Many things can cause the diminution of a military.  During and after Vietnam it was the drug culture, political upheaval, and changes in core value systems in the family and society.  In measure, this was addressed by General Alfred Gray, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, whom I hold in iconic status.  General Gray brought back the warrior ethos to the Marine Corps after the Vietnam era.  I requested that General Gray send my son an autographed picture of him as a boot camp graduation gift.  He kindly obliged with a picture of himself in cammies, autographed and with a nice note congratulating my son on becoming a “warrior.”  It is framed and hanging on our wall at home.  It is of note that he signed the photograph “General Al Gray, Marine.”

No pretentions, just “Marine.”

There are other dangers for our military, due in no small part to the military-industrial complex.  There is a very sobering piece entitled “Regression,” by William Lind.  In part he says:

When I was in Israel several years ago, I said to my host, a retired Israeli general with several interesting books to his credit, that I thought the IDF had begun to regress to the Second Generation after the 1973 war. He told me I was wrong; the regression had begun after the war in 1967.

The question of how it happened, and why maintaining the culture of a Third Generation military is so difficult even for armed services that have attained it—the Royal Navy lost it after the Napoleonic Wars, for reasons brilliantly set forth in Andrew Gordon’s The Rules of the Game, and the German Army lost it when the Bundeswehr was created, for political reasons—is of interest far beyond Israel. A number of Israelis have traced it in their case to the development of a large weapons R&D and procurement establishment, and I think there is a lot to that argument.

The virtues required in military officers involved in weapons development and procurement are the virtues of the bureaucrat: careful, even obsessive attention to process; avoiding risky decisions, and whenever possible making decisions by committee; avoiding responsibility; careerism, because success is measured by career progression; and generally shining up the handle on the big front door. Time is not very important, while dotting every i and crossing every t is vital, since at some point the auditors will be coming, and the politicians and the press will be waiting eagerly for their reports. Remunerative careers in the defense industry await those officers who know how to go along to get along. While the Israeli defense industry has produced some remarkably good products, such as the Merkava tank, getting the program funded still tends to be more important than making sure the weapon will work in combat. As time goes on, efficiency tends to become more important than effectiveness; not surprisingly, the simpler and more effective Israeli weapon systems came earlier, and more recent ones tend to reflect the American tendency toward complex and expensive ineffectiveness.

The Israeli inquiry into the Lebanon fiasco is unlikely to address this issue for the same reason it is not addressed in the United States: too much money is at stake. The R&D and procurement tail now wags the combat arms dog. Nor is the question of how to reverse the process and restore the virtues a Third Generation military requires in its officers an easy one. Those virtues—eagerness to make decisions and take responsibility, boldness, broad-mindedness and a spirit of intellectual inquiry, contempt for careerism and careerists—are not wanted in Second Generation militaries, and officers who demonstrate them are usually weeded out early. A Third Generation culture is difficult to maintain, and even more—impossible perhaps?—to restore once lost.

Yet, as I have said many times in these columns, a Second Generation military, no matter how lavishly resourced, has no chance against Fourth Generation opponents. In this conundrum lies the fate of the state of Israel, and the fate of states everywhere.

I am quick to speak out on the need for advancements in technology when it comports with troop protection and effectiveness, and when the technology is something other than R&D adventurism.  I posted on “Thermobaric Weapons and Body Armor,” and I posted here and here on proper funding of the Marine Corps.  But if you’ll notice about these posts, the equipment, if successful, would redound directly to increased safety for troops and effectiveness of our forces.  And … immediately so.

There is a darker side of the military establishment.  This side nurtures careerism, avoidance of responsibility, networking, and bowing to political pressures.  May I speak for the grunt for a minute?  When the grunts see this, they always judge it for what it is, and they immediately lose all respect for those who behave this way.  This loss of respect is irrevocable.

The most technologically advanced equipment is no replacement for well-trained, well-led and motivated troops.  To be frank, for those who have their career as the premier concern, they should just step aside and save their reports the trouble of cleaning up their mess and suffering the consequences of their careerism.  For the military-industrial complex, I have more harsh words for you.  If you are selling inferior products to the military, doctoring or embellishing data just to make a sale when you know that some other product is better suited to the mission, or in any way endangering our boys at arms in order to make a buck, you may be able to keep up the pretensions before men, but God sees things that take place in secret.  He knows the thoughts and intentions of the heart, and there will be a day of reckoning.  That will be an awful day for you.

I was dropping my son off at Camp Lejeune the day after labor day, and I saw Daniel’s eyes light up, as he said “Awesome.  Big flag today!”  He proceeded to inform me of the size of the flag and to mark the days that they flew that size flag.  He then said something rather stunning to me.  He said, “There are no more patriots.”  I rode the rest of the way to his barracks in silence.  He got out of the car, hugged me tightly, and said, “I love you dad.”  I have noticed that things that a boy wouldn’t otherwise do when he is a teen or in his early 20’s, Daniel has no problem doing, even around other Marines.  Somehow, the things that the Marine Corps instills and teaches makes them into something different than they were before.  They have a certain confidence that seems unshakable.

As I drove away from the base, I thought, “I know at least one patriot who is left.  And, I’ll bet that there are more than 2500 more who have perished in Iraq.”

With boys like these, we may just be okay.

Following the counsel of John Hawkins at RWN, I am listing my top ten blogs.  Since my son is a Marine, it will be virtually impossible to unseat SWJ from the number one position (especially the Daily News Links page where you just point and click on the day you want).  I am personally invested in what the USMC does — my son’s life hangs in the balance.  Numbers 2 – 10 are subject to revision at any time.

10] Blogs of War (and companion site, Chronicles of War; friend John Little has been very kind to me, instructive when I started up, and very nice to blogroll my site).

9] Little Green Footballs (The MSM fear LGF for good reason)

8] Counterterrorism Blog (I cannot not read this every day; it tells me where the world is headed before we get there)

7] Polipundit (My friends Knighthawk, Oak Leaf and Ace have been good to me and have given me very kind words and a link from time to time for my better posts)

6] Jihad Watch (Tireless expose of the enemy)

5] Riehl World View (Dan Riehl is one of the world’s great bloggers; simply magnificent, and he has given me a link from time to time, and a post welcoming me to the world of conservative blogging a few months back — oh, and he also blogrolled me)

4] Right Wing News (John Hawkins operates a virtual clearinghouse of good information, and together with on-point analysis that is always correct and conservative, this is a daily read)

3] Strategy Page (Great military information, and as a Milblogger, I would be lost without a daily dose of SP)

2] Michelle Malkin (What can I say; wonderful, although I am still waiting for the first returned e-mail; do you know I am out here, Michelle?)

1] Small Wars Journal (Will stay number one for me; I became familiar with the concept of small wars when I began studying the USMC because of my son; it would be good for others to understand as well)

**** UPDATE ****

Actually, I am taking liberty with my number one blog, since it is only barely a blog, linking to a bunch of stuff, including books, news, manuals, quotes, discussion threads and blogs by others.  I hope that this liberty is okay.  It is a must read every day for me.

On June 23 I posted “Normal Mineta Leaves – Thank God,” sensing a slight upwards tick on the U.S. securometer.  But little seems to have changed.

On August 16, I posted “TSA Shows no Respect for Military: One More Reason to Loath Them.”

And now, courtesy of Mary Katharine Ham, we see this photograph:

If it were me doing the search, I would refuse unless my head was covered by a hood of shame so that people could not tell who I was.  Then I would do it to keep a job but inform my superiors what an asinine practice it was to search little old white ladies.

This proves that we still do not take the GWOT seriously.  We are not yet engaged in the fight.  What will it take for us to wake from our slumber?

The ghosts of Norman Mineta have not yet been exorcised.

Let me be clear on what I think.  The coalition forces are winning in Afghanistan.  From intelligence estimates, there are only several thousand Taliban fighters left in the mountainous region bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan.  To put this in context, several thousand is the number sitting in a medium to large church in any U.S. city on a Sunday, and perhaps 1/20 of the attendance at a typical college or professional football game on a Saturday.  This is simply a small force size considering the fact that just a few years ago the country was controlled by Taliban (excluding the region controlled by the Northern Alliance).

On September 3, the Strategy Page was reporting:

September 3, 2006: Over the weekend, NATO troops near Kandahar (in the west), killed over 200 Taliban, while losing four of their own troops. Nearly a hundred Taliban were captured. This was part of a NATO operation to cripple Taliban forces in the Kandahar area. It appears to have succeeded, as interrogations of captured Taliban showed that this was a major enemy force in the area, and contained many key leaders.

It is noteworthy that 200 Taliban is considered a “major enemy force.”  This is not even a company of fighters.  As for the success rate over the last eight months, the Strategy Page is reporting:

September 5, 2006: The Taliban Summer offensive is nearly over, as the cold weather begins showing up. Nearly 2,000 have died in the last eight months from the Taliban violence. Most of the dead have been Taliban, most of them Afghans, but about a third Pakistanis and about five percent of them other foreigners. Most of the civilian victims were targeted by the Taliban. These included teachers and other government officials murdered by the Taliban, as part of a terror campaign to gain control over tribes in the south. This has largely backfired, as the Taliban was not strong enough to maintain constant pressure on the tribes. Apparently, the high Taliban death toll is the result of keeping large groups of gunmen in action, as this was the only way to back up the smaller terror squads, in the face of tribal attempts to resist or retaliate. But army and coalition forces would constantly catch the large Taliban groups, and smash them with smart bombs and superior firepower. 

So there have been many Taliban deaths, and their ability to field a fighting forces has been seriously weakened and compromised in Afghanistan.  But the situation seems to be different within Pakistan.

Yesterday was an interesting day on the conservative blogosphere.  It all started with the announcement of the truce / agreements signed between the Pakistan government and the Pashtun Muslims.  Bill Roggio posted on these events, focusing on the underreported story of the Pakistan “surrender” to the Muslim extremist fighters.  This created a storm of posts, counterpoints, trackbacks and comments, Michelle Malkin supporting the idea of a surrender, while the Captain’s Quarters supported the idea of a slick deal where the Taliban were the losers (and Musharraf the winner); Dan Riehl weighed in supporting the idea of a slick deal by Musharraf, while many other small bloggers (like yours truly) weighed in affirming Roggio’s position.

When the conservative blogosphere speaks, seldom is there as stark a difference of opinion as there was yesterday.  Still, in spite of the differences, the fact that a deal was cut at all implies a very weary Pakistan government (and restive troops and intelligence apparatus).  The Strategy Page weighs in on this issue as well:

September 6, 2006: Pakistan has declared victory and acknowledged defeat in the Pushtun tribal territories along the Afghan border. The government has signed a truce deal with the tribes. Under the terms of the deal, the tribes promise to expel foreign Islamic terrorists from their territories, and not allow their own men to join Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Neither promise is likely to be kept. Even now, Islamic extremists are exercising more control in the tribal territories, forming militias that are able to defy the tribal elders. However, the government is now expected to keep its troops in bases near the urban areas (which the tribes do not control anyway), and send in millions of dollars in economic aid (which the United States is expected to provide). This charade will go on (for a year or so) until the violations of the deal become too much to ignore. At that point, the war between the government and the tribes will resume. Afghanistan is already complaining of an increase in Pakistani Pushtun Taliban crossing over to fight.

The government was not willing to pay the price, in lives and cash, to subdue the tribes. This is nothing new, the fierce and persistent resistance of the Pushtun tribes has defeated outsiders for centuries. But there was also a religious angle. The tribes are full of Islamic conservatives, and tribal religious leaders have been turning the fighting into a religious war. The government does not want to give Islamic conservatives elsewhere in Pakistan more ammunition. Moreover, a significant minority of the officers in the army are Islamic conservatives, and the fighting was causing unrest with that important group. So the government has declared victory, stopped fighting the tribes, and is hoping to come up with some kind of Plan B before the Islamic terrorism gets out of hand. 

I concur that the Taliban in Pakistan cannot be trusted to carry out their obligations.  If you want to see why, look no further than their actions towards their own fighters.  On September 2, the Strategy Page reported:

September 2, 2006: Pakistan has been signing truces with rebellious Pushtun tribes on its side of the border, and this has led to a noticeable increase in the number Pakistanis captured or killed fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The additional number of Pakistanis in Afghanistan is not great, perhaps only a few hundred, but these guys have guns and murderous intent, and have hurt Afghans and foreign troops. 

Notice what has led to the noticeable increase in the number of Pakistanis captured or killed in fighting.  The signing of truces with the Pakistan government.

Get the picture?  In order to effect a downsizing in the hostilities with the Pakistan government, the Pashtun tribes were willing to sell out their own in Afghanistan to be killed.  Not foreign fighters — their own tribesmen.

This is the Taliban that Musharraf has cut a deal with.

There is good news and bad news in Afghanistan.  As you know, there are ongoing operations in Afghanistan, and the coalition forces are becoming very good at killing Taliban fighters.  Operation Medusa, as of September 3, 2006, had netted 200 Taliban killed and 80 captured, as compared to 4 NATO casualties.  In case you’re not counting (or dividing), this is a kill ratio of 50:1.

From the Washington Times:

An Army commander just back from Afghanistan had some good news and bad news.  The good: The coalition is good at finding and killing Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. The bad: Nearly as fast as the terrorists are killed, they are replaced by new recruits from camps in Pakistan. 

I have mixed feelings about calling this “bad” news.  On the one hand, I hate to see that there are so many in the world who hate us and want to kill us.  On the other hand, the good news part of the story is that if there are those who do indeed want to kill us, we are fighting them over there instead of on U.S. soil.  The effects of fighting them on U.S. soil would be many more U.S. deaths and the complete destruction of the U.S. economy (and certainly the destruction of our way of life).

Now for the really bad news.  Bill Roggio (h/t Michelle Malkin) has a must read piece on the surrender of the Pakistani army to the Taliban in the region of Waziristan.  His opening volley in the piece is this:

Pakistan’s “truce with the Taliban is an abject surrender, and al-Qaeda has an untouchable base of operations in Western Pakistan which will only expand if not checked.

Bill continues by outlining the terms of the truce:

– The Pakistani Army is abandoning its garrisons in North and South Waziristan.
– The Pakistani Military will not operate in North Waziristan, nor will it monitor actions the region.
– Pakistan will turn over weapons and other equipment seized during Pakistani Army operations.
– The Taliban and al-Qaeda have set up a Mujahideen Shura (or council) to administer the agency.
– The truce refers to the region as “The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.

In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.

In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.

It is well known now that Iran has not only pursued an enrichment program to develop highly enriched Uranium (the only purpose for which is a nuclear bomb), but a heavy water reactor as well, the purpose for which includes the production of Plutonium.  The Middle East Media Research Institute reports on why Iran says it wants to produce heavy water (quoting Iran nuclear chief Mohammad Sa’idi):

“One of the products of heavy water is depleted deuterium. As you know, in an environment with depleted deuterium, the reception of cancer cells and of the AIDS viruses is disrupted. Since this reception is disrupted, the cells are gradually expelled from the body. Obviously, one glass of depleted deuterium will not expel or cure the cancer or eliminate the AIDS. We are talking about a certain period of time. In many countries that deal with these diseases, patients use this kind of water instead of regular water, and consume it daily in order to heal their diseases.

“In other words, the issue of heavy water has to do with matters of life and death, in many cases. One of the reasons that led us to produce heavy water was to use it for agricultural… medical purposes, and especially for industrial purposes in our country.” 

Sa’idi is lying.  The use of heavy water for the treatment of disease is so costly and unproven that it would be absurd to use it on patients in lieu of chemotherapy.  The consumption of heavy water by biological organisms inhibits cell reproduction, but is also too toxic and too costly to be considered useful for the treatment of cancer or any other disease.  It simply makes more sense to use chemotherapy and other modern treatments.

On the other hand, heavy water has two strategic military advantages to Iran.  First, rather than worry with trying to achieve Uranium enrichment on the order of that necessary to sustain criticality in conventional light water reactor designs, natural Uranium can be used in heavy water reactors.  The design of Iran’s reactor is similar to the Canadian CANDU reactors, which can be studied here, here, and here.  The consequent Plutonium produced could then be reprocessed and purified to produce a nuclear bomb that requires less mass than its counterpart Uranium bomb.  This makes such a warhead able to be delivered with the rockets that Iran currently has in its arsenal.

This is about the miniturization of nuclear weapons, and it shows that Iran is pursuing two distinct paths towards the holy grail.  The first is highly enriched Uranium, in itself capable of being a weapon, and the second is Plutonium, produced without the aid of enriched Uranium by the use of natural Uranium in heavy water plants.

It is noteworthy that Jane’s Intelligence Review in 2003 said the following of Iran’s heavy water reactor:

The IR-40 heavy water research reactor is significant because it produces high quality plutonium, the most important component for a compact, nuclear device. If Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon small enough to launch on top of its Shahab 3 or 4 missiles, it will most probably be an implosion device with a plutonium (Pu) core.  The only way to acquire that is through reprocessing irradiated fuel. Bushehr is a light water reactor that has received much international attention and most probably will continue to be closely scrutinised, making it difficult to clandestinely remove its spent fuel for reprocessing. Even if the IR-40 has just as much attention, the Iranians would have a better chance of removing irradiated fuel or irradiating natural uranium targets for Pu production in this reactor.

Indeed, a heavy water reactor is among the most dangerous in existence from a proliferation perspective.  One reason is that the low neutron cross section of heavy water facilitates a high number of U238 (uranium-238 isotope) atoms to absorb neutrons, resulting in the production of a greater quantity and better quality of plutonium product.

According to David Albright, Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, the IR-40 will be able to produce 8-10kg of plutonium per year – approximately one to two bombs’ worth of nuclear material.  The IAEA holds that 8kg of plutonium constitutes a “significant quantity

It is well known now that Iran has not only pursued an enrichment program to develop highly enriched Uranium (the only purpose for which is a nuclear bomb), but a heavy water reactor as well, the purpose for which includes the production of Plutonium.  The Middle East Media Research Institute reports on why Iran says it wants to produce heavy water (quoting Iran nuclear chief Mohammad Sa’idi):

“One of the products of heavy water is depleted deuterium. As you know, in an environment with depleted deuterium, the reception of cancer cells and of the AIDS viruses is disrupted. Since this reception is disrupted, the cells are gradually expelled from the body. Obviously, one glass of depleted deuterium will not expel or cure the cancer or eliminate the AIDS. We are talking about a certain period of time. In many countries that deal with these diseases, patients use this kind of water instead of regular water, and consume it daily in order to heal their diseases.

“In other words, the issue of heavy water has to do with matters of life and death, in many cases. One of the reasons that led us to produce heavy water was to use it for agricultural… medical purposes, and especially for industrial purposes in our country.” 

Sa’idi is lying.  The use of heavy water for the treatment of disease is so costly and unproven that it would be absurd to use it on patients in lieu of chemotherapy.  The consumption of heavy water by biological organisms inhibits cell reproduction, but is also too toxic and too costly to be considered useful for the treatment of cancer or any other disease.  It simply makes more sense to use chemotherapy and other modern treatments.

On the other hand, heavy water has two strategic military advantages to Iran.  First, rather than worry with trying to achieve Uranium enrichment on the order of that necessary to sustain criticality in conventional light water reactor designs, natural Uranium can be used in heavy water reactors.  The design of Iran’s reactor is similar to the Canadian CANDU reactors, which can be studied here, here, and here.  The consequent Plutonium produced could then be reprocessed and purified to produce a nuclear bomb that requires less mass than its counterpart Uranium bomb.  This makes such a warhead able to be delivered with the rockets that Iran currently has in its arsenal.

This is about the miniturization of nuclear weapons, and it shows that Iran is pursuing two distinct paths towards the holy grail.  The first is highly enriched Uranium, in itself capable of being a weapon, and the second is Plutonium, produced without the aid of enriched Uranium by the use of natural Uranium in heavy water plants.

It is noteworthy that Jane’s Intelligence Review in 2003 said the following of Iran’s heavy water reactor:

The IR-40 heavy water research reactor is significant because it produces high quality plutonium, the most important component for a compact, nuclear device. If Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon small enough to launch on top of its Shahab 3 or 4 missiles, it will most probably be an implosion device with a plutonium (Pu) core.  The only way to acquire that is through reprocessing irradiated fuel. Bushehr is a light water reactor that has received much international attention and most probably will continue to be closely scrutinised, making it difficult to clandestinely remove its spent fuel for reprocessing. Even if the IR-40 has just as much attention, the Iranians would have a better chance of removing irradiated fuel or irradiating natural uranium targets for Pu production in this reactor.

Indeed, a heavy water reactor is among the most dangerous in existence from a proliferation perspective.  One reason is that the low neutron cross section of heavy water facilitates a high number of U238 (uranium-238 isotope) atoms to absorb neutrons, resulting in the production of a greater quantity and better quality of plutonium product.

According to David Albright, Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, the IR-40 will be able to produce 8-10kg of plutonium per year – approximately one to two bombs’ worth of nuclear material.  The IAEA holds that 8kg of plutonium constitutes a “significant quantity

Newsmax has a good writeup entitled New Evidence Emerges in Haditha Case, and yet another good one entitled Pentagon Leaders Distorting Haditha Facts.  Both articles should be studied, and the last one shows that there is (gasp!) a problem in the Pentagon.  Someone there is a turncoat and wants to see the Haditha Marines hung out to dry.  But turning our attention to a different issue, it dawned on me that even a rudimentary sequence of events has not been published by anyone.  There is various prose out there in the MSM, but I thought I would try to boil it down to a more strict “sequence of events” using both the Newsmax links above and the posts in my Haditha Roundup category.  I’ll start the sequence much earlier so that you can get a little bit of the flavor of the Haditha area (see also my posts in the Haditha Roundup category, in which I show how troublesome Haditha was to U.S. forces).

Six Marines become surrounded by insurgents in Haditha arrproximately six months prior to the alledged incident.  These six Marines die.  IEDs, RPGs, and small arms fire from insurgents are part of the daily routine for the Marines in and around the Haditha area.

On November 19, 2005, Staff Sergeant Wuterich’s unit left Firm Base Sparta at 0700 hours on a daily mission to drop off Iraqi army troops at a nearby checkpoint.

At approximately 0715 hours, an IED exploded and severely damaged the last of four Humvees, instantly killing Lance Corporal Terrazas, the driver of the vehicle.

Wuterich stopped the convoy and he and the other Marines got out of the vehicles.

While evaluating the scene, the Marines noticed a white unmarked car carrying four men lingering near the bomb site.  The Marines ordered the men to stop, and rather than stop, the men ran from the scene.  Following SOP, the Marines fired on the men.

Wuterich began briefing the Platoon leader, and AK-47 shots were heard from residences on the south side of the road.  At this point, the squad took defensive positions around the Humvees.

A Corporal with the unit said to Wuterich that he saw the fire coming from a specific house.

Stop sequence of events.  Editorial comment: A Marine fire team consists of four members, including a fire team leader (usually a Lance Corporal, Corporal or Sergeant) who carries an M16A2 with a grenade launcher (the fire team leader is the grenadier).  The main suppressing fire is laid down by the second member, the SAW gunner (Squad Automatic Weapon, or M249).  The other two members carry M16A2s (or M4s if the combat is expected to be primarily MOUT, or Military Operations on Urban Terrain).  In order properly to effect room-clearing procedures, the fire team prepares first by throwing in a fragmentation grenade (unless there are too many rooms such as in Fallujah, in which case the fire team cannot carry enough grenades and is restricted to use of firearms).  After the grenade, the team gets into a formation where each team member is aligned front to back so close that it is called a “stack.”  As I have commented before on The Captain’s Journal, this procedure is designed to save Marine lives and kill the enemy.  Once a room is designated an enemy zone, there is no protocol and no procedure for delineating friend from foe.  In fact, if the Marines redesigned the procedure to attempt to ascertain friend from foe prior to clearing the room, and the enemy learned of this revised procedure, this information would lead to the deaths of many Marines.  Hesitation kills in this procedure.  There is no provision for hesitation, nor can there ever be.  End of editorial comment and return to sequence of events.

Wuterich’s fire team then went to the house from which they had received fire, kicked in the door, and found a door to a room with people rustling behind it.  They kicked in that door, threw in a fragmentation grenade, and followed the grenade by clearing shots (Editorial comment: I am speculating that these shots were from an M249, but I have not seen any report on this.  It is noteworthy that the M16A2 can only fire in three-round bursts, and is not fully automatic).

The Marines noted that the people in the room were men, women and children, but they noticed a back door ajar and believed that the insurgents had slipped to a nearby house.

They moved to this house, kicked the door in, and then used a fragmentation grenade and more fire to clear the room.

Upon noting that they had not found the insurgents, Wuterich ordered the Marines back to the Platoon to reassess the situation.

Finally, K company was ministered to by civilian pastors of one of the Marines in that unit who were on a church-funded missions trip soon after this incident.  This pastor has said that the Marines talked very openly, and made no mention of any guilt over any alleged intentional massacre of civilians.  This fact is likely very significant, although the MSM will not tell it to you.

End of sequence of events.  Since I have a son in the Marines, I have been following this issue closely.  I know that the most undesirable outcome of this whole affair would be a revised set of rules of engagement in which the Marines have to ascertain friend from foe.  In such a condition, there will be many more dead Marines.

Tony Snow said from the White House podium that the entire report would be released.  I am counting on it, and look forward to it with eager anticipation.  When it is, I will read all 1000+ pages of it.  If these Marines are charged, I will dissect, parse, and otherwise rip apart the report and discuss my findings on TCJ.  Pentagon, you are on notice.  Take it under advisement.