However, I am in position to express an opinion since I am physically in France at this time and be somewhat knowledgeable on French politics and defense.

France has consistently expressed its will to restore diplomatic relations with the United States since the election of Nicolas Sarkozy, which happened earlier this year; and I haven’t been able to spot any clue suggesting a lack of sincerity in this praiseworthy endeavor as yet.

As far as I can see, all U.S. or else experts who wrote on this subject seem to share the same opinion.

Notwithstanding, I consider that this friendly attitude is still too fresh to make any serious forecast, or even just draw definitive conclusions, for the following reasons.

The new French President has to cope with a strong and largely represented left-leaning opposition at home, both within the government in particular and in officialdom in general. “Traditionally,” if I may say so, the United States doesn’t enjoy good image within the walls of the Ministry of Defense, from top to bottom and since long already; and this detail deserves to be taken in consideration given the tremendous influence this ministry exerts in this country. In this latter case this attitude owes much less to “usual” French anti-Americanism than to a feeling made up of distrust and jealousy sustained by an unmistakable and pointless complex of inferiority.

French economy is in bad shape and, despite the visible efforts of the daring new President to slow down the steady fall of the French industry in all domains, there is no signs suggesting any significant improvement at this time. This is normal since the whole French private economy is still crippled by constraining regulations on labor force, heavy taxes, and by an ubiquitous as elusive presence of the state at nearly all levels of the society; all characteristics that claim much longer than a few months to be changed, if ever there is such thing as a sincere will to change things that thoroughly.

All these difficulties limit considerably any ambitions of significant military intervention or cooperation on the side of the United States in particular from a political standpoint at this time, as with anyone else owing to economic reasons in general.

Also, there are numerous historical records in French politics suggesting ever possible sudden and unexpected reversal.

Prudence strongly recommends to bear this in mind.

Ultimately—and that is a more personal consideration—we cannot allow ourselves to neglect the worse case scenario, which is based on a lesson Russia, and Vladimir Putin more especially, taught us. That is, the new French president and his policy may ever aim at no more than temporarily beguiling the confidence and trust of the United States as part of a long termed and less friendly strategy. We have to ascertain that the new French friendly attitude toward the United States and its allies is authentic, durable, and that the less or more known strong and decades-long Russian influence in France has not played a part at some point in this context.

As yet, all new measures adopted by the government of Nicolas Sarkozy, though they appear to be suitable in some instances, could not be totally incompatible in a remote future with a domestic policy similar to this we are witnessing in Russia today.
Another coincidence which makes me somewhat uncomfortable is that much more than half the members of the new French government holding key positions are left-leaning old-guard politics who are not notoriously known for their sympathy in favor of free-entrepreneurship and individual freedom and their proponents.
At this last regard, if I accept as valid this theory of diversion aiming at the French Socialist Party, which seems to provide its share of unexpected results, yet I fail to see at which point it applies to former Ministers of the Jacques Chirac’s government.

Wait and see, once more.