and “tribal” and hopelessly backward? We still have an ugly spot on our national honor from abandoning South Vietnam to the communist killers. Anyone remember the Boat People? The world well remembers how we abandoned the shia in Iraq to Saddam’s mass executions and tortures in 1991. Are we willing to endure yet another flag of shame in Afghanistan?
Finally, the view espoused by Hinderaker and others is incredibly short-sighted. Our best hope of eliminating Al Qaeda or keeping them disrupted is by having troops and bases in Afghanistan that allow us at least the option of ground action against their sanctuaries in Pakistan. The only reason that we can even contemplate leaving Afghanistan is because we have not suffered any large-scale attacks since 2001. That is remarkable in itself and should be kept in mind when contemplating withdrawal.
Our continuous presence in Afghanistan, while extremely problematic, deeply flawed and poorly run, gets at least some credit for keeping Al Qaeda on the defensive and ill-prepared to mount another large-scale attack against the U.S. If, God forbid, Al Qaeda should pull off another 9/11-type attack and we can trace its origins to the Pakistani FATA camps, do you think we will want U.S. combat forces right next door in Afghanistan to go in and wipe out every, last camp and terrorist hideout? You bet we will. But if those forces are gone, our ability to make Al Qaeda pay (and to force our will upon Pakistan if they resist us crossing the border) is neutered.
(I cannot in good conscience leave off here without at least commenting on John’s statements above about Iraq. As Herschel Smith has said on more than a few occasions, the U.S. achieved an incredible feat of arms in 2006-2007 by taking it to Al Qaeda and Sadr’s illegal militias only to risk most of those gains by hastily agreeing to a status of forces treaty with Iraq that severely restricted our forces there. Since Obama’s election, the U.S. has been withdrawing troops at a pace that further jeopardizes our hard-won gains in security there. Too much American blood and treasure has been invested in Iraq for us to simply throw up our hands and say, “Well, it’s up to the Iraqis now. Good luck, we’re outta here!” Iraq can and should be a major ally of ours in the most crucial spot in the Middle East. We should be doing everything we can to ensure that we have a continuing military presence there as well as increasing diplomatic and economic ties. We still have troops in Germany and Japan, for crying out loud. How much more important is it to have troops or at least air bases in easy reach of Iran and the Persian Gulf — not to mention Syria and Israel?)
If the post by John Hinderaker is a real indication of the trends of conservative thinking (or the thinking of the public in general) then the U.S. is in big trouble in the world.
Can we save a few bucks from the budget by calling it quits in Afghanistan? Sure, but even Hinderaker admits that the cost is comparatively small change.
Let me emphasize here that I do not advocate an unlimited and unconditional engagement in Afghanistan. I have said before that if the U.S. is not serious about winning there, if we are simply using the precious lives of our combat forces as a political game or in some half-hearted program to get re-elected, then those forces should come home. But the rational response to bad policy and poor management is not to shut everything down and hide under the bed at home, it is to recognize the problems and do something about it: throw out the policy-makers and bad managers and implement a better approach.
It saddens me to think that John Hinderaker has gotten so discouraged with our Afghan policy that he would rather hide under the bed than use his considerable intellect to advocate for a better way.
The U.S. Marines brass is happy about the recent performance of the F-35.
Well, no one can say the Lockheed JSF team hasn’t had a good week. First came the hover and short takeoff and short landing. Today, they capped it with the plane’s first true vertical landing.
The Marines were officially happy. “Having the F-35B perform its first vertical landing underscores the reality of the Marine Corps achieving its goal of an all STOVL force,” said Lt. Gen. George Trautman, deputy commandant for aviation. “Being able to operate and land virtually anywhere, the STOVL JSF is a unique fixed wing aircraft that can deploy, co-locate, train and fight with Marine ground forces while operating from a wider range of bases ashore and afloat than any other TacAir platform.”
In the end, the Marines’ relentless pursuit of forcible entry and expeditionary warfare capabilities, along with their penchant for operating alone, is driving them to be disconnected from the U.S. Navy.
The future of Marines on aircraft carriers may hinge on the F-35 program.
The Marine Corps, which is the only U.S. service that has not announced a significant delay for the Joint Strike Fighter, remains fully committed to the F-35B Lightning II short take-off, vertical landing variant. Marine officials already have purchased 29 planes in the fiscal 2008-2010 budgets and officials insist they are on track to see a squadron operational by December 2012.
The test plane, BF-1, conducted its first vertical landing March 18, checking off a major milestone in the F-35B program. But that event was delayed by almost a year. Still, officials with Lockheed Martin, the F-35’s lead manufacturer, and the Corps said they are confident the timeline will be met, adding that the first two training aircraft are expected to be delivered by the end of 2010.
“We are going to be able to operate our planes from the sea, on our amphibious force fleets initially, and we’ll move ashore to the same kinds of forward operating bases that we operate the AV-8B,” Lt. Gen. George Trautman, the deputy commandant for aviation, said in a conference call with reporters.
Trautman said nothing about the Corps’ jets operating from carriers — as the Marines F/A-18 Hornets do today — but he did say the first F-35 squadron is expected to deploy with a Marine expeditionary unit in 2014.
Some observers say the Corps’ commitment to the F-35B is driven by a long-term desire to break away from Navy carriers. A powerful and versatile fighter jet that could operate from smaller-deck amphibs would grant the Marines more autonomy than ever before.
Commandant Conway is also still bullish on the redesigned EFV (Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle), but take particular note of this comment concerning the order of battle concerning the most expensive forcible entry vehicle ever conceived.
Interesting that our Marines would be expected to fight their way ashore, and then dismount to add armor so they can actually drive around? Would one vehicle protect the others while some put on additional armor? Would the armor be pre-positioned where the Marines were gonna storm ashore???
All programs can have high hopes – until tin is bent and problems show up.
Since the EFV has a flat hull in order to speed along the top of the water, it must be armored-up to survive IEDs on land. So how does it get that way? Why, the U.S. Marines put the armor on it. They shoot their way on to shore and then stop, get out, wait on Navy supplies, and then fix up the EFVs.
Doesn’t sound like a good plan to you? Well, this confused thinking permeates the expeditionary concept at the moment. Consider also this comment.
So we’ve got 60% of the world living in cities near the ocean. We think those cities will be the areas where Marines are called upon to restore stability, work with local security forces, etc.
How do you protect the ships from missiles with stand-off distance, yet get the Marines some sort of armor protected vehicle? EFV was the answer.
Or, we just wait until all the bad guys go to bed, then we row ashore with M1′s on LCACs!
So this commenter poses the following scenario: we are conducting forcible entry to a shoreline where the Navy must be protected from missiles by being over the horizon (i.e., 25 miles out to sea), but these missiles are coming from a nation-state that is in such bad need of stabilization that the Marines must conduct forcible entry to work with security forces.
So you say that it sounds like someone is working with an infeasible or implausible scenario? The QDR doesn’t help, giving no hint that the DoD even pretended to study the future situation and appropriately plan budgetary expenditures to match the needs. One searches in vain for any forward thinking or strategic vision beyond adequate funding for fourth generation warfare and transnational insurgencies.
Crush at Blackfive links two studies performed out of Australia:
Why the F-22 and the PAK-FA have the “Right Stuff” and why the F/A-18 and the F-35 do not
Crush questions whether we may be surrendering our air superiority if we relinquish the F-22 in favor of the troubled F-35 program. I have also clearly sided with the F-22 as being a far superior fighter. W. Thomas Smith also smartly points out that the aircraft do completely different things.
Russia and China will continue to be almost bankrupt into the near future (just like we are). But it’s also important not to allow our current air superiority to lull us into a false sense of security.
In conclusion, I would offer up the following points from these links and previous ones at The Captain’s Journal:
One final thought is in order. I am convinced that fighter drones (ones to which we can truly entrust the security of America) are many years off, if they are even feasible. Beyond this, true leadership is needed for such expensive weapons systems – the kind of leadership that has vision rather than the kind that conducted the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Prior:
Marine Corps Commandant on DADT and Expeditionary Warfare
Strategic Decisions Concerning Marines and Expeditionary Warfare
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticizes air strikes:
The United States cannot succeed in Afghanistan if the American military keeps killing Afghan civilians, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Monday.
In remarks to scholars, national security experts and the media at the Brookings Institution, Admiral Mullen said that the American air strikes that killed an undetermined number of civilians in Afghanistan’s Farah Province two weeks ago had put the U.S. strategy in the country in jeopardy.
“We cannot succeed in Afghanistan or anywhere else, but let’s talk specifically about Afghanistan, by killing Afghan civilians,” Admiral Mullen said, adding that “we can’t keep going through incidents like this and expect the strategy to work.”
At the same time, Admiral Mullen said, “we can’t tie our troops’ hands behind their backs.”
Admiral Mullen’s comments on the civilian casualties from the Farah air strikes, which have caused an uproar in Afghanistan, reflect deep concern within the Pentagon about the intensifying criticism from Kabul against the American military. Admiral Mullen, who noted that commanders in the region had in recent months imposed more restrictive rules on air strikes to avoid civilian casualties, offered no new solutions in his remarks. He only said that “we’ve got to be very, very focused on making sure that we proceed deliberately, that we know who the enemy is.”
By midafternoon on May 4, after a battle between Afghan police and army forces and Taliban fighters had raged for hours, Marines Special Operations forces called in air strikes.
Three F-18 fighter-bombers, flying in succession over several hours, dropped a total of five laser-guided and satellite guided bombs against Taliban fighters who were firing at the American and Afghan forces, said the official, Col. Gregory Julian, in an email message late Sunday.
Villagers, however, have reported that an even heavier bombardment came after 8 p.m. when they said the fighting appeared to be over and the Taliban had left the village.
The military has disputed this version of events, saying the Taliban fighters continued to fire at American and Afghan troops, requiring additional air strikes. These came from a B-1 bomber, which dropped three 500-pound satellite-guided bombs on a tree grove, four 500-pound and 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs on one building, and one 2,000-pound satellite-guided bomb on a second building, Colonel Julian said. Villagers have said they sought safety from the initial air strikes in a compound of buildings, but it was not clear whether these were the same buildings the American aircraft later bombed. Villagers said the bombings were so powerful that people were ripped to shreds. Survivors said they collected only pieces of bodies.
In all, Colonel Julian said, eight targets were attacked over a seven-hour period, but he denied reports from villagers that a mosque had been damaged in the strikes. Colonel Julian and other American military officials have said that the Taliban deliberately fired at American and Afghan forces from the rooftops of buildings where civilians, including women and children, had sought shelter, to provoke a heavy American military response.
Colonel Julian said at the peak of the fighting that day, some 150 Afghan soldiers and 60 Afghan police, along with their 30 American trainers, as well as two Marine Special Operations teams that made up a quick-reaction force, were battling about 300 militants, including a large number of foreign fighters.
Afghan government officials have accepted handwritten lists compiled by the villagers of 147 dead civilians. An independent Afghan human rights group said it had accounts from interviews of 117 dead. American officials say that even 100 is an exaggeration but have yet to issue their own count.
Analysis & Commentary
There remains an uproar over this incident because of noncombatant casualties, and some of it even over military analysis web sites. The focus of much of the discussion is on how counterinsurgency cannot succeed with noncombatant casualties, and that successful counterinsurgency must be population centric. True enough within context, this point misses the mark by a wide margin and succeeds only in parroting doctrinal talking points without a true understanding of what this incident can tell us about the campaign.
Regular readers of The Captain’s Journal can do better. Be circumspect, smart and deliberate, and consider the question of what we might learn from this incident? Considering the recent few months of the campaign, what information may we cobble together to place this incident within its proper context? How can we avoid the traps into which most apparatchiks fall, of advocating either bombing them into submission or implementing procedures to avoid noncombatant casualties altogether because it isn’t “population centric?”
First of all, there is no doubt that fathers and mothers of children who have perished, or children of fathers or mothers or siblings who have perished at the hands of U.S. military action, intentional or not, will forever be our enemies. It is understandable, and would be the same with most readers. Noncombatant casualties makes enemies.
Of course, many things make enemies, including promises to stop the Taliban and failing to meet those promises. But in this case there is something deeper going on, something that requires a bit of thought and trending.
In the Battle of Wanat where nine U.S. Soldiers perished and twenty seven were wounded, the Taliban massed some 300 or more fighters at one time in the area. Were it not for Close Combat Aviation (CCA) and Close Air Support (CAS), the casualty rate would have been even higher. Vehicle Patrol Base Wanat and Observation Post Top Side were what one might consider “far flung.” It was an area of operation that had heretofore not seen U.S. troops, but in which the Taliban were numerous and Taliban control unquestioned.
When the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit was deployed to the Garmser region of the Helmand Province in 2008, they killed approximately 400 Taliban who had massed in Garmser, at times calling their fire fights “full bore reloading.”
In Marines, Taliban and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, we covered the exploits of one Force Recon platoon who documented the fact that in their engagements with the Taliban the enemy fighters swelled to over 400 during ambushes and even during Taliban attacks on Forward Operating Bases. This is remarkable. This is basically half a Battalion of Taliban forces conducting what Force Recon called very good infantry tactics, including enfilade and interlocking fires, combined arms, and all of the other infantry tactics on which most good infantry is trained.
Finally, in Trouble in the Afghan Army: The Battle of Bari Alai we discussed the probable treachery of the Afghan Army during a Taliban attack on Observation Post Bari Alai in which three U.S. Soldiers perished along with two Latvian Soldiers. More than 100 Taliban fighters massed for the attack on the Observation Post.
Now go back and study the report above that has Admiral Mullen so concerned. The Taliban massed approximately 300 fighters for the fire fight with what turns out to be a fairly small U.S. force. They had Afghan troops alongside, but as we learned at Wanat, no Afghan troops perished that fateful night. The Afghan Army is shot through with drug abuse, and during the fight for Observation Post Bari Ala, it is believed that the Afghan troops laid down their weapons in a pre-arranged agreement with the Taliban.
Actually, a bit of study yields the conclusion that the Taliban have always wanted to mass troops (2005 report):
As the Taliban start shooting, O’Neal’s platoon scurries for cover. But there’s no panic. “They think, without a doubt, they have us outnumbered,” recalls O’Neal, a native of Jeannette, Pa., and leader of 2nd Platoon, Chosen Company. “We’ve got only 23 people on the ground, and I would say the Taliban had over 150 before the day was over” …
Taliban fighters, meanwhile, appear to gain courage from numbers, the ability to swarm a smaller enemy unit. A sense of safety in numbers, however, is often the Taliban’s undoing if a US platoon can fix an enemy’s position long enough for aircraft or other infantry units to arrive. This is the backbone of US military strategy in Zabul, and one reason why the Taliban have lost so many fighters this year.
It is fairly well known now that the additional troops deployed to Afghanistan are going to the population centers around Kabul and Kandahar – of course, in a tip of the hat to population centric counterinsurgency doctrine. So the balance of Afghanistan is left to the Taliban to raise revenue, recruit fighters, train, interdict our logistics lines, implement their governance and basically control as they see fit.
Then, since the U.S. is massing troops in and around the population centers, far fewer are left for the rural terrain. The most that can usually be accomplished is squad, platoon and company-sized engagements, or even smaller units to embed with the Afghan forces. This is very close to what is considered distributed operations. Few patrols in Taliban-controlled areas, no ensuring that the Taliban feel the strong presence of forces, just bare minimum to “train” the Afghan forces.
Yet when the Taliban are able to mass forces of as much as half a Battalion, the expectation is that much smaller units of U.S. forces will engage them without causing noncombatant casualties, while at the same time, the Taliban are clearly using human shields.
Clearly, we are asking the impossible of U.S. troops. The Obama administration doesn’t want to deploy more than about 68,000 U.S. troops to the theater, and as long as this small footprint obtains, heavy use of air power will be necessary to keep smaller units from being completely overrun when the Taliban mass troops.
There is a solution to this dilemma, but it requires more troops to disengage the Taliban from the population. The number of troops we have at the moment is not enough to do this mission. Hence, while noncombatant casualties are a sad thing and certainly counterproductive, the answer is not to inform the smaller units of U.S. forces that they cannot use air support. As much as The Captain’s Journal hates to see noncombatant casualties, more Marines and Soldiers in coffins would be much worse.
Following are some related but disaggregated thoughts on the upcoming U.S. Department of Defense budgetary cuts, along with some very good required reading on this subject.
Gates Readies Big Cuts in Weapons
As the Bush administration was drawing to a close, Robert M. Gates, whose two years as defense secretary had been devoted to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, felt compelled to warn his successor of a crisis closer to home.
The United States “cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything,” Gates said. The next defense secretary, he warned, would have to eliminate some costly hardware and invest in new tools for fighting insurgents.
What Gates didn’t know was that he would be that successor.
Now, as the only Bush Cabinet member to remain under President Obama, Gates is preparing the most far-reaching changes in the Pentagon’s weapons portfolio since the end of the Cold War, according to aides.
Two defense officials who were not authorized to speak publicly said Gates will announce up to a half-dozen major weapons cancellations later this month. Candidates include a new Navy destroyer, the Air Force’s F-22 fighter jet, and Army ground-combat vehicles, the offi cials said.
More cuts are planned for later this year after a review that could lead to reductions in programs such as aircraft carriers and nuclear arms, the officials said …
Gates is not the first secretary to try to change military priorities. His predecessor, Donald H. Rumsfeld, sought to retool the military but succeeded in cancelling only one major project, an Army artillery system.
Former vice president Dick Cheney’s efforts as defense chief under the first President Bush, meanwhile, are cited as a case study in the resistance of the military, defense industry, and Capitol Hill. Cheney canceled the Marine Corps’ troubled V-22 Osprey aircraft not once, but four times, only to see Congress reverse the decision.
And we’re glad that the V-22 Osprey program was completed. It is already making an impact in the Marine Corps expeditionary concept. The Captain’s Journal is still a supporter of Secretary Gates, but these defense cuts are both unnecessary and ill-advised (although not of Gates’ choosing in a perfect world). Beginning in 2011, Russian armed forces will undergo a comprehensive rearmament to refurbish and replaces weapons systems. While the U.S. is disarming, one of the only two near peers in the world is increasing and rearming its military. No, wait. Make that both near peer states.
Beijing Considers Upgrades to Navy
China’s top military spokesman said it is seriously considering adding a first aircraft carrier to its navy fleet, a fresh indication of the country’s growing military profile as it prepares for its first major naval deployment abroad.
At a rare news conference Tuesday, Chinese defense-ministry officials played down the importance of Beijing’s decision to send warships to the Gulf of Aden to curb piracy — China’s first such deployment in modern history — saying it doesn’t represent a shift in defense policy. The two destroyers and supply ship are to depart Friday for the Middle East.
But officials also made clear that China’s navy, which has been investing heavily in ships and aircraft, now has the capability to conduct complex operations far from its coastal waters — and that Beijing is continuing to expand its reach and capability, perhaps with a carrier.
It’s unclear what parts of an aircraft carrier China would build itself and what parts it might need to acquire from abroad. China has bought carriers before, but none ended up in the country’s fleet.
In some of the most direct public statements on current thinking behind Beijing’s naval policy, defense military spokesman Col. Huang Xueping said Tuesday that “China has vast oceans and it is the sovereign responsibility of China’s armed forces to ensure the country’s maritime security and uphold the sovereignty of its costal waters as well as its maritime rights and interests.”
At Information Dissemination, Galrahn makes a good observation on the importance of the expeditionary concept.
As we have noted many times on the blog, the amphibious ship is the hardest working type of ship in the US Navy in the 21st century. The data says all that needs to be said regarding the requirement.
They are flexible platforms that bring together a wide variety of capabilities that can effectively perform the range of mission profiles from soft power to forward afloat staging bases to even assault roles when necessary. They are the rapid responders when crisis breaks out on land, and best fit the most often called upon requirements of the US Navy when problems occur, whether it is Hezbollah/Israel or a natural disaster, the amphibious ship, not the aircraft carrier, is the type of platform sent into to help out people … The biggest problem with the sea basing concept isn’t the idea regarding how to get troops to land, but how to sustain troops from sea once we get them on land. The single largest factor that limits support is fuel.
The Captain’s Journal agrees with Galrahn and the importance of force projection – whether hard or soft power – with the Marines Expeditionary Units (including the “combined arms” concept of multiple naval vessels with various defensive and offensive capabilities. But with us it isn’t a matter of either-or. It’s both-and. We need both the carrier battle groups and the MEUs.
We will learn the lesson, again, the easy way or the hard way. But we must be prepared to fight both near peers and counterinsurgency campaigns. As for China, when they want to expand their global influence, the first big ship they go after is the carrier. Concerning Galrahn’s warning on the need for fuel, this highlights all the more the need for ports and air superiority for refueling tankers. Concerning overall air superiority, if the sole focus of our national defense dollars is in counterinsurgency, littoral combat and small wars, the MEUs will be left to the slaughter once the ordnance begins raining down from the sky.
Concerning this issue of being able to fight two wars at one time, the current administration is toying with this age-old doctrine.
The protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are forcing the Obama administration to rethink what for more than two decades has been a central premise of American strategy: that the nation need only prepare to fight two major wars at a time.
For more than six years now, the United States has in fact been fighting two wars, with more than 170,000 troops now deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. The military has openly acknowledged that the wars have left troops and equipment severely strained, and has said that it would be difficult to carry out any kind of significant operation elsewhere.
To some extent, fears have faded that the United States may actually have to fight, say, Russia and North Korea, or China and Iran, at the same time. But if Iraq and Afghanistan were never formidable foes in conventional terms, they have already tied up the American military for a period longer than World War II.
A senior Defense Department official involved in a strategy review now under way said the Pentagon was absorbing the lesson that the kinds of counterinsurgency campaigns likely to be part of some future wars would require more staying power than in past conflicts, like the first Iraq war in 1991 or the invasions of Grenada and Panama.
In an interview with National Public Radio last week, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates made it clear that the Pentagon was beginning to reconsider whether the old two-wars assumption “makes any sense in the 21st century” as a guide to planning, budgeting and weapons-buying.
Be careful here. This seems like a prelude to deep cuts in the men and materiel necessary for air superiority, Naval superiority and force projection. Wait, we’ve already discussed this above, and it looks like that’s exactly what’s going to happen.
Finally, you will note that the cuts also target both nuclear refurbishment and development and the F-22 program. The Captain’s Journal has already weighed in on these issues.
An Aging Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
The three links above are required reading, as are the two links below (for those readers who aren’t convinced of the need to refurbish our existing nuclear weapons stockpile or continue further development).
Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management
National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century
Finally, read this:
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