Comments on: Concerning Killing Bad Guys and Sacking Worthless Officers http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/02/13/concerning-killing-bad-guys-and-sacking-worthless-officers/ News & Commentary on Warfare, Policy and Counterterrorism Sat, 30 Aug 2008 09:38:53 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5 By: Herschel Smith http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/02/13/concerning-killing-bad-guys-and-sacking-worthless-officers/#comment-24937 Herschel Smith Tue, 19 Feb 2008 03:18:38 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/02/13/concerning-killing-bad-guys-and-sacking-worthless-officers/#comment-24937 Thanks, and I agree with your comments entirely. Until the operational strategy is coherent, numbers don't matter. Thanks, and I agree with your comments entirely. Until the operational strategy is coherent, numbers don’t matter.

]]> By: TF6S http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/02/13/concerning-killing-bad-guys-and-sacking-worthless-officers/#comment-24933 TF6S Mon, 18 Feb 2008 20:51:56 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/02/13/concerning-killing-bad-guys-and-sacking-worthless-officers/#comment-24933 This is an excellent analysis, albeit a depressing one. With all the lessons the military has learned in Iraq, it is rather disturbing to see that our allies, for ideological reasons, refuse to rethink their own positions as al-Qaeda concentrates its resources, solidifies itself in Pakistan and launches a new offensive aimed at demoralizing the West one tribal atrocity at a time. I can understand the general population or civilian politicians having a hard time understanding the nuances of COIN, but for high ranking officers to display such ignorance is really problematic. Your operational strategy has to target the operational strategy of your enemy. In this case, your point about our Allies refusing to engage in kinetic operations, is actually supporting--instead of confronting, challenging and attacking--the operational strategy of the Taliban resurgence. Arguments about armor, troop levels, coordination and training of indigenous people, the rebuilding of infrastructure, etc. are moot until your operational strategy is aligned to attack and defeat your enemy's. If your strategy is faulty, you'll never be able to build enough roads, schools and water treatment facilities in the same way that you'll never have enough boots on the ground to kill enough bad guys. There are going to be some tough times ahead in this theater. This is an excellent analysis, albeit a depressing one. With all the lessons the military has learned in Iraq, it is rather disturbing to see that our allies, for ideological reasons, refuse to rethink their own positions as al-Qaeda concentrates its resources, solidifies itself in Pakistan and launches a new offensive aimed at demoralizing the West one tribal atrocity at a time.

I can understand the general population or civilian politicians having a hard time understanding the nuances of COIN, but for high ranking officers to display such ignorance is really problematic. Your operational strategy has to target the operational strategy of your enemy. In this case, your point about our Allies refusing to engage in kinetic operations, is actually supporting–instead of confronting, challenging and attacking–the operational strategy of the Taliban resurgence.

Arguments about armor, troop levels, coordination and training of indigenous people, the rebuilding of infrastructure, etc. are moot until your operational strategy is aligned to attack and defeat your enemy’s. If your strategy is faulty, you’ll never be able to build enough roads, schools and water treatment facilities in the same way that you’ll never have enough boots on the ground to kill enough bad guys.

There are going to be some tough times ahead in this theater.

]]>