This little nuggert from an article otherwise focused on Iranian funding of the violence in Iraq:

“You see them enabling all comers,� he said. “And by the way, nobody in this country stays bought. You’re rented.�

The senior military official was discussing intelligence issues under condition he not be named, in a briefing with journalists in Baghdad on Wednesday, the transcript of which was made available on Thursday.

He estimated that Iran has sent “millions of dollars� to the Mehdi Army militia of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, including rogue elements that had slipped out of Sadr’s direct control.

Interestingly, this same issue is discussed elsewhere:

Since Moqtada Al Sadr has taken a more active role in Iraq’s government, his militiamen have become frustrated by the constraints and have broken away, the New York Times said Thursday. Splinter groups are hiring themselves out as death squads and criminal gangs, the newspaper said.

Shiites dominate Sadr’s militia, the Times said, and are organized into neighborhood protection forces. His militias have listened to Sadr in the past, but as violence in Iraq spread, so did the militias’ waywardness, the Times said.

Sadr still has as many as 7,000 militiamen in Baghdad, the Times said.

Al Sadr’s militia, at least some of them, have turned into common criminals.  So much for the “holy war” concept.

Regarding those remaining, an estimated 7000 militia, on FNC several nights ago, Fred Barnes divulged that an unidentified general had told him that the U.S. military was going to “go after” al Sadr.

It would appear that if we don’t we are leaving a powder keg in place.  Al Sadr has been allowed to operate with impunity for too long.  If the problem isn’t his loyal followers spawning hatred of the U.S. with pro-Hizballah rallies, it is the disloyal followers spawning organized crime.

In Taliban Preparing for Major Spring Offensive, I cited a report that the Taliban were readying for large scale operations against Kabul:

In a recent telephone interview with a Pakistani reporter, senior Taliban leader Dadullah Akhund said he had told local Taliban members to cease attacks in Pakistan but to continue their fight “abroad” against the U.S. military. He said that he had 500 suicide bombers and 12,000 fighters at his disposal and that by next spring the Taliban would have enough force to launch major attacks on Kabul, the Afghan capital.

This might be bluster, but it also might be a revelation of the long range plan for the Taliban.  Either way, it appears as if the interim period will see smaller, lighter and more dedicated incursions into Afghan territory:

In North Waziristan, a ruggedly mountainous region where foreigners are banned, the Taliban are in control and the mood following the peace deal was buoyantly militant. Residents said there was a general expectation that the peace deal with Pakistan’s ruling army will let the militants step up fighting in Afghanistan.

In one village a few miles from the Afghan border, men said Taliban officials have declared that the jihad now will be more organized and disciplined. Men who volunteer to fight must now cross in smaller groups and stay for longer periods - at least 40 days, according to one source. Fighters will be required to hand their identity documents to the Taliban commander in their village to ensure that they will not be identifiable as Pakistani citizens.

This is the tactic of special operations: small units, silent operation, no identification, with sustenance being derived from the land or the people.  It is certainly not the case that these fighters will be the equivalent of SEALs, Delta Force, or Marine Recon, but the point is that this might signal a temporary change in tactics.

If it is deemed too risky to directly attack Waziristan due to instability in the Musharraf regime and the nuclear weapons in Pakistan, then plans must be made for operations of increased intensity along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

In my post Brain Injury: Signature Wound of the War in Iraq, I discussed IEDs and brain injury as being the wound that many GIs were coming home with, and I encouraged our support — over the long haul — of these disabled troops.  There is more at the two links below.  I must confess that I read these pieces under some emotional distress.  These boys have made a sacrifice that will be with them the balance of their lives.  But read these stories you must.  Don’t turn away from them.  Even if you know the drill, read the stories anyway.  You will be a better person for knowing the struggles that the families of these young boys endure.

Army explores issue of living wills as more return from war in comas

Families bear catastrophic war wounds

In a stark admission of the casualty rate for al Qaeda in Iraq, al Masri has divulged enemy intelligence to the coalition:

CAIRO, Egypt — The new leader of al-Qaida in Iraq said in an audio message posted on a Web site Thursday that more than 4,000 foreign insurgent fighters have been killed in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. It was believed to be the first major statement from insurgents in Iraq about their losses.

“The blood has been spilled in Iraq of more than 4,000 foreigners who came to fight,” said the man, who identified himself as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir - also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri - the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. The voice could not be independently identified.

The good news is that Iraq, while not being touted as such, is important to the GWOT because, if nothing else, it has become a place where literally thousands of terrorists can be killed.  The notion that this is a bad thing is a political talking point, but militarily, is nonsensical if we see the GWOT as being a larger, regional, and protracted campaign that must be won on soil other than America.

Of course, there is bad news, and the bad news is sobering.  In my post Afghanistan, Talibanistan, Waziristan and Kill Ratios, I conservatively calculated a kill ratio in recent Afghanistan action of 50:1.  Considering U.S. mortalities of 3022 as I write this post, and using a value of 4000 al Qaeda in Iraq, the Iraqi situation is much worse.  I calculate a kill ratio of 1.324.

A kill ratio is not simply a clinical number.  These are the sons of America, and it behooves us to understand the difference between Afghan fighting and the war in Iraq.

While it is easy to second-guess each strategic decision and tactical blunder that has been made, several things can be pointed out that might have contributed to this stark difference.  While there is a resurgence of the Taliban in Waziristan, at least initially, the enemy was routed and driven out of Afghanistan.  Conventional operations did not cease until the territory was relatively secure.  The enemy, even now, is being fought primarily on terrain other than urban, and in Iraq, the prevalence of MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) is noteworthy.

As I have pointed out in previous posts, bypassing large urban centers on our drive to Baghdad put a quick end to conventional operations and a start to counterinsurgency operations, but this cessation was likely premature.  Fallujah was taken with relatively few casualties compared to the continually increasing casualty count in the al Anbar Province.  We have left the enemy in Ramadi, Haditha, al Haqlaniyah, Habaniyah, and other highly urbanized parts of al Anbar, and consistently use COIN tactics to effect enemy casualties, but this leads also to a high casualty rate for U.S. troops.

The lesson is simple.  When a strategy of COIN is intended and employed in large urban areas where large numbers of the enemy have been intentionally left to operate, the kill ratio does not even come close to comparing with conventional operations.

This should cause us to think long and hard in the future about the cessation of conventional operations and the invocation of counterinsurgency operations.

The Taliban has taken control over Waziristan and is patiently rebuilding their ranks with plans to lauch major attacks into Kabul in the spring of 2007.  Pakistani editorials urge more involvement in politics, and Musharraf denies that any of this matters by discussing Bin Laden rather than the Taliban. 

Musharraf has denied that the Waziristan accord with the Taliban was really an accord with the Taliban, claiming that it was with the tribal leaders.  If so, then it was with the tribal leaders who were left after the execution of more than 200 tribal leaders.  Musharraf is also denying that Pakistan or the intelligence services are aiding terrorism.

LONDON - An angry Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said he would complain to British Prime Minister Tony Blair Thursday about allegations that Pakistan’s intelligence service backed terrorism.

In media interviews ahead of the London meeting, Musharraf denied the allegations in a British defence ministry policy paper, and also said that Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was alive and hiding in Afghanistan.

“Absolutely, 200 percent, I reject it,� Musharraf told the BBC in an interview Wednesday to address the allegations before he traveled to London on Thursday.

The British broadcaster cited a policy paper written by an unnamed senior official in the British defence ministry as charging that the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service, supported terrorism.

“Indirectly, Pakistan, through the ISI, has been supporting terrorism and extremism, whether in London on 7/7 (the July 7, 2005 bombings on London’s transport network) or in Afghanistan or Iraq,� the report reads.

But Musharraf wants it both ways.  He has on the one hand agreed to the Waziristan accords, allowing free rein to the Taliban, and on the other hand attempted to draw a symbiotic connection between Bin Laden and terrorism.  It is an easy abdication of responsibility.

Rather than reject the violence and mayhem caused by the Taliban, there are calls from within Pakistan for the inclusion of the Pashtun tribes (and their “representatives,” the Taliban) in national politics.

It’s thus time to strategise the scenario in Afghanistan and judiciously and pragmatically prioritise the issues for giving hope to the Afghan people. President Musharraff’s observation that Pakhtoon population represented by the Taliban needs to be brought on board in the country’s administration represents the crux of the problem. It is the bitter truth about the ground realities in Afghanistan, which Bush and Karzai should over ponder over for the sake of peace and security. The fact that Afghan people can’t be subjugated with military might should also be recognised by Washington if peace and security needs to be restored in the land-locked country. We are, however, convinced that a Waziristan like deal with Taliban is the answer to the objective conditions in Afghanistan.

This kind of denial of the true intentions of the Taliban reverses logic.  The problem is asserted to be that the Taliban are not involved in politics, and so the solution is proferred to give them more power and authority under the belief that this will bring peace.  In the Washington Post today we learn that the Waziristan area is under the control of the Taliban, and peace is not high on the Taliban’s agenda.

In a recent telephone interview with a Pakistani reporter, senior Taliban leader Dadullah Akhund said he had told local Taliban members to cease attacks in Pakistan but to continue their fight “abroad” against the U.S. military. He said that he had 500 suicide bombers and 12,000 fighters at his disposal and that by next spring the Taliban would have enough force to launch major attacks on Kabul, the Afghan capital.

“This deal has handed over North Waziristan to the Taliban,” Afrasiab Khattak, a human rights activist and secular politician, said in an interview in Peshawar, located in the so-called settled areas outside the tribal region. He said a hierarchy of Taliban commanders had taken control of North Waziristan, collecting taxes and meting out rough justice.

“The war in Afghanistan is totally from this side,” Khattak said. “It is a new round of jihad, and it is not going to remain inside the tribal enclaves.”

The Taliban has taken control over Waziristan and is patiently rebuilding their ranks.  Pakistani editorials urge more involvement in politics, and Musharraf denies that any of this matters by discussing Bin Laden rather than the Taliban.

And NATO should be watching and preparing to take action, or Afghanistan will fall back into the hands of the Taliban.