Myths About Afghanistan
Victor Davis Hanson on whether Afghanistan is really the "graveyard of empires ..."
In Critical Errors in Assessing Iran as we have done previously, we pointed out that Iran is currently engaging in covert war with the U.S., both inside and outside the borders of Iraq. The U.S. intelligence community has had difficulty with this idea, questioning on the one hand whether the so-called “highest levels” of Iranian power knew and approved of the activities of al Quds, and on the other hand even taking the view early on that Iran actually sought and desired a stable and secure Iraq.
At a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence … the outgoing director of national intelligence, John Negroponte, said the old view was that Iran does not want a civil war in Iraq. But he said this assessment was changing.
“One has to wonder why it is that they have increased their supply of these kinds of lethal weapons to extremist Shia groups in Iraq, provoking violence, attacks on coalition forces, and others. And one wonders if their policy towards Iraq may not have shifted to a more aggressive posture than it has been in the past,” he said.
Concerning the most recent meeting in Baghdad, it is not clear what if anything would be accomplished, because the U.S. has met discretely with Iran for years. In Intelligence Bulletin #1 we discussed the Iranian al Quds forces, and later in The Covert War with Iran we detailed some of the Iranian activities inside Iraq. Yet there is even more current evidence against Iran concerning weapons in the southern portion of Iraq, and specifically Basra. Data on Iranian involvement in Basra attacks against British forces has been compiled.
The Sun, 5 March – British troops in Iraq are being bombarded by new rockets and mortars supplied by Iran.
The missiles have caused 30 casualties so far at one large base in Basra alone.
The Sun has seen remnants and duds from the giant cache that prove they could NOT have been made in Iraq.
They are freshly painted, dated “2006� and have been scrubbed clean to hide any markings.
Shi’ite Muslim extremists are also slipping over the border for Iranian-funded training in how to use them, senior officers say.
The new explosives began to rain down on Basra three months ago. They include 107mm Katyusha-style rockets and 81mm and 60mm mortars.
Basra Palace — home to the 2nd Battalion, The Rifles’ Battle Group — has taken almost 90 strikes, wounding 30. Previously rebels used old stocks from raided Iraqi army bases.
But no heavy calibre munitions have been made in Iraq since 2003.
Rifles’ Intelligence Officer Lt Matt Birbeck said: “A lot of work has been done on this by us and the Americans and we think the new projectiles are being supplied by Iran.
“But they are being clever about it, hiding their tracks.�
Iranian involvement doesn’t stop at Iraq, however. There are regional implications for an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.
The Sunday Telegraph, 4 March – Iran has trained secret networks of agents across the Gulf states to attack Western interests and incite civil unrest in the event of a military strike against its nuclear programme, a former Iranian diplomat has told The Sunday Telegraph.
Spies working as teachers, doctors and nurses at Iranian-owned schools and hospitals have formed sleeper cells ready to be “unleashed” at the first sign of any serious threat to Teheran, it is claimed.
Trained by Iranian intelligence services, they are also said to be recruiting fellow Shias in the region, whose communities have traditionally been marginalised by the Gulf’s ruling Sunni Arab clans.
Were America or Israel to attack Iran, such cells would be instructed to foment long-dormant sectarian grievances and attack the extensive American and European business interests in wealthy states such as Dubai and Saudi Arabia. Such a scenario would bring chaos to the Gulf, one of the few areas of the Middle East that remains prosperous and has largely pro-Western governments.
The claims have been made by Adel Assadinia, a former career diplomat who was Iran’s consul-general in Dubai and an adviser to the Iranian foreign ministry.
Here at TCJ we have not wondered about Iran as has the international IC. Rather, we have wondered about an international IC that wonders about Iran.
On March 12, 2007 at 8:52 am, Glenmore said:
I wonder if Asgari had to leave Iran because the decision had been made to use intel from him in a public or at least a non-secure way, such that he would have likely been revealed.
If the decision is that Iran shall not have nukes, and if the desire is that brute force not be used to enforce that decision, then what are the alternatives? The only thing that would have a chance is overwhelming unity among the rest of the world – which just won’t happen with the current lack of belief in anything the US government says. But perhaps, just maybe, a critical mass (heh) of world governments would accept the word of Asgari regarding the Mad Mullahs plans, and work together to try to stop them without military force – through meaningful economic force. It may not be LIKELY to work, but perhaps a decision was made to try it, as one last chance to avoid war.
On March 12, 2007 at 11:41 am, Dominique R. Poirier said:
This comment relates to the statement made by Mr. John Negroponte one may read in the first extract of this post.
In my opinion, the initial assessment of Mr. Negroponte about Iran was certainly correct. Just, things changed since then and this may owe to two reasons.
The first one may be that Iranian attitude changed for reasons relating to the sanctions and strong reaction of Washington about the evolution of its nuclear program. At some regards this may remind the principle of uncertainty as explained by the physicist Werner Heisenberg, but applied here to foreign affairs. As a way of saying in passing, Russian analysts use to see things under the angle of epistemology, an approach which encompasses good knowledge of the principles of uncertainty; and certainty as well. In other words, observation does influence the outcome of any action or event at the level of a particle, as well as it happens in strategy and military and foreign affairs.
The second reason may be found while looking at events at a broader scale than this of Iranian politics and aims and goals per se. I mean that events occurring in the Middle East in general and relating to Iranian moves and shifts of attitude may be attributable to other reasons, goals, and aims, once one attempt to put them side by side with other different events happening in some others places and region of the world. I slightly evoked this point in another comment relating to Iran and I didn’t elaborate then in order not to wander from the matter at hand.
Actually, my point was, and still is, that Iranian moves, and the way things evolve in the Middle East, entertain certain coherence with other events happening, say, in some parts of the Southern American continent, in certain parts of Europe, and in certain parts of the African continent. This enumeration is not exhaustive.
I warn my reader at that point of my comment that this I am suggesting must be considered as mere conjectures.
So, when we attempt to find a possible relationship, or common point, between some of those events, or/and certain moves and changes of attitude expressed by certain foreign leaders, or/and the evolution of terrorism noticed here and there, or/and events relating to economy and industry in some instances, we may have an inkling of a likely grand strategy aiming at undermining the U.S. interests, and policy, and set of values at a worldwide scale. Let me make clear that this has nothing to do with mere anti-Americanism.
Of course, I constantly keep in mind that hostile attitudes toward the U.S. noticed here or there may not always be imputable to such a grand, planned and orchestrated strategy, but to local trends and to the individual will of some; exactly as it happens when isolate persons decide, entirely by their own, to commit hostile acts against U.S. interests before falsely claiming they belong to Al Qaeda. In order not to make my comment too long I deliberately reduce the origin of this last kind of phenomenon to mere emulation. Then, on a case by case basis, this emulation may, on the long term, favor, or give way to, alliance with partners which are truly acting in the frame of a coherent grand strategy.
While attempting to question and restructure and question again my own hypothesis in an effort to give it an understandable and likely “shape� or “line� I discover that, should it ever correspond to a reality, it couldn’t in any case be attributable to the sole Iranian will, or even to a Shi’a or Sunni conspiracy. For, Iran or/and any Muslim faction are unlikely to exert such an influence upon those remote places and their inhabitants and leaders.
In revenge, I may find at least one much more influential actor likely and capable to exert such influence upon both a country such as Iran, and other ones located elsewhere in the world.
Even though I do not play any official role in any organization, and be not professionally involved in foreign affairs and related matters, I feel somehow compelled to rely on the above oblique reference since I am still talking about hypothesis. I apologize to those who may find hard to follow me.
Nonetheless, I think that this hypothesis deserves to be taken in consideration as long as no undisputable contradictory evidence be found. Until then, I have to confess that much more than 50 percent of all assumptions and forecasts of mine based upon this hypothetical grand strategy proved, in turn, to materialize. On the contrary, nearly all my assumptions and forecasts about possible Iranian moves proved to be misleading, in 50 percent of the casers at least, each time they were based, strictly speaking, upon the sole national interest of this country. Religious or ideological considerations limiting to Iran or Shi’a failed to constitute reliable basis too. In order to put an emphasis on this point, much more than 50 percent of my assumptions and forecast proved to be false in the case of some other countries when I relied on their national interests and likely aims and goals; and right, in the equal proportions, when I relied on the hypothesis of this grand strategy.
That’s the point which encourages me to dare expressing myself a bit about, actually.
One will easily imagine how uncomfortable I may feel when, in each and all of my attempts to assess a given situation, I have to choose, as sound basis, between the national interest and ambitions of a given country (which provides poor unsatisfactory forecasts in too many cases), and the aforesaid hypothesis of a grand strategy (which provides very good results).
On the other hand, one will easily understand how funny and gratifying it may be to make repeated correct assumptions and forecasts against countless previous contrary opinions.
Actually, the main reason of this discomfort is that since the Cold War is over since 1991, the hypothesis of such a grand strategy is no more credible than any of those numerous and farfetched conspiracy theories available on the web, even though it works so well when attempting to guess what next.
P.S. to Herschel Smith,
Happily, latest minor changes will allow me to stay in touch with The Captain Journal a bit longer than this I previously scheduled. Best regards,