Articles by Herschel Smith

From Bill Gertz of The Washington Times:

New intelligence reveals China is covertly supplying large quantities of small arms and weapons to insurgents in Iraq and the Taliban militia in Afghanistan, through Iran.

U.S. government appeals to China to check some of the arms shipments in advance were met with stonewalling by Beijing, which insisted it knew nothing about the shipments and asked for additional intelligence on the transfers. The ploy has been used in the past by China to hide its arms-proliferation activities from the United States, according to U.S. officials with access to the intelligence reports.

Some arms were sent by aircraft directly from Chinese factories to Afghanistan and included large-caliber sniper rifles, millions of rounds of ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades and components for roadside bombs, as well as other small arms.

The Washington Times reported June 5 that Chinese-made HN-5 anti-aircraft missiles were being used by the Taliban.

According to the officials, the Iranians, in buying the arms, asked Chinese state-run suppliers to expedite the transfers and to remove serial numbers to prevent tracing their origin. China, for its part, offered to transport the weapons in order to prevent the weapons from being interdicted.

The weapons were described as “late-model” arms that have not been seen in the field before and were not left over from Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq.

U.S. Army specialists suspect the weapons were transferred within the past three months.

The Bush administration has been trying to hide or downplay the intelligence reports to protect its pro-business policies toward China, and to continue to claim that China is helping the United States in the war on terrorism. U.S. officials have openly criticized Iran for the arms transfers but so far there has been no mention that China is a main supplier.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Wednesday that the flow of Iranian arms to Afghanistan is “fairly substantial” and that it is likely taking place with the help of the Iranian government.

Defense officials are upset that Chinese weapons are being used to kill Americans. “Americans are being killed by Chinese-supplied weapons, with the full knowledge and understanding of Beijing where these weapons are going,” one official said.

The arms shipments show that the idea that China is helping the United States in the war on terrorism is “utter nonsense,” the official said.

John Tkacik, a former State Department official now with the Heritage Foundation, said the Chinese arms influx “continues 10 years of willful blindness in both Republican and Democrat administrations to China’s contribution to severe instability in the Middle East and South Asia.”

Mr. Tkacik said the administration should be candid with the American people about China’s arms shipments, including Beijing’s provision of man-portable air-defense missiles through Iran and Syria to warring factions in Lebanon and Gaza.

The Bush administration hides the destabilizing influence of China in the Middle East because they are “pro-business.”  In China, anyone – Chinese citizen or visitor to the country – can legally purchase any piece of software for $5 or less because of the pirating being done in China, with the full approval of the Chinese government.  There is China’s pro-business policy for you.  It costs U.S. software developers and code writers billions of dollars each year.  China has always been and is currently a nation run by a band of criminals.

With each passing day, new evidence emerges that indicates that this administration doesn’t want to win the war.

The Strategy Page has an interesting article on combat support troops.

Even in Iraq, most of the troops are combat support, and many work regular shifts, under pretty comfortable conditions. This makes it possible for them to do what American troops have been doing overseas for over half a century, take college courses. Many are conducted in classrooms, via instructors hired by the University of Maryland, which has been handling the program since the 1950s. But an increasing number of schools allow courses to be conducted via computer (and before that by mail). The Internet based courses are very popular. There’s no count on exactly how many troops are taking college courses in Iraq, but it’s believed to be several thousand. Most troops spend all their time in heavily fortified bases (FOBs, or Forward Operating Bases), and while there are plenty of other ways to spend your time, many see the studies as a worthwhile way to deal with off-duty time. However, combat units, and some on-call combat support units, leave little off-duty time for anything but eating, sleeping, getting ready for the next mission, and maybe a little X-Box.

I have raised the issue before of the bloated ratio of combat support to infantry.  Completely aside from strategy, force size, supplies, logistics and equipment, unless and until the U.S. learns to utilize the force by leveraging their time and presence on the battlefield, the U.S. will not be able to conduct efficient counterinsurgency.  This is true regardless of whether one considers the kinetic or nonkinetic aspects of counterinsurgency.  Troops who have time to learn calculus are not contributing to the conduct of the campaign (comparatively), and the fault lies not with them, but leadership which lacks innovation and adaptability.

Furthermore, there is a difference between meeting recruitment goals, and having a ratio of support to infantry that is small enough to be effective.  It is profoundly unhelpful to meet recruitment goals in supply, logistics, ordnance, etc., where the utilization of these troops gives them time to attend college while deployed.

The potential solutions to this problem are numerous.  We could grant additional pay for earning the combat action ribbon, based on a ratio to troops who have not earned this distinction, this ratio never being able to be removed from a Soldier’s or Marine’s pay scale.  Or, we could utilize the support troops so effectively that there would be voluntary transfers to infantry.  Or, assignments could be made rotational.  Each solution, however, would require the willingness to buck the system, so no solution is likely to be forthcoming.

Whether constabulary actions or reconstruction, since boots on the ground among the people are necessary to conduct counterinsurgency, we have shown that we are not yet truly committed to the COIN campaign in Iraq.  If we are not going to commit, it is best to withdraw.

My very astute reader, Dominique, has left a smart and sweeping comment on my article Religion and Insurgency: A Response to Dave Kilcullen (which is followed up by article Smith Responds).  The response is important enought to warrant its own article.  The comment is published here entirely.

Just for the sake of clarity, let’s continue this a bit further.  I do not advocate – and have never advocated in anything I have published – that we expend attention, resources, effort, largesse, or the time of our armed forces to attempt to (a) change the minds of adherents of Islam, (b) tell Muslims what the Quran says, (c) evangelize Muslims, or (d) war against Muslims because they are adherents to Islam.  I am not charging you with this misunderstanding, but some of the commenters have made this error, failing to read my prose with a clear head and open mind.

My basic presupposition has been that there are some insurgents who are religiously motivated, mainly because they have told us so (and this, not in communications to us, but communications to themselves such as the letter from al Qaeda high command to Zarqawi that we intercepted).  This fraction is less than unity, but greater than zero.  For the sake of argument, I am willing, even, to grant my detractors the point that this fraction (FR, or fraction that is religiously motivated) is less than unity by a non-trivial amount, even though I am not sure that this is the case.  For this fraction FR, whether right or wrong, their hermeneutic forces them to do what they do under the rubric of religion.  For FR, religious commitment is more important than security or largesse.  Therefore, FR will not be amenable to our efforts at WHAM (winning hearts and minds).

The other insurgents (fraction not religiously motivated), FNR = 1 – FR, will be amenable to WHAM under this formulation.  It pays to understand enough about the culture and religion to know how to ascertain which schools of thought the fraction FR represents and how we might identify these subsets up front.  For example, given the religious motivation of Ansar al Sunna, it is a good bet that they are in the category of FR.

This is a simple formulation, and one that I think makes good common sense.  The readers and commenters who think I am calling for a holy war are reactionary, stolid and mentally dense.  Again, Dominique, you are not in this category, but some of my readers have been.  For those readers who are in this category, I can only say, please, try to keep up with me as the conversation advances and moves forward.  You’re slowing the train down.

Kilcullen, on the other hand, has proposed that there are no insurgents who are religiously motivated, and thus arrives at the conclusion that all insurgents will be amenable to efforts at WHAM.

The differences are fairly clear, and the reader can make up his or her own mind.  In the future, I will publish another article that discusses the published U.S. military doctrine concerning religion and insurgency and how this changed in favor of the more secular view after the events of 9/11.

Around mid-May, raw video of recent combat action in Fallujah was posted.  There are a number of interesting characteristics of this action, but particularly note the sniper fire coming from minarets.

In Fallujah: The Continuing Battle for Hallowed Ground, we discussed Fallujah being the most active city in the Anbar province for the insurgency, and the use of Fallujah as a staging location for enemy activity throughout not only Anbar but Baghdad as well.

Insurgent and U.S. operations continue with relentless consistency in and around Fallujah.  Eighteen people were killed south of Fallujah on June 5th when a “suicide bomber driving a truck packed with explosives plowed into a busy commercial district, police said. Fifteen others were wounded.” (other reports vary as to numbers killed and wounded).  “Some witnesses said the attack occurred near a meeting of tribal sheiks who have been fighting Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”

The multinational force does not issue press releases on all combat operations, and so the ease with which we can catalog coalition operations is a pointer to the regularity and comprehensive nature of the kinetic operations against the insurgency.

June 5th combat action by U.S. forces:

During continued operations to disrupt the al-Qaeda in Iraq network in Anbar province, Coalition Forces conducted a raid on four associated buildings northeast of Fallujah.  The ground force detained 13 suspected terrorists for their association with a cell that carries out attacks against Iraqis and Coalition Forces with VBIEDs, snipers, and mortars, and targets Iraqi infrastructure.

June 7th combat action by Iraqi army:

Iraqi Army Forces on June 7 detained four members of an al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist cell believed to be responsible for setting improvised explosive devices and conducting small arms fire attacks against Iraqi and Coalition Forces on and around Camp Fallujah.

With Coalition Forces present as advisors, Iraqi Soldiers detained the four suspects in the vicinity of Al Fayath, located south of Camp Fallujah. During the operation they seized assault rifles, numerous magazines, ammunition, and materials used to construct, trigger and place improvised explosive devices.

June 8th combat action by U.S. forces:

Coalition Forces killed one terrorist and detained 12 suspected terrorists during operations targeting the al-Qaeda in Iraq network Friday in Anbar province.

Based on information gained from an operation May 27, Coalition Forces raided several buildings northeast of Fallujah.  After they announced their presence through an interpreter, one terrorist outside the building threw a hand grenade at the ground forces.  Coalition Forces took appropriate self-defense measures and engaged the armed terrorist with small arms fire, killing him.

Coalition Forces searched the buildings and detained 12 suspected terrorists on scene for their alleged involvement in the al-Qaeda in Iraq network.  Information gained from earlier operations indicates the suspects are involved in indoctrination for al-Qaeda in Iraq.  In one ceremony conducted by the network, those who declined to join the terrorist group were killed.

June 9th combat action by U.S. forces:

Coalition Forces killed five terrorists and detained 11 suspected terrorists during operations targeting the al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist network in central Iraq Saturday morning.

Coalition Forces tracked a suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq weapons distributor to a building southeast of Fallujah.  As they approached the area, five men in the front yard reached for weapons.  Responding appropriately to the hostile threat, Coalition Forces engaged the armed men, including the suspected weapons distributor, killing them.  Two other suspected terrorists were detained.

June 10th combat action by U.S. forces:

Coalition Forces captured six suspected terrorists Sunday morning during operations that continue to deny safe haven to members of the al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist network.

Based on information gained during a successful operation May 27, Coalition Forces targeted a location in Fallujah looking for an individual suspected of recruiting for al-Qaeda.  The suspected jihad leader is known for using “join or die

In Intelligence Bulletin #3, we said:

… if Sadr returns to Iraq, his arrest or disappearance might incite such a firestorm of problems that the Baghdad security plan is brought to a halt.  The Mahdi army doesn’t like even the presence of combat operation posts or bases in Sadr City.  Sadr will never be convicted in a court in Iraq, and a show trial that exhonerates him would be the worst of all possible outcomes.  The U.S. is tracking the whereabouts of Sadr.  Major General William Caldwell said that Sadr was still inside Iran as of 24 hours ago.  This seems like a confident report, and assuming its accuracy, it gives lattitude for the appropriate action to remove Sadr from the political and spiritual scene, thus enabling the security plan to succeed.  We highly commend the notion of a strategic disappearance of Sadr as one key to the overall success of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In Iran, Sadr, and Iranian Forces Deployed Throughout the Middle East, we said:

At the standdown of the surge and security plan, Sadr will return to Baghdad, heavily guarded, to women crying and waving their scarves in the air, and men shooting their AK-47s and and swearing to kill on command.  Sadr will be received back as not just a hero, but as someone almost divine, who stood down the U.S.  Any capture of Sadr and turnover to the courts of Iraq would have the opposite outcome of that intended, because no Iraqi court will convict Sadr of crimes, thus exhonerating and codifying him in his rule of his followers.

Iran will then have their forces deployed in Lebanon, headed by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and in Iraq, headed by Moqtada al Sadr.  Only confident actions by the administration – rather than acquiescence by the State Department – will avert such an outcome.  The Brits would rather “de-escalate,

The Marines take a close one.

In Can the Air Force Contribute to Counterinsurgency?, I posted my response to Major General Dunlap’s comments concerning the use of the Air Force in counterinsurgency.  Dunlap made other interesting observations in his comments.

FM 3-24 reflects an outdated notion of airpower in its annex. Specifically, with respect to the collateral damage issue, it expresses a ‘fossilized’ view of airpower’s propensity to cause collateral damage and openly discourages commanders from employing it.

Mysteriously, FM 3-24 has no such cautions about other kinds of fires (MLRS, artillery, etc.) In fact, today’s airpower’s precision targeting pods, smaller warheads, weaponeering, ISR, and ground-based controllers, etc., have all served to vastly reduced collateral damage – from even the high standards of 2003’s major combat operations.

Perhaps the video above is an example of what Dunlap discusses.  Dunlap is trying to put meat on the skeleton of theory concerning the involvement of air power in small wars, while in fact the increased use of air power is occurring at this very moment.

Four years into the war that opened with “shock and awe,” U.S. warplanes have again stepped up attacks in Iraq, dropping bombs at more than twice the rate of a year ago.

The airpower escalation parallels a nearly four-month-old security crackdown that is bringing 30,000 additional U.S. troops into Baghdad and its surroundings — an urban campaign aimed at restoring order to an area riven with sectarian violence.

It also reflects increased availability of planes from U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. And it appears to be accompanied by a rise in Iraqi civilian casualties.

In the first 4 1/2 months of 2007, American aircraft dropped 237 bombs and missiles in support of ground forces in Iraq, already surpassing the 229 expended in all of 2006, according to U.S. Air Force figures obtained by The Associated Press.

“Air operations over Iraq have ratcheted up significantly, in the number of sorties, the number of hours (in the air),” said Col. Joe Guastella, Air Force operations chief for the region. “It has a lot to do with increased pressure on the enemy by MNC-I” — the Multinational Corps-Iraq — “combined with more carriers.”

The Air Force report did not break down the specific locations in Iraq where bombings have been stepped up. But U.S.-led forces also are locked in new and dangerous fronts against insurgents outside Baghdad in such places as Diyala, a province northeast of the capital.

Left unaddressed in this account is whether the increased use of artillery would have caused the same collateral damage as ordnance delivered by air, or whether the rise in civilian casualties is even related to the use of air power.

The air force (and navy) has said “we want back in this war.”  The Multinational Force has said, “it’s good to have you back.  As to how this all happens, we’ll have to work those details out as we go.”  And Dunlap’s project remains interesting.

**** UPDATE ****

The Strategy Page has a related commentary, large parts of which are reproduced below:

A major problem in Iraq is that there are two, quite different, solutions to the violence problem. Most of the bombings, and violence in general, are the work of Sunni Arab groups, desperate to get back into power, and avoid being brought to justice for atrocities committed during Saddams long reign. The Iraqi solution is the traditional one; punish the entire Sunni Arab community. Since the Kurds and Shia now have far more men under arms than do the Sunni Arabs, this approach would result in a series of battles against Sunni Arab neighborhoods (in large cities) and towns (out in the countryside). These areas would be cut off from the outside world. Food, water and electricity would cut off as well. Surrender or die. Those who surrendered would be disarmed, taken to a border area, and forced out of the country. In some areas, there might be massacres as well. It’s an Iraqi tradition that’s hard to shake.

The other approach is less popular among most Iraqis, and it is the American one. This involves getting Sunni Arab leaders to tame the terrorists in their midst, and become law-abiding Iraqis. Few Kurds or Shia Arabs feel they can trust the Sunni Arabs, but if they want to keep American troops in the country (which keeps the Iraqi casualty rate down, and unfriendly neighbors out), they have to go along with the current “surge” campaign. This has resulted in two interesting developments. First, many more Sunni Arab leaders are switching sides, coming over to the government, and joining the fight against the Sunni Arab terrorists groups (a mélange of  nationalist and religious fanatic organizations, plus al Qaeda and other foreign factions.) Sunni Arab militias are not much more effective against the terrorists (who are certainly more fanatical, a major military advantage in the Arab world), than the Iraqi security forces. But these new alliances have led to more information about where the terrorists hang out, and this has resulted in the greater use of American smart bombs. So far this year, about 250 have been used. That compares to the 229 dropped for all of 2006. In Afghanistan, where the number of terrorists is much lower, and the tips more numerous, nearly a thousand smart bombs have been used so far this year. Iraqis have also adapted to the use of smart bombs, and civilians are more quick to get out of the way when terrorists invade, and take over, their homes. Thus while the smart bomb use has more than doubled this year, the number of  civilian deaths from these weapons is only up about 25 percent (that’s about fifty people so far this year). In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the terrorists try to use civilians as human shields. Understandably, the civilians are reluctant to cooperate.

This is interesting on a number of levels.  First, as I have hinted in my articles on rules of engagement (and especially see The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement), the protest that more robust ROE would infuriate the population and lead to high civilian casualties turns out to be incorrect.  The ironic truth appears to be that when civilians learn that a home is no protection from U.S. combat action, when the insurgents show up they leave the home or drive the insurgents out.  If the presence of the insurgents means less security (as has been the case so far), then U.S. refusal to deal with the insurgency due to ROE means a prolonging of that insecurity (consider also the calamitous British failure in Basra and the degradation of security over the last three years, a subject for a future article).

Second, in using the phrase “religious fanatic” (there are surely some of them in Iraq) the authors at the Strategy Page appear to be ignoring Kilcullen’s view, i.e., there are no religious fanatics in the insurgency in Iraq.

With regards to the events of Haditha, on the one hand we have John Murtha’s histrionics; on the other, the forthright, deadpan observation in recent testimony at Camp Pendleton:

CAMP PENDLETON — A Marine lieutenant testified Wednesday that he had never considered that Marines might have done anything wrong in killing 24 people in the Iraqi town of Haditha, even as he found the bodies of two women and six children huddled on a bed.

Lt. Max Frank, who had been ordered to take the bodies to the city morgue, said he assumed that the Marines had “cleared” three houses of suspected insurgents according to their standing orders — by throwing in fragmentation grenades and entering with blasts of M-16 fire.

The smoke from the grenades, Frank said, would have kept the Marines from seeing that they were firing on women and children.

How can Murtha behave so hysterically, with Lt. Frank testifying that he never considered that anything wrong was done by the Marines under his charge?  Context is everything, and most discussions about the events of Haditha lack the proper context.

The events of Haditha occurred at the end of what we should consider Operation Iraqi Freedom 2: heavily kinetic operations against insurgents, with most of these operations involving military operations on urban terrain (MOUT).  The events that most poignantly mark OIF2 occurred in Fallujah, i.e., the first and second battles of Fallujah.  It is important to understand these battles.

Military doctrine can be simply described as a core set of beliefs, or a way of thinking about problems and framing military planning.  Military strategy involves the planning and conduct of war.  The two go hand in hand, with each informing the other.  Military tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are the lowest level conduct of war, and should be seen as a function of doctrine and strategy.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 (or the initial stages of the war when heavily conventional TTPs were employed), large population centers such as Fallujah were bypassed.  This strategy led to the rapid overthrow of the regime, but the congregation of insurgents in urban areas.  The battle for Fallujah in 2004 had as its strategy to force out the noncombatants, thus leaving the insurgents the (presumed) only persons left in the urban area.  This assumption was essentially correct.

At the doctrinal and strategic level, the decision could have been made, for example, to starve the insurgents out of the city.  Since there were displaced residents, there wasn’t time for this.  From the standpoint of TTPs, the decision was made to engage the insurgents in heavily kinetic operations, relying most heavily on room clearing operations.  In room clearing, the presupposition is that the room is inhabited by the enemy, and that the enemy is lying in wait to kill Marines.

The specific procedure, which will not be explained in detail here, involves first the use of a fragmentation grenade followed by fire from the firearms of the fire team (M16A2 or M4, and SAW).  This is true with the exception that the Marine cannot carry enough grenades to use on all rooms in a city the size of Fallujah, and eventually, the TTP in the battle for Fallujah involved only firing, i.e., no  use of a grenade.  Firing is immediate and aimed at all inhabitants of the room, under the assumption, once again, that all inhabitants are the enemy.

Cordon and knock and other ‘softer’ approaches to counterinsurgency came later (so-called Operation Iraqi Freedom 3), but for the time periods marked by Fallujah (and in 2005 Haditha), room clearing was the TTP relied upon when fire was taken from a location in Anbar.  It is also important to know that many veterans of the battle for Fallujah who left the theater after this battle went into the drill instructor ranks (for boot camp) or trainers for SOI (School of Infantry).  Room clearing was taught to new Marines, and is still taught to this day.

On that fateful day in Haditha, the Marines were engaging in room clearing tactics.  It isn’t any more complicated than that.  It was an approved method of battling insurgents, it was ordered, and given that fire was coming from the location of the rooms that were cleared, it was justified.  As we observed in Haditha Events Coming to a Head:

The one who led the stack into the room that day had previously been engaged in the battle for Fallujah.  The protocol was to toss in a fragmentation grenade, and follow with a stack of four Marines (a “fire team

In Enemy Operations in Baghdad and Fallujah, relying on Andrew Lubin’s reporting from Fallujah, we discussed Fallujah as being a hot spot of insurgent activity as the ‘security plan’ got underway, and how far ahead Ramadi was in terms of pacification than other some parts of the Anbar province.

This contrast is accentuated by recent reports, and from the perspective of combat operations, Fallujah still remains the most active city in the Anbar province.  Omar Fadhil observes that after “Looking at the two main routes of al-Qaeda and how the main strongholds around Baghdad are aligned, they suggest that the Fallujah area and its immediate surroundings still remain the main hub for terrorists.”  Fallujah is strategically located, being in the Anbar province but close enough to Baghdad (slightly more than half an hour drive away) to still be a significant base for the insurgency in Baghdad.

The Marines continue to set up checkpoints, conduct raids, and patrol through the streets and neighborhoods of Fallujah.  The insurgency continues to terrorize the population.  “In western Iraq on Thursday, a suicide bomber hit a police recruiting center in Fallujah, and there were conflicting reports about the death toll. Police said as many as 25 people were killed, but the U.S. military said just one policeman died.”  Yesterday, the insurgents sent several mortar rounds into residential population centers in Fallujah, killing nine noncombatants.

One reason for the continued violence in Fallujah is the lethargy of involvement of the tribes in combating the insurgency contra the model displayed in Ramadi.  Mohammed of Iraq the Model gives us an explantion of the state of the so-called Awakening Council in the greater Fallujah area.

A member of the Anbar Awakening Council said that forces loyal to the council are close to clear Ramadi from terrorists who destroyed the city with the sabotage acts against society and infrastructure, adding that these forces are almost done clearing Heet, Kubeisa, Rutba, Barwana and Baghdadi while progress toward Fallujah, Huseiba and Haditha remains slow because the formations of the Awakening are still humble (in those areas).

Michael Yon is sending positive reports back from Anbar, but he is in Hit (or Heet), not Fallujah.  The reports we are receiving and reading are consistent with the observations of Omar and Mohammed.  Anbar cannot be discussed in a single breath, for it is too diverse.  Fallujah lags behind the balance of Anbar and remains an area affected by the insurgency.

One needn’t spend much time around Marines to learn what Fallujah means in the lore and history of the United States Marine Corps.  The first and second battles for Fallujah made it hallowed ground for the Marines.  The insurgency seems determined to incite violence and prevent pacification of the area.  The Marines are just as determined not to see the desecration of hallowed ground.  And so the battle continues.

**** UPDATE ****

From AP:

U.S. and Iraqi forces killed seven members of al-Qaida in Iraq and destroyed a truck bomb factory Saturday in Fallujah, the military said.

A two-hour gunbattle began just after 7 a.m. when Fallujah police came under small-arms fire and spotted two men wearing suicide vests fleeing from the scene. Marines accompanying the police returned fire, killing both militants, according to a statement.

The Marines with the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment then fired at five other suspects trying to escape, killing them and causing another suicide vest to explode, the military said.

The U.S.-led forces subsequently discovered a compound with two trucks rigged as suicide bombs and more bomb-making materials, which the military said were destroyed in a controlled detonation that did not damage nearby buildings.

Eight suspects were detained for questioning, the military said.

And from the Middle East Times:

BAGHDAD —  UPDATED: Unidentified gunmen shot dead a local Al Qaeda leader in the western Iraqi city of Fallujah Saturday, police said, as fighting between rival Sunni factions undermined the insurgency.

The apparent assassination of the militant kingpin came as the US military announced that marines and Iraqi security forces had killed seven Al Qaeda fighters in a gunbattle during an assault which led to a truck bomb factory being destroyed.

Both incidents appeared to be linked to increased cooperation between Sunni factions, once sympathetic to the Iraqi resistance, and the US military, which is encouraging nationalist factions to fight Al Qaeda.

Colonel Tareq Al Dulaimi, a senior police intelligence officer with close ties to Anbar Province’s pro-US tribal coalition, confirmed reports that Muwaffaq Al Jugheifi had been killed but did not identify the attackers.

Dulaimi described the slain Al Qaeda leader as an Iraqi from Fallujah.

The process that Ramadi has been through … grips Fallujah at the moment.

There have been recent calls from members of the Senate for investigations into claims that Pinnacle’s Dragon Skin armor is better than the currently deployed body armor.  Response from the Army was swift and direct.  This article covers some recent history of body armor and the current “dust-up” in the media and Senate, and briefly examines claims and counter-claims.  A way forward is recommended for final disposition of the issues surrounding body armor.  This article has a companion article: Gear and Equipment Problems for the Marines.

NBC News recently did an exposé on the Dragon Skin body armor, raising again the question whether it is superior to the currently deployed body armor (this issue has been followed for years by Soldiers for the Truth).  Before we examine the claims and counterclaims, some history must be rehearsed so that words and concepts and not read and discussed in a vacuum.

The Interceptor body armor system (IBA) was deployed during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The IBA consists mainly of an Outer Tactical Vest (the shell), soft armor panels, and Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), hard ceramic plates designed to prevent penetration of the 7.62 mm round.  The soft armor is designed to prevent penetration of a 9 mm round and shrapnel from some explosive ordnance.  It covers approximately the entire surface area of the OTV.  There were initially two main SAPI plates, one for the front and the other for the back.

The ballistic capabilities of the SAPI were upgraded, and hence the currently deployed plate is referred to as ESAPI, for enhanced SAPI.  There are also side SAPI plates, and during the first – and sometimes the second – deployment of Soldiers and Marines to OIF, wearing the side SAPIs was optional.  Many Soldiers and Marines chose not to wear them, since as a carrier the IBA was not designed to hold the side SAPIs (I’m looking at the IBA shell as I write).  The side SAPIs were worn in conjunction with the original IBA with use of a molle system.

It was discovered that enemy snipers were aiming for gaps in the SAPI plate coverage (e.g., the side torso under the arms), and so wearing the side SAPIs eventually became mandatory.  The heavy battlefield weight, along with the lack of integration of the side SAPIs into the shell, caused the US Marine Corps to revise its body armor system to the Modular Tactical Vest, or MTV (the commercial version is the Spartan 2 Assault Vest, from Tactical Applications Group).  Having put on both the IBA and the MTV (or Spartan 2) I can attest to the improvements of the MTV over the Interceptor.  Some Marines are still being deployed with the IBA rather than the MTV, and are choosing to purchase the Spartan 2 shell themselves (and transfer the soft panels and SAPI plates to the new carrier).

If the reader recalls seeing video from Iraq, the vests that the soldiers are wearing always seem to be “hiked up” in the back (with very little lower back protection).  As one NCO in the 101st Airborne told me, “the front SAPI is low, the rear SAPI is high, and we hang equipment on the front of our vests using molle loops and carabiners.  Why do you think that we walk leaning backwards?  We’re trying to keep from falling over forwards.”  Battlefield weight (and weight distribution) is a huge deal.  This NCO told me that without the order to wear the side SAPIs, he would choose not to in spite of the increased risk.  More on battlefield weight later.

The new Marine MTV raises the SAPI in the front a little, lowers it in the back a little, and makes use of the soft armor panels more efficiently (it avoids doubling over of the soft armor in the shoulder area with the IBA and deploys the soft panels to their fullest extent).  It fully integrates the side SAPIs into the outer shell with a carrier for the plates, and it provides soft panel neck and groin protection.  Contrary to the IBA which places the full weight of the soft armor and SAPI plates on the shoulders, its design hugs the body and places the weight on the hips, much like an internal frame backpack.  Finally, the MTV has a quick release system, a system that is designed with a single pull cord that instantly disassembles the vest, typically used during escape situations when someone is trapped in a vehicle rollover or weighed down in deep water.  This feature is particularly popular with Marines and especially Navy Corpsmen who want to get injured Marines out of their gear quickly.  The Marines with whom I have talked have spoken very approvingly of the MTV (Spartan 2).  It is popular, the improved features are important and valuable, and it represents a quantifiable improvement over previous versions.

But in spite of the superiority of the MTV to the IBA, both systems use the same philosophical approach: an overall carrier, holding soft ballistic panels designed to stop very small arms (e.g., 9 mm and shrapnel) supplemented by SAPI plates of some finite surface area (in the front, back and sides) designed to stop 7.62 mm rounds from AK-47s.  Now comes Pinnacle’s Dragon Skin, with a completely different philosophical approach to body armor.

Dragon Skin uses an interconnected system of ballistic discs held together with adhesive.  The accolades are certainly impressive, but as soon as the NBC report was issued, the Department of Defense came to the defense of the IBA and leveled some significant criticisms against the Dragon Skin.

In response to a May 17 NBC News report challenging the Army’s use of Interceptor body armor vs. the newer “Dragon Skin

The United States Marine Corps is having gear and equipment problems, but the problems are not just with the gear and equipment.

Richard Lardner
Associated Press
Washington – The system for delivering badly needed gear to Marines in Iraq has failed to meet many urgent requests from troops in the field, according to an internal document obtained by the Associated Press.

Of more than 100 requests from deployed Marine units between February 2006 and February 2007, less than 10 percent have been fulfilled, the document says. It blamed the bureaucracy and a “risk-averse” approach by acquisition officials.

Among the items held up were a mine-resistant vehicle and a hand-held laser system.

“Process worship cripples operating forces,” according to the document. “Civilian middle management lacks technical and operational currency.”

The 32-page document – labeled “For Official Use Only” – was prepared by the staff of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force after they returned from Iraq in February.

The document was to be presented in March to senior officials in the Pentagon’s defense research and engineering office. The presentation was canceled by Marine Corps leaders because its contents were deemed too contentious, according to a defense official familiar with the document. The official spoke on condition of anonymity …

The document lists 24 examples of equipment urgently needed by Marines in Iraq’s Anbar province. One, the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle, has received attention as a promising way to protect troops from roadside blasts, the leading killer of U.S. forces in Iraq.

After receiving a February 2005 urgent request approved by Maj. Gen. Dennis Hejlik – who was a commander in Iraq from June 2004 to February 2005 – for nearly 1,200 of the vehicles, the Marine Corps instead purchased improved versions of the ubiquitous Humvee.

The industrial capacity did not exist to quickly build the new mine-resistant vehicles, and the more heavily armored Humvees were viewed as a suitable solution, Marine Corps officials said.

That proved not to be the case as insurgent elements in Iraq developed more powerful bombs that could penetrate the Humvees. The mine-resistant vehicles are now a top priority for all the military branches, which plan to buy 7,774 of the carriers at a cost of $8.4 billion …

A second example cited is the compact high-power laser dazzler, an inexpensive, nonlethal tool for steering unwelcome vehicles away from U.S. checkpoints in Iraq.

The dazzler emits a powerful stream of green light that stops or redirects oncoming traffic by temporarily impairing the driver’s vision.

In June 2005, Marines stationed in western Iraq filed an urgent request for several hundred of the dazzlers, which are built by LE Systems, a small company in Hartford, Conn. The request was repeated nearly a year later.

“Timely purchase and employment of all systems bureaucratically stymied,” the document states.

But the Corps didn’t stop with failing to provide the necessary equipment.  The next step was to prohibit the direct commercial procurement of the equipment by the Marines who needed it.

Separate documents indicate the deployed Marines became so frustrated at the delays they bypassed normal acquisition procedures and used money from their own budget to buy 28 of the dazzlers directly from LE Systems.

But because the lasers had not passed a safety review process, authorities in the United State (sic) barred the Marines from using them.

In January, nearly 18 months after the first request, the Marines received a less powerful laser built by a different company.

Titus Casazza, president of LE Systems, criticized the Marine Corps acquisition process.

“The bureaucrats and lab rats sitting behind a desk stateside are making decisions on what will be given to our soldiers even if contrary to the specific requests of these soldiers and their commanding generals,” he said.

The stipulation to deploy and use only government-issued gear and equipment has been codified in a recent Marine Administrative Order, MARADMIN 262/07.

1.  THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS DIRECTS THE FOLLOWING POLICY FOR MARINES AND SAILORS ASSIGNED TO USMC AND JOINT COMMANDS, ON THE WEAR AND PURCHASE OF BODY ARMOR AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE).  PPE REFERS TO PROTECTIVE BODY ARMOR, HELMETS, GOGGLES, CLOTHING, AND OTHER GEAR DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE WEARER’S BODY FROM BATTLEFIELD INJURIES.  PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: OUTER TACTICAL VEST, MODULAR TACTICAL VEST, LIGHTWEIGHT HELMET, FULL-SPECTRUM BATTLE EQUIPMENT, MILITARY EYE PROTECTION SYSTEMS (ESS ICE SPECTACLES / ESS PROFILE NVG GOGGLES), ENHANCED SMALL ARMS PROTECTIVE INSERT PLATES, SIDE SMALL ARMS PROTECTIVE INSERT PLATES, BALLISTIC PLATE CARRIER, QUAD GUARD, FLAME RESISTANT ORGANIZATIONAL GEAR AND COMBAT ARMS EARPLUGS …
2.  MARINES/SAILORS DEPLOYED TO COMBAT ZONES WILL BE ISSUED MARINE CORPS APPROVED PPE, INCLUDING MODULAR BODY ARMOR SETS.
5. INDIVIDUAL MARINES/SAILORS MAY NOT USE COMMERCIAL PPE IN LIEU OF GOVERNMENT TESTED, APPROVED AND ISSUED PPE.  COMMANDERS MAY AUTHORIZE MEMBERS OF THEIR COMMANDS TO USE COMMERCIALLY PURCHASED PPE ITEMS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AS LONG AS ADDITIONS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FUNCTIONALITY OF APPROVED PPE.  INDIVIDUALLY PURCHASED COMMERCIAL PPE WILL NOT BE REIMBURSABLE BY COMMAND/UNIT (GOVERNMENT) FUNDS.

In fact, the much heralded Modular Tactical Vest, which was promised early in 2007, has yet to be deployed (the commercial version of the MTV is the Spartan 2 Assault Vest, which in form, fit and function, is exactly equivalent to the MTV).  This order prohibits the so-called Dragon Skin body armor, a prohibition which is probably permanent unless and until the manufacturer’s price comes down, the test protocol for the vest is clarified and a purchase order issued by the DoD.  What isn’t clear is whether this MARADMIN prohibits Marines from purchasing and using the Spartan 2.  Having put on both the IBA (Interceptor) and the Spartan 2, I can attest to the fact that the Spartan 2 (or MTV) lives up to its billing.

However, what is clear is that if the Marines would get control of the gear and equipment problems within its ranks, administrative orders such as this one would not have to be issued.  The mere existence of the order tells the story of the gear problems in the Corps.  The Marines have always been on the short end of the stick when it comes to their share of the DoD budget.  Reasons for this include the fact that they feel (with good cause) that if their share increases, along with the money will come political pressures and other meddling from which they are currently somewhat more insulated.  Of course, at the much more personal level, there are fundamental issues of fairness to be addressed that have nothing to do with the Marine’s share of the pie.  Why shouldn’t Marines be allowed to purchase and use commercially-available ballistic glasses if they meet or exceed military specifications?

But in terms of the supply and logistics bureaucracy, there is simply no excuse for failure to provide badly needed gear and equipment to the front.  Request for gear is not tantamount to griping and complaining, and critical reports to field grade officers or logistics higher-ups in the states is not the same thing as insubordination.  A more professional and open-minded approach is needed by those who should already be behaving that way.