Oh wait, I didn’t translate that into british:

Bollocks! This blog is pants. Daft American prats, at least we Brits won the Revolu … oh sod off!

One important point missed in both of the comments above is that first of all, the British experience in Basra was not good, while the U.S. experience in Anbar, while difficult, was successful. This is important not because there is no history of COIN experience by other countries in other eras of history and other parts of the world, but precisely because that is so.

The British experience in Northern Ireland was, if we face the truth, COIN among their own people. Same language, same basic culture (Protestants and Catholics worship the same God even if different in worship form), same technology, same family structures, etc.

For Soldiers and Marines to be dropped into Iraq (Middle East, different language, tribal culture, sectarianism prone to killing rather than simply arguing, and a recent history of brutality and torture under one of the worst dictators in world history) is quite literally like being dropped onto another planet.

COIN must be adaptable, adjusted, maleable, etc. The public also must be behind the campaign, or it won’t succeed. The fact of the matter is that the U.S. needs NATO only to the extent that we aren’t willing to expand the force size and properly fund the war. NATO is functioning as surrogate U.S. forces.

As to the experience in SE Asia, I know senior level field grade officers (Colonel) who agree with me that the COIN campaign was robust and successful, and the final victory for the North was conventional. Let’s just agree to disagree on that one.

I have plenty of posts on the issue of talks with the Sunnis in Anbar being done from a position of strength (i.e., more than 2 years of hard core kinetic operations that exhausted the enemy) versus the British experience in Basra being a diminution of security from the beginning due to strategy. This post was not written in a vacuum. This points to the summary of all of the above, which is that the track record you speak of is only partially relevant. The transnational insurgency we face today is of a different paradigm (tribal, at least partially, partially religious and partially not, standoff weapons such as IEDs due to historical era, borderless due to ease of transit, dealing with populations that have been tortured and brutalized, populations that have had to deal with globalization, and so on and on).

The final point I will make is that while you point to the tone of my post, and share your disagreement with my views, you should realize (by studying the links and links contained in prior links) that this is a continuation of debates happening at the highest levels of the Pentagon as we speak. Gates wants to divorce U.S. troops from the NATO efforts and is looking for a way to do this without offending our NATO partners. So - there are the facts for you.

“If the Dutch are in charge it doesn’t bode well since they have no counterinsurgency experience. They also recently deployed troops to the campaign who were surprised that the Taliban were engaged in armed resistance to NATO forces.”

The first sentance is just plain wrong, as the Dutch with their colonial past have ample experience. From http://www.onderzoekinformatie.nl/nl/oi/nod/onderzoek/OND1328964/ (found by google with “dutch counterinsurgency”):

“For example the British, French and Americans have not only fought recent insurgencies, but also gained counterinsurgency experience during their colonial era. The Dutch forces share a similar background. During the initial stages of the ISAF-mission and the operation in the Iraqi province Al-Muthanna Dutch soldiers had a taste of fighting insurgencies. Even earlier peace keeping operations as in Cam-bodia and Lebanon brought some experiences. However, the major part of the Dutch counterinsurgency experiences was gained in the colonial past. In particular the Dutch East Indies turned out to be a hard but valuable learning school.”

The second sentance is a distortion and simplification of facts. The fact that the population fled to the still dutch controlled area signals which side they prefer. I don’t want to turn this into a debate on wether the Dutch have the right strategy though, but it’s clear they have one.

“The British want to pull back on the violence, reminiscent of their irrelevant recollections of Northern Ireland.”

Why irrelevant? And are the other british experiences irrelevant as well?

“[..] unless U.S. forces are free to conduct counterinsurgency as they need to.”

The problem in my opinion is the lack of an overall synchronized strategy, which ever that may be. Let different nations run off and do their own thing will be couter-productive and make the coalition lose any credibility left.

“As for SE Asia, the COIN campaign was won.”

To my information, there was never a COIN campaign. On a small scale atempts at COIN were tried and were successful, but they were never incorporated in a full strategy for the conflict.

To be honest, I find the tone of your article a bit misplaced. The US did not invent COIN, nor does it have a better track-record then any of the nations you mentioned. ISAF has spend less time in Afghanistan’s south then the OEF and I wouldn’t say they were doing worse. Fact is that the US needs NATO and others (not to forget!) and that means compromise. Wether you like it or not.

Second, listen very carefully. As to the balance of your comment, back off of the yelling. Posting comments is a privilege, not a right. If you wish to disagree with my positions, that’s acceptable. Just above your comment is one that disagrees, and does so respectfully (and better than you do). You’ll learn to do that or get kicked out. I don’t owe you a forum to discuss your views.

As to the actual content of the balance of your post, there isn’t much there to which I feel a need to respond. If you had taken the time to research my stuff before you screamed you would know that I have other posts that address the very real differences between what we did in Anbar (from a position of strength) and what the Brits did in Helmund (from a position of weakness). Quite simply, there is no analogy.

As for SE Asia, the COIN campaign was won. The war was lost when NVA regulars came in and Congress lost heart. But this is very far afield. Next time, try to stay on point and respectful, and do your homework before posting.

Oh. And I am talking about the Dutch. Don’t be stolid (although it must be pointed out that there is a very real doctrinal split between how the U.S. did COIN in Anbar and the British did it in Basra). We all see the results.