Comments on: On Negotiating with the Taliban http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/10/05/on-negotiating-with-the-taliban/ News & Commentary on Warfare, Policy and Counterterrorism Thu, 18 Mar 2010 15:02:46 -0400 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: roger29palms http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/10/05/on-negotiating-with-the-taliban/comment-page-1/#comment-26617 roger29palms Mon, 06 Oct 2008 21:21:58 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/?p=1327#comment-26617 If the press is accurate, there appears to be signs of a backlash in Pakistan so the playing field is beginning to be prepped there. The comments reported earlier this year of Afghanis wanting security indicates that [most] humans everywhere have common wants and needs. As the Taliban and AQ are still stuck in high school, thinking they can cow the populace with threats and mayhem, I would say that one aspect of the battlefield's prepation is playing into our hands. I recall reading last year a comment by an unnamed Marine captain to the effect that the sheiks in Anbar were businessmen and AQ was bad for business. That was the most cognizant comment I have read in all my reading about this situation. You are correct though, about the need for enough force, and I didn't mean to sound like Mr.'s Chamberlain, O'bama, and the embarrassingly naive N. Pelosi and J. Carter. Firepower can alter one's mindset. I believe it was in "Charlie Wilson's War" that the statement was made that the anti-Russian fight was flagging until the stingers were introduced whereupon the mujahiden found new enthusiasm and went on to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan. If the press is accurate, there appears to be signs of a backlash in Pakistan so the playing field is beginning to be prepped there. The comments reported earlier this year of Afghanis wanting security indicates that [most] humans everywhere have common wants and needs. As the Taliban and AQ are still stuck in high school, thinking they can cow the populace with threats and mayhem, I would say that one aspect of the battlefield’s prepation is playing into our hands.
I recall reading last year a comment by an unnamed Marine captain to the effect that the sheiks in Anbar were businessmen and AQ was bad for business. That was the most cognizant comment I have read in all my
reading about this situation.
You are correct though, about the need for enough force, and I didn’t mean to sound like Mr.’s Chamberlain, O’bama, and the embarrassingly naive N. Pelosi and J. Carter. Firepower can alter one’s mindset. I believe it was in “Charlie Wilson’s War” that the statement was made that the anti-Russian fight was flagging until the stingers were introduced whereupon the mujahiden found new enthusiasm and went on to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan.

]]> By: Herschel Smith http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/10/05/on-negotiating-with-the-taliban/comment-page-1/#comment-26615 Herschel Smith Mon, 06 Oct 2008 15:17:25 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/?p=1327#comment-26615 Of course, but you're helping me to make my point. Remember how secular the Anbaris were. Sheikh Risha himself was a chain smoker, and many Marines were able to stop in to homes during patrols and watch U.S. football and other such things on TV. Imposition of the austere AQ brand of extremism was foreign. Even so, the Anbaris needed force behind them to resist AQ, and they found it in the Marines. Afghanistan will be a different game altogether. Roads, power, air conditioning, infrastructure, and the many things that mark Iraq won't matter. The Marines in Helmand haven't had power for seven months where they are. There is none to be had. It's already austere there. I'm not as sanguine as you about the possibilities, especially without force projection. There is no magic. Even in Anbar we didn't recite some incantation to do COIN. Hard work was involved, and I'm afraid that we are tending towards the incantation version in Afghanistan rather than the hard work version. Of course, but you’re helping me to make my point. Remember how secular the Anbaris were. Sheikh Risha himself was a chain smoker, and many Marines were able to stop in to homes during patrols and watch U.S. football and other such things on TV. Imposition of the austere AQ brand of extremism was foreign. Even so, the Anbaris needed force behind them to resist AQ, and they found it in the Marines.

Afghanistan will be a different game altogether. Roads, power, air conditioning, infrastructure, and the many things that mark Iraq won’t matter. The Marines in Helmand haven’t had power for seven months where they are. There is none to be had. It’s already austere there.

I’m not as sanguine as you about the possibilities, especially without force projection. There is no magic. Even in Anbar we didn’t recite some incantation to do COIN. Hard work was involved, and I’m afraid that we are tending towards the incantation version in Afghanistan rather than the hard work version.

]]> By: roger29palms http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/10/05/on-negotiating-with-the-taliban/comment-page-1/#comment-26614 roger29palms Mon, 06 Oct 2008 14:34:47 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/?p=1327#comment-26614 I have always thought that a large factor in our success in Iraq was the unacceptable behavior of Al Queda. I think a similiar situation will arise or has arisen with the Taliban and their austere view of how people should lead their lives. I have always thought that a large factor in our success in Iraq was the unacceptable behavior of Al Queda. I think a similiar situation will arise or has arisen with the Taliban and their austere view of how people should lead their lives.

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