Mosques, Snipers and Rules of Engagement
BY Herschel Smith
19 years, 3 months ago
Michael Totten is in Baghdad, and while his (most recent) entire report is both interesting and highly worth reading, I want to focus in on the following words:
“They have a little bunker up there,
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Herschel,
I read the same comment by gifted (and followed you comment back here) however when you say this:
“Lastly, even if “Gifted
Opps, should be “^There will be and should be exceptions…”
That paragraph wasn’t meant to imply that preventing ISF from assaulting a Mosque was the position that “Gifted” would advocate. I don’t know what position he would advocate on that question. I concur that it would be best to leave the Mosques to the ISF, but the problem is that there are plenty of ISF around, and Mosque problems still remain. This really is a huge issue and we need a national conversation on the nature of counterinsurgency, why we would wage it, should we wage it, how we wage it, and whether we support such a thing as national policy. Right now the only ones seriously discussing the issue are in the professional counterinsurgency community. The public, generally speaking, is absent from the discussion. This is a shame, because the public thinks that we are in a “war.” The professional community would probably say something like “Gifted” would say. The solution they would profer would be something like “we want the population to remove the sniper domicile themselves due to our nonkinetic operations” (WHAM, winning hearts and minds). It is counterproductive to take out the snipers and yet create two or three more insurgents in his place because we have infuriated the locals by “desecrating” their place of worship (forget that the desecration began when the sniper was allowed in). Or so the thinking goes. This sounds erudite, doesn’t it? Unintended consequences, and so forth. But I think the issue runs far deeper and is more complicated than that. Again, I recommend that you go back and watch the YouTube video I link up from a previous post where there is robust combat directed against a minaret by Marines in Fallujah. I simply cannot tell you how I know this to be true, but the soft “cordon and knock” approach to COIN was not followed in Anbar by the Marines. And if they took rounds from a Mosque, they sent M1A1 rounds back at the Mosque. Anbar is far better off than Baghdad today. This fact warrants some serious reflection. I also don’t buy into the notion of an insurgent for an insurgent. For instance, if the sniper is an ex-special forces Iraqi who has killed twenty Marines and you take him out by combat action directed at a Mosque, does it really matter if you replace him with two more insurgents if they are inexperienced, untrained and likely to give up and go home after their rage diminishes? It is a pretty safe bet that guys shooting from Mosques are hard core. As long as rounds are being sent down range by either Marines or insurgents, security is absent. Mothers don’t like to see gunfire while their children are trying to play and they are trying to find vegetables to eat for dinner. I suppose the best way of saying it comes from an article today, URL –> http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/08/permission_to_win_in_iraq.html “So far as I can make out — I am not writing from Iraq, but I do make a… Read more »
The question boils down to: what kind of war do we want to fight? Until Patreaus took over there seemed to be talk of pursuing a counterinsurgency-type war, but this ran counter to a strong desire for a conventional conflict. The American authorities and the American people urged an outcome that could be cleanly called ‘victory’. A word that is incongruous in a counterinsurgency conflict, except in an historical context.
If we are attempting pacification through military dominance, a more certain and feasible route given our overwhelming force, the mosque is obstacle, like any other, and the answer is obvious.
If we are trying to win hearts and minds, then the mosque issue needs to be addressed locally by counterinsurgency forces in conjunction with local residents. The answer may be much less clear, and palatable to troops in the field.
If we want to save American lives and bring the populace to heel by force of arms, then we are using way too little force.
Somebody needs to make a clear decision about how to proceed and stick with it. A decision that should have been made directly after our dynamic military victory. The elements of success for a counterinsurgency; a clear objective and civil support, are in the hands of the enemy. We are now fighting to show that the US can provide Iraq with security so we can win back civil support.