Articles by Herschel Smith

John Hawkins of Right Wing News has a new blogger’s poll up: The Rightosphere Temperature Check for September.  The Captain’s Journal participated in the poll.  Go check it out for some interesting results.

John Hawkins of Right Wing News has a new blogger’s poll up: The Rightosphere Temperature Check for September.  The Captain’s Journal participated in the poll.  Go check it out for some interesting results.

A tribe is a social group existing before or outside of the state, usually defined by kinship, clan, lineage, culture and dialect.  It is heavily patristic, usually with a tribal leader in addition to tribal elders.  Tribes have historically existed for protection, economic stability, cultural and religious instruction, and identification.  Ralph Peters observes that “We are witnessing the return of the tribes – a global phenomenon, but the antithesis of globalization as described by pop bestsellers.  The twin tribal identities, ethnic and religious brotherhood, are once again armed and dangerous”  (Wars of Blood and Faith, page 356).

Bing West recounts the circumstances surrounding the turning of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Reesha to the U.S. forces.

In September 2006, AQI killed one too many, and a young, mid-ranking sheikh, Abdul Sattar, also called Abu Risha, set out to avenge his murdered relatives. Outgunned in one encounter, he was facing an unpleasant end, when an American Army unit suddenly entered the fray with guns blazing. A quick learner, Sattar proposed a partnership with his rescuers: he would provide tribesmen willing to fight if the Americans would provide firepower and government sanction. Sattar proved to be the Sunni leader we desperately needed in Anbar. Once his own tribal lands were cleared of AQI, nearby tribes joined his movement; the Americans parked a tank outside his house as a display of support and power. Over the next year, attacks in Anbar dropped from 400 to 100 per month.

So at Asad Air Base in early September, the provincial governor, Mamoon Rashid, gave young Sattar the place of honor next to President Bush. The meeting was intended to honor the Sunni sheikhs who had driven out al-Qaeda in Iraq. It was also a not-subtle nudge to Maliki to get on with Sunni reconciliation. Maliki was scheduled to visit the province two days later to deliver an eagerly awaited supplement to the provincial budget. Nursing an eye infection, he was none too pleased by the peremptory summons.

For most of the previous two years, Maliki’s host, Governor Mamoon, had been marooned in the sandbagged government center in downtown Ramadi, kept alive by Marine sharpshooters who fired through mouse holes in the hallway above his office and defecated in plastic bags because the sewer line had been blown up, leaving a stinking lake outside the front door. Mamoon had survived three assassination attempts and gone weeks at a time without a single Iraqi visitor to his “office.

In testimony before congress, General Petraeus was clear in his warning over Iranian intent to have a Hezbollah-like force deployed within Iraq.  He also made the point very clearly that the war in Iraq could not be won solely in Iraq.  Since then it has been reported that Iranian arms have made their way into Afghanistan, with senior NATO leadership both confirming and then demurring on this shipment interdiction.

General Dan McNeill, head of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), confirmed a report in Sunday’s Washington Post which said the shipment had been discovered last week.

“The geographic origin of that convoy was clearly Iran but take note that I did not say it’s the Iranian government,” the US general told AFP in an interview.

“In that convoy there were explosive materials that could be made into more advanced improvised explosive devices,” he said, refusing to make any further comment on the shipment, as it was still being analysed.

“It is not the first convoy that we have intercepted that had geographical origins from Iran, but it is one that has my attention.”

Turning back to Iraq, it didn’t take Secretary of Defense Gates long to downplay the Iranian threat.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said yesterday that the United States can contain the Iranian threat to Iraq without going to war with the Islamic republic.

Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq can be dealt with “inside the borders of Iraq” and there is no need for U.S. forces to take action inside Iran, Gates said on “Fox News Sunday.”

“The administration believes that continuing to try to deal with the Iranian threat through diplomatic and economic means is by far the preferable approach,” he said.

Meanwhile, the Telegraph has a major news story concerning hawks in the military and administration who are carefully crafting an escalatory campaign with Iran to justify full blown military action, drawing up a list of 2000 strategic and military bombing targets inside Iran.  Concerning those hardened bunkers containing the centrifuges being used to create high enriched Uranium, plans were made and enacted long ago to develop weapons that could penetrate and destroy those installations.

The U.S. has a 14-ton super bomb more destructive than the vacuum bomb just tested by Russia, a U.S. general said Wednesday.

The statement was made by retired Lt. General McInerney, chairman of the Iran Policy Committee, and former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

McInerney said the U.S. has “a new massive ordnance penetrator that’s 30,000 pounds, that really penetrates … Ahmadinejad has nothing in Iran that we can’t penetrate.”

He also said the new Russian bomb was not a “penetrator.”

On Tuesday, the Fox News television channel said: “A recent decision by German officials to withhold support for any new sanctions against Iran has pushed a broad spectrum of officials in Washington to develop potential scenarios for a military attack on the Islamic regime.”.

Commenting on the report, McInerney said: “Since Germany has backed out of helping economically, we do not have any other choice. … They’ve forced us into the military option.”

McInerney described some possible military campaign scenarios and said: “The one I favor the most, of course, is an air campaign,” he continued.

He said that bombing would be launched by 65-70 stealth bombers and 400 bombers of other types.

“Forty-eight hours duration, hitting 2500 aimed points to take out their [Iranian] nuclear facilities, their air defense facilities, their air force, their navy, their Shahab-3 retaliatory missiles, and finally their command and control. And then let the Iranian people take their country back,” the general said describing the campaign, adding it would be “easy.”

Exactly how bombing Iran will help the “Iranian people take their country back” is not made clear by McInerney.  At TCJ we are in favor of letting the fly-boys do what needs to be done if it comes to that.  However, regarding this claim of being “easy,” perhaps it would be good to rehearse the consequences of such an air war before we start it.

1. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Forces would carry out attacks against U.S. interests, including embassies, throughout the world.
2. The same forces would carry out attacks against U.S. troops within Iraq.
3. Oil prices would skyrocket.
4. Due to oil prices, the American and possibly world economy would likely go into a phase of hyperinflation, followed by recession.
5. Some U.S. pilots will be shot out of the sky, captured, tortured and run in front of TV cameras to “recant their attrocities.”

Again, if this is all necessary, then air power is the solution.  But no one yet is talking about Michael Ledeen’s solution, which is to avoid both the negotiations (in which we have engaged for two decades to no avail) and war (which would certainly be costly), by fomenting revolution and regime change from within.  Such a moderate and sensible approach, yet not courted or advocated by either side at the moment.

But make no mistake about it.  The Iranian problem will not go away, and it must be faced sooner rather than later.  A recent speech before the U.S. congress has received far too little attention.

In a video message to a meeting at the U.S. Congress on September 11, 2007, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the Iranian Resistance said, “The undeniable reality is that the policy of appeasing the Iranian regime with the aim of bringing about gradual or behavior change or containing it has failed. For the mullahs the only way to deal with the tide of democracy in Iran and global developments is repression, nuclear weapons, domination of Iraq and spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

Preamble & Introduction

The progress in pacification of Ramadi is well worn news now, and the next largest city in Anbar was a hard city to tame because of different culture (heavy reliance on the Mukhtars as opposed to Sheiks for leadership), but even Fallujah has in large measure been pacified.  The Iraqi security forces have withdrawn from Fallujah, and the security of Fallujah is primarily an Iraqi police operation in concert with the U.S. Marines.  The face of Anbar is changing to one of constabulary operations.

Even the lamentable assassination of Sheik Abdul Sattar Abu Reesha seems to have brought unintended consequences to al Qaeda, as the tribes have vowed to fight them until the “last child of Anbar.”

For the future, as part of their pre-deployment training, U.S. Marines are interested in how the Belfast police work with the military in Northern Ireland.

The US Marines are being sent to Belfast – to learn more about how police and the military can work effectively alongside each other in Iraq.

According to a senior PSNI officer who helped produce a major report on Iraqi security forces for the US Congress, the Marines hope to apply the lessons of Northern Ireland in Anbar province.

Assistant Chief Constable Duncan McCausland, who is in charge of Belfast, said a delegation of US Marines will visit Northern Ireland next month.

Mr McCausland was the only non-American who was a member of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, which inspected the Iraqi military and police this summer and reported to the US Congress just before General David Petraeus.

Mr McCausland said the US Marines, who have helped transform the security situation in Anbar province, are interested in how the RUC and PSNI worked with the British Army and want “to look at some of the aspects we’re involved in”.

Analysis & Commentary

This is indeed a strange experiment.  The British have lost Basra as we have previously discussed.  We argued that the loss was due in large part to the British soft cover, tepid rules of engagement, and especially the minimal force projection.  Since Anbar is probably the safest province in Iraq while Basra has taken Anbar’s place as the most dangerous province in Iraq, it might be argued that the U.S. could learn a “softer approach” much like the British forces in Northern Ireland in order to embed with the Iraqi Police effectively.

But this argument misses the point, and in the superlative degree.  The British – some of them – have managed to see the problem with their Basra experience.

At first we were pretty condescending to the Americans, insisting that our light touch, learned in Northern Ireland, was far more effective than their alleged heavy-handedness. We were wrong. Basra is not Londonderry. Our ever-lower profile was seen by local militias — and the public — as weakness. As a result the militia grewstronger and stronger, and now Basra is a town of warring gangs. We never committed enough — and we reduced our numbers much too soon. We now have only 5,000 men and women in Basra.

Iraq had been brutalized by the savagery of more than two decades under Saddam Hussein, had suffered eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, was divided by religious sect and tribal allegiance, and was sitting on top of one of the world’s largest oil reserves in Basra, ripe for criminal gangs, thugs, thieves and greedy sheiks to assert power and become wealthy.  Into this the British brought an approach that they had used before.

The message received by the British public was that this softly-softly approach would – thanks to experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere – succeed in a peacekeeping mission where the Americans’ heavy-handed tactics would fail.

It was a view held almost universally in the British army. “British military guys can be totally insufferable about this,” says one retired US general who advises the Bush administration on Iraq … But the days of soft hats and handing sweets to children are now long gone.

The real problem was not soft cover, tepid rules of engagement, or minimal force projection.  This model worked in other locales for the British in their history.  The real problem was one of cultural ignorance and inexperience that led to these things.  Northern Ireland is not the Anbar Provincce any more than it is the Basra Province, and this conflation of tactics has led to Basra being the utter disaster area that it is today.  “Children are afraid to go to school,” said Ali Kareem, media officer for the Secretary of Education at Basra provincial council. “And there is a shortage of teachers because many female teachers have quit due to the violence.”

But there is a better way to train for counterinsurgency.  We have previously argued that cultural sensitivity and relevance is important in counterinsurgency.  We have earlier observed that:

… troops (most of the time) are given some basic instruction in Arabic as part of the training for deployment.  This training is based on the philosophy of phonetics (i.e., sounds, proper pronunciation).  With limited time, money and resources, this is the best approach and sure to yield the best possible results in the short term.  But proper planning for the long war needs to take the next step.  Immersion in Arabic (both spoken and written) needs to be part of the planning for not only officers, but enlisted men as well.  A better knowledge of Arabic would cause a remarkable step change in warfighting capabilities in Iraq (and throughout the Middle East) given the nature of COIN.

W. Thomas Smith, Jr., recounts a recent experience from Anbar that informs our discussion on cultural awareness and its value.

Whenever Col. Bohm and other officers met with an Iraqi, it was always with an ever-so slight bow, a right hand over the heart followed by an extended right hand; a warm smile and a greeting, “Salam alikom, (peace unto you), my friend.

From time to time it pays to take a look at the keywords used to bring visits to a site (when those visits are neither direct nor referrals).  I use Google Analytics for this task, among other things.  The search word strings yesterday were typical of a Milblog site.

1. “Spartan body armor.”  A Google search on the words “Spartan 2 tactical vest” yields TCJ just below Tactical Applications Group, the company that produces the Spartan body armor system, because of our body armor coverage.  “SAPI plates” is also a frequent search word string (you may not become famous by being a Milblogger, but at least you get tired, the hours are long and the words sound important).
2. “Jaish al-Mahdi army.”  This makes sense, since a Google search puts TCJ third for our article The Rise of the JAM.
3. “Are soldiers allowed to buy their own equipment?”  This is understandable as well, since page two of Google results lists Gear and Equipment Problems for the Marines.  Of course, this reader would have left disappointed and perhaps perplexed, since the answer is an unqualified maybe but probably not with qualifications, caveats, and stipulations enough to drive the sensible person mad, as if a lawyer wrote the rules … Hmmmm … a new theory hatches!
4. Variations on “rules of engagement,” “rules of engagement in Iraq,” “rules of engagement causing casualties,” “rules of engagement a hindrance,” “cjcsi 3121.01b,” etc., for our rules of engagement coverage.  Of course, these hits also bring in the person who is attempting to find engagement cards for their loved ones.
5. “Ansar al Sunna,” for our equivalent category.  I might remark on how forgiving search engines are, since the dual spellings (Sunna vs. Sunnah) are irrelevant.

And so the list goes.  It becomes an interesting little exercise.  But once in a while I stumble on a word string that grabs my attention so thoroughly that I cannot stop thinking about it until I unravel the mystery (I have not yet).

“Why shouldn’t we lie to NCOs?”  Now, take note of the fact that this isn’t formed thusly: “Why we shouldn’t lie to NCOs.”  No, it reads just “[w]hy shouldn’t we …”  This is particularly problematic, since we don’t know the rank of the individual searching on this word string.  Perhaps the chap had one too many pints of beer before searching on these words (did I give the country away?).  Or perhaps not.  Perhaps he is UA and needs an excuse for coming back late for formation.  Or perhaps rather than an enlisted man, he is an officer and wants to talk himself into lying to his subordinates.  Or perhaps he is an NCO searching for a reason for his subordinates not to be dishonest with him (Based on what I know of NCOs, this theory makes the least sense. An NCO would not search for a reason for his subordinates to respect him – he would simply demand it.).

Until this chap tells us why he wants to lie to an NCO, we cannot help him with his problem.  And just to set the record straight, at TCJ we do not support lying to NCOs.

From time to time it pays to take a look at the keywords used to bring visits to a site (when those visits are neither direct nor referrals).  I use Google Analytics for this task, among other things.  The search word strings yesterday were typical of a Milblog site.

1. “Spartan body armor.”  A Google search on the words “Spartan 2 tactical vest” yields TCJ just below Tactical Applications Group, the company that produces the Spartan body armor system, because of our body armor coverage.  “SAPI plates” is also a frequent search word string (you may not become famous by being a Milblogger, but at least you get tired, the hours are long and the words sound important).
2. “Jaish al-Mahdi army.”  This makes sense, since a Google search puts TCJ third for our article The Rise of the JAM.
3. “Are soldiers allowed to buy their own equipment?”  This is understandable as well, since page two of Google results lists Gear and Equipment Problems for the Marines.  Of course, this reader would have left disappointed and perhaps perplexed, since the answer is an unqualified maybe but probably not with qualifications, caveats, and stipulations enough to drive the sensible person mad, as if a lawyer wrote the rules … Hmmmm … a new theory hatches!
4. Variations on “rules of engagement,” “rules of engagement in Iraq,” “rules of engagement causing casualties,” “rules of engagement a hindrance,” “cjcsi 3121.01b,” etc., for our rules of engagement coverage.  Of course, these hits also bring in the person who is attempting to find engagement cards for their loved ones.
5. “Ansar al Sunna,” for our equivalent category.  I might remark on how forgiving search engines are, since the dual spellings (Sunna vs. Sunnah) are irrelevant.

And so the list goes.  It becomes an interesting little exercise.  But once in a while I stumble on a word string that grabs my attention so thoroughly that I cannot stop thinking about it until I unravel the mystery (I have not yet).

“Why shouldn’t we lie to NCOs?”  Now, take note of the fact that this isn’t formed thusly: “Why we shouldn’t lie to NCOs.”  No, it reads just “[w]hy shouldn’t we …”  This is particularly problematic, since we don’t know the rank of the individual searching on this word string.  Perhaps the chap had one too many pints of beer before searching on these words (did I give the country away?).  Or perhaps not.  Perhaps he is UA and needs an excuse for coming back late for formation.  Or perhaps rather than an enlisted man, he is an officer and wants to talk himself into lying to his subordinates.  Or perhaps he is an NCO searching for a reason for his subordinates not to be dishonest with him (Based on what I know of NCOs, this theory makes the least sense. An NCO would not search for a reason for his subordinates to respect him – he would simply demand it.).

Until this chap tells us why he wants to lie to an NCO, we cannot help him with his problem.  And just to set the record straight, at TCJ we do not support lying to NCOs.

We have previously covered Operation Alljah in and around the Fallujah area of operations, involving robust kinetic operations around Fallujah in May and early June, gated communities, interaction with the population, parnership with the Iraqi police, and the use of biometrics for identification of the population.  Bill Ardolino is embedded with the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment and is reporting from Fallujah.

Operation Alljah was the latest and most successful bid to achieve security in the former insurgent stronghold of Fallujah, marrying projection of force with aggressive civil affairs outreach.

We have argued for more than a year that force projection is usually inversely related to the actual need to use that force, something the British got very wrong in Basra.  We have also argued for the proper involvement of NGOs and rebuilding and reconstruction (water, sewage, electricity) as an integral part of effective counterinsurgency.  Continuing:

During the operation, the city was subdivided into 10 neighborhoods in efforts dubbed “the swarm,” a coordinated series of counterinsurgency components: US troops and Iraqi Security Forces rolled into a neighborhood and established security, cordoned it off with concrete barrier checkpoints, created a local police precinct, recruited a neighborhood watch, provided employment for day laborers, conducted an information campaign to inform the citizenry of the operation, arbitrated any claims against Iraqi or US forces, distributed food and began meetings with neighborhood leaders to address infrastructure concerns.

Heavy engagement of the population was the hallmark of Operation Alljah.  But while the tribes were of paramount importance in Ramadi, the engagement of this operation specifically targeted a heretofore neglected constituency.

“When we got here, there was a sheik’s council. But in [the actual city of)] Fallujah, you can’t have a sheik’s council, because they have [Muktars, who are] like city sheiks. Fallujah is not divided by tribes, like in Ramadi. So when we were doing the sheik’s council, we were going nowhere, because the sheiks didn’t know the people … until we started noticing the Muktars. They were like, ‘What about us? How come nobody’s talking to us?'” explained 5/10 CAG Staff Sergeant Mauricio Piedrahita.

“So we started talking to them. They are like block captains who go back to the Saddam days. He’s in charge of a neighborhood. He knows everyone inside that neighborhood. They’re official positions appointed by the government. We do contracting for projects through them, because they know who to employ, because they know ‘Hey, I’m not gonna employ this guy because he’s from another district, he needs to be employed by his own (neighborhood).’ So this way we ensure that everyone is getting a fair amount of contracts and the projects and jobs are being distributed around the district.”

Engaging Muktars and backing their authority has succeeded where past civil affairs strategies have failed. Projects are now more in line with the needs of the community, and the decentralization of contracting has mitigated serious problems with corruption. During these meetings, the Muktars outline the most pressing infrastructure needs for the district: power (generators), fuel, water and sewage.

Bill marks this operation with a counterinsurgency exclamation point.  “[The Marines and IP] are not kicking down doors, they knock on the door, they give them time for the women and children to go into a room, they’ll talk to the man of the house, so it’s a different attitude,” said SSG Piedrahita” … Some marines complain about the “boring” nature of the civil affairs focus, while others embrace it.  “It’s a change,” said SSG Piedrahita. “But like they say, we’re marines, we adapt to anything. We’re always going to do the job as best we can. Like these guys, the 2/6, are all grunts, all infantrymen. They get trained to kill, in combat, and then we get this and we adapt to it and do the best we can. In a way, it’s good. We’re not getting Marines killed out here.”  There has been a certain learned aspect to this operation, and the results have been recognized all the way up to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who has visited Foward Operating Base Reaper.

1st Lt. Barry Edwards summarizes the conclusion of the operation, by saying that “Iraqi Security Forces and U. S. Marines concluded major activities associated with Operation Alljah, Sept. 6, having curbed the murder and intimidation threat imposed by al Qaeda and improved the security posture in Fallujah.  The operation, which began May 29, was carried out by the Fallujah police; soldiers from the 2nd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division; and Marines from Regimental Combat Team 6, throughout the course of 10 iterations to set conditions for Iraqi police control within the city of Fallujah.  The improved security picture in the city has allowed the Iraqi Army to withdraw, leaving the Iraqi Police in full control of enforcement of the rule of law.”

In an interesting recapitulation of “what’s wrong with this picture,” in Saqlawiyah, 1/1 Marines (of RCT-6) have targeted weapons caches with success.

It was late morning when Pfc. Andrew D. Bear noticed the lone cinderblock in the middle of a field. There were no houses, no cement facilities, and no structures of any kind for hundreds of feet. It was just dirt, mud, weeds and the Marines of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, accompanied by local Iraqi policemen. To the Yorba-Linda, Calif., native, the cinderblock, sitting in the sun-baked mud, stuck out like a cockroach in a spoonful of oatmeal.

“Now, tell me why a cinderblock would be just sitting in the middle of this field, all by itself,

A pivotal figure in the “Anbar Awaklening” is fallen:

Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was the leader of an alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that rejected al-Qaeda because of its methods and worked with the US.

He was killed in a bomb attack near his home in Iraq’s western Anbar province.

Abu Risha was among a group of tribal leaders who met President George W Bush during his visit to Iraq last week.

“The sheikh’s car was totally destroyed by the explosion. Abu Risha was killed and two of his bodyguards were seriously wounded,” Ramadi police officer Ahmed Mahmoud al-Alwani told Reuters.

Later it was reported that both bodyguards had died.

Abu Risha was the leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, also known as the Anbar Awakening, an alliance of clans which sided with US forces and the Iraqi government in order to try to reclaim Anbar province from al-Qaeda.

More here.  This is not good news.  Sattar was a key figure in the turning of the Ramadi tribes against al Qaeda, rogue tribes and indigenous fighters who had joined the insurgency.  The hope and prayer is that in spite of this, the “Awakening” will live on and peace will come to this land.

Anbar has been a classical counterinsurgency campaign with a twist.  But in order to set the stage for the discussion, shall we consider the remote areas in the mountains of North and South Carolina?  Any boy who has been raised to drive the backroads and traipse the winding trails through these mountains knows that there are certain places one doesn’t go, and certain things one doesn’t do.

There remain moonshine stills, people avoiding revenue collectors, and general rogue elements who like to go to the little local bar and clean their shotguns while they drink.  Actually, they aren’t avoiding revenue collectors.  The collectors just don’t go up there, and they shouldn’t.  The adventuresome young one learns not to look too hard for trouble, and generally know who belongs where, and when.  Anything or anyone out of place means trouble – time to go for the gun and let the dogs loose.

It is probably the same way in the sprawling urban areas, and this concept is important for considerations in classical counterinsurgency doctrine.  An insurgency simply cannot survive without the willing acquiescence of the population, or at least the important and more powerful elements of the population.

Common sense, along with trusted communications from military personnel in the Anbar Province, convinced me to write Al Qaeda, Indigenous Sunnis and the Insurgency in Iraq, in which I claimed that much, if not most, of the insurgency was indigenous to Anbar.  Bill Ardolino gives us an interesting interview of an interpreter working with the U.S. forces, reporting directly from Anbar.  One interesting exchange took place that is relevant to this issue:

INDC: When I speak to Fallujans, many say that it was all outsiders causing the insurgency, but a lot of it was certainly driven by locals. What portion of the insurgency was really local? Most of it?

Leo: Yes.

INDC: So why are people afraid to say, “Yeah, we used to fight the Americans?