In Where is Anbar Headed? Where are the Marines Headed?, I cited the ABC News Report that claimed that the Pentagon officials were considering a major pullback of Marines from the Anbar Province, due in part to the most recent Devlin intelligence report covered by the Washington Post.  Michael Fumento notes that the Post article stands in stark contrast to his recent experiences as an embedded reporter in Ramadi.  I said in “Where is Anbar Headed” that it looked like the U.S. was either getting out of Anbar or getting serious about Anbar.

Today General Peter Pace denied reports that the Pentagon was considering a movement of Marines out of the Anbar province.  Asked specifically whether serious consideration is being given to the idea of abandoning Al-Anbar to put more U.S. forces in Baghdad, Pace bluntly replied “no.”  “You gave me a very straight question. I gave you a very straight answer. No. Why would we want to forfeit any part of Iraq to the enemy? We don’t,” he told reporters at a Pentagon briefing.

I believe that it is important to keep balance with respect to our understanding of the Anbar Province.  Assuming that Pace is correct and that conditions and intentions don’t change, the U.S. will not abandon Anbar.  I have discussed the alignment of some of the tribes in the Anbar Province with the Iraqi government and against al Qaeda, but it is also clear that these tribes cannot secure Anbar without the help of Iraqi security forces and more particularly U.S. forces.

In Coalition, Al Qaeda and Tribes Battle in Anbar and Diyala, I covered the recent battles against al Qaeda in which tribal elements participated.

On November 25, insurgents linked to al Qaeda attacked an Anbar tribe in an alliance of twenty five tribes who have vowed to fight al Qaeda.  The insurgents attacked the Abu Soda tribe in Sofiya, near the provincial capital of Ramadi, with mortars and small arms, burning homes, in apparent revenge for their support of the Iraqi government.  “Al Qaeda has decided to attack the tribes due to their support,� said Sheikh Abdel Sittar Baziya, head of the Abu Risha tribe and a founder of the movement. “The terrorists have gone to a neighboring tribe and have brought fighters to attack the Abu Soda.�

Al Qaeda attacked through a tribal area checkpoint, and burned homes and killed tribal members using small arms and mortar fire.  Coalition forces assisted the Abu Soda tribe with air strikes and artillery fire at al Qaeda.  There is no report of coalition casualties, but fifty al Qaeda linked insurgents and nine tribesmen were killed in the battle (Reuters is reporting fifty five al Qaeda killed).  Four Iraqi civilians were evacuated to Camp Taqqadum for medical treatment for inujuries sustained during this battle.

Take note of the determinative aspect of the battle: “Coalition forces assisted the Abu Soda tribe with air strikes and artillery fire at al Qaeda.”  Without the presence of U.S. forces, I believe that the tribes would lose heart and nerve, disperse, flee to Syria (like so many of them already have), and desist offensive operations within several weeks.  Al Qaeda would own Ramadi within one month and all of Anbar within two months.

Col. Peter Devlin wrote “Although it is likely that attack levels have peaked, the steady rise in attacks from mid-2003 to 2006 indicates a clear failure to defeat the insurgency in al-Anbar.”  The Post misinterpreted this and other aspects of the report as meaning that “The U.S. military is no longer able to defeat a bloody insurgency in western Iraq or counter al-Qaeda’s rising popularity there, according to newly disclosed details from a classified Marine Corps intelligence report that set off debate in recent months about the military’s mission in Anbar province.”

This is a preposterous statement by the Post.  Regardless of what the intelligence report said or didn’t say, to assert that it is no longer possible for the most powerful nation on earth to defeat an insurgency makes the authors of the article look like rodeo clowns.  No one alive believes that it is “impossible,” not even the authors of the article.

But just as we should not overreact to the Devlin report, we should listen to it and heed its advice.  I concur with Devlin’s remarks.  The trend line for casualties in Iraq has a positive slope line (see Statistical Evaluation of Casualties in Iraq).  I have commented here in The Consequences of Inadequate Force Projection that lack of force projection, along with rules of engagement that cause our troops to be hamstrung (with Marines reporting that “A lot of us feel like we have our hands tied behind our back“), are the two most serious impediments to victory in Anbar, and in fact, all of Iraq.  With the current force projection and rules of engagement, the U.S. will not win.

As before, I say that the U.S. is getting out, or getting serious.  Getting serious requires robust rules of engagement and proper force projection.

Prior:

1. Where is Anbar Headed? Where are the Marines Headed?
2. Coalition, Al Qaeda and Tribes Battle in Anbar and Diyala
3. Racoon Hunting and the Battle for Anbar
4. The Reasons the U.S. Won’t “Clear� Ramadi
5. Demonstrations, Violence and Preparations in al Anbar Province
6. Combat Operation Posts
7. Regression in al Anbar Province
8. Ramadi is Still a Troubled City
9. Al Anbar Tribes Gives Coalition Three Divisions of Recruits
10. Ramadi: Marines Own the Night, 3.5 Years Into Iraq War
11. Will we Lose the Anbar Province?
12. Haditha Sequence of Events
13. Update on Ramadi
14. Ramadi: Don’t Expect More Fallujah

The U.S. is engaging in three categories of technology transfer to the enemy: (1) It is bad but almost impossible to stop, (2) It is extremely bad and we should do a much better job of stopping it, and (3) It is extremely bad and we are intentionally doing it.

It is bad but almost impossible to stop

At Chronicles of War, John Little is covering the issue of the Technical Mujahid.  CENTCOM has published an update to “What Extremists are Saying” that outlines the basics of a new computer hardware, software and file management protocol for jihadists.

The first issue of what is indicated to be a period magazine, “Technical Mujahid� [Al-Mujahid al-Teqany], published by al-Fajr Information Center, was electronically distributed to password-protected jihadist forums Tuesday, November 28, 2006.

This edition, 64-pages in length, contains articles that primarily deal with computer and Internet security, in addition to other pieces explaining Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and video types, editing, and encoding into different formats. The editors of the publication state that it was written to heed the directives of the Emir of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and his call for technical support. Material such as this, regarding anonymity on the Internet, concealing of personal files locally on a computer, and utilizing all schemes of encryption, is to serve as electronic jihad, and a virtual means of supporting the Mujahideen.

Jihad, as a philosophy, religion and world view, is utterly incapable of sustaining technological development.  If it were possible to stop all technological development in the U.S., it is likely that jihadist technology would stay static, or freeze in place.  But because software and information technology is so readily available (consider the staggering amount of source code available over the web for free), jihadists will make ready use of this technology.  The strategy here might be to stay several steps ahead of the enemy by waging a better technology war than they do.

It is extremely bad and we should do a much better job of stopping it

The Strategy Page has this concerning technology espionage of our air defense program:

American federal prosecutors revealed that they are trying an Indian born American citizen, Noshir S. Gowadia, on charges of spying for China. Gowadia is alleged to have sold China details of the B-2 bombers engine exhaust system. This technology makes it more difficult for heat sensors (like heat seeking missiles) to detect the exhaust of the B-2 engines. Gowadia is also alleged to have helped Chinese engineers apply this technology to the design of a stealthy cruise missile. The secrets Gowadia sold would also make it easier for the Chinese to detect a B-2 bomber. Gowadia is supposed to have helped China with other matters relating to stealth technology.

Gowadia has apparently been running a Hawaii based spy ring since 1999, and made six clandestine trips to China. Gowadia worked on the B-2 project from 1968 to 1986, as one of the designers. Gowadia was arrested a year ago, and his trial will begin next Summer. He could get life in prison if convicted.

China is interested in upgrading the quality of its weapons systems, and will take every opportunity to steal military and technological secrets.  Similar to the Wen Ho Lee incident (concerning the miniturization of nuclear weapons), when the secrets are of so much importance and the loss of them so damaging, the level of security must be commensurate with this risk.  This sort of thing just cannot happen if the U.S. is to stay secure from its enemies.

It is extremely bad and we are intentionally doing it

In Our Dirty Little Secret: Technology Proliferation, I have covered the issue of higher education, and how U.S. universities are training the next generation of  PhDs in sensitive areas such as nuclear engineering, bacteriology, biochemistry, biotechnology research, microbiology and neuroscience, and atomic, chemical, molecular and nuclear physics.  Approximately 10% of the degrees awarded in these areas were awarded to students from 26 countries that are on the State Department “watch� list as being state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt and Jordan.

American universities are doing this with full knowledge that they are training students who do not have U.S. citizenship, will not stay in the U.S., and could potentially use the knowledge against the U.S.  And it continues unabated … while the citizens of America trust the government to keep them safe.

John Little has given us a tip to a breaking story about potential movement of the Marines out of Anbar altogether.  This is major … major … news.  ABC News is reporting the following (I will copy and paste at length, and then offer up [I hope] some interesting … and unique … observations):

ABC News has learned that Pentagon officials are considering a major strategic shift in Iraq, to move U.S. forces out of the dangerous Sunni-dominated al-Anbar province and join the fight to secure Baghdad.

The news comes as President Bush prepares to meet with Iraq’s president to discuss the growing sectarian violence.

There are now 30,000 U.S. troops in al-Anbar, mainly Marines, braving some of the fiercest fighting in Iraq. At least 1,055 Americans have been killed in this region, making al-Anbar the deadliest province for American troops.

The region is a Sunni stronghold and the main base of operations for al Qaeda in Iraq and has been a place of increasing frustration to U.S. commanders.

In a recent intelligence assessment, top Marine in al-Anbar, Col. Peter Devlin, concluded that without a massive infusement of more troops, the battle in al-Anbar is unwinnable.

In the memo, first reported by the Washington Post, Devlin writes, “Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government institutions from the village to provincial levels have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by al Qaeda in Iraq.”

Faced with that situation in al-Anbar, and the desperate need to control Iraq’s capital, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace is considering turning al-Anbar over to Iraqi security forces and moving U.S. troops from there into Baghdad.

“If we are not going to do a better job doing what we are doing out [in al-Anbar], what’s the point of having them out there?” said a senior military official.

Another option under consideration is to increase the overall U.S. troop level in Iraq by two to five brigades (that’s about 7,000 to 18,000 troops).

Generals Casey and Abizaid, however, have both weighed in against this idea. And such an increase would only be sustainable for six to eight months. Far more likely, the official says, will be a repositioning of forces currently in Iraq. “There is a push for a change of footprint, not more combat power.”

In Racoon Hunting and the Battle for Anbar, after the Marines had said that Fallujah held iconic status to them, and losing it would be like losing Iwo Jima, I asked the question, “Will we lose this hallowed soil, this soil on which so much U.S. blood has been shed?”

Perhaps.  And then perhaps not.  There are two possibilities that I see.  Either we have ceded power to al Qaeda and asked the Iraqi security forces to take them out, or we are cordoning off the area, only to go in later to “clear” it.  On October 24, I said that we would not “clear” Ramadi Fallujah-style, and at the time I had what I thought were good reasons to take this position.

I believe that there is some possibility, however remote it may seem to the reader (and to me), that we are cordoning off the Anbar Province (and in particular Ramadi), in order to prepare an assault later “Fallujah-style.”  More Marine patrols where they are getting sniper attacks is not adding to security.  We are either getting out, or we’re getting serious.

I confess, I am at a point of indecision on this, because I think the military brass may be.  It might be left to the incoming SECDEF to make the decision.  More force projection, or do we turn it over to the Iraqis?

The war turns on this decision.

In Old and New Body Armor for Marines, I discussed the planned deployment of the new Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) to replace the Interceptor System.  Following up on this post, I wrote Snipers and Body Armor, and followed up this post with Snipers Having Tragic Success Against U.S. Troops, in which, using a New York Times article, I showed that snipers in Iraq had adapted and were learning to aim for gaps in SAPI plate coverage in the Interceptor body armor system, and that the new MTV was superior to the Interceptor regarding these gaps in coverage.

While writing and subsequent to these posts, I communicated numerous times with USMC Public Affairs Officers, and they were mostly helpful.  For instance, unless it is explained to you in a word-picture, it is difficult to understand how the MTV handles weight distribution better than its predecessors.  Backpackers can visualize this easily, but others may not be able to as well.  Any back packer who carries a heavy pack, whether internal or external frame, knows that the shoulders cannot withstand all of the weight for very long.  The shoulders need a break.  The MTV gives them the break they need.  The MTV has a design similar to backpacks in which the weight rests on the hips rather than the shoulders, and this may give the Marine the edge he needs to fight more effectively.

The help from the PAOs has withered lately, and hopefully will start up soon as I press the issues I have with body armor.  It has been said to me that the MTV was intended to be an improvement over the Interceptor as it regards comfort, but that “Interceptor offers the same level of ballistic protection as the MTV.”  This contradicts the Strategy Pages and Stars and Stripes, both of which are linked in my earlier posts.  In fact, the MTV apparently offers fully and more integrated protection in the side SAPI plates.  Here is a picture of the side SAPI plate.

 

 

The Marine Corps Times has a nice 360-degree flash player that shows the body armor and how it fits the Marine.  There is also an updated article in the Marine Corps Times that says what I have learned from the PAOs, that the USMC will issue the new MTV in or about February, but that they do not know yet which specific units will have the MTV.  For me, this isn’t very satisfying, and I will pursue the matter.

On the issue of snipers which I have covered with a vengeance, the Strategy Page has an interesting update, which doesn’t shed new light beyond what I have already covered, except to say that al Qaeda snipers in Anbar are using children to hunt for snipers, and paying handsome rewards for kids who find U.S. snipers and report back to them.

The Information Ministry of the Islamic State of Iraq periodically publishes updated propaganda.  Their mother web site is blocked by some ISPs, but it is easy enough (if you cannot get to it) to find web sites who profer the propaganda without verification, such as Jihad Unspun.  Al Qaeda claims to have had a stellar day on November 18.  The claim is that in two separate incidents, five “crusaders” were killed in each incident for a total of ten killed by IEDs.

Let’s evaluate this claim.  First of all, the Multi-National Force web site publishes press releases upon the death of any U.S. service member.  A quick check of the home page for press releases shows that no such deaths occurred.  On the other hand, Jihad Unspun uses phrases like “so-called Iraqis” and “collaborators” to describe the Iraqi troops, and it is possible that rather than U.S. forces, they are referring to Iraqi forces (although, frankly, it seems strange to refer to Iraqis as “crusaders” even if they are your enemy).

This too can be independently verified.  The Iraq Coalition Casualty Count tracks all Iraqi deaths (both army and police).  A quick check of this web site shows that no such deaths occurred on November 18.

The Jihadists have made outlandish claims to have killed ten troops in a single day by IEDs, while absolutely no independent reports of this exist anywhere.  To the jihadist claims, I say, prove it!