Articles by Herschel Smith

It had to happen sooner or later.  Son and faithful reader Joshua sends me this link.  Jihadists have read, and are ridiculing the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24.

Jihadists and their supporters are reading and mocking the Pentagon’s new counterinsurgency field manual, which was released publicly and posted on several Department of Defense Web sites Friday even though it addresses such sensitive topics as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting.

One Arabic-language jihadist Web site linking to the Pentagon’s 282-page counterinsurgency manual is Tajdeed.net, which routinely calls for the killing of U.S. and British forces in Iraq; praises bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the 9/11 attacks; and whose sponsor, Mohamed al Massari, has called for the assassination of George Bush and Tony Blair.

Al Massari, an expatriate Saudi dissident, and his jihadist Web site are based in Britain, where he lives despite calls by some British leaders for Al Massari’s deportation or arrest.

On the same Tajdeed Web page providing a link to the Pentagon’s new counterinsurgency manual (linked from a related Reuters story posted on the site), there is a gruesome photo of the body of a U.S. Air Force pilot whose parachute is still strapped to his back (apparently Major Troy Gilbert, whose plane went down north of Baghdad in late November).

Next to that photo is a computer-generated smiley face with these words in Arabic: “This one won’t be reading the manual.”

The Arabic-language Tajdeed message board posting is headed: “The American occupation publishes a booklet containing directives to its soldiers on facing the mujahadeen.”

Notable Arabic-language comments from readers of the Tajdeed posting include “Bless you, you who have broken the U.S. and its military and made it resort to booklets.” Also: “The Pentagon is distributing the booklet to save whatever is left of it!,” referring to the U.S. military.

As of 0015et (0815 Iraq time) Monday, 363 people had read the Arabic-language message board containing the link to the manual and the photo of the dead U.S. airman.

The Tajdeed Web site also showcases gory videos of attacks against western targets in Iraq, provides de facto insurgent training manuals, and provides tips for jihadis on how to sneak into Iraq.

Initial reaction to the Pentagon’s global, unrestricted distribution of the counterinsurgency field manual was one of disbelief.

One British private security contractor with employees in Iraq said: “Only in the land of the free could (such) a handbook be produced and issued to the enemy.” The contractor spoke on the condition of anonymity because his company works with the U.S. military.

I have been critical of the COIN manual.  In War, Counterinsurgency and Prolonged Operations, I contrasted FM 3-24 with both Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and the Small Wars Manual, regarding the understanding of both of the later of the effect of prolonged operations on the morale of the warrior, and the reticence of the former on the same subject.  In Snipers Having Tragic Success Against U.S. Troops (still a well-visited post), I made the observation that while snipers were one of two main prongs of insurgent success in Iraq (IEDs being the other), FM 3-24 did not contain one instance of the use of the word sniper (at the time I assessed the draft manual, but the longer, final version suffers the same flaw).

The manual is written more on a doctrinal than tactical level.  It contains broad, sweeping prose on strategical approach, devolving into platitudinous ramblings in places.  Frankly, it is difficult for me to see the advantage that the insurgent might gain by knowing its content.  Body armor improvements and, on the tactical level, things such as satellite patrols, are much more important to the soldier or marine in the field than what FM 3-24 says or doesn’t say.

It would be more detrimental for the Small Wars Manual to fall into the hands of the enemy, if we had followed its counsel (e.g., increasing force size to match the threat, disarming the public, etc.), but of course, it is too late to recall it from the public domain.

In the end, it is true that the openness of the American culture has hindered the war effort.  But the lesson of this story is not that FM 3-24 should have been OPSEC.  It was released into the public domain for a reason.  However, the fact that the British will not deport the individual responsible for this web site points to the robust existence of a pre-9/11 fantasy in which, to the Brits, the blogger is apparently just some boyish amateur rather than a part of jihadism and therefore a mortal danger to the survival of the west.

I am more concerned about the blogger than FM 3-24 or what happens to it.

It is important to understand just what the would-be savior of Operation Iraqi Freedom will do in Iraq. What is our way forward? In an important and provocative article on Petraeus, the Times Online gives us some insight into the man and his philosophy:

Having co-authored the US military’s counter-insurgency manual, General Petraeus believes that only by combining military strength and sensitive interaction with locals can an insurgency be defeated. He has been influenced by a study of the British in Malaya during the 1950s by John Nagl, a Pentagon official.

Colonel Nagl compared Malaya to America’s failure in Vietnam, where the US Army approached the conflict as a conventional war. The British defeated the insurgency in Malaya, he writes, because of a “civil-military strategy based on intelligence derived from a supportive local population

Regarding one post to which one particularly irrelevant comment was appended, I responded to Rod ‘Breaker’ McCoy that while I appreciated his comments to previous posts, I do not allow people to use the courtesy I allow to make comments on my website for the purposes of advertising their services. I also contended that comments should be relevant to the content of the post rather than discuss other, unrelated issues. To this, Mr. McCoy responded the following:

I object to your attitude. You dont (sic) anwer (sic) questions. Your site is organized to discuss only your opinions. You are arrogant and afraid to hear other better informed opinions.

You are the enemy of people who seem to have the same cause.

However, you are weak and spiteful towards people who want to do more than whine.

You only want to publicize your own drivel and keep others from getting ahead or stating their views.

I consider you as bad as a leftist or a muslim (sic) imperialist., (sic) only to you the objective is to vent only! (sic)

Do not contact me again ! (sic)

Smith responds:

You should give up caffeine and use the money you save to purchase a spell checker. Beyond this, I suppose that I should recommend that you find a good counselor.

From the Telegraph, we learn that the insurgents are learning information mined from the internet to target British bases in Iraq.

Terrorists attacking British bases in Basra are using aerial footage displayed by the Google Earth internet tool to pinpoint their attacks, say Army intelligence sources.

Documents seized during raids on the homes of insurgents last week uncovered print-outs from photographs taken from Google.

The satellite photographs show in detail the buildings inside the bases and vulnerable areas such as tented accommodation, lavatory blocks and where lightly armoured Land Rovers are parked.

Written on the back of one set of photographs taken of the Shatt al Arab Hotel, headquarters for the 1,000 men of the Staffordshire Regiment battle group, officers found the camp’s precise longitude and latitude.
“This is evidence as far as we are concerned for planning terrorist attacks,” said an intelligence officer with the Royal Green Jackets battle group. “Who would otherwise have Google Earth imagery of one of our bases?

“We are concerned that they use them to plan attacks. We have never had proof that they have deliberately targeted any area of the camp using these images but presumably they are of great use to them.

Anyone who has used Google Earth knows how dated the satellite information is.  For instance, if you pull up the information on your home, you will probably see a photograph from months ago, and more than likely so many months that it is a different season of the year.

In conventional war (e.g., WWII), where forces are fairly mobile and pressing a known enemy towards a known end, months-old intelligence would be meaningless.  This is the advantage of the fighter in an insurgency and the disadvantage of the counterinsurgent.  The insurgent is mobile, and the counterinsurgent is not.

I have previously argued that the mobility of insurgents in Anbar challenges U.S. abilities to maintain security; that the constant resupply and safe haven across the Syrian border makes the battlefield dynamic to the point of making standard counterinsurgency tactics inapplicable.  From Haditha, we learn that tactics are being used to seal off insurgents.  Non-human resources are being used as a force multiplier in this region.

Adapting ideas tracing back from ancient history to modern Israel, US Marines have sealed off flashpoint towns with sand walls in a new counter-insurgency tactic to quell the wilds of western Iraq …

When 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines deployed to western Al-Anbar from Hawaii in mid-September they sustained casualties in Haditha every day for 45 days. Then on November 10, gun battles in the town stopped.

Captain Matthew Tracy, whose marines patrol Haditha, attributes the lull to a local strongman, a former officer in the Saddam Hussein army known simply as Colonel Faruq, with the power and charisma to bring the town to heel.

Provided, that was, the Marines built a defensive sand wall sealing off Haditha from the porous desert, with checkpoints and traffic restrictions.

So last month, “berms” stretching 20 kilometres (12 miles) were built around Haditha and two neighbouring towns to cut off insurgent supply lines. A simultaneous US-led raid left dozens of insurgents dead or captured.

Ultimately, the borders with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran will have to be completely sealed, and safe haven denied to would-be insurgents inside Syria.  The vulnerability of the tactic described above is that it relies on a local “strongman.”  Assassination of this strongman might cause a problem, so the ability to resupply elements of terror across the border must be stopped.

This article has been updated with Security and WHAM: Getting the Order Right

According to The Washington Note:

Washington intelligence, military and foreign policy circles are abuzz today with speculation that the President, yesterday or in recent days, sent a secret Executive Order to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director of the CIA to launch military operations against Syria and Iran.

The President may have started a new secret, informal war against Syria and Iran without the consent of Congress or any broad discussion with the country.

Adding fuel to the speculation is that U.S. forces today raided an Iranian Consulate in Arbil, Iraq and detained five Iranian staff members. Given that Iran showed little deference to the political sanctity of the US Embassy in Tehran 29 years ago, it would be ironic for Iran to hyperventilate much about the raid.

But what is disconcerting is that some are speculating that Bush has decided to heat up military engagement with Iran and Syria — taking possible action within their borders, not just within Iraq.

Is this so strange?  To begin with, the doctrine of dual containment has been in effect since the Clinton administration.

The broad national security interests and objectives expressed in the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Chairman’s National Military Strategy (NMS) form the foundation of the United States Central Command’s theater strategy. The NSS directs implementation of a strategy of dual containment of the rogue states of Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens. Dual containment is designed to maintain the balance of power in the region without depending on either Iraq or Iran. USCENTCOM’s theater strategy is interest-based and threat-focused. The purpose of U.S. engagement, as espoused in the NSS, is to protect the United States’ vital interest in the region – uninterrupted, secure U.S./Allied access to Gulf oil.

Given the state of affairs then and even more so now, it would be irresponsible for the U.S. not to have such doctrine and plans.

But if true, this would follow in line closely with what I suggested in The Broader War: Redefining our Stratety for Iraq.  After calling for an air strike on Syria to remove the propaganda equipment being used by the Iraqi insurgents, I stated:

As a “going forward

According to The Washington Note:

Washington intelligence, military and foreign policy circles are abuzz today with speculation that the President, yesterday or in recent days, sent a secret Executive Order to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director of the CIA to launch military operations against Syria and Iran.

The President may have started a new secret, informal war against Syria and Iran without the consent of Congress or any broad discussion with the country.

Adding fuel to the speculation is that U.S. forces today raided an Iranian Consulate in Arbil, Iraq and detained five Iranian staff members. Given that Iran showed little deference to the political sanctity of the US Embassy in Tehran 29 years ago, it would be ironic for Iran to hyperventilate much about the raid.

But what is disconcerting is that some are speculating that Bush has decided to heat up military engagement with Iran and Syria — taking possible action within their borders, not just within Iraq.

Is this so strange?  To begin with, the doctrine of dual containment has been in effect since the Clinton administration.

The broad national security interests and objectives expressed in the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Chairman’s National Military Strategy (NMS) form the foundation of the United States Central Command’s theater strategy. The NSS directs implementation of a strategy of dual containment of the rogue states of Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens. Dual containment is designed to maintain the balance of power in the region without depending on either Iraq or Iran. USCENTCOM’s theater strategy is interest-based and threat-focused. The purpose of U.S. engagement, as espoused in the NSS, is to protect the United States’ vital interest in the region – uninterrupted, secure U.S./Allied access to Gulf oil.

Given the state of affairs then and even more so now, it would be irresponsible for the U.S. not to have such doctrine and plans.

But if true, this would follow in line closely with what I suggested in The Broader War: Redefining our Stratety for Iraq.  After calling for an air strike on Syria to remove the propaganda equipment being used by the Iraqi insurgents, I stated:

As a “going forward

At Blogs of War, John Little gives a link to a new military bloggers contest being run by the VA mortgage center.  In order to keep veterans and active duty personnel better informed about updates to their benefits, they are starting a blog.  They are kicking it off with this contest.  The top Milblog is awarded $3000, with the balance of the top ten being awarded $250.

There certainly are some big players and important folks, and my web site doesn’t deserve to be mentioned with the rest of the list.  Our friend John Little at Blogs of War has been at this since … well … basically since the creation of mankind, or maybe just the computer (the one built by John Von Neumann).  Blackfive has linked me before and is a heavily trafficked website by some ex-military heavy-hitters, and I have a buddy from OPFOR that visits here often.

After you vote for Blogs of War and OPFOR, go to a different computer and vote for me so that my [doubtless] low vote count is not too embarrassing.

Here is the link: VA Mortgage Center Blog Vote Page

If I can make it into the top ten blogs, I’ll use the $250 for ministry.

In Concerning the Failure of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, I argued that the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy employed by the U.S. in Iraq has failed. I argued that this failure is not attributable to the warriors in the field, nor is it a detraction from the effort they have expended and the blood and limbs they have lost. Rather, it is due at least in part to the adoption of David Galula’s principles of COIN, coming mostly from the situation he faced in Algeria. To be sure, his book is serious study, and much wisdom can be gleaned from his theories. But the global war on terror is a “horse of a different color,” and requires its own theoretical framework.

While the list isn’t comprehensive, I cited seven reasons that the Iraq situation is not entirely conducive to application of the same COIN doctrine, and gave hints as to things that might be considered in the development of revised doctrine for the war. President Bush will soon announce his strategy for going forward in Iraq, and it seems prudent and timely to pull one thread in the tapestry of a revised strategy, perhaps the most important one. Without this thread, the rest of the fabric unravels.

Pointing to a border with Syria that has not been secured, I said that “The battlefield, both for military actions and so-called “nonkinetic

Just reported from Fox News:

The United States launched a strike Monday against suspected Al Qaeda members in Somalia, a senior U.S. official informed FOX News.

The attack by the Air Force AC-130 gunship, capable of firing thousands of rounds per second, left casualties on the ground, but it is not clear if any of the dead were targeted terrorists, the official said.

The U.S. could have been targeting two terrorists — Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Saleh Nabhan — who are connected to the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa that left more than 200 dead. Officials have long suspected those involved in the bombings have taken refuge in Somalia.

There may have been a scent of terrorist movement when Al Qaeda operatives taking cover in the Somalian capital of Mogadishu were likely chased out of their hideouts as Ethiopian forces cleared out Islamists who had taken power there.

The move marks the first time the U.S. has mounted a mission in Somalia since forces pulled out in 1994, two years after entering on a mission to feed starving people there. However, due to the bombings, the U.S. has shared intelligence with allies such as Kenya and Ethiopia and this fresh attack could be part of an ongoing anti-terror operation.

It is about time. More on the AC-130 can be found here.