Articles by Herschel Smith

On June 23 I posted “Normal Mineta Leaves – Thank God,” sensing a slight upwards tick on the U.S. securometer.  But little seems to have changed.

On August 16, I posted “TSA Shows no Respect for Military: One More Reason to Loath Them.”

And now, courtesy of Mary Katharine Ham, we see this photograph:

If it were me doing the search, I would refuse unless my head was covered by a hood of shame so that people could not tell who I was.  Then I would do it to keep a job but inform my superiors what an asinine practice it was to search little old white ladies.

This proves that we still do not take the GWOT seriously.  We are not yet engaged in the fight.  What will it take for us to wake from our slumber?

The ghosts of Norman Mineta have not yet been exorcised.

Let me be clear on what I think.  The coalition forces are winning in Afghanistan.  From intelligence estimates, there are only several thousand Taliban fighters left in the mountainous region bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan.  To put this in context, several thousand is the number sitting in a medium to large church in any U.S. city on a Sunday, and perhaps 1/20 of the attendance at a typical college or professional football game on a Saturday.  This is simply a small force size considering the fact that just a few years ago the country was controlled by Taliban (excluding the region controlled by the Northern Alliance).

On September 3, the Strategy Page was reporting:

September 3, 2006: Over the weekend, NATO troops near Kandahar (in the west), killed over 200 Taliban, while losing four of their own troops. Nearly a hundred Taliban were captured. This was part of a NATO operation to cripple Taliban forces in the Kandahar area. It appears to have succeeded, as interrogations of captured Taliban showed that this was a major enemy force in the area, and contained many key leaders.

It is noteworthy that 200 Taliban is considered a “major enemy force.”  This is not even a company of fighters.  As for the success rate over the last eight months, the Strategy Page is reporting:

September 5, 2006: The Taliban Summer offensive is nearly over, as the cold weather begins showing up. Nearly 2,000 have died in the last eight months from the Taliban violence. Most of the dead have been Taliban, most of them Afghans, but about a third Pakistanis and about five percent of them other foreigners. Most of the civilian victims were targeted by the Taliban. These included teachers and other government officials murdered by the Taliban, as part of a terror campaign to gain control over tribes in the south. This has largely backfired, as the Taliban was not strong enough to maintain constant pressure on the tribes. Apparently, the high Taliban death toll is the result of keeping large groups of gunmen in action, as this was the only way to back up the smaller terror squads, in the face of tribal attempts to resist or retaliate. But army and coalition forces would constantly catch the large Taliban groups, and smash them with smart bombs and superior firepower. 

So there have been many Taliban deaths, and their ability to field a fighting forces has been seriously weakened and compromised in Afghanistan.  But the situation seems to be different within Pakistan.

Yesterday was an interesting day on the conservative blogosphere.  It all started with the announcement of the truce / agreements signed between the Pakistan government and the Pashtun Muslims.  Bill Roggio posted on these events, focusing on the underreported story of the Pakistan “surrender” to the Muslim extremist fighters.  This created a storm of posts, counterpoints, trackbacks and comments, Michelle Malkin supporting the idea of a surrender, while the Captain’s Quarters supported the idea of a slick deal where the Taliban were the losers (and Musharraf the winner); Dan Riehl weighed in supporting the idea of a slick deal by Musharraf, while many other small bloggers (like yours truly) weighed in affirming Roggio’s position.

When the conservative blogosphere speaks, seldom is there as stark a difference of opinion as there was yesterday.  Still, in spite of the differences, the fact that a deal was cut at all implies a very weary Pakistan government (and restive troops and intelligence apparatus).  The Strategy Page weighs in on this issue as well:

September 6, 2006: Pakistan has declared victory and acknowledged defeat in the Pushtun tribal territories along the Afghan border. The government has signed a truce deal with the tribes. Under the terms of the deal, the tribes promise to expel foreign Islamic terrorists from their territories, and not allow their own men to join Taliban operations in Afghanistan. Neither promise is likely to be kept. Even now, Islamic extremists are exercising more control in the tribal territories, forming militias that are able to defy the tribal elders. However, the government is now expected to keep its troops in bases near the urban areas (which the tribes do not control anyway), and send in millions of dollars in economic aid (which the United States is expected to provide). This charade will go on (for a year or so) until the violations of the deal become too much to ignore. At that point, the war between the government and the tribes will resume. Afghanistan is already complaining of an increase in Pakistani Pushtun Taliban crossing over to fight.

The government was not willing to pay the price, in lives and cash, to subdue the tribes. This is nothing new, the fierce and persistent resistance of the Pushtun tribes has defeated outsiders for centuries. But there was also a religious angle. The tribes are full of Islamic conservatives, and tribal religious leaders have been turning the fighting into a religious war. The government does not want to give Islamic conservatives elsewhere in Pakistan more ammunition. Moreover, a significant minority of the officers in the army are Islamic conservatives, and the fighting was causing unrest with that important group. So the government has declared victory, stopped fighting the tribes, and is hoping to come up with some kind of Plan B before the Islamic terrorism gets out of hand. 

I concur that the Taliban in Pakistan cannot be trusted to carry out their obligations.  If you want to see why, look no further than their actions towards their own fighters.  On September 2, the Strategy Page reported:

September 2, 2006: Pakistan has been signing truces with rebellious Pushtun tribes on its side of the border, and this has led to a noticeable increase in the number Pakistanis captured or killed fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The additional number of Pakistanis in Afghanistan is not great, perhaps only a few hundred, but these guys have guns and murderous intent, and have hurt Afghans and foreign troops. 

Notice what has led to the noticeable increase in the number of Pakistanis captured or killed in fighting.  The signing of truces with the Pakistan government.

Get the picture?  In order to effect a downsizing in the hostilities with the Pakistan government, the Pashtun tribes were willing to sell out their own in Afghanistan to be killed.  Not foreign fighters — their own tribesmen.

This is the Taliban that Musharraf has cut a deal with.

There is good news and bad news in Afghanistan.  As you know, there are ongoing operations in Afghanistan, and the coalition forces are becoming very good at killing Taliban fighters.  Operation Medusa, as of September 3, 2006, had netted 200 Taliban killed and 80 captured, as compared to 4 NATO casualties.  In case you’re not counting (or dividing), this is a kill ratio of 50:1.

From the Washington Times:

An Army commander just back from Afghanistan had some good news and bad news.  The good: The coalition is good at finding and killing Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. The bad: Nearly as fast as the terrorists are killed, they are replaced by new recruits from camps in Pakistan. 

I have mixed feelings about calling this “bad” news.  On the one hand, I hate to see that there are so many in the world who hate us and want to kill us.  On the other hand, the good news part of the story is that if there are those who do indeed want to kill us, we are fighting them over there instead of on U.S. soil.  The effects of fighting them on U.S. soil would be many more U.S. deaths and the complete destruction of the U.S. economy (and certainly the destruction of our way of life).

Now for the really bad news.  Bill Roggio (h/t Michelle Malkin) has a must read piece on the surrender of the Pakistani army to the Taliban in the region of Waziristan.  His opening volley in the piece is this:

Pakistan’s “truce with the Taliban is an abject surrender, and al-Qaeda has an untouchable base of operations in Western Pakistan which will only expand if not checked.

Bill continues by outlining the terms of the truce:

– The Pakistani Army is abandoning its garrisons in North and South Waziristan.
– The Pakistani Military will not operate in North Waziristan, nor will it monitor actions the region.
– Pakistan will turn over weapons and other equipment seized during Pakistani Army operations.
– The Taliban and al-Qaeda have set up a Mujahideen Shura (or council) to administer the agency.
– The truce refers to the region as “The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.

In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.

In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.

It is well known now that Iran has not only pursued an enrichment program to develop highly enriched Uranium (the only purpose for which is a nuclear bomb), but a heavy water reactor as well, the purpose for which includes the production of Plutonium.  The Middle East Media Research Institute reports on why Iran says it wants to produce heavy water (quoting Iran nuclear chief Mohammad Sa’idi):

“One of the products of heavy water is depleted deuterium. As you know, in an environment with depleted deuterium, the reception of cancer cells and of the AIDS viruses is disrupted. Since this reception is disrupted, the cells are gradually expelled from the body. Obviously, one glass of depleted deuterium will not expel or cure the cancer or eliminate the AIDS. We are talking about a certain period of time. In many countries that deal with these diseases, patients use this kind of water instead of regular water, and consume it daily in order to heal their diseases.

“In other words, the issue of heavy water has to do with matters of life and death, in many cases. One of the reasons that led us to produce heavy water was to use it for agricultural… medical purposes, and especially for industrial purposes in our country.” 

Sa’idi is lying.  The use of heavy water for the treatment of disease is so costly and unproven that it would be absurd to use it on patients in lieu of chemotherapy.  The consumption of heavy water by biological organisms inhibits cell reproduction, but is also too toxic and too costly to be considered useful for the treatment of cancer or any other disease.  It simply makes more sense to use chemotherapy and other modern treatments.

On the other hand, heavy water has two strategic military advantages to Iran.  First, rather than worry with trying to achieve Uranium enrichment on the order of that necessary to sustain criticality in conventional light water reactor designs, natural Uranium can be used in heavy water reactors.  The design of Iran’s reactor is similar to the Canadian CANDU reactors, which can be studied here, here, and here.  The consequent Plutonium produced could then be reprocessed and purified to produce a nuclear bomb that requires less mass than its counterpart Uranium bomb.  This makes such a warhead able to be delivered with the rockets that Iran currently has in its arsenal.

This is about the miniturization of nuclear weapons, and it shows that Iran is pursuing two distinct paths towards the holy grail.  The first is highly enriched Uranium, in itself capable of being a weapon, and the second is Plutonium, produced without the aid of enriched Uranium by the use of natural Uranium in heavy water plants.

It is noteworthy that Jane’s Intelligence Review in 2003 said the following of Iran’s heavy water reactor:

The IR-40 heavy water research reactor is significant because it produces high quality plutonium, the most important component for a compact, nuclear device. If Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon small enough to launch on top of its Shahab 3 or 4 missiles, it will most probably be an implosion device with a plutonium (Pu) core.  The only way to acquire that is through reprocessing irradiated fuel. Bushehr is a light water reactor that has received much international attention and most probably will continue to be closely scrutinised, making it difficult to clandestinely remove its spent fuel for reprocessing. Even if the IR-40 has just as much attention, the Iranians would have a better chance of removing irradiated fuel or irradiating natural uranium targets for Pu production in this reactor.

Indeed, a heavy water reactor is among the most dangerous in existence from a proliferation perspective.  One reason is that the low neutron cross section of heavy water facilitates a high number of U238 (uranium-238 isotope) atoms to absorb neutrons, resulting in the production of a greater quantity and better quality of plutonium product.

According to David Albright, Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, the IR-40 will be able to produce 8-10kg of plutonium per year – approximately one to two bombs’ worth of nuclear material.  The IAEA holds that 8kg of plutonium constitutes a “significant quantity

It is well known now that Iran has not only pursued an enrichment program to develop highly enriched Uranium (the only purpose for which is a nuclear bomb), but a heavy water reactor as well, the purpose for which includes the production of Plutonium.  The Middle East Media Research Institute reports on why Iran says it wants to produce heavy water (quoting Iran nuclear chief Mohammad Sa’idi):

“One of the products of heavy water is depleted deuterium. As you know, in an environment with depleted deuterium, the reception of cancer cells and of the AIDS viruses is disrupted. Since this reception is disrupted, the cells are gradually expelled from the body. Obviously, one glass of depleted deuterium will not expel or cure the cancer or eliminate the AIDS. We are talking about a certain period of time. In many countries that deal with these diseases, patients use this kind of water instead of regular water, and consume it daily in order to heal their diseases.

“In other words, the issue of heavy water has to do with matters of life and death, in many cases. One of the reasons that led us to produce heavy water was to use it for agricultural… medical purposes, and especially for industrial purposes in our country.” 

Sa’idi is lying.  The use of heavy water for the treatment of disease is so costly and unproven that it would be absurd to use it on patients in lieu of chemotherapy.  The consumption of heavy water by biological organisms inhibits cell reproduction, but is also too toxic and too costly to be considered useful for the treatment of cancer or any other disease.  It simply makes more sense to use chemotherapy and other modern treatments.

On the other hand, heavy water has two strategic military advantages to Iran.  First, rather than worry with trying to achieve Uranium enrichment on the order of that necessary to sustain criticality in conventional light water reactor designs, natural Uranium can be used in heavy water reactors.  The design of Iran’s reactor is similar to the Canadian CANDU reactors, which can be studied here, here, and here.  The consequent Plutonium produced could then be reprocessed and purified to produce a nuclear bomb that requires less mass than its counterpart Uranium bomb.  This makes such a warhead able to be delivered with the rockets that Iran currently has in its arsenal.

This is about the miniturization of nuclear weapons, and it shows that Iran is pursuing two distinct paths towards the holy grail.  The first is highly enriched Uranium, in itself capable of being a weapon, and the second is Plutonium, produced without the aid of enriched Uranium by the use of natural Uranium in heavy water plants.

It is noteworthy that Jane’s Intelligence Review in 2003 said the following of Iran’s heavy water reactor:

The IR-40 heavy water research reactor is significant because it produces high quality plutonium, the most important component for a compact, nuclear device. If Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon small enough to launch on top of its Shahab 3 or 4 missiles, it will most probably be an implosion device with a plutonium (Pu) core.  The only way to acquire that is through reprocessing irradiated fuel. Bushehr is a light water reactor that has received much international attention and most probably will continue to be closely scrutinised, making it difficult to clandestinely remove its spent fuel for reprocessing. Even if the IR-40 has just as much attention, the Iranians would have a better chance of removing irradiated fuel or irradiating natural uranium targets for Pu production in this reactor.

Indeed, a heavy water reactor is among the most dangerous in existence from a proliferation perspective.  One reason is that the low neutron cross section of heavy water facilitates a high number of U238 (uranium-238 isotope) atoms to absorb neutrons, resulting in the production of a greater quantity and better quality of plutonium product.

According to David Albright, Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, the IR-40 will be able to produce 8-10kg of plutonium per year – approximately one to two bombs’ worth of nuclear material.  The IAEA holds that 8kg of plutonium constitutes a “significant quantity

Newsmax has a good writeup entitled New Evidence Emerges in Haditha Case, and yet another good one entitled Pentagon Leaders Distorting Haditha Facts.  Both articles should be studied, and the last one shows that there is (gasp!) a problem in the Pentagon.  Someone there is a turncoat and wants to see the Haditha Marines hung out to dry.  But turning our attention to a different issue, it dawned on me that even a rudimentary sequence of events has not been published by anyone.  There is various prose out there in the MSM, but I thought I would try to boil it down to a more strict “sequence of events” using both the Newsmax links above and the posts in my Haditha Roundup category.  I’ll start the sequence much earlier so that you can get a little bit of the flavor of the Haditha area (see also my posts in the Haditha Roundup category, in which I show how troublesome Haditha was to U.S. forces).

Six Marines become surrounded by insurgents in Haditha arrproximately six months prior to the alledged incident.  These six Marines die.  IEDs, RPGs, and small arms fire from insurgents are part of the daily routine for the Marines in and around the Haditha area.

On November 19, 2005, Staff Sergeant Wuterich’s unit left Firm Base Sparta at 0700 hours on a daily mission to drop off Iraqi army troops at a nearby checkpoint.

At approximately 0715 hours, an IED exploded and severely damaged the last of four Humvees, instantly killing Lance Corporal Terrazas, the driver of the vehicle.

Wuterich stopped the convoy and he and the other Marines got out of the vehicles.

While evaluating the scene, the Marines noticed a white unmarked car carrying four men lingering near the bomb site.  The Marines ordered the men to stop, and rather than stop, the men ran from the scene.  Following SOP, the Marines fired on the men.

Wuterich began briefing the Platoon leader, and AK-47 shots were heard from residences on the south side of the road.  At this point, the squad took defensive positions around the Humvees.

A Corporal with the unit said to Wuterich that he saw the fire coming from a specific house.

Stop sequence of events.  Editorial comment: A Marine fire team consists of four members, including a fire team leader (usually a Lance Corporal, Corporal or Sergeant) who carries an M16A2 with a grenade launcher (the fire team leader is the grenadier).  The main suppressing fire is laid down by the second member, the SAW gunner (Squad Automatic Weapon, or M249).  The other two members carry M16A2s (or M4s if the combat is expected to be primarily MOUT, or Military Operations on Urban Terrain).  In order properly to effect room-clearing procedures, the fire team prepares first by throwing in a fragmentation grenade (unless there are too many rooms such as in Fallujah, in which case the fire team cannot carry enough grenades and is restricted to use of firearms).  After the grenade, the team gets into a formation where each team member is aligned front to back so close that it is called a “stack.”  As I have commented before on The Captain’s Journal, this procedure is designed to save Marine lives and kill the enemy.  Once a room is designated an enemy zone, there is no protocol and no procedure for delineating friend from foe.  In fact, if the Marines redesigned the procedure to attempt to ascertain friend from foe prior to clearing the room, and the enemy learned of this revised procedure, this information would lead to the deaths of many Marines.  Hesitation kills in this procedure.  There is no provision for hesitation, nor can there ever be.  End of editorial comment and return to sequence of events.

Wuterich’s fire team then went to the house from which they had received fire, kicked in the door, and found a door to a room with people rustling behind it.  They kicked in that door, threw in a fragmentation grenade, and followed the grenade by clearing shots (Editorial comment: I am speculating that these shots were from an M249, but I have not seen any report on this.  It is noteworthy that the M16A2 can only fire in three-round bursts, and is not fully automatic).

The Marines noted that the people in the room were men, women and children, but they noticed a back door ajar and believed that the insurgents had slipped to a nearby house.

They moved to this house, kicked the door in, and then used a fragmentation grenade and more fire to clear the room.

Upon noting that they had not found the insurgents, Wuterich ordered the Marines back to the Platoon to reassess the situation.

Finally, K company was ministered to by civilian pastors of one of the Marines in that unit who were on a church-funded missions trip soon after this incident.  This pastor has said that the Marines talked very openly, and made no mention of any guilt over any alleged intentional massacre of civilians.  This fact is likely very significant, although the MSM will not tell it to you.

End of sequence of events.  Since I have a son in the Marines, I have been following this issue closely.  I know that the most undesirable outcome of this whole affair would be a revised set of rules of engagement in which the Marines have to ascertain friend from foe.  In such a condition, there will be many more dead Marines.

Tony Snow said from the White House podium that the entire report would be released.  I am counting on it, and look forward to it with eager anticipation.  When it is, I will read all 1000+ pages of it.  If these Marines are charged, I will dissect, parse, and otherwise rip apart the report and discuss my findings on TCJ.  Pentagon, you are on notice.  Take it under advisement.

We go through some heavy stuff here at TCJ.  How about something lighter and more fun to close the night or weekend out?

I am probably showing my age here (something from 1977), but here it goes:

Styx: Come Sail Away Video

From the AP:

The U.N. atomic agency has found traces of highly enriched uranium at an Iranian site linked to the country’s defense ministry, diplomats said Friday. The finding added to concerns that Tehran was hiding activities that could be used to make nuclear arms.

The diplomats, who demanded anonymity in exchange for revealing the confidential information, said the findings were preliminary and still had to be confirmed through other lab tests. But they said the density of enrichment appeared close to or beyond weapons grade _ the level used to make nuclear warheads.

We learn something else through UPI:

The discovery marked the third instance that highly enriched uranium was found at an Iranian facility, but the IAEA said the nuclear fingerprint on the new discovery does not match that found on earlier samples, which the agency had concluded came from contaminated equipment from Pakistan, The New York Times reported Friday. 

Folks, it takes at least about 2% U-235 enriched nuclear fuel to make a nuclear reactor function (i.e., stay critical and produce power), and this value usually doesn’t go above about 5% (except for military reactors, that is, the types on board submarines, which are highly enriched for reasons that I won’t go into here).  But commercial nuclear power simply doesn’t need fuel above about 5% U-235.  The rest of it is U-238.  Something else happens to the U-238.  It absorbs a neutron to become Pu-239 which is fissile with a “thermal” neutron, and ends up producing power due to fission later on.  Pu-239 is fissile while U-238 is not — it is “fissionable,” which means it cannot fission from a neutron below 1 MeV.  What is the upshot of this?  U-238 cannot be used to make a bomb.  You have to enrich the mixture to increase the U-235 content.

When they say “highly enriched,” they mean much greater than 90% (>> 90%).  This enrichment does not work for anything except naval reactors (the technology for these reactors is not available to Iran) and nuclear bombs.

I hope this is clear to everyone.  Reactors for submarines that the Iranians do not know how to build, and nuclear bombs.  These are the only reasons a country needs highly enriched Uranium.

And what we learn from the IAEA is that the signature (characteristic gammas) of this Uranium ensures that it did not come from Pakistan where the original contamination came from years ago.  This is different Uranium from a different source.

Hold on to your shorts and tighten your seat belts.  Here we go.