Iran Poised to Strike as the Intelligence Community Wonders
BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 1 month ago
In Critical Errors in Assessing Iran as we have done previously, we pointed out that Iran is currently engaging in covert war with the U.S., both inside and outside the borders of Iraq. The U.S. intelligence community has had difficulty with this idea, questioning on the one hand whether the so-called “highest levels” of Iranian power knew and approved of the activities of al Quds, and on the other hand even taking the view early on that Iran actually sought and desired a stable and secure Iraq.
At a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence … the outgoing director of national intelligence, John Negroponte, said the old view was that Iran does not want a civil war in Iraq. But he said this assessment was changing.
“One has to wonder why it is that they have increased their supply of these kinds of lethal weapons to extremist Shia groups in Iraq, provoking violence, attacks on coalition forces, and others. And one wonders if their policy towards Iraq may not have shifted to a more aggressive posture than it has been in the past,” he said.
Concerning the most recent meeting in Baghdad, it is not clear what if anything would be accomplished, because the U.S. has met discretely with Iran for years. In Intelligence Bulletin #1 we discussed the Iranian al Quds forces, and later in The Covert War with Iran we detailed some of the Iranian activities inside Iraq. Yet there is even more current evidence against Iran concerning weapons in the southern portion of Iraq, and specifically Basra. Data on Iranian involvement in Basra attacks against British forces has been compiled.
The Sun, 5 March – British troops in Iraq are being bombarded by new rockets and mortars supplied by Iran.
The missiles have caused 30 casualties so far at one large base in Basra alone.
The Sun has seen remnants and duds from the giant cache that prove they could NOT have been made in Iraq.
They are freshly painted, dated “2006
On March 12, 2007 at 8:52 am, Glenmore said:
I wonder if Asgari had to leave Iran because the decision had been made to use intel from him in a public or at least a non-secure way, such that he would have likely been revealed.
If the decision is that Iran shall not have nukes, and if the desire is that brute force not be used to enforce that decision, then what are the alternatives? The only thing that would have a chance is overwhelming unity among the rest of the world – which just won’t happen with the current lack of belief in anything the US government says. But perhaps, just maybe, a critical mass (heh) of world governments would accept the word of Asgari regarding the Mad Mullahs plans, and work together to try to stop them without military force – through meaningful economic force. It may not be LIKELY to work, but perhaps a decision was made to try it, as one last chance to avoid war.
On March 12, 2007 at 11:41 am, Dominique R. Poirier said:
This comment relates to the statement made by Mr. John Negroponte one may read in the first extract of this post.
In my opinion, the initial assessment of Mr. Negroponte about Iran was certainly correct. Just, things changed since then and this may owe to two reasons.
The first one may be that Iranian attitude changed for reasons relating to the sanctions and strong reaction of Washington about the evolution of its nuclear program. At some regards this may remind the principle of uncertainty as explained by the physicist Werner Heisenberg, but applied here to foreign affairs. As a way of saying in passing, Russian analysts use to see things under the angle of epistemology, an approach which encompasses good knowledge of the principles of uncertainty; and certainty as well. In other words, observation does influence the outcome of any action or event at the level of a particle, as well as it happens in strategy and military and foreign affairs.
The second reason may be found while looking at events at a broader scale than this of Iranian politics and aims and goals per se. I mean that events occurring in the Middle East in general and relating to Iranian moves and shifts of attitude may be attributable to other reasons, goals, and aims, once one attempt to put them side by side with other different events happening in some others places and region of the world. I slightly evoked this point in another comment relating to Iran and I didn’t elaborate then in order not to wander from the matter at hand.
Actually, my point was, and still is, that Iranian moves, and the way things evolve in the Middle East, entertain certain coherence with other events happening, say, in some parts of the Southern American continent, in certain parts of Europe, and in certain parts of the African continent. This enumeration is not exhaustive.
I warn my reader at that point of my comment that this I am suggesting must be considered as mere conjectures.
So, when we attempt to find a possible relationship, or common point, between some of those events, or/and certain moves and changes of attitude expressed by certain foreign leaders, or/and the evolution of terrorism noticed here and there, or/and events relating to economy and industry in some instances, we may have an inkling of a likely grand strategy aiming at undermining the U.S. interests, and policy, and set of values at a worldwide scale. Let me make clear that this has nothing to do with mere anti-Americanism.
Of course, I constantly keep in mind that hostile attitudes toward the U.S. noticed here or there may not always be imputable to such a grand, planned and orchestrated strategy, but to local trends and to the individual will of some; exactly as it happens when isolate persons decide, entirely by their own, to commit hostile acts against U.S. interests before falsely claiming they belong to Al Qaeda. In order not to make my comment too long I deliberately reduce the origin of this last kind of phenomenon to mere emulation. Then, on a case by case basis, this emulation may, on the long term, favor, or give way to, alliance with partners which are truly acting in the frame of a coherent grand strategy.
While attempting to question and restructure and question again my own hypothesis in an effort to give it an understandable and likely “shape