In the spirit of The Strong Horse in Counterinsurgency, Victor Davis Hanson, who recently won the National Humanities Medal, observed of the turning of the Anbari tribes to the U.S.:

… the US military has eliminated a large number of terrorists, insurgents and general terrorists since 2003. Given the noxious fumes of Vietnam-era “body-countsâ€? we don’t mention this. But many of the sheiks suffered horrendous losses among their tribes to the US in the past four years that led to some demoralization and the simple absence of their more skilled and veteran fighters. So, when they weighed the odds—increasing oil-generated wealth on the one hand versus being mowed down by the US on the other—the choice was to join us.

I we have said previously, “the insurgency was defeated for a number of ancillary and contributing reasons, including tribal cooperation, security, money and largesse paid directly to concerned citizens and the sheikhs, and other factors.  But the primary reason that the U.S. forces have succeeded was that they were the stronger horse.  The Iraqis saw this and sided with a winner.”

But there is the issue of political reconciliation to address, and thus far, the progress being made in Iraq is ground up by design, due in no small part to the ineptitude and intransigence of the Maliki administration.  Progress still continues to be made in the Anbar province, even as the Anbar schema is applied to the balance of Iraq.  In the operational update with Col. Stacy Clardy III, Commander, RCT-2, Multinational Force West, we learned that the mayor who recently took over Haditha met with more than 200 sheikhs and tribal leaders (previously it would have been remarkable to get 30 in one place), and told them that “if you stand with the Americans, it’s just like if you stood with the Americans after World War II, in terms of Japan and Germany; you can see where they led them down the road to prosperity.  And if you look at those countries today, that is what we want here in Iraq.”

The Anbaris do indeed want this for themselves and Iraq.  They believe, though, that the Sunnis are more capable than the Shi’a at running a government, and at least in Iraq at the present time, and with the point of comparison being Maliki, they are likely correct.  But given the inexplicable and irrational commitment of the State Department to Maliki and the weak parliamentary system that was imposed on Iraq, the power sharing situation is unlikely to change in the near future.  For all of the good will, faith and rhetorical flourish of our friend the mayor of Haditha, sadly, his vision probably requires a U.S. presence and investment that is unlikely to come to pass unless progress is made on the national front.

As for Maliki and his handlers, there is a window of opportunity.  Thomas Ricks, reporter for the Washington Post, has written a clear-headed expose on the current thinking in the leadership of the Multinational Force concerning the administration and efforts (or lack thereof) at reconciliation and power sharing.  He opens:

Senior military commanders here now portray the intransigence of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al-Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents or Iranian-backed militias.

In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government’s failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. A window of opportunity has opened for the government to reach out to its former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq, but “it’s unclear how long that window is going to be open.”

The lack of political progress calls into question the core rationale behind the troop buildup President Bush announced in January, which was premised on the notion that improved security would create space for Iraqis to arrive at new power-sharing arrangements. And what if there is no such breakthrough by next summer? “If that doesn’t happen,” Odierno said, “we’re going to have to review our strategy.”

Thomas Ricks is an extraordinary reporter, but of course was working towards this particular story.  It is quite possible that rather than some stunning and remarkable step change in the political climate in Iraq, there is slow progress towards a stable nation-state while at the same time living with a low level of violence throughout the region.  Time will tell the story.  But at The Captain’s Journal we hold General Odierno in high regard, and concur that this window of opportunity not only must be utilized to the fullest extent, but also has been paid for by the tears, sweat, sacrifice and blood of American warriors.  The State Department should stand up and take note that it is just as immoral for the U.S. authorities to fail to pressure the Maliki administration for change as it is for the Maliki administration to remain unchanged.

Other resources:

Last Call: An Opportunity is a Terrible Thing to Waste, The Small Wars Journal Blog.