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	<title>Comments on: Are We Bribing the Sheikhs?</title>
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	<description>News &#38; Commentary on Warfare, Policy and Counterterrorism</description>
	<pubDate>Sat, 30 Aug 2008 10:01:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Slab</title>
		<link>http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/11/12/are-we-bribing-the-sheikhs/#comment-23641</link>
		<dc:creator>Slab</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Nov 2007 04:01:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Herschel, I wouldn't be so fast to denounce CSM on their reporting.  Their assessment on the pressure to recruit leaders to counter the insurgency looks pretty accurate from where I am sitting.  And they are right to voice concern over the partnership with the Sunni tribes - if we forget to keep a wary eye on our erst-while allies, we run the risk of committing similar mistakes as certain Latin American governments, whose support of "pro-government" paramilitary groups backfired when those groups grew beyond the ability of the government to control them.  I believe our partnership with the Sunni groups is the right strategy for now, but we must always keep an eye towards transitioning control from the unofficial militias to GoI security forces.  That might even mean one day having to use force to facilitate that transition.  The goal is not just short term peace and stability, it is long term stability backed by a legitimate Government of Iraq.  That, as you have alluded to, requires quite a bit of reform on the part of the GoI so that their promises are no longer "empty", but it still must remain our eventual goal.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Herschel, I wouldn&#8217;t be so fast to denounce CSM on their reporting.  Their assessment on the pressure to recruit leaders to counter the insurgency looks pretty accurate from where I am sitting.  And they are right to voice concern over the partnership with the Sunni tribes - if we forget to keep a wary eye on our erst-while allies, we run the risk of committing similar mistakes as certain Latin American governments, whose support of &#8220;pro-government&#8221; paramilitary groups backfired when those groups grew beyond the ability of the government to control them.  I believe our partnership with the Sunni groups is the right strategy for now, but we must always keep an eye towards transitioning control from the unofficial militias to GoI security forces.  That might even mean one day having to use force to facilitate that transition.  The goal is not just short term peace and stability, it is long term stability backed by a legitimate Government of Iraq.  That, as you have alluded to, requires quite a bit of reform on the part of the GoI so that their promises are no longer &#8220;empty&#8221;, but it still must remain our eventual goal.</p>
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