From ABC News:

A scathing Senate report says US contractors in Afghanistan have hired warlords, “thugs,” Taliban commanders and even Iranian spies to provide security at vulnerable US military outposts in Afghanistan. The report, published by the Senate Armed Services Committee, says lax oversight and “systemic failures” have led to “grave risks’ to US forces, including instances where contractors have employed Afghan subcontractors who were “linked to murder, kidnapping and bribery, as well as Taliban and anti-coalition activities.” The chairman of the committee, Sen. Carl Levin, D.-Michigan, said the report was evidence that the US needs to reduce its reliance on contractors. “We need to shut off the spigot of US dollars flowing into the pockets of warlords and power brokers who act contrary to our interests,” said Sen. Levin. The committee reviewed roughly 125 unclassified Department of Defense security contracts between 2007 and 2009, and found that there are some 26,000 private security contractors operating in Afghanistan, the majority of whom are Afghan nationals. The review found “systemic failures” of the military oversight for contracts, including the hiring of what Levin called “many too many” security contractors who had been improperly vetted, improperly trained or were not provided weapons.

In some cases, companies were awarded contracts though they had no ability to provide the services needed. In those cases, companies then quickly hired local nationals without proper vetting or security checks. The chaotic system left US facilities and personnel vulnerable to attack. The report found that some Afghan security guards simply walked off their posts at remote forward operating bases.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the notion of hiring locals to perform force protection for the Marines would have been met with laughter and scoffing.  To be sure, the Marines embedded with the IPs, and hired Iraqis as interpreters.  They also hired the so-called Sons of Iraq to perform neighborhood watch and guard duty for gated communities.  But as for force protection proper, the Marines used Marines.

The Senator can pontificate all he wants about the need to stop the flow of dollars into the pockets of untrustworthy Afghans.  The troubled and troubling Hamid Karzai has already made illegal the hiring of non-Afghan contractors for anything except embassy force protection.  The puppet, as the Taliban call him, doesn’t very much like answering to the puppet master.  It’s almost as if he knows that the puppet master is looking for an exit.

You know there aren’t enough troops when you hire foreign spies to perform your force protection.  We should end all discussion of military doctrine surrounding force protection in our military schools.  It’s meaningless.  And no, just because I’m discussing force protection doesn’t mean that I don’t believe in force projection.  One doesn’t exclude the other, and the exercise of a little more force projection and killing the enemy while off of huge FOBs would mean the need for less force protection of U.S. troops by foreign spies.

In other words, if we were off of FOBs and if we didn’t have such a bloated support to infantry ratio, do you think this discussion would be happening right now?

Michael Yon has a must read on a great many subjects with several interesting themes, so drop by and pay him a visit – and then hit the tip jar for his good work.  One particularly interesting paragraph reads thusly:

Recently a mission was launched to Nimroz Province.  American Marines hovered in on two Osprey aircraft, secured the airfield (or at least brought a lot of guns), and later a British general landed in another Osprey and the meetings began.  The bottom line of the meetings was that we are not going to do much to help Nimroz Province.  It’s out of sight and out of mind.  The American way of doing things, along with British moral support, is to give money to people who are blowing you up and to ignore those who are neutral or helping you.  The meeting was as impressive as it was meaningless.  Swoop in on the loud Opsreys, set up machine gun positions, make a show of how nice it is to take off your body armor, talk a lot with nice words, and leave in the loud Ospreys.  Waste of time.  And if you dare try to calculate the hard and soft costs of that mission, it had to have cost well over a million dollars.

Well, Michael’s article is informative and compelling as always, but this part is depressing.  I have long feared – and written – that the Marines are losing the perspective and experience base they gained in the Anbar Province.  All I can say is that this sounds very much indeed like a worthless exercise.  And it also sounds like the British have affected the Marine perspective way too much.

Taking body armor off is irrelevant.  I know, General Petraeus asks the boys to show respect and take off their wrap arounds to talk to the elders, and so be it.  But I don’t really care that deeply about that issue either.  The same thing applied to Iraq, and the Marines regularly did what they wanted to do in Anbar.

Michael says that the American way of doing things is to give money to those who are blowing you up.  Well, maybe so, at least right now, and in Afghanistan.  It wasn’t so in Iraq, and it certainly wasn’t so with the Marines in the Anbar Province.  Remember Recon by Fire?  And I won’t recount the experiences of a certain Marine I know.  And just to give a little Army take on their action in Iraq:

One thing that I think many people forget about Iraq (or maybe it wasn’t reported?) is that in 2007 and 2008 we were killing and capturing lots of people on a nightly basis. Protecting the populace was A priority. When speaking to the folks back home, in order to sell the war, perhaps we said that it was the priority. But on the ground, I do not recall a single Commander’s Update Brief spending any time at all discussing what we had done to protect anyone. We were focused on punching al-Qaeda in the nuts at every opportunity and dismantling their networks. The reconcilables got the message loud and clear that they could take money and jobs in return for cooperation, or they would die a swift death when we came knocking down their doors in the middle of the night. The rest of the populace made it clear to them that they should take the offer. The only protection that the population got from us was good fire discipline so that we did not kill non-combatants. We made it clear that the government intended to win this thing and we did not send that message by delivering governance or digging wells. We shot motherf******s in the face.  Pop-COIN blasphemers, your scripture is false teaching. Here is some truth:

To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven: A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted; A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up; – Ecclesiastes 3:1-3 (KJV)

It’s time to kill.

True enough, there is the tea drinking, the sit-downs, the meetings, and the making nice with the locals.  My son did a lot of that in Anbar as well.  He also killed a lot of people.  It’s important which aspect comes first.  It means everything to the campaign.

Take off your wrap-arounds, remove your body armor, or shoot insurgents in the face?

Just saying.

From the BBC:

Five UK soldiers killed by a “rogue” Afghan police officer did not have enough pistols to defend themselves, one soldier’s father has said.

Adrian Major, of Cleethorpes, North East Lincs, whose 18-year-old son Jimmy was shot last year in Helmand, said he had been told it was too expensive to issue every soldier with a pistol.

“If I had known that, I would have bought him a side arm myself,” he said.

The MoD said cost was not an issue and not all troops carried a pistol.

But the BBC has learned this policy has now been reviewed.

Five servicemen died in the attack by Gul Buddin at a police outpost in Helmand, southern Afghanistan last November.

Radio 4′s File on 4 programme has also learned that the gunman should not have even been at the police post.

He had been employed unofficially by the local police commander, who is now under arrest.

The Taliban subsequently claimed they had carried out the attack.

The soldiers, who had been mentoring the Afghan police, had become concerned about their inability to verify the identity of some of the people they were working alongside.

The troops from the Grenadier Guards and the Royal Military Police had just returned from a morning patrol.

Once inside their defended compound, they put down their main weapons and removed their body armour, as Army rules allow.

A policeman known as Gul Buddin, who was on guard duty, stepped aside from his position and opened fire at close range on British soldiers sitting in a group.

Mr Major, from Cleethorpes, Lincolnshire, and other bereaved families have been briefed by British military personnel.

“Jimmy was on guard on the roof. He had just been relieved for five minutes and they were sat at the end of the building on a step and the Afghan policeman was in the corner and he just walked over and just opened up on them all as they were all just sat down chilling out,” he said.

“[The soldiers] are there to help the people. It’s like any soldier – if you are going to die, you want to die in combat. To be murdered in cold blood, it beggars belief,” he added.

“I think if they’d had side arms and body armour on, I don’t think he would have done it.

“He had the ideal opportunity – they were sat and relaxed and he took great advantage of it.”

The MoD said: “This is absolutely not an issue of cost – not all British troops routinely carry side arms.

“There are enough side arms in theatre, should individuals require them, and they will be carried if individuals are trained to do so and their roles require it.”

However, the BBC understands the MoD has investigated the possibility of issuing all its soldiers with side arms, with priority being given to troops involved in mentoring operations. It’s understood extra pistols have been bought and sent to Afghanistan.

It would seem questionable whether pistols would have stopped the attack if the attack was premeditated and it was conducted inside the wire.  Maybe so.  But let’s put aside that issue for a moment.  The MoD has a point, at least as it concerns standard protocol for issuing pistols.

Pistols are issued in the U.S. to fire team members who carry the SAW, of Squad Automatic Weapon.  It is also issued to squad leaders, even though those squad leaders also have their carbine (M4) or rifle (M16A4).  All of the Soldiers or Marines in infantry have the same MOS (military occupational specialty), but for those who have duties which require them to carry a SAW or be a squad leader, they also qualify on the pistol before being formally issued that pistol.  Soldiers and Marines who are infantrymen who do not carry a SAW or have the duties of squad member are not typically issued a pistol.

But what would be wrong with issuing a pistol to every Soldier or Marine who has the infantry MOS?  If we limit this to infantry, a small fraction of the overall force given the bloated ratio of support to infantry, cost is not a prohibitive concern.  Qualification on a pistol is not that time intensive or attention consuming.  Furthermore, being in infantry, they have been taught muzzle discipline and fire team and squad member responsibilities.

There is no good reason that I can think of not to issue pistols to all Soldiers and Marines who have the infantry MOS.

We have been stupid and allowed Hamid Karzai to do what he threatened to do in the interest of trying to create the perception of a viable government in Kabul.

The Afghan government said yesterday it has started dissolving private security businesses in the country by taking steps to end the operations of eight companies, including the one formerly known as Blackwater and three other international contractors.

“We have very good news for the Afghan people today,’’ presidential spokesman Waheed Omar told reporters in the capital. “The disbanding of eight private security firms has started.’’

Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced in August that private security contractors would have to cease operations by the end of the year — wiping out an industry with tens of thousands of guards who protect military convoys, government officials, and businesspeople.

Some security contractors have been criticized for operating more like private militias, and the government said it could not have armed groups that were independent of the police or military forces.

The eight companies include Xe Services, the North Carolina-based contractor formerly called Blackwater, and NCL Holdings LLC of Virginia, Four Horsemen International of New Mexico, and Compass International of London, Omar said.

Two large Afghan companies, White Eagle Security Services and Abdul Khaliq Achakzai, are on the list. The remaining two companies are small operations with fewer than 100 employees, so he declined to name them.

Omar said many of the companies had turned in weapons, some voluntarily. He did not say why the eight had been chosen as the first to be closed down, and if any international companies had actually left the country. A statement issued by the president’s office was more strongly worded, saying that the process of closing down the eight companies was “almost complete.’’

An owner of White Eagle, Sayed Maqsud, said his company had handed over weapons for a contract that was completed but was still employing guards under another contract.

“We are not shut down. Only we gave up 340 weapons,’’ Maqsud said, explaining that the company’s contract to guard fuel convoys for American troops in southern Helmand province had ended. He said he fired 530 guards who had been working under that program when the contract finished and handed over the guns to the government.

However, he said they have another 1,200 guards protecting cellphone towers for South Africa-based mobile phone company MTN, with plans to continue that unless the government says they have to close down.

Karzai’s original decree on private security companies gave an exemption to companies that guard the compounds of international embassies or organizations. It was unclear what this means for companies on the list that also have contracts to guard US government installations or other diplomatic missions.

Omar said the government was focused on security companies that are providing protection for highways or convoys, not those training Afghan forces or guarding embassies. He said the national security forces are not yet able to protect embassies and international organizations.

The US Embassy in Kabul said it was looking into what the decision would mean for US government contracts.

The Afghan government has estimated that 30,000 to 40,000 armed security guards are working in the country. The Interior Ministry has 52 security companies licensed, but some older contracts are still being completed by unlicensed operations. About half of the companies are Afghan-owned.

I’m sure that this will end well.  I’m sure that this is “very good news for the Afghan people.”  I’m sure that the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police will be able to fill the gap.  And you know all about the Taliban having infiltrated the ANA and ANP, right?  And you know all about the inability of NGOs to perform their function due to the increase in security incidents, right?

I’m sure that this will end well for the campaign.

An important and recent account of combat action from a friend and patriot currently in Afghanistan.

How can you not love and admire the American fighting man. Men who are sent perform pointless, thankless tasks in the service of their nation. Poorly lead, poorly supported; they still manage to perform with patience and valor. It is unfortunate that there are no words to describe the thoughts and actions of such men. I try to explain to the privileged 99% of American citizens who do not serve, just what this means. And fail miserably. They just look at me, disbelief on their faces and I’m sure, disgust on mine.

So the platoon is vehicle mounted, MRAPS and Hmmwv’s with ANA in Ford Rangers. The platoon negotiates a defile with high ground all around and the ambush is sprung when the lead and then trail vehicles are disabled with IED and RPG fire. Its a good size linear ambush; PKM’s and RPG’s. The platoon takes causalities immediately and all vehicular maneuver is initially destroyed under intense fire. The soldiers dismount to fight for their lives. Even the gunners are forced off their turrets.The Taliban forces have RPG 9′s and are trying to take the vehicles apart even as the PKM fire is pinning the dismounts and killing and wounding. C2 is a mess and the some of the ANA forces are trying to run away.

One soldier, armed with an old iron sighted M14 he found in a Conex container in a small outpost, targets three PKM gunners who have the main element pinned down. The Taliban forces intend to reduce this force to the point that they can conduct a ground assault across the ambush site and secure equipment and prisoners. Platoon leadership is massing fires and calling for Medivac and CAS, but it’s not going too well.

The RPG men are at 200-350 meters, close to their max range. They are popping up and down over various rocky berms that define the surrounding high ground above the kill zone. They know their business; target the vehicles and masses of men, hold them in place so that the machinegun fire and ground assault forces can finish the job. As they pop up and down they make lousy targets for the ambushed forces pinned down below. The RPG’s are fast and loud and leave an evil, snaking, brown smoke trail in their wake.

Its the PKM fire that is the real issue. Cleverly and with sound tactical acumen, they are positioned within their max range on a berm above and behind the RPG gunners. It is very difficult for the U.S. Forces on the valley floor to see them and fix them with their own fires. Here the M4 is not really in its element. Firing up slope from exposed positions at machine gunners with cover and concealment, the little 5.56mm round is no match for the  7.62mm rounds delivered at a high rate of fire. The soldiers are off their trucks, away from their own machine guns and heavy weapons which again are very limited due to the steeply sloping terrain. They are difficult to elevate to the point that effective fire can be delivered. The Taliban RPG and PKM gunners suffer no limitations.

The platoon leadership struggles to maintain their fires and a fighting force. Despite all the chaos they begin to get vehicles moving and their remaining heavy weapons on target. The Taliban is tightening the noose on this ambush. The balance of the U.S. forces are still dismounted, returning fire and treating casualties. The Taliban now has 360 degree fire on this tiny force. U.S. Forces are surrounded and need to get the heck out of there.

The M14 gunner has watched fire from 3 specific PKM’s who have the front, back and sides of the ambushed forces pinned down. With some assistance spotting fire, he is able to silence or slow them down. He then takes the initiative and with a fire team in tow; maneuvers on a ridge line and kills the assault commander, his body guard and other PKM gunners. This breaks the back of the assault force and the platoon is now able to take charge of their Alamo Vally and recover their tactical loses from the ambush. CAS is now on site but no one cares. It’s F15′s and they rarely drop anything for fear of civilian collateral damage. Besides, the Platoon FAC is mired in ROE as opposed to mission, concerns. He is removed from the platoon COP within 24 hours of this fight.

The ambush is defeated but the remains of the platoon have very little time to recover and remove their own dead and wounded and to police the Taliban dead. The remains of the Taliban force are quickly scrutinized. The U.S Forces need to get the heck out of this ambush site before they are counter attacked by a larger Taliban force.

The Taliban assault force commander is well dressed and equipped. His pockets are rifled to reveal papers identifying him as a Pakistani Intelligence official. Its difficult to match his identification papers to his person because he was shot in the face and not much remains. He is also caring a small black book that has identifying and contact information for all the ANA and ANP officials in this area. The platoon interpreter is on site and he suggests that the information in this black book demonstrates the complicity of all local Afghan officials.

The Platoon consolidates vehicles and equipment for evacuation. Dustoff arrives for the wounded and though full of complaints, hauls the combat dead as well. Some equipment is destroyed on site with Thermite and direct fire and the Platoon returns to their COP to debrief, refit and turn-in their hard earned combat intelligence. Its really just another day in Afghanistan.

There are many themes from previous discussions, from Pakistani duplicity in this campaign, to micromanagement of the enlisted men, to ANA cowardice and lack of discipline, to the need for additional training in marksmanship and the need to arm members of fire teams and squads with various weapons that enable them to engage in more long range fire and maneuver tactics (in Marine Corps terms, this would mean relying heavily on the DM, or Designated Marksman, or Scout Sniper for long range targeting).  It also means arming squads with M14s or some equivalent weapon.  There are tens of thousands of M14s still in armories in the U.S. waiting to be utilized.

But without rehearsing too much detail on the main themes of heroism, megalomaniacal staff level officers, weapons training and selection, and poor performance of our allies, this account takes its place among the great ones in this campaign.  God bless the U.S. warrior.