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	<title>Comments on: Calamity in Basra and British Rules of Engagement</title>
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	<link>http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/07/23/calamity-in-basra-and-british-rules-of-engagement/</link>
	<description>News &#38; Commentary on Warfare, Policy and Counterterrorism</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 08 Aug 2008 18:26:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Slab</title>
		<link>http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/07/23/calamity-in-basra-and-british-rules-of-engagement/#comment-22498</link>
		<dc:creator>Slab</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2007 16:35:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>GI, an excellent point. Don't forget, the Marine Corps made a lot of noise about using the "soft" approach shortly before being handed Anbar province in 2004. There was a lot of talk of patrolling in soft covers, and even wearing our woodland uniforms to clearly distinguish us from the U.S. Army. We were going to do it different, and better, than the U.S. Army had done it, or so we said. That all changed when Fallujah and Ramadi blew up in our faces, of course. The difference is, we got past our hubris, and we didn't hunker down inside our FOBs - we went out in pursuit of the enemy.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>GI, an excellent point. Don&#8217;t forget, the Marine Corps made a lot of noise about using the &#8220;soft&#8221; approach shortly before being handed Anbar province in 2004. There was a lot of talk of patrolling in soft covers, and even wearing our woodland uniforms to clearly distinguish us from the U.S. Army. We were going to do it different, and better, than the U.S. Army had done it, or so we said. That all changed when Fallujah and Ramadi blew up in our faces, of course. The difference is, we got past our hubris, and we didn&#8217;t hunker down inside our FOBs - we went out in pursuit of the enemy.</p>
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		<title>By: GI</title>
		<link>http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/07/23/calamity-in-basra-and-british-rules-of-engagement/#comment-22321</link>
		<dc:creator>GI</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Aug 2007 10:52:44 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I have had a number of British and even Aussies tell me that the US ROE in the Sunni Triangle was to tough and incorrect strategy compared to what the way they do things down south.  

I always reply that they are always welcome to redeploy their forces to the Sunni Triangle and try out their strategy and see how it works and show us Yanks how it is done.  They never seem to like that idea.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have had a number of British and even Aussies tell me that the US ROE in the Sunni Triangle was to tough and incorrect strategy compared to what the way they do things down south.  </p>
<p>I always reply that they are always welcome to redeploy their forces to the Sunni Triangle and try out their strategy and see how it works and show us Yanks how it is done.  They never seem to like that idea.</p>
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