Archive for the 'Afghanistan' Category

Report (from the New York Times)

United States marines pushed the Taliban out of this village and the surrounding district in southern Helmand Province so quickly in recent weeks that they called the operation a “catastrophic success.”

Yet, NATO troops had conducted similar operations here in 2006 and 2007, and the Taliban had returned soon after they left. The marines, drawing on lessons from Iraq, say they know what to do to keep the Taliban at bay if they are given the time.

“There is definitely someone thinking out there,” said Capt. John Moder, commander of Company C of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, speaking of the Taliban. “That’s why we need these people to be at least neutral to us,” he said, gesturing to the farmers who have been slowly filtering back to harvest their fields.

Originally sent to Garmser District on a three-day operation to open a road, the marines have been here a month and are likely to stay longer. The extension of the operation reflects the evolving tactics of the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, building on the knowledge accumulated in recent years in Anbar Province in Iraq.

The district of Garmser, a fertile valley along the Helmand River, had been under control of the Taliban and members of Al Qaeda for most of the last two years and much of it had become a war zone, as the Taliban traded fire with British troops based in the district center. One of the largest poppy-growing areas in the country, Garmser District has been an important infiltration route for the insurgents, sending weapons and reinforcements to the north and drug shipments to the south to the border with Pakistan.

Previous operations by NATO forces to clear the area of Taliban had yielded short-lived successes, as the Taliban have re-established control each time, Afghans from the area said. It is a strategy the insurgents have employed all over Afghanistan, using roadside and suicide bombs as well as executions to terrorize the people and undermine the authority of foreign forces and fledgling local governments.

In Garmser those with the means gave up and fled to the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah. Interviewed there by telephone, they said they had been living as refugees for almost two years and were still afraid to return — and to be identified, for fear of retribution from the Taliban.

But Company C served in Anbar Province, once one of the most intractably violent areas of Iraq, which quieted last year under a new strategy of empowering local groups called Awakening Councils, which now provide security. The marines were confident they could put that experience to good use here.

Only when you win over a critical balance of the local population and empower them to stand up to the insurgents can you turn the situation around, several marines said.

First Lt. Mark Matzke led a platoon for nine months last year in the Anbar city of Ramadi, where he said he got to know every character in a small neighborhood, both the troublemakers and the power brokers. But it was only when he sneaked in after dark and listened to people’s grievances in private that he was able to work out a strategy for protecting them from the insurgents.

“Through listening to their grievances, you could figure out that the people did not like the insurgents,” he said. But their biggest fear was that the marines would pull out, he said, leaving them at the mercy of insurgents who would treat them as collaborators.

As trust was built up, the people began to side with the marines and started to tip them off about who the insurgents were and where to find them. “You just need to give them confidence,” he said.

In this village, only the poorest laborers and farmers have started filtering back, Lieutenant Matzke said, adding, “These people are completely broken.” They refused all assistance at first, he said, but after talking for a couple of hours they admitted they could use the help, but were afraid to accept it for fear of the Taliban.

The people were glad when the Taliban were driven away, the marines said, and that is a sentiment they need to nurture. “We need to convince the people we are here to help, and to exploit the fact that we can help,” Captain Moder said.

As a first step, the marines promised to provide a strong security cordon so those villagers who had fled could return without fear to rebuild their homes and reopen the bazaar.

When on patrol, the marines carry a small gadget the size of an old Polaroid camera that takes fingerprints, photos and an iris scan of people they meet. It is used to build a database of the residents so they can easily spot strangers, the marines say. The Afghans accepted the imposition without protest.

Observation on the ground, information from the populace and control of key commerce and transportation routes are all ways to prevent the Taliban from seeping back into the area, Col. Peter Petronzio, commander of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, said in an interview.

“You need physically to be there,” he said. “You need to continue to move about the population, let your presence be known, but do it in a way so that you are not smothering and overwhelming. You have got to let life go on.”

But the villagers remain scared, uncertain how long the marines will stay and who will follow in their wake.

“I don’t think I will go back until complete peace and security comes,” said one elder, who said he had heard his house had collapsed under bombardment. “This is not the first time we have suffered. Several times we have seen such operations against the Taliban, and after some time the forces leave the area and so the Taliban find a way to return.”

“If NATO really wants to bring peace and make us free from harm from the Taliban,” he said, “they must make a plan for a long-term stay, secure the border area, install security checkpoints along the border area, deploy more Afghan National Army to secure the towns and villages, and then the people will be able to help them with security.”

Analysis & Commentary

The statement about Anbar being quieted by empowering local groups is a bit of a dumbed down version of the Anbar campaign, and doesn’t do justice to the kinetic fight against both al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency.  It also doesn’t do justice to the fight between the Sunni insurgency and al Qaeda even before being empowered by the U.S. (much later in the campaign).  Its continual repetition implies that all NATO has to do is have a few meetings with tribal elders and arm their sons, and the Taliban problem will suddently be over.  It is doltish.

The Sunnis in Anbar are stubborn people (according to Iraqis with whom we have spoken), and much more secular that the al Qaeda jihadists who flooded from across the globe to fight (Shiekh Abdul Sattar abu Risha was a chain smoker).  Al Qaeda’s brutality, U.S. kinetic operations, relationships built with tribal leaders (viz. Captain Travis Patriquin), a string of combat outposts in Ramadi, biometrics and gated communities in Fallujah, sand berms around Haditha, and a complex puzzle of other factors made up the campaign in Anbar.  The Anbar narrative is too complex to throw a few words at it in an article about Afghanistan.  If a journalist cannot draw this out in a single article, they s/he shouldn’t try.

Nonetheless, security does play a premier role in the discussion above, and in earlier reports about the Marines in Helmand it had been stated that the Marines were to continue through Afghanistan on a NATO command wish list of chores.  Apparently the idea of secure, hold and build has dawned on command and they are allowing the Marines to stay as they should.

It’s just not correct to say that the COIN tactics are evolving in Afghanistan.  U.S. Army units have been at combat outposts for quite a while, and the Marines are simply conducting well-rehearsed and finely-tuned COIN learned in the school of hard knocks in Anbar.  For the most part NATO forces are still conducting force protection at FOBs, with each country’s forces undermanned.  As for evolving tactics, there is no comprehensively agreed to strategy or set of tactics or even rules of engagement; there is merely an aggregate of disparate missions and strategies thrown together into a messy brew.

It is interesting that biometrics is being used – albeit on a small scale – in a tip of the hat to Operation Alljah.  Without biometric and census data the Marines won’t know who is who, and without the Marines, biometric data is useless.

The people have spoken to let us know what will be necessary to return en masse to their homes and rebuild society.  Security.  It is a theme we have discussed before, and shows once again that long term force projection is required.

Finally, it really is annoying to see ‘marines’ misspelled (a capital M should be used), and since the article is not discussing marine life in the sea and the spelling rules are fairly simple, it is profoundly poor that this kind of mistake continually makes it through journalists and editors.

Prior: Marines in Helmand

Seth G. Jones of RAND National Defense Research Institute has published Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.  It will required several assessments to analyze the entirety of the paper, and in lieu of attempting to assess the paper chronologically, we will address it thematically.  Several quotes will be supplied (mainly from Chapter 2 which is entitled Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare).  The last quote is from the recommendations section at the end of the paper.

RAND Study

One of the key challenges in waging effective counterinsurgency operations is understanding the variables that impact their success (or failure).  Most assessments of counterinsurgency operations tend to ignore or downplay the role of indigenous forces and mistakenly focus on how to improve the capabilities of outside forces to directly defeat insurgents. This might include revising the U.S. military’s organizationalstructure or increasing external resources (such as troops) to directly counterinsurgents. This approach assumes the recipe for a successful counterinsurgency is adapting the U.S. military’scapabilities so it can win the support of the local population and defeat insurgents. The problem with this approach is that it ignores or underestimates the most critical actor in a counterinsurgency campaign: the indigenous government and its security forces.

This mistake is common in the counterinsurgency literature. John Nagl argues, for example, that success in counterinsurgency operations is largely a function of an external military’s ability to adapt its organizational structure and strategy to win the support of the local population and directly defeat insurgents. But he largely ignores the role of the indigenous government and its security forces.

This focus on winning counterinsurgency campaigns by improving the capabilities of external actors has become conventional wisdom among numerous military officials and counterinsurgency experts. However, such a strategy is misplaced. While improving the U.S. military’sability to directly counter insurgents may be necessary to a successful counterinsurgency campaign, it is not sufficient. In particular, it underestimates the importance of indigenous forces: Most counterinsurgency campaigns are not won or lost by external forces, but by indigenous forces. The quality of indigenous forces and government has significantly impacted the outcome of past counterinsurgencies.

Indeed, there are dangers in focusing too heavily on a lead U.S. role and improving U.S. military capabilities to directly act against insurgents. First, U.S. forces are unlikely to remain for the duration of any counterinsurgency effort, at least as a major combatant force.  Insurgencies are usually of short duration only if the indigenous government collapses at an early stage. An analysis of all insurgencies since 1945 shows that successful counterinsurgency campaigns last for an average of 14 years, and unsuccessful ones last for an average of 11years. Many also end in a draw, with neither side winning. Insurgencies can also have long tails: Approximately 25 percent of insurgencies won by the government and 11 percent won by insurgents last more than 20 years.  Since indigenous forces eventually have to win the war on their own, they must develop the capacity to do so. If they do not develop this capacity, indigenous forces are likely to lose the war once international assistance ends.  Second, indigenous forces usually know the population and terrain better than external actors and are better able to gather intelligence. Third, a lead U.S. role may be interpreted by the population as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success.  Fourth, a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they—and not foreign forces—control their destiny. Competent governments that can provide services to their population in a timely manner can best prevent and overcome insurgencies.

Recommendations section: Where possible, U.S. counterinsurgency forces should be kept to a minimum and supported with civil-affairs and psychological operations units.

Analysis & Commentary

Jones is obviously well-studied and presents the data clearly, and the citations above are all the more remarkable because of these facts.  Without even a careful reading of the text, Jones is calling for the small footprint model of counterinsurgency.

Jones presents data and analysis to support a number of self-evident truths, such as the need to stand up the country’s own counterinsurgency forces as U.S. forces stand down, the need for a government essentially without corruption, and so forth.  But the leap from these truths to the necessity for a small footprint is not obviously or logically a necessary one.

More to the point, it is remarkable that this analysis was written in 2008.  General Abizaid and his successors were under orders to train the Iraqi Security Forces, and while some forces were deployed in the field conducting regular counterinsurgency operations, many weren’t until the security plan.

The Marines didn’t pay much attention to things going on outside of the Anbar Province, having had that AO turned over to them in 2004.  After a halting start in Fallujah, al Fajr set the stage for things to come in the province.  To rehearse an old theme, the tribal turn against al Qaeda and the insurgency didn’t occur in a vacuum.  Not only did al Qaeda’s brutality aid the turning, Shiekh Abdul Abu Sattar Risha had smuggling lines completely cut by U.S. kinetic operations.  Al Qaeda had become brutal, but the U.S. was an impediment to the welfare of his tribe.  He chose to fight al Qaeda, and even after beginning this part of the awakening a U.S. tank was parked in his front yard to protect his home and family.  The Sunnis turned on al Qaeda and sided with the U.S. because it was advantageous to do so.

Force projection was the hallmark of the Marine campaign in Anbar, with constant contact with both the enemy and population.  The small footprint or minimal force projection model was not applied in Anbar.  Subsequently after implementation of the security plan in and around Baghdad, it is simply impossible to argue that the small footprint model was used by Petraeus.

In fact, the opposite is true.  If there is any legacy of the small footprint model it is that in part it led to the necessity for the surge and security plan.  The notion of standing up the Iraqi Army suffered in the wake of cultural differences (e.g., the foreign idea of NCOs) as well as porous borders and a transnational insurgency.  Without a heavier footprint than in the early phases of OIF, the institutions couldn’t stand up and become disentangled from corruption (and still haven’t completely).

Turning East to Operation Enduring Freedom, it is no secret that the campaign is under-resourced by a wide margin, as the retiring General McNeill has said so.  The strategy planned for the future of Afghanistan is to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of weakness rather than from a position of strength as was done with the Sunni insurgency in Anbar.  The desperation is obvious, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai while offering peace talks has said he would personally go and talk to the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar if he knew his whereabouts or “his phone number.”  This last point should be reconsidered for its power and pedagogical value.  Karzai is talking about making peace with (and thus legitimizing) the very forces which made safe haven for al Qaeda prior to 9/11.

The most recent success in Afghanistan, the Helmand Province, is a success because of force projection by U.S. Marines.  Security is the necessary precondition for standing up the institutions that Jones wants to rely upon.  As one tribal elder in Garmser said to the Marines after entering, “When you protect us, we will be able to protect you.”

This protection doesn’t come with the small footprint model of COIN.  The two most recent insurgencies in history, involving not only radicalized elements but also transnational engagement, are evidence that the large footprint model for COIN is a winner.  Seth Jones has made a number of salient observations concerning COIN in the RAND paper, but almost-failed-nation-states which are vulnerable to criminals and transnational insurgents require nontrivial force size and obvious force projection (such as was the case in Anbar).  Whatever good might come from Jones’ study, his paper, at least on this point, seems badly dated and out of context given the recent conduct of COIN in OIF and OEF.

Further reading:

International Herald Tribune, U.S. think tank: Pakistan helped train Taliban, gave info on U.S. troops

MSNBC, U.S. think tank: Pakistan officials help Taliban

The lobbying and the public relations campaign has been essentially completed, and the stage is set for a major shift in strategy in Afghanistan.  The teammates are Hamid Karzai – who has said that the West has bungled the war on the Taliban– and the British.  But the shift in strategy will not look anything like the surge or security plan for Iraq.  Rather, the British and Karzai are pushing for negotiations with the Taliban, and the British plans have been approved by the Cabinet.

It began with the British experiment with Musa Qala, and even though it went very badly, there has been no change in the long range plans.  Upon his recent visit to the U.S., Karzai made a stop at the New York Times to make sure that he communicated that he wanted the U.S. to stop arresting the Taliban and their sympathizers.  He has repeated this narrative within the last few days, and again made it clear what the real problem is with the campaign.  Western forces are to blame for rising violence in Afghanistan.

Karzai said in an interview on Indian television that the West risks losing peoples’ goodwill and that its forces should have done more to crack down on Taliban and al-Qaeda bases outside the country.

In the interview with CNBC TV 18 aired Monday, he didn’t directly mention bases in Pakistan, but his government has singled out that country in the past.

Karzai’s criticism — including his insistence that civilian casualties must stop — is important in light of his stated plan to stand for re-election next year. The president is often criticized in Afghanistan for being too close to the United States and Britain.

The president said Western forces did not focus on “sanctuaries of terrorists” despite his government’s warnings over the past five years.

“It was a serious neglect of that, in spite of our warning,” he said, adding that other former members of the Taliban who had given up arms were unfairly hunted down within Afghan borders.

“Some of the Taliban who have laid down their arms, who are living in the Afghan villages peacefully, who have accepted Afghanistan’s new order, they were chased, they were hunted for no reason, and they were forced to flee the country,” he said, according to Reuters.

The narrative is nonsensical, since the sanctuaries to which Karzai refers are the very places to which the Afghan Taliban flee for safe haven.  Karzai wants them targeted in Pakistan, but not in Afghanistan.  Nonetheless, the narrative is given additional weight by the British.  Once eager to get back into the “good war” in Afghanistan after the Basra disaster, the British are weary and reeling from the defections of high level generals to the civilian world.  Miliband turned up the rhetoric on the campaign, reiterating the tripe that there is no military solution to the problem, and the same notions were pushed by Des Browne, who not only endorsed talks with the Afghan Taliban, but also the negotiations with the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan.

The final act in this sorry play involves British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

As the deadliest year in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion in 2001 comes to a close, Gordon Brown is ready to talk to the Taliban in a major shift in strategy that is likely to cause consternation among hardliners in the White House.

Six years after British troops were first deployed to oust the Taliban regime, the prime minister believes the time has come to open a dialogue in the hope of moving from military action to consensus-building among the tribal leaders. Since January 1, more than 6,200 people have been killed in violence related to the insurgency, including 40 British soldiers. In total, 86 British troops have died. The latest casualty was Sergeant Lee Johnson, whose vehicle hit a mine before the fall of Taliban-held town of Musa Qala.

The Cabinet on Friday approved a three-pronged plan that Mr Brown will outline for security to be provided by Nato’s International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) and the Afghan national army, followed by economic and political development in Afghanistan.

Pakistan defends its participation in the negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban, saying that they aren’t engaged in talks with terrorist, but rather, “peace-loving” people.  Karzai sees the Afghan Taliban as peace-loving too and unrelated to the violence, and has struck deals with some of the hard core commanders.  The Afghanis believes it’s Pakistan’s fault, and the Pakistanis believe it’s all Afghanistan’s fault.

The British are tired and want to”negotiate,” the Norwegians are engaged solely in force protection, and the Germans are paying $30,000 per month to warlords for protection.  Gates has not had yet seen fit to pull the rug from under NATO command and retake authority over the campaign, and before Petraeus even becomes fully engaged in CENTCOM, the plans to capitulate are in full swing with him lacking the organizational authority to do anything about it.

The U.S. Marines who won the Anbar Province have had significant initial success in the Helmand Province in turning back Taliban control.  But whether because of lack of forces or simple unwillingness, NATO is recalcitrant and won’t learn from the example.  The NATO strategy being pushed is not one that will simply coexist alongside the U.S. strategy, any more than this approach succeeded in Basra.  It is literally in competition with the U.S. approach, and will work against the goals of the campaign.  Operation Enduring Freedom is becoming a testimony to a squandered opportunity, and the campaign is in very bad trouble.  If the West has indeed squandered an opportunity to kill the Taliban, negotiating with them is not the answer.

In spite of the success the U.S. Marines have had in the Helmand Province (and the example that this has provided to NATO), the balance of NATO forces in Afghanistan are focused primarily on force protection, and in order to procure that protection, some shady deals have been struck.  Spiegel recently interviewed Hamid Karzai, and while the entire piece is worth studying, one exchange stands out as descriptive of the campaign thus far.  NATO forces are buying protection from criminals and warlords.

SPIEGEL: Dirty deals are still necessary for the stability of Afghanistan?

Karzai: Absolutely necessary, because we lack the power to solve these problems in other ways. What do you want? War? Let me give you an example. We wanted to arrest a really terrible warlord, but we couldn’t do it because he is being protected by a particular country. We found out that he was being paid $30,000 a month to stay on his good side. They even used his soldiers as guards …

SPIEGEL: That sounds like the story of Commander Nasir Mohammed in Badakhshan, a province where German soldiers are based.

Karzai: I don’t want to name the country because it will hurt a close friend and ally. But there are also many other countries who contract the Afghan militias and their leaders. So I can only work where I can act, and I must always calculate what will happen before doing anything.

Karzai has just described an incredibly weak government, along with an incredibly weak campaign if the Germans are paying criminals $30,000 per month for protection.  In this case, the Germans don’t have the force (or rules of engagement) necessary to accomplish force protection, and thus they are buying it.

Another extreme example comes from the Norwegians.

The Norwegian base at Meymaneh is less secure than similar bases belonging to other ISAF forces. “The officers are angry, and I can see why,” says Vice Admiral Jan Reksten, in charge of the Norwegian contingent in Afghanistan.

Faryab province in northwestern Afghanistan has become increasingly restless in recent years. Taliban strength has been growing and there has been fighting in Meymaneh both last fall and in May this year.

Both the military and political heads of the armed forces accept that the base needs strengthening. When the Norwegian force was asked what it needed to defend itself, it asked for 120 troops and long-range weapons. A mobile reaction force was also ordered, so that the allied garrisons in the area could assist each other if any of them came under heavy attack.

Initially they were offered 100 men and long-range weapons. This was pared down to what was termed an absolute minimum of 76, still including mortars.

The most recent tally has fallen to 46 soldiers, with no long-range arms. These will instead be put into storage in Mazar-e-Sharif. This is the sequence of events which has caused tempers to fray.

The base at Meymaneh is a so-called Provincial Reconstruction Team base that provides security and helps with reconstruction in their local area. There are 30 such bases in Afghanistan. The United States alone has 12.

According to defense chief Sverre Diesen and army chief Robert Mood, Meymaneh will in fact be strengthened by the arrival of the arrival of more than 40 troops. The base will house a total of 200 Norwegians, of which 60 are deployed with the helicopter ambulance team currently stationed there. A few Latvian soldiers are also on the base.

“The Swedes, Germans and everyone else have robust rapid response forces. Mortars and armoured assault vehicles are almost always included,” says Col. Ivar Halset, who takes over as commander in Meymaneh in July.

“If we come under the sort of attack we experienced in May, we would no longer have weapons superiority over the Taliban,” adds Halset.

“The nearest reinforcements are an eight hour drive from Meymaneh and a further four to five hours from the areas where trouble is most likely occur,” he concludes.

“When the Norwegian force was asked what it needed to defend itself …” says it all.  The Norwegians are preoccupied with force protection, and as well they should be.  They lack even the basic weapons necessary to do the job, and are so far away from reinforcements (eight hours) and high trouble locations (four hours) that consideration of a combat outpost or counterinsurgency operations is out of the question.

The Australians also admit that more forces are needed.

Defence boss Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston has predicted foreign forces will be in Afghanistan for more than 10 years and thousands more troops are needed there.

He told a Senate Committee yesterday the Australian troops in Oruzgan province had Taliban insurgents on the back foot.

But he admitted they were unable to “hold the ground”.

“We can prevail in small areas but not across the whole province,” he said.

“Large tracts of the province are controlled by the Taliban.

“The ability to hold territory and influence what is happening – that’s the issue. There is a long, long way to go.”

Air Chief Marshal Houston’s sober assessment was backed by Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon.

And then he just as quickly states that not another Australian troop will be committed to the campaign.  Upon his recent retirement, General McNeill made some important observations.

General McNeill’s Isaf control began in February last year. At that time, the force was comprised of 33,000 NATO troops. Since then, 20,000 more have been added, but still more are needed, he said.

“This is an under-resourced war and it needs more manoeuvre units, it needs more flying machines, it needs more intelligence, surveillance and recognisance apparatus”, the general stated.

“I’m not just focused on the US sector, I’m talking about across the country.”

But the example has been given to us.  Ask the Marines in the Helmand Province if they wish to give $30,000 a month to organized crime as protection money.  On second thought, we know the answer to that question before we ask, and hence, we know what needs to be done to win the campaign.  It’s just a matter of doing it.

In Are the Taliban Really on the Brink of Defeat? the contradictory claims of progress and resurgent violence in Afghanistan were examined within the context of the NATO organizational structure.  On the other hand, no coverage of the Marine operations in the Helmand Province has been as extensive as at The Captain’s Journal with our category Marines in Helmand.  The Marines are having great success, of course.  But we weighed in on the first subject by stating that the British had exaggerated the imminent defeat of the Taliban.  Counterinsurgency takes force projection, and that, for a protracted period.

But are these two claims contradictory?  Since Glenn Reynolds linked the first post at Instapundit there was some interest in the subject.  Roger Fraley linked this post and caught on to the potential contradiction, and Noah Shachtman with Danger Room published his similarly themed article Who’s Up in Afghanistan? (several hours after The Captain’s Journal, by the way).  Noah points out:

Of course, this doesn’t have to be a binary choice. The Taliban could be causing more mischief, and the Marines may be kicking their asses.

Well yes, but more to the point, we should be seeing this as the difference between the micro- and macro-counterinsurgency level.  The Marines are not, after all, deployed all over Afghanistan.  They are in a troublesome province, to be sure, but they are only in Helmand, and then only in and around Garmser.  There is an MEU of around 3200 (the 24th MEU), not all of which is deployed in Garmser (some are engaged in training the Afghan forces and other things).

If we want to consider things on a macro-counterinsurgency level, the McClatchy bloggers link a source called Nightwatch, and opine on Afghanistan as follows:

But now listen to John McCreary, a former senior intelligence analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff who compiles NightWatch, an insightful analysis by a veteran professional of daily international developments drawn from open, unclassified sources. His take today on Afghanistan paints a far different – and gloomier – picture.

According to McCreary, May saw more violence than any other month since the 2001 U.S. intervention that toppled the Taliban and forced Osama bin Laden and his followers to flee into Pakistan. He says there were 214 violent incidents in more than 100 of the country’s 398 districts last month. That was up from April’s count of 199 violent incidents in 86 districts.

Writes McCreary: “Despite official efforts to spotlight improvement, the spring offensive this year is far worse than last year’s spring offensive. The security situation has deteriorated again. At no prior time has the Taliban managed to stage attacks in over 100 of the 398 districts.”

“If Taliban fighters are heading to Pakistan, they are going back to base to rest and to get more ammunition and supplies,” he concludes.

In other words, even though there are now more U.S. and ISAF troops than ever before – about 50,000, including 33,000 Americans – Afghanistan may be on track to seeing its bloodiest year yet since the U.S. intervention.

Now, McClatchy is horrible, horrible, horrible, and always biased and colored in the way they see and present the so-called news they publish.  The picture they present is worse than the conditions on the ground, because the Marines really are having outstanding success in Helmand.  After all, they are Marines.

There are two things that we just hate here at The Captain’s Journal.  First, we hate presentations of the situation that are rosier than the conditions on the ground, made that way for the purpose of justifying the campaign.  In our opinion, the campaigns (in Iraq and Afghanistan) need no justification, and we don’t waste time by debating six year old decisions.  Next, we hate presentations of the situation that are more bleak than the situation on the ground is, made that way for the purpose of undermining the very campaign we should be attempting to win.

The Captain’s Journal loves the truth, and presents critical analysis for the purpose of examination of strategy, tactics and logistics.  We do not engage in political ‘hackery’, and we don’t shill for politicians or political parties.  The campaign in Afghanistan is suffering from lack of force projection.  The campaign in Afghanistan must be won.  The Marines are showing us how to win it.  These are not contradictory points, and our articles on this have made perfect sense.

The broad strokes of the picture were painted for us by Nicholas Schmidle in Next-Gen Taliban.  Leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, told us of some of his concrete plans for the future.

“We want to eradicate Britain and America, and to shatter the arrogance and tyranny of the infidels. We pray that Allah will enable us to destroy the White House, New York, and London.”

This theme was reiterated by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as he addressed questions via the internet from international members – or presumed members – of al Qaeda.  As we summarized in Why is there Jihad?

Nationalism is evil and out of accord with the global aspirations of al Qaeda.  Nation-states are not just not helpful, or even a necessary evil.  They are quite literally an obstacle to jihad, not because they share the loyalties of jihadists, but rather, because they fundamentally don’t acquiesce to the vision of world conquest in the name of Islam and the forcible implementation of Sharia law.  What we see as a transnational insurgency is to the jihadists simply a world wide struggle.  They don’t recognize nation-states as legitimate.

Now with the “peace accord” between Mehsud and Pakistan, Baitullah has said that he intends to send fighters to Afghanistan to assist in the insurgency.  It was merely a matter of time before Pakistan helped to implement his broader plan.  His brand of Islam doesn’t recognize borders.  “Islam does not recognize boundaries”… “There can be no deal with the United States.”

More to the point, Syed Saleem Shahzad gives us a glimpse into the evolution of the Pakistan Taliban from their relatively humble beginnings to becoming an international threat.

He has been cultivated by al-Qaeda and is now part of a nexus headed by Takfiris (those militantly intolerant of “infidels”) belonging to al-Qaeda and a group of former Pakistani jihadis who cut their teeth in Kashmir under Baitullah.

Baitullah sees a very broad role for himself and for his comrades. They do not want simply to be members of a local resistance movement. They are riding the global ideological bandwagon of al-Qaeda and envisage a complicated strategy to win a war against the West.

Regardless of whether the Taliban are engaged by the U.S. within Pakistan proper, as we discussed in Conversation with a Jihadi, the surest way to put pressure on the Taliban is to begin the pressure in Afghanistan.  The Marines have made a very good start.

The commander of British forces in Afghanistan has recently said that the Taliban are in very deep trouble.

Missions by special forces and air strikes by unmanned drones have “decapitated” the Taliban and brought the war in Afghanistan to a “tipping point”, the commander of British forces has said.

The new “precise, surgical” tactics have killed scores of insurgent leaders and made it extremely difficult for Pakistan-based Taliban leaders to prosecute the campaign, according to Brig Mark Carleton-Smith.

In the past two years an estimated 7,000 Taliban have been killed, the majority in southern and eastern Afghanistan. But it is the “very effective targeted decapitation operations” that have removed “several echelons of commanders”.

This in turn has left the insurgents on the brink of defeat, the head of Task Force Helmand said.

These are strong words, and they markedly disagree with other official reports.  On May 15, 2008, a NATO spokesman stated that “attacks by insurgents in eastern Afghanistan have risen sharply,” and on May 20, 2008, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported to Congress that violence in Afghanistan is increasing.  He also stated:

“In short, a stable Iraq and Afghanistan that are long-term partners and share our commitment to peace will be critical to achieving regional stability and security,” he said.

“This will require years, not months, and will require the support of the American people, our regional allies and concerted action by the Iraqi and Afghan people and their leaders.”

These radically divergent reports are not atypical of NATO behavior in Afghanistan.  We are accustomed to well-rehearsed strategy and clear, consistent communication from the Multinational Force in Iraq.  NATO performs more like a multi-headed creature with different countries not only failing to ensure consistency in communication, but following very different strategies (most remarkably the British at all levels of the government).

Finally, in undeniable demonstration of the point, General McNeill, top commander of the NATO forces in Afghanistan, failed to confirm the view of the British commander.

The 24th MEU deployed to Afghanistan in February 2008 to battle the Taliban in the Helmand province, and there is current discussion of deployment of more Marines to replace the 24th MEU.  Marines aren’t deployed to the campaign when the enemy is defeated.  Common sense should be applied, and effusive reports of both victory and defeat should generally be rejected in favor of seeing counterinsurgency as a protracted but necessary process.

In lieu of the British good news of imminent victory (the Brits simply got a little too emotional), we can say that the campaign in Afghanistan is winnable.  The realistic view is that force projection is required, and that, for a protracted period of time.

While purveying propaganda, al Qaeda and Taliban spokesmen often unintentionally relinquish information that points to vulnerabilities and infighting within their organization.  An interview with a jihadist is used below, along with a question and answer session by Ayman al-Zawahiri, to supply the broad outlines of two specific vulnerabilities.

Background & Report

In spite of the U.S. objections to negotiations with the Tehrik-i-Taliban, there has been enough British and Canadian support, as well as internal support within Pakistan, that the authorities were persuaded to continue the process.  They want more time.

This week the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. General Dan McNeil said any deal must include stopping fighters from crossing the two countries’ shared border.

“We have gone back and looked at the data we have over a long period of time when there have been other peace deals,” he said.  “And the fact is each time the talks resulted in a peace deal we have an increased level of activity.”

Pakistani officials insist that unlike previous agreements the new peace talks involve elected government representatives – not the military – and those representatives have more credibility with tribal leaders …

Pakistan’s former spy agency chief Asad Durrani says people living near the disputed border known as the Durand line who are sympathetic to the Taliban will not immediately change their behavior because of a peace agreement. 

“If we expect that these people will completely prevent the crossings of the Durand line – that cannot be done, simply impossible,” he said.  “If we think that we can prevent those people who feel motivated to go on the other side and help the Afghan resistance – that again is mission impossible.”

Despite U.S. criticism of the deal and pessimism even among Pakistanis about finding a lasting peace agreement, negotiator Arshad Abdullah says that after more than six years of failed policies, critics should give the new approach time.

“With these agreements hopefully Afghanistan will be better off.  It is a trial.  Basically we want the world community to give us a chance and see how successful we are,” he said.  “It is a matter of three or four months and within six months hopefully we will have an even better situation.”

But is more time going to matter?  Understanding the enemy is crucial in the struggle against the global insurgency.  An Asia Times journalist gives us a glimpse into the nature of the enemy in a recent article, and it behooves us to listen as he describes a conversation with a jihadi.

Seven months ago I visited Bajaur and Mohmandagencies. As my taxi driver headed from Peshawar, the capital of North-West Frontier Province, he was played some Pashtu music on the car’s CD. Quickly, though, he changed it for jihadi songs.

“The militants have not only brought guns to the tribal areas, they have also brought a culture which has transformed tribal society,” commented a passenger traveling with me.

Syed Saleem Shahzad (with Asia Times) then goes on to describe a more recent meeting with a jihadi in the context of thinking about this “culture which has transformed” society.  He talks with a fighter who converses with him under the psuedonym “S.”

S is the son of a Pakistani military officer and left his home after completing school at the age of 17. Ever since, he has been an active jihadi, and in eight years he has only seen his family once.

He joined al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001 – even serving for bin Laden – but soon after that event he went to the South Waziristan tribal area in Pakistan with Arab-Afghans such as Sheikh Ahmad Saeed Khadr and Sheikh Essa.

S said his association with Arab-Afghan militants turned him from an ordinary jihadi into an astute trainer. “In my early 20s, I was training big names of this region, including young Arabs and Uzbeks who were many years older than me,” said S.

S could have earned a monthly stipend to devote himself to being a jihad, but he chose to work as a trader in Pakistani cities to earn extra money. He then returned to the mountain vastness of Afghanistan to join the Taliban’s fight against NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Afghanistan.

A turning point in S’s life came when, returning from Khost province in Afghanistan where he ran a training camp, he was arrested by Pakistani Frontier Corps.

“I was passed on from one security agency to another, and each time the interrogation methods changed. My pre-9/11 association with bin Laden and Zawahiri and occasional meetings with Zawahiri after 9/11 boosted me as an ‘al-Qaeda associate’ in the eyes of my Pakistani examiners. For one-and-half years I did not see a single ray of sunlight. After thorough interrogations, they concluded that I was just a fighter and a trainer against NATO troops who happened to be a ‘renegade’ son of an army officer,” said S.

“They contacted my father and despite that he had abandoned me a long time ago, when he heard about my situation all his fatherly affection returned and he agreed to become my guarantor that I would not take part in any jihadi activities.

“So I was released in front of Peshawar railway station, blindfolded, and when my blinds were removed there was my old father in front of me. I was standing with my hands and feet chained, and when my guards removed these my father hugged me and wept profusely.

“That was the only brief interaction between me and my family as I once again went into my own world of jihad. It was me and my gun, and I never looked back to see if there was any family, a father or a mother, waiting for me … though I miss them a lot,” S related in a sad, soft voice.

Syed Saleem Shahzad goes on to discuss the location of Bin Laden and other things, but a meaningful exchange occurs late in the interview.

S said he is against the use of suicide attacks. “I do not know the exact status of such attacks in Islamic law, but certainly in my manuals of war it is prohibited. I have argued with all the top commanders that any target can be hit without the use of suicide attacks,” S said.

On strategic matters, S is clear that attacks on Pakistani security forces in the tribal areas can only add up to problems. “I always argued with top ideologues like Sheikh Essa that the more success we get in Afghanistan, the more we will gain support from Pakistan. If NATO remains strong in Afghanistan, it will put pressure on Pakistan. If NATO remains weaker in Afghanistan, it will dare [encourage] Pakistan to support the Taliban, its only real allies in the region,” S said.

Analysis & Commentary

Two very remarkable vulnerabilities have been accidentally divulged in this last exchange.  It is obvious that S is religiously motivated.  Not only does he say so, but the hold and sway this has over him is enough to break with a weeping father to go back to his commanders.  Its power is complete with this jihadist.

This same religious commitment is also causing a problem within the movement.  Note what S says about the tactics of suicide attacks.  “I do not know the exact status of such attacks in Islamic law, but certainly in my manuals of war it is prohibited. I have argued with all the top commanders that any target can be hit without the use of suicide attacks.”

There may be a couple of reasons for the difficulty, one of which is the certain death of the jihadist.  But the most significant objection doubtless has to do with death of noncombatant Muslims due to these attacks.  They would like to believe that the suicide bomb is the Taliban equivalent of the JDAM targeted with GPS.  Innocents are spared, or so the claim goes.  Baitullah Mehsud recently had his own press conference in which he says that suicide attacks are “our most destructive weapon … out atom bomb,” but better than the enemy’s atom bomb because our bomb targets only the enemy while the enemy’s kills innocents.

But this isn’t true, and there is work ongoing within their ranks to backfit a justification for their tactics.  The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has an interesting analysis of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s recent Q&A session, and suicide tactics play a prominent role, having been brought up in the questions posed to Zawahiri.  The problem is also summarized in the most recent issue of the CTC Sentinel.

In the course of defending al-Qa`ida against charges of unjustly killing innocent Muslims during his April 2, 2008 “open interview,” Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri reintroduced Hukm al-Tatarrus (the law on using human shields) into the debate.1 A relatively unfamiliar term to non-Muslims and Muslims alike, al-Tatarrus refers to God’s sanctioning of Muslim armies that are forced to kill other Muslims who are being used as human shields by an enemy during a time of war.2 Al-Tatarrus is a religiously legitimate, albeit obscure, Islamic concept that al-Qa`ida ideologues have been increasingly using in order to exculpate themselves from charges of apostasy. The method in which al-Qa`ida is promoting al-Tatarrus, however, seeks to facilitate the sacrifice of Muslim lives in contravention of 14 centuries of religious teachings.

Al Qaeda has turned to Abu Yahya for scholarly analysis, but his scholarship is nothing short of revolutionary, and he turns out not to be much of a scholar after all.

While the Qur’anic and hadith restrictions on killing innocent Muslims were appropriate during the early days of Islam, he suggests, they should have no bearing on warfare today because modern warfare is qualitatively different. Whereas early Islamic thinkers had to consider the implications of using a catapult against an enemy fortress in which Muslims were residing, or conducting night raids against an enemy household in which Muslims were likely present, the nature of contemporary warfare is one where the enemy uses “raids, clashes and ambushes, and they hardly ever stop chasing the mujahidin everywhere and all the time, imprisoning them, their families and their supporters.” What it means to be “directly engaged in combat,” Abu Yahyaargues, has changed. By positing that Islam is in a state of constant and universal warfare, he implicitly lowers the threshold for proving that one’s killing of innocent Muslims is just.

In short, the nature of today’s all-encompassing warfare means that the jihadist movement must find a “new perception of different ways of modern shielding which were probably not provided for by the scholars of Islam who knew only of the weapons used during their era.” In these few sentences, Abu Yahya attempts to wipe the slate clean of the most sacred and defining texts with regard to the issue of killing human shields.

They are obviously struggling with the justification for what Baitullah Mehsud calls his “most destructive weapon.”  The brutality of al Qaeda in the Anbar province helped to turn the population against them.  A well aimed information campaign outlining the noncombatant casualties and suffering resulting from suicide attacks is appropriate and would possibly be effective in weakening the enemy’s tactical position.  In Anbar the U.S. had to prove themselves to be the stronger horse (to use a phrase made popular by Bin Laden).  There is no magic, and the necessary context for a rejection of jihad is its battlespace defeat.  But the battlespace defeat might be assisted by a good information campaign targeting this vulnerability.

The second important thing we learn from the interview of S is that the campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan is, in the words of The Captain’s Journal, inextricably tied.  “If NATO remains strong in Afghanistan, it will put pressure on Pakistan. If NATO remains weaker in Afghanistan, it will dare [encourage] Pakistan to support the Taliban, its only real allies in the region,” S said.

The corollary to the the tribal region of Pakistan being a safe haven for the Taliban is that strong action in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan.  It is one campaign, a fight against a transnational insurgency, and seeing the campaign through the lens of borders and nation-states is wrongheaded.  The surest way to put pressure on the tribal region within Pakistan is to continue the chase in Afghanistan.  There is no replacement for kinetic operations to kill or capture the enemy.  We know this not only because it is common sense, but also because the enemy has told us so.

By now it isn’t news that the MARSOC Marines who were deployed to Afghanistan and accused of wrongdoing will not be charged.

The Marines of Marine Special Operations Company F “acted appropriately” when they fired in response to an attack March 4, 2007, in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland said Friday.

The written statement from the commanding general of Marine Corps Central Command came in response to a January court of inquiry into the shootings, which Army officials said killed Afghan civilians. Army Lt. Gen. Frank Kearney with Special Operations Command Central expelled the Marine special operations company from Afghanistan after the incident.

Two Marines, Maj. Fred Galvin and Capt. Vincent Noble, were named in the court of inquiry into the events in Afghanistan’s Nangahar province on March 4 and March 9, 2007.

Both men were accused, but not charged, with conspiracy to make a false official statement, dereliction of duty, failure to obey a lawful order and making a false official statement.

“Appropriate administrative actions based on the findings of the court of inquiry” will be taken against Galvin, who served as the company commander at the time of the incidents; Noble, the platoon commander at the time; and Capt. Robert Olsen, the unit’s intelligence officer and second-in-command, according to the press release from Marine Corps Forces Central Command.

Appropriate administrative actions?  Just what does this mean?  The Captain’s Journal will try to follow this to see where it goes.  W. Thomas Smith, Jr., has some interesting observations.

Galvin’s Marines were ordered out of Afghanistan – far too hastily in my professional opinion – pending an investigation that dragged on far too long, and in which too much political correctness and perhaps (based on my own personal musing) a bit of inter-service rivalry were infused: Not to mention the fact that the word of the locals, and a human rights group that was not there at the time, was considered more believable than that of the Marines.

The locals, whose stories often conflicted with one anothers,’ never could come up with a firm casualty count (though U.S. Army officers reportedly made cash payments to Afghans who said they were survivors or members of survivors’ families).

Fact is, there is no proof – much less evidence – that any civilians were killed: No bodies or forensic evidence, except for that of the suicide bomber, were recovered.

But there is a 900 pound gorilla in the room, and The Captain’s Journal will point it out if no one else will.  We still aren’t convinced that the Marine Corps should have Marines dedicated to special operations.  Force Recon?  Sure.  Someone needs to be qualified to perform reconnaissance operations (jump qualifications, etc.).  Someone in a company must be qualified as the DM, and someone must be qualified as a combat lifesaver, and so on.

But the notion of special operations has morphed – probably due to stupid television depictions – from one of specialized troops to one of supermen.  Up until now that has been the Army’s problem.  Marines are supposed to be self sufficient, hence the notion of a MEU.  Marines stick with Marines, and Force Recon supports its unit.  Otherwise, it has no function.

When Galvin’s Marines were deployed to Afghanistan months ago, they were only special operations.  They weren’t connected to any unit except MARSOC.  As for kinetic operations, if you want force projection, turn loose a company of Marine infantry.  Special operations, to Marines, means support of that company.

We’re open to compelling argument, but we still fail to see the need or the mission for MARSOC.  Does someone want to convince us?

An Afghan boy collects resin from poppies in an opium poppy field in Arghandab district of Kandahar province, south of Kabul, Afghanistan on May 23, 2008. Afghanistan will ask international donors next month for over US$4 billion to revive its farming sector as it struggles with wheat shortages and skyrocketing food prices.  (AP Photo)

Seven months ago and before the Marines deployed to Afghanistan, The Captain’s Journal laid waste to the argument that the Marines should be in the business of destroying poppy crops.  Dumb idea, said we, and it runs counter to one of the main ideas behind counterinsurgency.

The Marines have flatly stated that they aren’t after poppy.  They’re after Taliban.  Rock on.  Whether the Marines are just smart or they listened to The Captain’s Journal – which is smart – doesn’t matter.  They have performed well in Helmand without destroying the living of the farmers.  The war on terror has no business being confused with the war on drugs.

But General McNeill sees things differently and has some of his troops engaged in doing exactly that.

NATO troops in Afghanistan have made significant progress eradicating the country’s poppy fields, an officer for the military alliance said Monday.

Speaking from his headquarters in Kabul, U.S. Army Gen. Dan K. McNeill said opium poppy cultivation remains a major threat to Afghanistan, the U.S. Defense Department said in a news release.

“In some portions of the country right now, mostly in the south, the cultivation of poppy is a far greater threat to the Afghan government — to the security and stability here — than the insurgency,” McNeill said.

The Afghan government must head up the elimination of opium poppy cultivation as the country’s economic base, McNeill said, estimating that the Taliban and al-Qaida receive between 20 percent and 40 percent of their money from the drug trade.

The United Nations estimates the terrorist groups receive closer to 60 percent from drugs.

“We are in there fighting insurgents who are as much narco-dealers as they are insurgents,” McNeill said. “In some cases, we are fired upon by people doing narco-business.”

So what?  The Captain’s Journal doesn’t get the connection.  What if the farmers were growing gizmos that sold for good money down the road in Iran or Turkey or wherever.  Suppose that the Taliban forcibly took a cut of the profits.  What’s the difference between doing it with gizmos and doing it with poppy?  General McNeill could very well have been in the position of saying “We are in there fighting insurgents who are as much gizmo profiteers as they are insurgents.”  So?  The problem is still with the insurgents, not the gizmos … or the poppy.

We still believe that the best solution to all of this is to capture or kill the insurgents and then let market forces deal with poppy.  What’s that we hear?  It’s already happening?

In one of the most important developments since the war in Afghanistan began in late 2001, opium production has declined in the country. Over 20 of the country’s 34 provinces will be opium-free this year according to a report by the United Nations that has now been corroborated by Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics minister, General Khodaidad.

Among the provinces with remaining opium cultivation, the Taliban-dominated Helmand province ranks high, but even here it is being seen that the humble wheat crop has replaced poppy. Some newspapers that sent reporters to Helmand province, over the course of April and May this year, have independently verified this assertion. A European television program on the subject was among the most-forwarded news items on the Internet last week.

Interestingly, it is not the efforts of the Afghan government alone that have caused the reduction in opium production but something much more mundane, namely the increased price of wheat, that has pushed up production of the grain in many parts of the country. Therein lies a tale of so-called market manipulation that actually goes back to one of the central points about rural poverty alleviation in the region, namely the strength of economics.

The Captain’s Journal is out front again, and we don’t even charge the Department of Defense for this analysis.  But our Marine boys will probably keep listening to us.