Archive for the 'War & Warfare' Category

If Afghanistan is the model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, then the U.S. ought to rethink its strategy.  There is a role for both special operators and regulars in today’s warfare.  Cessation of regular operations too soon is counterproductive.

Bill Roggio is covering the fact that Pakistan has released more than 2500 al-Qaeda and Taliban, most of whom are heading to Waziristan.  Bill also covers the continuing operations in Afghanistan, stating that:

But the Afghan and Coalition efforts may merely be a holding action. Attempts to stabilize the provinces on the Pakistani border has been a difficult task as Taliban and al-Qaeda have used Pakistan’s Baluchistan and North West Frontier Provinces as bases of operations … The fighting in Afghanistan will only intensify.

Vital Perspective is reporting (from Jane’s Defence) that the Army and Marine Corps are putting the finishing touches on a new counter-insurgency manual that is designed to fill a crucial gap in U.S. military doctrine.  Afghanistan has lessons for our struggle in Iraq.  If this manual doesn’t mention and learn from our (at least partially) failed strategy in Afghanistan, then they should go back to the drawing board.

Much has been made about counterinsurgency warfare and the strategy the U.S. uses to attain peace and stability in Iraq.  The Washington Post recently published an article entitled In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths.  In this article, the Staff Writer compares and contrasts two (allegedly) different approaches to securing peace and stability in the al Anbar province (the problems of which I have written on in my post Will We Lose the Anbar Province?).  I have also discussed the debate over force size and military footprint in my post The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection, which bears on the subject of force size and strategy and how various forces are utilized.

The Washington Post article is similar to those published previously, where the special forces operator is characterized as smart, patient, politically astute, and easily maleable and adaptable in new and challenging situations, while the non-special forces are depicted as dull, stolid, slow to adapt, and hopelessly educated and trained in the age-old military practices and stategy, much of which is too coarse and heavy-handed for the current situation in Iraq.  One is left to conclude that the regulars are knuckle-draggers.  It is an easy article to write — an easy story to tell.

The truth is neither of these depictions, and it is not somewhere in between.  The truth is more complicated.  As I have noted before from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Urban Resolve program:

In military operations since World War II, United States forces have preferred to bypass major urban areas to avoid the costly combat expected inside cities.

There is a huge difference between bypassing the troops (both regular and irregular such as the Fedayeen) on our advance to Baghdad, leaving the enemy behind, and killing the enemy if he can be identified and located, when he is identified and located.  The special forces might claim that the entire operation should have been a counterinsurgency operation, while the regulars might claim that we stopped conventional operations too soon, and much of the enemy was still intact when we switched over to counterinsurgency strategy.

There are those who are complaining that the regulars are not taking an approach that more closely resembles newer and more sophisticated counter-insurgency techniques.  But ironically, no one complains that the Afghanistan campaign was too “regular.”  In fact, it was nothing but irregular and Special Forces operations.  We primarily used the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban from northern Afghanistan and Kabul, while we relied heavily on three tribal leaders / warlords, at least one of whom could not be trusted, to attempt closure with the enemy at Tora Bora.  The attitude of many of the fighters was in part responsible for the failure to close in on the enemy.  From the perspective of one fighter:

Awol Gul was calm and relaxed as B-52s pummeled a mountain behind him and Al Qaeda sniper fire rang out in the distance. “They’ve been under quite a bit of pressure inside there,” he said. “It is likely that they have made a tactical withdrawal farther south. They have good roads, safe passage, and Mr. bin Laden has plenty of friends.

“We are not interested in killing the Arabs,” Mr. Gul went on to say. “They are our Muslim brothers.”

We lost Osama bin Laden and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Taliban fighters.  When the last cave was taken at Tora Bora:

On Dec. 16, Afghan warlords announced they had advanced into the last of the Tora Bora caves. One young commander fighting with 600 of his own troops alongside Ali and Ghamsharik, Haji Zahir, could not have been less pleased with the final prize. There were only 21 bedraggled Al Qaeda fighters who were taken prisoners. “No one told us to surround Tora Bora,” Mr. Zahir complained. “The only ones left inside for us were the stupid ones, the foolish and the weak.”

Today the Taliban and al Qaeda have control over Waziristan, have recently fought the Pakistani army to a draw, have seen 2500 of their fellow Taliban released, and have managed to inflict enough terror into Afghanistan that 267 schools have been forced to cease operations altogether.  If Afghanistan is the model for special operations, then we ought to rethink how we are conducting these operations.

There is a place for special operations, and certainly there is need always to adapt our techniques to the circumstances.  And with counterterrorist tactics being all the rage now, should I be bold enough to say that it is not the answer to all of our problems?

When we lose thousands of Taliban at Tora Bora, fighters are shooting at Marines and Soldiers in foxholes in Ramadi and U.S. forces will not hunt down and kill the enemy in response (while they also take bets as to when they will be attacked again), and no one in the chain of command can make a decision to kill 190 Taliban at a funeral because of “religious sensibilities,” may I suggest that we need to re-evaluate our strategy?  And to reflexively demur to special operations is easy, but not the answer. 

Deadly and sinister IED technology perfected by Hezbollah with the help of Iran has made its way into Iraq, with the sole purpose, together with the presence of IRGC forces, of the destabilization of Iraq.  Iran sees itself at the center of a new Middle East Caliphate when U.S. troops depart. 

As I have discussed in previous posts, Iran has IRGC troops in Iraq, and has provided IED technology to Iraqi insurgents.  The most recent development in ordnance type and application in Iraq comes in the form of Hizbollah technology.

A multi-charged roadside bomb, developed by Hizbollah in Lebanon, is being used against British and American soldiers by Iraqi insurgents linked to Iran, according to military intelligence sources.

The device consists of an array of up to five armour-piercing “explosively formed projectiles” or EFPs, also known as shaped charges. They are fired at different angles at coalition vehicles, resulting in almost certain death for at least some of the soldiers inside.

The bombs are easier for insurgents to use because, unlike single EFP devices, they do not need to be carefully aimed and so can be planted beside a road within a few seconds. Their killing potential is also enhanced because more than one EFP is likely to hit a single vehicle.

Some have been painted to look like concrete blocks – a modification of a tactic used by Iranian-backed Hizbollah, which hollowed out imitation rocks, bought in Beirut garden centres, to conceal bombs targeting Israeli vehicles.

A senior defence source said: “There are clear signs of Iran’s sinister hand, and through that, Hizbollah, in this development.”

A Pentagon document obtained by The Sunday Telegraph describes the devices as “well manufactured by experienced bomb makers” and “pioneered by Lebanese Hizbollah”. It adds: “The United Kingdom has accused Iran of providing these devices to insurgents in Iraq.”

Triggered when an infra-red beam is broken, the projectiles are capable of penetrating the armour of 60-ton Abrams tanks. Warrior armoured vehicles and Land Rovers, used by British forces in southern Iraq, offer almost no protection against them.

In February, John Negroponte, America’s director of national intelligence, blamed the Iranian government for the spread of such weapons throughout Iraq.

He told a United States Senate committee: “Teheran is responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-coalition attacks in 2005, by providing Shia militants with the capability to build IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] with explosively formed projectiles, similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah.”

Coalition forces recently intercepted an infra-red EFP device being transported into Iraq across the Shatt al-Arab waterway from Iran.

Courtesy of the Telegraph, this picture below offers a primer on the devices.

But even as deadly as this technology is to U.S. troops, to see this in the aggregate is to fail to grasp the larger Iran strategy for Iraq.  Iran’s strategy is twofold, and it is dangerous to misunderstand their intentions or underestimate their willingness to go forward with their plans.

The first prong in the Iran strategy involves retaliatory strikes and armed conflict in Iraq proper should the U.S. use military force to secure or destroy nuclear facilities in Iran.  The Washington Post a couple of months ago reported on Iran’s Iraq strategy:

The most likely theater of operations in the initial stages of a U.S.-Iranian conflict, however, would be next door — in Iraq. Since the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iran has methodically built and strengthened its military, political and religious influence in Iraq. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has extensively infiltrated Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior and police force, both mainstays of Shiite power. The hundreds of Iranian mullahs and businessmen who have slipped across the border have a commanding presence in southern Iraq’s commercial and religious sectors.

[ … ]

Iran’s paramilitary and intelligence buildup in Iraq would put some members of the “coalition of the willing” to shame. Over the past three years, Tehran has deployed to Iraq a large number of the Revolutionary Guard’s Qods Force — a highly professional force specializing in assassinations and bombings — as well as officers from the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security and representatives of Lebanese Hezbollah.

[ … ]

Iranian personnel have established safe houses throughout southern Iraq. They monitor the movement of coalition forces, tend weapons caches, facilitate cross-border travel of clerics, smuggle munitions into Iraq and recruit individuals as intelligence sources. Presumably, Tehran has recruited networks within U.S. military bases and civilian compounds that could be activated on short notice. Iran is also believed by regional intelligence agencies to have armed and trained as many as 40,000 Iraqis to prevent an unlikely rollback of Shiite control.

In my post Iran Muscles in on Iraq, I said:

With close enough cooperation, enough largesse spread around by Iran, and enough meddling in the affairs of Iraq, the hope apparently is that Iraq would become more like Iran, a place hostile to Western influences and militant against Western values.

Iran is not for a single second interested in stability in Iraq.  Iran is interested in a world Caliphate, and Iraq is less seen as a stumbling block to that end and more and more seen as another pawn to use to that end.

In a remarkably similar assessment, the Strategy Page about the same time reported:

Al Maliki is trying to convince the Iranians to stop supporting (with money, weapons and technical advisors) radical Shia militias in Iraq. The purpose of this support is to prepare these radical Iraqi groups to stage a coup and take over the Iraqi government. Iraq would then be turned into an Islamic republic, like Iran. This kind of takeover worked in Iran because it was done in the middle of a war with Iraq (in the 1980s), a war begun by Saddam Hussein, who thought he could rush in and grab some Iranian oil fields while Iran was distracted by its rebellion against the Iranian monarchy. The Iranian religious radicals have held on to power since, despite only having the support of a minority of the population, by establishing a police state. Most of the cops are Islamic radicals out to impose proper Islamic lifestyles on all Iranians. Democracy is not considered properly Islamic, nor are a lot of things from the West, including movies and accurate news. But the Iraqis, al Maliki is apparently trying to convince the Iranians, are different. While about 30 percent of the Iranian population supports the religious dictatorship, the percentage is lower in Iraq, and the pro-democracy crowd is armed and willing to fight. The Iranians believe that, as soon as the U.S. troops leave, the Iraqi Islamic radical militias can make their move and, in effect, unite Iran and Iraq as a Shia axis for Islamic radicalism that will conquer the world for the Shia brand of Islam.

And this is the second prong of the Iran strategy.  The first prong is proximate and has immediate consequences, i.e., the deaths of U.S. troops and the destabilization of Iraq.  The second prong is more theoretical but just as dangerous.  Iran wants to control the Middle East, and sees itself at the center of a new Caliphate.  Iraq is a pawn in the strategy to begin this process.

The U.S. will not win in Iraq until Iran is driven out entirely.  Furthermore, driving Iran out of Iraq will not address the possibility of a nuclear Iran.

Either indecision cost the U.S. the opportunity to achieve effective kill, or decision did not consider moral ramifications of leaving the Taliban alive to kill NATO troops. 

In my post Lost Chance to Kill Taliban: Two Mistakes Were Made, we learned only a few facts about the drone that captured the picture of the approximately 190 Taliban who were in formation for a funeral.  The image is below.

We have since learned a little more about this incident.  Regarding chain of command:

Every airstrike, whether from a manned aircraft or a Predator, must be at least approved by commanders at the regional Combined Air Operations Center, or CAOC. If an intended target is particularly sensitive, the decision could go all the way up to a general officer serving as top combat commander.

When an organization gives too much latitude, it suffers from apoplexy.  When it gives too little latitude, it suffers from indecision and ineptitude.  With ROE that require approval of remotely located senior officers, it certainly must be considered indecisive and inept.

Continuing:

The current rules of engagement, likely developed by senior Pentagon officials, do not rule out an attack on religious gathering but do generally prohibit an attack on a religious site such as a cemetery or mosque, military analyst and retired Army Col. Jack Jacobs told MSNBC TV. 

In my post GIs Attack Militants in Ramadi Mosque, I discussed the fact that GIs who were fired upon from insurgents inside a Mosque returned fire and “finally unleashed several rounds from M1 tanks.”

So it apparently is not correct that the troops doing battle cannot fire upon religious structures or gatherings (the report documents the fact that the GIs didn’t know whether prayers had begun when they returned fire).

In a stunning defense of the decision not to fire at the Taliban gathered for the funeral, the military issued this statement:

“During the observation of the group over a significant period of time, it was determined that the group was located on the grounds of a cemetery and were likely conducting a funeral for Taliban insurgents killed in a coalition operation nearby earlier in the day,

Michelle Malkin informs us of the New York Post story of an opportunity to kill a significant number of Taliban.  Two mistakes were made in this sad episode.  As the Post reported about losing this opportunity:

U.S. intelligence officers in Afghanistan are still fuming about the recent lost opportunity for an easy kill of Taliban honchos packed in tight formation for the burial, NBC News reported.

The unmanned airplane, circling undetected high overhead, fed a continuous satellite feed of the juicy target to officers on the ground.

“We were so excited. I came rushing in with the picture,” one U.S. Army officer told NBC.

But that excitement quickly turned to gut-wrenching frustration because the rules of engagement on the ground in Afghanistan blocked the U.S. from mounting a missile or bomb strike in a cemetery, according to the report. 

The first mistake is that the rules of engagement prohibited killing the enemy.  I don’t care whether it is a Mosque, a cemetary, someone’s house, a school, or someone’s bath tub.  If the enemy is there, he should be killed.  If the officers are afraid to craft such ROE, I will be happy to assist them.  All they have to do it call me.

The second mistake is that the senior officer didn’t override the ridiculous rules of engagement and order the killing of the Taliban.  This is simply unacceptable, and points to officers who will not make hard decisions because of careerism.  I have addressed this careerism before in my post Patriotism, Big Flags and Military Regression:

To be frank, for those who have their career as the premier concern, they should just step aside and save their reports the trouble of cleaning up their mess and suffering the consequences of their careerism.

There is no reason that these Taliban should not be dead; not ROE, and not the officers present and their lack of willingness to make hard decisions.  As it stands, these Taliban are alive to injure or kill NATO troops, and the officers who are responsible still have careers.  They shouldn’t.

Note: Original edited for typographical error.

By now it has become news that the latest military intelligence assessments of the western Iraq province of al Anbar are remarkably negative and even morose.  The various news coverage is cataloged in a discussion thread at Small Wars Journal, called Situation Called Dire in West Iraq.  Since I have my readers for an average of only a couple of minutes per visit, I won’t waste time reiterating the news in this post.  You can go check it out at SWJ.  The pronosis looks grim, even after being “spun” by the military brass to remove some of the sting of the assessments.

There are still dozens of loosely connected smaller insurgent cells in al Anbar, some with only several fighters.  But there are some large groups, including the Islamic Army in Iraq, made up of several thousand fighters, and the Mujihadeen Army.  Together these two groups make up about 50% of the total insurgent force in the al Anbar province.  Finally, there is still a contingency of al Qaeda, but the loose connection between these groups means that there is no one leader to target, no single strategy that is necessarily the best, and no central command and control.  These groups enjoy maximum latitude and command is pushed down through the “organization(s).”  The only thing in common between these groups is that they have no intention of becoming part of the political process, and they intend to fight to the death.

There is a stark difference in the way the U.S. has approached Fallujah and the way we have approached Ramadi.  This difference is due to the influence of several factors.  First, the empty-headed catcalls and questions about when we are going to leave Iraq have been met with equally empty-headed retorts that “we’ll leave when the Iraqis are ready to take over from us.”  Both the question and retort miss the point, and in the superlative degree.  The second reason for the difference is the current influence of military brass that preens and postures and pontificates about the lessons learned from Vietnam.  There is a drive to assume a small footprint and use minimum force projection.  I argue in my post The Debate over Diminished Force Projection that this confuses categories and fails to learn the lessons of Iraq (forget Vietnam for a minute and focus on Iraq).

Regarding the intelligence report, one Army officer summarized it as arguing that in Anbar province, “We haven’t been defeated militarily but we have been defeated politically — and that’s where wars are won and lost.”  It would appear that even this misses the point.

If the question “when are we leaving” misses the point, the retort “when the Iraqis can take over” misses the point, and wars being “won or lost” in politics misses the point, then what exactly is the point?

Remembering Iraqi politics is necessary to understand why these things have happened, and invoking the lessons of Vietnam is not very helpful.  Politics teaches us that to refer to “Iraqis” is too broad, since there are three very distinct groups: Kurds, Shia and Sunni.  The army is made up largely of Shia Muslims, and after displacement of the Sunni population upon the fall of the regime, the Sunni and Shia have an understandably suspicious view of each other.  For the Iraqi army to wage war on the insurgents in al Anbar is not what it seems.  Rather, in reality, it would approximately be the Shia army waging war on the remaining Fedayeen fighters and regime loyalists, with Sunni citizens caught in the middle who have no love for the Shia and a certain amount of sympathy for the loyalists.  Al Qaeda in Iraq is a nuisance and a violent organization, but to the extent that they serve to repell government forces from al Anbar, they prevent revenge killings of the Sunnis (not so much from the army, but from the certain police presence to follow).

To refer to politics in al Anbar is to refer to something that doesn’t currently exist.  The brass in Iraq, by diminishing force projection in al Anbar in order to let “reconstruction win the hearts and minds of the people,” are deferring to a phantom.  The very people whose hearts and minds we want to win are being protected by the enemy who destroys their political institutions and prevents reconstruction.

The Strategy Page from a few months ago is correct.  There isn’t civil war in Iraq, and there can never be civil war in Iraq.  If the factions war with each other, the Kurds will be left alone (or defended by themselves alongside the Kurds in Turkey), and the Shia majority will utterly destroy the Sunni minority.  Rather than speak of civil war, we should speak of genocide.

The only force in the region who is capable of winning the war on the battlefield is the U.S.  Reliance on the Iraqis to effect the victory is a losing strategy.  Yet, this seems to be exactly what our strategy is, according to Maj. Gen. Zilmer:

A senior American commander in Iraq said Tuesday that U.S.-led military operations are “stifling” the insurgency in western Anbar province but are not strong enough to defeat it.

Marine Maj. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer told reporters in a telephone interview from his headquarters in Fallujah that he has enough U.S. troops _ about 30,000 _ to accomplish what he called his main mission: training Iraqi security forces.

“For what we are trying to achieve out here I think our force levels are about right,” he said. Even so, he said the training of Iraqi soldiers and police had not progressed as quickly as once expected.

“Now, if that mission statement changes _ if there is seen a larger role for coalition forces out here to win that insurgency fight _ then that is going to change the metrics of what we need out here,” he added.

Maintenance of the peace can be accomplished by the Iraqi troops alongside U.S. troops, and the political process can be protected by both the U.S. and Iraqis.  Reconstruction can be assisted by the most versatile force in the world, the U.S. military.  But winning the war on the battlefield is necessary prior to winning it politically.  Unless and until the enemy is killed or captured, politics is irrelevant because it doesn’t exist.

We can still win this war, but we need to dispatch a division of Marines as soon as possible to begin operations in Ramadi, Fallujah (yes, it has regressed), Hamdaniyah, Haditha and al Haqlania.  Generals who learned the wrong lessons from the wrong war and who are applying them in the wrong place at the wrong time for the wrong reasons with the wrong understanding are decreasing our chances of success in al Anbar.

We should remember the counsel of General George Patton, who believed that the the U.S. at the Battle of the Bulge could still lose World War II.  This belief caused him to drive his troops 100 miles within 48 hours and engage in combat with no food and no sleep.  This war can be won, but we must move quickly, and we must move with a heavy footstep.

Col. David Hunt, appearing on FNC a couple of months ago, almost blew a gasket when asked what to do about Ramadi: “Send in the Marines and let them clean it out.”

Indeed.  Then … and only then … can politics begin.

Bill Roggio has a good piece entitled “The Great Taliban Turkey Shoot,” in which he outlines for us today the high numbers of Taliban dead that has resulted from recent offensives in Afghanistan by NATO forces (particularly focusing on so-called “black” operations).  I also discussed the state of affairs for the Taliban in my posts “Afghanistan, Talibanistan, Waziristan and Kill Ratios,” and “Taliban win in Pakistan (for now).”  In the last post, I discussed the fact that the Pakistanis were selling out their own tribesmen to be killed in Afghanistan in order to effect a truce with the Pakistani army (i.e., the truces that have been signed have come with a price to both the Pashtun tribes and the Pakistani army).

From The Independent, we learn of Taliban action in Afghanistan, even recently, and what it means for some of the social infrastructure of the country:

Now there is a concerted – armed – campaign to keep such children away from school. Education – particularly that of girls – is associated with the often-hated government and the occupying Western forces. Their opponents – including the Taliban – burn schools and attack teachers. The Ministry of Education said 267 schools had been forced to stop classes – a third of them in the south where five years after 9/11, fighting is intensifying as the Nato-led troops confront a resurgent opposition.

High numbers of Taliban killed — successful black operations by NATO forces netting high value targets — truces in Pakistan and the withdrawal of the Pakistani army — and burned schools.  What are we to make of all of this?

First, it is clear that the Taliban have not stood down.  They want Afghanistan back, and are prepared to continue the murder of the citizens and general application of terror in order to cause the downfall of the current Afghanistan government.  Second, the summer campaigns are over, and the Taliban will more than likely retreat to the relative warmth and safety of villages on the other side of the border.  But without the departure of the Pakistani army, there would be no warmth and safety.  The Pakistani army is weary of killing fellow Muslims, and the Taliban need a respite.  Their numbers have been depleted, and they need some time to lick their wounds.

Third, it appears that alleged “high value targets” may not be so high value after all.  Consider the case of Zarqawi in Iraq, who was replaced almost as soon as he was killed.  Black operations that kill or capture al Qaeda and other foreigners in the area might make it seem that success is just around the corner for NATO (and this may be intentional by the Taliban), but in the total absence of foreigners, the Taliban still have their eye on the ball.  The Taliban were around long before the foreigners came in to spread largesse around.

Don’t be fooled into thinking that this deal-making between Pakistan and the Pashtun tribes is actually a good thing for NATO or Afghanistan.  There is trickery all right, and this is a slick deal, but the ones being taken are Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The Taliban gets to regroup, heal, and let winter pass before starting in earnest again in the spring.  They will give up their own kin to accomplish the downfall of the regime and the re-entry of the Taliban.  They will certainly not go away, and the pressure must be relentless in order for NATO to win.

While the cloak and dagger tactics are interesting, black operations will not win the war.  Individual “high value” targets should not be given a pass, but the special operations activities will remain a sideline activity to the heavy lifting of killing the Taliban.  If this can be done utilizing only black operations, then so be it.  But it would seem that this is more than just a special forces struggle.

It has been said that armies train to fight the last war (or sometimes, two or three wars ago).  There is a pressing need to keep the training, equipment and tactics up-to-date.  On the other hand, as I pointed out in my post “Patriotism, Big Flags and Military Regression,” the military-industrial complex can become self-serving to the point of the regression of the military, this regression nurturing careerism, expensive military toys, and retirement opportunities for officers leaving the military if cooperation with weapons manufacturers has opened the right doors.  And I pointed out that because this sort of thing deprives the right programs of the dollars necessary for force protection and training, it is evil.  So care must be taken as to how monies are spent in matters military.  Lives are literally on the line.

I am certain that tactical maneuvers must be practiced until they are second nature.  Squad rushes should be performed and practiced, but when the most likely application of firepower will be in an urban setting, to focus too heavily on these tactics is to remember the lessons of World War II and the Korean War, and to forget the lessons of Fallujah and Ramadi.  In fact, the training for tactics to properly effect MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) is not only necessary and desired by Marines and Soldiers (because this is what they will most likely be doing in Iraq), but it is also slow in coming, and is not nearly frequent enough.  Marine Corps training at Twentynine Palms and the Mohave desert facilities is state of the art, appropriate, and the right thing at the right time.  At SOI (School of Infantry), Marines war against each other with chalk bullets, and getting hit by these bullets is painful, leading to incentive not to get hit.  This is outstanding and praiseworthy training.  But more is needed.  Marines need to engage in Arabic language classes, IED technology classes, more urban warfare simulations, and war gaming.  In summary, training needs to relevant to the threats sustained by the troops; therefore, the highest risks should receive the greatest attention.

The calculus is simple.  While Marines should be well-rounded, the training on weapons and tactics should be a mathematical function of the probability of usage, need and application.  This approach helps to set the boundary conditions for smart expenditures of money.  So let’s rehearse something that is probably a smart expenditure of money.  Later we’ll visit something that probably isn’t.  First, the smart money.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command is engaged in something called Urban Resolve.  To explain the reason for the program’s existence, USJFC informs us that:

In military operations since World War II, United States forces have preferred to bypass major urban areas to avoid the costly combat expected inside cities.

The urban environment contains extremely complex terrain, with urban canyons, complicated infrastructures, and subsurface maneuver space.

The explosive growth of the world’s major urban centers, changes in enemy strategies, and the global war on terrorism have made the urban battlespace potentially decisive and virtually unavoidable.

Some of our most advanced military systems do not work as well in urban areas as they do in open terrain. Therefore, joint and coalition forces should expect that future opponents will choose to operate in urban environments to try to level the huge disparity between our military and technological capabilities and theirs. 

The plan to address the needs in urban warfare — as proposed by the USJFC — is rather complex, relying on things that do not directly involve the Marine or Soldier in the field, at least not yet.  The initial stages involves a lot of war-gaming, tabletop reviews, and battlefield modeling and simulations.  I don’t know exactly how this might work, but I have an idea that might approximate what will happen.

Any gaming, modeling or training that is done should be probabilistic.  Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) are commonly used in industries in which failure is not an option, e.g., the airline industry, and the commercial nuclear power industry.  Probabilistic analysis requires Monte Carlo simulation techniques.  These probabilistic techniques are applied to data that has been mined and cataloged concerning the nature of reality, that is, how and why things happen the way that they do given certain initial conditions.

Using probabilistic techniques, the analyst may then, based on certain assumptions and initial conditions, “play roulette” with the next event.  Monte Carlo simulation will account for the fact that one event is more probable than the alternate event, and each individual path of events, or “history,” will use these techniques throughout the chain of events at each new event to evaluate the likelihood of various consequences and make choices based on mathematical probabilities.  The virtue of the method is that with enough histories simulated, given that no history, or chain of events, is exactly like the previous or subsequent chain of events, the analyst gets a comprehensive picture of the kinds of things that can happen and how to plan for them.

This picture can be used to evaluate relative risk.  Risk is the product of probability and consequences, which means that the analyst may focus his energies on those things that pose the highest risk.  Something may have a low probability, but very high consequences (e.g., high casualty rate).  This kind of thing, while not as important as those things that are high probability and high consequences, still may require some attention.

Finally, this method relies on correct data, so the analyst is required to interview, use expert witness and testimony, record history, watch video of actual war footage using cameras carried into battle, use audio recordings, catalog experiences of the infantry, interrogate the enemy, mine statistics, etc.

Questions like these will be important in tabletop reviews and computer simulations:

1. What is the probability that the enemy has a particular weapon or weapons system?
2. What is the probability that they know how to use it correctly?
3. What is the enemy’s motivation?
4. Where is the enemy initially located?
5. What is likely to be his tactics upon being engaged?
6. Has the enemy pre-staged the area?
7. What is likely to be our response given our training?
8. Is this the correct response?
9. Is there a better response?
10. Are we under time constraints?
11. Will collateral damage ensue from the altercation?
12. If so, is this collateral damage acceptable?
13. What is the command and control of our troops, and how much latitude have they been given?
14. How much latitude do our troops need?
15. How much latitude does the enemy have?
16. Can the combatant be ascertained and discerned from the non-combatant?
17. Are changes in our weapons systems needed in order to effect a successful altercation?
18. Do our troops have the right weapons sytems for the ensuing altercation, and if not, can they be aquired within the necessary time frame?

The USJFC summarizes the advantages of this virtual battlefield thusly:

The DCEE uses its analytic, faster-than-real-time simulations nearly continuously. It uses simulations to support wargames and human-in-the-loop events simultaneously. As the DCEE continues to mature, the total number of modeled battlespace elements possible will soon be more than one million individual entities. This expanding capability, combined with the high definition and clarity of modeled global population areas, will provide a virtual capability second to none. The ability to replicate multiple iterations of an issue quickly is an important additional capability that permits rapid examination of issues.

Ultimately, a distributed environment that incorporates virtual simulation, concept development, real-world situations, and optional live field training in a seamless environment is a significant transformational capability.

Good, because unless this is tested in the field, the alleged advantages are unproven and perhaps even dangerous.  And the Marines (that is, the grunts doing the heavy lifting) will need and benefit from this virtual battle space.

As a final note, if you think that this is perhaps beyond the comprehension of the typical Marine, think again.  Take a wild guess as to how many Marines already play commercially-available, complex war games on their free time with the aid of a computer, head-sets and the internet, while online with several hundred other people in their “guild?”

We have seen over the past couple of years the growth in influence of the Shiite majority in Iraq, including the fielding of a Shiite army (Mahdi army).  This influence caused new Prime Minister Maliki to pressure — even threaten — the U.S. concerning recent skirmishes between the U.S. and al Sadr’s militia, saying that “this won’t happen again.”

In a special to Gulfnews.com, Sami Moubayed observes:

The journalist Ellen Knickmeyer coined a very important phrase on August 24 in The Washington Post, saying a “Shiite Giant” has emerged in the Arab world.

This is very true. The mind of this giant is based in Tehran. He has got arms powerful arms, in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bahrain.

On a daily basis we hear the names of various Shiite leaders who have become iconic, national, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic names in the Arab and Muslim world. This Shiite giant has been created by a variety of politicians and leaders including clergymen such as Ayatollah Khomeini, Moosa Al Sadr, Mohammad Hussain Fadlallah, Ali Al Sistani and Ali Khamenei. It has military leaders such as Moqtada Al Sadr and Hassan Nasrallah, and pragmatic politicians such as Abdul Al Aziz Al Hakim, Nabih Berri and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

This giant was born out of the Islamic revolution of 1979, since one of its objectives was to emancipate the Shiites around the world. Before that they had been an underclass in most Arab countries, being poor, underdeveloped, uneducated and had very limited social mobility.

This was particularly true in Lebanon and Iraq, the two countries in which today, the Shiites enjoy a vary different standing.

This “Shiite Giant” has raised fears in the Arab world. It caused King Abdullah of Jordan to express fears that a Shiite Crescent was emerging in the Arab world. Earlier this year Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak made similar comments on Al Arabiya TV, saying that the Shiites were more loyal to Iran than they were to their own countries.

This observation makes one wonder exactly what kind of Iraq we are leaving behind (i.e., will the Shiite majority in Iraq be a proxy for Iran)?  There is news now concerning the cohesion of the three main groups in Iraq and the future of the country.  From Arab News:

BAGHDAD, 7 September 2006 — Iraq’s dominant Shiite alliance yesterday submitted a draft of a new law to govern the division of the country into autonomous regions …

The United Iraqi Alliance, the dominant Shiite parliamentary bloc, is promoting a “law of regional formation

It is a distinctly American pathology, this denial that 9/11 occurred.  Sometimes it takes on ridiculous and circus-like attributes, as with Professor Steven Jones:

Yet five years after the terrible event, some believe there is more to the story — that the official version of events is wrong. Just days before the anniversary, Steven Jones, a professor of physics at Brigham Young University in Utah, was suspended on paid leave because he argued explosives brought down the towers.

Conspiracy theories, many accusing the United States government of orchestrating the attacks, grew in popularity. A documentary called Loose Change, collecting these theories and stating them as the truth, became a underground hit on Google’s online video website and YouTube.com.

The fact that there is no dispute on the technical details of the failure modes of the WTC is unconvincing to the crackpot purveyors of wild stories of U.S. complicity and pre-planted explosives.  I am sitting at my desk studying again the FEMA document “World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations,” FEMA 403, September 2002, co-sponsored by the American Society of Civil Engineers.  I am as impressed now as I was when I first received this document in the mail at how much detail is contained in the document, how much study it took to put this mammoth tome together, and how conclusive it is as to the failure modes and overall comprehension of the accident sequence.

Further, there are other such studies available.  The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) has performed an extensive study of the same sort of thing I discussed above in their report “Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers.”  This is part of a larger effort to catalogue and archive issues (mostly technical) pertaining to the WTC and its collapse.

For those who believe that they know how buildings are supposed to collapse, you need to study the design reports of the WTC.  Ironically, the innovation in the structural design that made it possible to construct such a behemoth structure to begin with, was the undoing of the structure upon the crash of the airliners into the building.  There was no structural steel, per se (in the usual sense of the word, i.e., beams).  Both the axial stiffness and lateral stability were provided by the skin of the building.  Unfortunately, while the structure was designed to withstand the direct crash of an airliner into the building, the designers failed to consider the addition of heat due to the payload of jet fuel.

The intense heat generated by the burning of the jet fuel caused a reduction in the yield strength of the metal skin, causing it to buckle and be unable to sustain the mass of floors above.  When one floor began to relocate to the floor beneath it, the problem ceased to be static and became hopelessly fatal, with dynamic loads that the structure was entirely incapable of supporting.  Since the structural support was provided by the very skin which was buckling, there was no recovery, and the building was doomed.

Soon after this event, professors of engineering at various institutions produced calculations very quickly which demonstrated that the structure was not able to withstand the temperatures generated by the combustion of the jet fuel.  As a side note, it has been suggested by the naysayers that the fire was caused by the combustion of diesel fuel.  Not only is this false, it is absurd.  Diesel fuel doesn’t burn hot enough to cause the temperatures seen by the structure, and there wasn’t enough of it to cause the weakening and collapse of the building.

But there is a different kind of denial.  While it is deadly for Europe to deny the influx of Muslim extemism, it is at least understandable that stolid and comfortable people would fail to heed the warnings of 9/11.  What is so troublesome is that many in the U.S. still do not understand those warnings, and the U.S. is still, it seems, not on a war footing.

I was recently discussing with someone the nature of the war we are in, attempting to explain that Iraq was, if we were able to sustain the motivation to win the war, a foothold in the middle east.  To the east is Iran, to the west, Syria.  Both were and are state sponsors of terror, and unless and until we tackle the problem of these two states, the GWOT will not be won.  Syria must be confronted, perhaps militarily, perhaps not, depending upon the power of our state diplomacy.  Iran must be confronted, more than likely militarily.  Saudi Arabia must be confronted for their financial support of terrorism, and Afghanistan must be won.  Finally, Pakistan must be dealt with over the Madrassas and schools of terror still allowed in the region.

The war will encompass military action, and that, far more than anyone has been willing to admit as yet.  It will require a State Department that is engaged and actually an ally of the policy of the war rather than an enemy of it.  It will require more police action, more border security, more special forces black operations, more CIA human intelligence, and more homeland security for ports.  It is — by my estimations — a 25 year war.

Iraq is only the beginning.  Yet the U.S. is suffering fatigue, due in part to the failure to learn the lessons of 9/11.  We engage in irrelevant talk of the relationship of Iraq to Al Qaeda prior to the war, and handwring over WMD that at the moment lack germane application to what is happening in the Middle East.  We pretend that we are in a world of 9/10.  So if we fail to learn the lessons of 9/11, what honor and tribute have we paid to the immediate victims of 9/11 and the subsequent deaths of U.S. troops who fight on our behalf trying to defeat radical, facist Islam?

Are rememberances of any avail if we refuse to admit what 9/11 means?

Courtesy of SWJ, this from the San Francisco Chronicle:

In the first and second years after the U.S. invasion, critics say, American troops were focused on kicking in doors and looking for bad guys, when they needed to take a softer approach to the local population. The military brought along civil affairs units to help Iraqis build schools and hospitals, but those efforts were often overshadowed by the damage done by air strikes and artillery bombardments.

That’s not to say those methods were not necessary at the time, but analysts say the insurgency was strengthened because the soldiers and Marines used too much force too often. And they didn’t simultaneously work closely enough with Iraqi leaders to provide security and to get the local population on their side…

I have gone on record favoring the approach used in Fallujah as opposed to the approach currently in use in Ramadi in my post “The Debate over Diminished Force Projection.”  The difference is in how the enemy is identified and defeated.  There are reports of Marines and Soldiers running — even within the protected government compounds — to avoid sniper fire in Ramadi, hoping to cover the government officials who want to make it to the next building without being shot.

The Strategy Page has this today:

September 8, 2006: In Iraq, the rate of attacks remains very high compared to this time last year. Over the past three months, attacks have average 800-1000 a week. Curiously, during the same period, attacks that are identified as “sectarian” have declined from about 20 percent of all incidents to about 10-12 percent. Incidents in Baghdad are also down, by about 10 percent, due to the concerted government/Coalition effort to get more personnel into difficult neighborhoods. Most attacks are still against civilians, with attacks on Government troops and police in second place, and Coalition forces a rather distant third. But in Anbar province, Al-Qaeda, which has come to dominate the insurgency in region, seems to be focusing on U.S. Forces, which have take (sic) some 75-85 percent of the attacks. 

Al Qaeda have made Ramadi their home, and even if we (or the Iraqis) win in Ramadi, it is likely that the next phase is Al Haqlaniyah.  So we need to deal now with how we will attack the issue of Al Qaeda in and among the population.  Even after Ramadi, the deal is not done.  There is more to go nearer to the Syrian border.

In Fallujah we essentially caused the evacuation of the city of the civilian population, and hence, could use hard techniques and overwhelming force to kill or capture the enemy.  While this may not work to our advantage in Ramadi or other parts of the Sunni triangle, we don’t have to send mortar shells or JDAMs in to kill the enemy.  When Marines are running from building to building trying to protect government officials from being shot by sniper fire in the Ramadi protected zones, we have a problem.

Once again … and I feel like I am rewinding, play again, rewind, play again … “winning the heart and mind of the population” does not require us to leave the enemy alive and killing us or the Iraqis.  We will only win the cities and the people by killing Al Qaeda in the Sunni triangle.

This might involve Marine snipers, or it might involve more patrols, or it might involve a sweep of the city, or three-block strategy, or a series of mini-sweeps, or other tactics.  And I understand that Marines and Soldiers need to be on the ground, talking to the population, keeping the power grid functional, smoking with the men on the street corner, working with the locals to get people medical treatment, etc.

But you would have a hard time convincing me that business is operating properly with snipers shooting at “safe-zones.”  The way to win the population is to kill their enemy.  The Sunnis will not see Al Qaeda as their allies.  They are foreigners who are preventing the practice of business, worship, and a return to normalcy.