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The Jerusalem Post is reporting that an unidentified source in Israeli intellegence is saying that Hezbollah remains strong and relatively unaffected by the Israeli offensive:

Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, have spoken with enthusiasm about a multinational force, but the high-ranking officer said Monday that Hizbullah had not been damaged enough and still retained enough “diplomatic power” to thwart the deployment of such a force.

“Hizbullah has not been sufficiently weakened,” the officer said. “And there may be no choice but to expand the ground operation in the direction of the Litani River to achieve that goal.”

According to intelligence information, the Hizbullah command-and-control array is still functioning even after nearly four weeks of fighting. So are the logistical command centers – still operating and succeeding in directing the smuggling of weapons into Lebanon from Syria.

The officer said that Hizbullah still had the ability to fire short-range rockets, of which the guerrilla group has already fired 2,500 since the beginning of the war.

The only way to stop the short-range rockets, he said, was for the IDF to deepen its incursion north to the Litani and to sweep through cities like Tyre, estimated to be the hiding place for most of the short-range 122mm Katyusha rockets. 

In a stinging opinion piece in the Jerusalem Post, David Horovitz opines (this is an extended quote, but well worth the time to read it):

Almost four weeks into the war, Hizbullah mocks Israel’s inability to staunch the fire. The Arab world, part of which essentially backed Israel’s anti-Hizbullah offensive in its early stages, has withdrawn or, in many cases, thrown its weight publicly behind the terrorists amid daily evidence of Israel’s failure to decisively prevail. In America, analysts question Washington’s over-reliance on Israel, the little strategic ally that couldn’t.

But Israel could prevail in this conflict. Israel could silence the Katyusha launchers. What it would need do is resort to one of those two options – a much greater use of air power or a larger ground offensive.

Either of those avenues, however, would necessarily involve death on a far larger scale than we have seen thus far. Pulverizing air power would likely create Lebanese civilian casualties of a number that would dwarf the toll to date. Wider use of ground forces, on Hizbullah’s home territory, would likely dwarf the IDF toll hitherto sustained in the close-quarters fighting.

With every day’s evidence of underwhelming military success, the chorus swells in Israel that this is a no-brainer. The army is being humiliated, the argument runs; Israel’s critical deterrent capability is being shattered. Israel simply must ratchet up its military response to the daily rain of incoming rockets. And while some experts favor the ground-forces option, for others the choice is no choice at all: Dead Lebanese or dead Israelis? Why the hesitation?

And yet Israel hesitates. It certainly does not want to put more of its ground forces into harm’s way. But it also does not want to inflict civilian casualties on a more drastic scale in Lebanon.

This is partly because of a sense of short-term gain and long-term loss. A much more forceful use of air power might indeed shatter Hizbullah’s Katyusha capability and bring a respite to the North. But it also might leave Israel friendless internationally, and thus utterly vulnerable.

Without America in its corner, Israel is in real, existential trouble.

I have called for more aggressive ground action by the IDF, in part:

• IDF Loses Momentum?
• Israeli Air Force Shocked at Failure of Air Campaign 

But a combination of things have come together to put the Israelis in a terrible predicament right now:

1. Five years of buildup by Hezbollah (For the moderates and doves in Israel, let’s admit it together.  This occurred on Sharon’s watch.  There is a price to pay for such things.).
2. Hesitation at the potential of inflicting civilian casualties with an enemy who rejoices and celebrates at the deaths of innocents.
3. Israeli Air Force claims that air power alone could do most of the heavy lifting in the war.

This should have been a two or three-week war with tens of thousands of IDF troops going north, accompanied by heavy armor and all of the air power than Israel could muster at one time.  Instead, time has wasted away.  Hesitation always makes the losses worse.

Will Bush be able to stem the tide of anti-Israel sentiment long enough for Ehud Olmert to lead Israel out of this mess?  Is Ehud Olmert competant enough to lead Israel out of this mess?  Does Israel have the will to wage this war?

These are all salient questions and ones that will be answered in the near future.

On a side note, somehow I cannot see Israel in this same situation had Benjamin Netanyahu been Prime Minister.

**** UPDATE #1 ****

Continuing its incoherent military strategy against Hezbollah, Israel has apparently decided to ditch the plan to reach the Litani River.  It looks like Olmert and the IDF will pursue this half-way measure until the bitter end.

I predict that Hezbollah will be empowered by the apparent defeat of the IDF when this is all over.

**** UPDATE #2 ****

NRO has a good commentary from the editors:

Arabs are complaining that the proposed U.S./French resolution hands the Israelis their military objective by diplomatic means. So it does.

And here’s the rub: Israel does not appear to have been able to weaken Hezbollah sufficiently to compel it to go along with any settlement acceptable to the Jewish state. Perhaps when the fog of war lifts, Israel will be revealed to have damaged Hezbollah in a way that isn’t evident right now. If Israel were waging a war against bridges, highways, and south Beirut apartment buildings, it would be winning a smashing victory. But it is fighting a tenacious guerilla force that can be swept out of the south only with the kind of massive ground invasion that it has so far wanted to avoid. Instead, Israel has contented itself with quick hit-and-run raids, and has consequently been forced to fight for control of villages just inside the Lebanese border two or three times over.

Absent a clear Hezbollah defeat, a satisfactory diplomatic result is hard to imagine. The Lebanese government and other Arabs will find it difficult to stand up to a militia that fought the mighty Israelis at least to a draw. Any international peacekeeping force, meanwhile, is unlikely to hold its own against a Hezbollah that hasn’t been de-fanged, and such a force may well only become complicit in Hezbollah’s control of the south, in a repeat of the feckless performance of the current force, UNIFIL. 

There are a few options, then. Israel could significantly broaden its military offensive, which would offer the best chance of changing the dynamic; this is still under consideration. It could continue to fight a limited war against Hezbollah in some form or other for weeks, hoping that it can hurt Hezbollah over time and that no political disaster — like the fall of the Lebanese government — will happen in the interim. Or it can let American diplomacy run its course and hope for the best, knowing that the U.S. is not operating in ideal circumstances and that, even if Hezbollah accepts a deal, the outcome will probably only be a stopgap prior to the next war. If none of Israel’s options is appealing, it is because there are consequences to waging a mediocre military campaign (bold mine).

I was complaining about the military campaign two or more weeks ago, saying that this could be rectified and the whole campaign saved, if only the IDF would move immediately to a large-scale ground invasion of southern Lebanon.  Time was — and still is — of the essence.  As it is, it is doomed to fight a much more bloody campaign to take this territory than if they had taken our advice, and the Arab world is under no pressure to make a deal with Israel because of the failed military campaign.  A deal favorable to Israel will only be brokered if there is compelling reason for the Arab world to do so.  A military victory over Hezbollah would be just such a compelling reason.