U.S. Marine Corps Combat Action in Sangin

BY Herschel Smith
6 years, 4 months ago

From NPR:

The first time U.S. Marines went on patrol from this base in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban were ready. The militants shot and killed a 21-year-old lance corporal just 150 feet from the perimeter.

The Marines patrolling through the green fields and tall mud compounds of Helmand province’s Sangin district say they are literally in a race for their lives. They are trying to adjust their tactics to outwit Taliban fighters, who have killed more coalition troops here than in any other Afghan district this year.

“As a new unit coming in, you are at a distinct disadvantage because the Taliban have been fighting here for years, have established fighting positions and have laid the ground with a ton of IEDs,” said Lt. Col. Jason Morris, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. “You have to evolve quickly because you have no other choice.”

[ … ]

“We kind of snuck our nose in the south to see what the south was about and we found out real quick that you don’t go south unless you have a lot of dudes,” said Sgt. Adam Keliipaakaua, who was leading the patrol.

[ … ]

The Marines now have a better idea of where they will be ambushed around their base and have doubled the size of their patrols to increase the amount of firepower they can direct toward the Taliban. On Thursday, the Marines killed 15 militants in an hourlong firefight, according to NATO.

Those who patrol through the main bazaar in the district center now know to look to the skies. They said the Taliban often fly white kites over the local mosque to signal the presence of the Marines.

The Taliban like to attack using so-called “murder holes” — small holes carved into strong mud walls that allow the insurgents to shoot without exposing themselves …

To avoid walking into a firefight, the Marines look to see whether kids are around. Their absence could mean an impending attack, but the Taliban also use children as spotters, so the tactic isn’t foolproof.

“A little kid will run around the corner and run back, and a minute later you are being shot at,” said Keliipaakaua.

But the threat of an ambush pales in comparison to the biggest danger lurking in Sangin and much of Afghanistan: the scores of IEDs buried in roads, trails, compounds and even canals. Many are largely constructed out of wood or plastic, making them very difficult to detect.

Three days after Ceniceros was killed, another member of 3rd Platoon, Cpl. David Noblit, stepped on an IED in a compound located in dense vegetation across the street from Patrol Base Fulod. Noblit survived the explosion but lost both his legs (for a discussion of Ceniceros, see portions of the article edited for length).

The battalion has been hit with about 40 IED attacks and has found more than 100 other bombs before they exploded.

“You want to vary up your routes to go where the enemy doesn’t expect you to travel,” said Esrey, 33, of Havelock, North Carolina. “I can walk through water ankle-high, but the bad guys probably know that’s where I want to go, so I want to go somewhere the water is chest-high.”

But the Taliban are always watching and adapting as well. One of the last Marines from the battalion who was killed stepped on an IED buried underwater in a canal.

“The tactics keep changing because they’re smart and they watch us,” said Esrey. “They don’t have TV here. We’re their TV.”

Analysis & Commentary

First, spotters and signalers are a common problem with the Taliban, as they were in Ramadi, Iraq.  They have not been dealt with as harshly as I have recommended.  A spotter or signaler is no different than a combatant, and they were treated as combatants by Marines in Iraq whether they held a weapon or not.  Then again, dealing with the spotters as I have recommended (and the Marines actually did in Iraq) would require a change to the rules of engagement.  Our generals are smarter than those successful Marines in the Anbar Province, and so we don’t do things like that anymore.

Second, having a “lot of dudes” is the equivalent of my recommendations in previous coverage of Marine combat action in Sangin.  There are many locations in Afghanistan that need attention and additional troops, from the Paktika province to Kunar and Nuristan, and indeed, the whole Pech River Valley area.  The border needs more mentored ANP, and even the North is coming under increasing Taliban attention.

I have made no secret of my full court press for more troops.  But in this case, the U.S. Marines have the Helmand Province, and it makes no sense to have Marines on MEUs pretending that they are going to conduct a major, full scale, water-borne amphibious assault against some unknown (or non-existent) near-peer enemy while their brothers lose their legs in Afghanistan.  In fact, I would suggest that it is immoral to send Marines into harm’s way without the requisite support and manpower.  The support and manpower exists.  It’s currently located at Camps Lejeune and Pendleton preparing to board amphibious assault docks and waste millions of dollars floating around the seas and stopping at every port so that Marines can get drunk.  We can do better than that for the Marines under fire in Afghanistan.

Finally, it makes sense to fight the Taliban where they are.  If we don’t they will simply relocate to the areas we are trying to secure (such as Kandahar) and fights us there.  It is conducive to minimum noncombatant casualties to conduct combat operations in Sangin rather than in Kandahar if possible.

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To the best of my knowledge the United States has approximately 500 rifle companies. Even if every single one of these were in Afghanistan, they would be insufficient for proper counter-insurgency and counter-infiltration operations in a country of that size and terrain. This gross lack of infantry is evident in every account of platoon-to-company level operations that I have read including the one linked in your post.


Captain, in Al Anbar the Marines were augmented by 7th and 1st IADs [8 IA combat maneuver brigades] plus over 10 thousand provincial Iraqi Police . . . all trained and mentored by the Marines. This is was what crossed the tipping point in Al Anbar [know we don’t see eye to eye on this.]

The way to cross the tipping point in Helmand is by increasing the size and quality of 215th ANA Corps and provincial AUP. BG Ghori’s 3rd Bde, 215th ANA Corps, proves this can be done. And they didn’t even have the advantage of Marine training and mentors for the most part. ;-)

Captain Smith, maybe we don’t disagree that much. I favor far longer training cycles for ANP and ANA officers and NCOs; who generally speaking are a motivated and enthusiastic lot. I also favor longer basic training for enlistee applicants. To achieve this, MG Karim’s ANA Training Command and MG Pattang’s ANP Training Command need to be able to train several times as many ANSF at any given time. On ANSF officers: Only a small percentage of applicants are accepted for officer training currently and those who get accepted tend to be highly motivated. My proposal for be would be to admit many tens of thousands of ANSF officers in “two in the box” training. Partner two officers together, assign them to the same position in the same ANSF unit [i.e. a platoon would have two commanders, a company would have two deputy commanders, or a battalion HQs would have two G2s]; have one attend college/training while the other fights, then reverse, then reverse again, then reverse again. Both officers would be in continual contact and collaborate on local relationships and combat execution. -1-6 months . . . both A and B are in training -7-12 months . . . A… Read more »
Typo: -1-6 months . . . A in training, B in training -7-12 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -13-18 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -19-24 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -25-30 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -31-36 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -37-42 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -43-48 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -49-54 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -55-60 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -61-66 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -67-72 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -73-78 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -79-84 months . . . A in the fight, B in training -85-90 months . . . A in training, B in the fight -91-96 months . . . A in the fight, B in the fight In two years, two mid grade officers… Read more »
Interesting ideas for training, Anan. But even assuming the absolute brilliance of a better training regimen, it will never happen because the U.S. is not in A-stan in anything like the significant numbers needed to take the fight to the bad guys and (with some apparent exceptions like Helmand) the combat forces we have in theater are confined to FOB’s or otherwise hamstrung by tactical limits. (And, of course, by the president of A-stan who is calling for further restrictions on ROE’s and use of force and the confinement of U.S. forces to bases… lovely, that). President Obumble is not going to increase forces or resources into A-stan; we will be lucky if he does not start cutting forces in just 10 months’ time! So, bottom line, there will be no training of anyone that is going to take anywhere near 4 years let alone 8 years’ time. I really am not disparaging the training plan. It is just academic, that’s all. Possibly brilliant, but like most things academic, disconnected from reality because the U.S. lacks the will and– most importantly– the leadership to put it into action. But let’s consider something the Marines in Helmand are doing that is… Read more »
“it will never happen because the U.S. is not in A-stan in anything like the significant numbers needed to take the fight to the bad guys and (with some apparent exceptions like Helmand) the combat forces we have in theater are confined to FOB’s or otherwise hamstrung by tactical limits. (And, of course, by the president of A-stan who is calling for further restrictions on ROE’s and use of force and the confinement of U.S. forces to bases… lovely, that). President Obumble is not going to increase forces or resources into A-stan; we will be lucky if he does not start cutting forces in just 10 months’ time! So, bottom line, there will be no training of anyone that is going to take anywhere near 4 years let alone 8 years’ time.” Who says that the trainers have to be American? Taliban/AQ threaten other countries more than the US. Turkey wanted to do more on the training side from the start but didn’t want to be saddled with the long term bill for ANSF operations costs. Fact is that the US and NATO didn’t cooperate with Turkey on ANSF training. Turkey, today, plans to train about one third of all… Read more »
Anan, I will not argue the particulars of training ANA or ANP. As I said previously, I am willing to grant you, arguendo, that your training plan is perfection itself. So far as that goes. But you did not address the main gist of my argument which renders yours academic: we are on a fast track to losing in A-stan and there is no time, not even the 2 years that you claim might be possible under ideal conditions, for the kind of training regimen to make any, timely difference. If you have read much of the Captain’s Journal you will note the number of posts detailing the atrocious state of the ANA. Drug use. Desertion. Infiltration by Taliban sympathizers. Refusal to engage the enemy. The ANP do not even rise to the level of the ANA. It will be a very, very long time before the ANA is anywhere close to being an effective, counter-insurgent force. As I said above, the most effective counter-insurgent force we can get up and running in a short period of time is the kind of neighborhood militias that the Marines are putting together in Sangin. You make a point about these militias lack… Read more »
That second land army we have #military « ELP DEFENS(C)E BLOG

[…] is a great must-read from The Captains Journal. It is an account of some of the USMC efforts in Afghanistan. And this […]

“we are on a fast track to losing in A-stan and there is no time, not even the 2 years that you claim might be possible under ideal conditions, for the kind of training regimen to make any, timely difference.” Things are far from as grim as you think. For Russia, India and Iran, the Taliban/AQ pose a larger threat than they do for America. Turkey is also threatened. Unlike other NATO members, Turkey isn’t in Afghanistan for NATO or America; Turkey is in Afghanistan for Turkey and will remain in Afghanistan no matter what America does. Karzai knows this, and believes that these other countries will step in and help him fight the Taliban regardless of what America does. The ANSF aren’t as bad as you think either. Some examples: -203rd ANA Corps [granted they and their Rakkasans partners fight against the toughest fighters on either side of the Durand . . . Siraj Haqqani, LeT, TTP, TNSM, IJU, and some of Iyas Kashmiri’s Lashkar al Zil] This is the only good Corps in the ANA -Khost and Paktia AUP . . . some pretty tough fighters among them -9 ANA combat commando battalions [all planned to have 4… Read more »
Captain, Have been reading you for years, and we disagree on many things. ;-) You can e-mail me offline on sources since links tend to crash blogposts. The total size of NTM-A is only 3,500 right now and a projected 5,200 at end state. A majority at end state of the 5,200 will likely not be American. The total training side of CSTC-A [NTM-A’s predecessor organization] was about one thousand when Pres Obama was elected. Note that back then CSTC-A use to include OMLTs, POMLTs, advisors, so these are being backed out. India, Russia, Turkey and South Korea, could substantially boost the size of NTM-A above 5,200. This would make a major medium term difference in the ANSF. A 50% surge in the size of NTM-A would allow approx. 50% more ANSF to be trained at any given point of time. To break these countries down: Turkey is in the process of boosting their commitment [and would likely do more if the EU would stop insulting Turkey.] To convince the Turks to do more, the Turks should only be asked to send trainers while NTM-A funded the training facilities and equipment and ANSF TO/E on their own dime [a long… Read more »
Agree with you on the value of NCOs. But even with a weak NCO corps, officer training does make a big difference. Look at the ROK forces, and the Pakistani Army for that matter. The ANA can be as good or better than the Pakistani Army even with a mediocre NCO corps. That should be the goal. Building a good NCO corps is hard. The ANA has many good enlisted soldiers. Ideally these would be promoted to NCOs. Part of the problem is that ANA mid grade officers disrespect NCOs as do Afghan civilians. Some of this might be because Afgans over value education and credentials [or are snobbish on education.] The real reason for increasing NCO training to 6 months with intensive literacy training would be to convince ANA mid grade officers, Afghan civilians and junior ANA enlisted to respect NCOs since they would now be “educated” and would now have gone through an officer selection type of course. How to identify good potential NCOs? Look at existing ANA units. Identify the top few percent of their enlisted, the ones with heart, and put them in NCO school. Do the same with graduates from basic training [granted, it is… Read more »
We have disagreed on Iraq for many years. Still read you nonetheless. Much of the ISF was junk. Much of it was good. Major divergences in quality between units in the early years. Agree with you that Sadr didn’t voluntarily stand down, he was forced to. He was forced to in large measure for the following reasons: -substantial improvement in the quality of the ISF and a strong eagerness on the part of the ISF to go after him [part of why LTG Uthman’s 8th IAD in the 5 provinces of the upper south was mentioned, and why I emphasize Najaf/Karbala/Babil Iraqi Police] -the fact that the ISF were much more popular and legitimate among Iraqis than JAM and that Mookie would be politically killed to confronting the ISF -Maliki and the Najaf Marjeya were more popular than Sadr and Sadr felt a confrontation would them would hurt him among his base -Mookie was upset that Khamenei was using him and that Mookie was not in command and control of “his own” forces. Mookie publicly bashed Khamenei for supporting Al Qaeda in mass murdering Iraqis while living in Iran. -There was a wave of anti Iranian sentiment among Iraqis -JAM… Read more »
Royal Marines speak of ‘horrible’ reality of life on patrol in Afghanistan

[…] The Captain's Journal » U.S. Marine Corps Combat Action in Sangin […]


First of all, the man who said ” a lot of dudes” I know personally and this is his 4th combat deployment and he has been to Iraq twice and also Afghanistan. One of his deployments was the Al-Anbar province in Iraq. I agree with you that that they need to deploy more units to the area instead of wasting so much effort and money on missions to nowhere useful. In my mind, if you go to war, go to war right. They are completely robbing most of these young men of the resources that are available to them. Also, as long as the Taliban is crossing over from Pakistan every minute, they will never cease to multiply and that blood vessel needs to be cut quickly. For every Taliban these men kill, another hundred cross the border to replace them. The fundamental strategy of this war is faulty, and it saddens me to see the young, brave men of the infantry, in particular, have to pay the price with their lives. -0311 Vietnam

The Captain's Journal » Holding Terrain in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s Games of Duplicity Part III

[…] response to U.S. Marine Corps Combat Action in Sangin, Old Warrior said: … in my mind, if you go to war, go to war right. They are completely […]


You are currently reading "U.S. Marine Corps Combat Action in Sangin", entry #5742 on The Captain's Journal.

This article is filed under the category(s) Afghanistan,Marine Corps,Marines in Helmand and was published November 14th, 2010 by Herschel Smith.

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