Danelo clearly says that “because these men are unarmed” as being the reason that they were not engaged (not the fact that they didn’t have a good shot), leading directly to my recommendation (along with the instance of the guards who could not engage the enemy scouting their position) that this aspect be changed.

Let’s engage (pardon the pun) this conversation on a little different level. Let me try to say the things I am saying above in a little different way for you. I am clearly failing in my attempts so far.

When I got back into town Saturday night later, I read your comment. Pondering it, I then immediately checked my e-mail, and found a note from a Marine officer, recently back from Iraq, who stated his agreement with my article, as well as his agreement with my recommended changes. Please trust me on this, since I cannot divulge his name. His last name is fairly well-known, and would likely cause problems were I to publish the e-mail.

The second NCO I cited in one of my previous articles (the one in Anbar) — and again, you will have to trust me on this — comes from an individual who was very well placed, and not only had access to high level decision making, but even participated in it. I wish I could have given my readers the entire context of his instances, but the primary reason that the information on context, location, unit and date are redacted from the article is that he was concerned that official U.S. accounts to families would be upended by my article. But if you can trust me, his account(s) went further than the ROE were not communicated well, or that the officers were risk averse (both of which might have been true). His instances and objections pertained to the actual written ROE and the decisions they forced at the time.

Charlie, how could these things be? I respect you, a battle-experienced Marine officer, and I respect the Marine officer who wrote me to concur with my view of the needed changes. And, I most certainly concur with well-placed and medal winning NCO from Anbar. How could well respected, experienced, highly placed persons so disagree on these things?

The conclusion(s) that I have come to is twofold, although I only address one in the article. First, I think that those individuals who have had good experiences with the ROE will tend to side with you, while those individuals who have been in specific circumstances where the ROE have let them down will tend to agree with my article (some to greater and some to lesser degrees).

Second, I still believe that our pre-theoretical commitments determine the outcome of our thought. For instance, suppose that we began the discussion by asking the question, “why does such a thing as ROE need to exist?” The answer to that will differ per person, one saying something like “in order to comport with the LOAC,” another (like Victor David Hanson) saying something like “so that we do not lose momentum in our combat such as happened with the withdrawal from Fallujah the first time and as occurred with the failure to shoot looters.” When the Iraqis saw that we would not / could not protect their assets, they had to consider militias. Yet another person may respond on utilitarian grounds (the potential consequences of overreaction are more important than anything else). There are other potential answers.

Charlie, the discussion MUST begin on pre-theoretical grounds. One must know why an individual believes that ROE should exist before he can know how that person wants the ROE to look. The two are that connected. They are inseparable.

The comparison with snipers is, in my opinion, not meaningful to the discussion at hand. However, having said that, I have a very, very long-winded reply to your two comments here. Unfortunately, just back in town, tired, drop by tomorrow. This seed comment will have been expanded to something more thought-provoking.

Marine Sniper Takes Out Insurgent Sniper

Part of winning the War on Terror is convincing the Arabs that you don’t hate them and want to kill them all. I can’t think of a better way to convince them of that than demonstrate that the US is more careful than the Iraqi government at protecting Iraqis from accidental death. The comparison with the terrorists is even more stark. Getting people to be rational and see this for themselves is another challenge though.

Herschel – Thanks, and thanks for providing this forum. Don’t discount its impact. While Maj. Gen. Caldwell certainly isn’t reading and replying to blogs, there may be unseen connections between many levels of expression, from little blogs to writers and editors of newspapers to lower level staff who see items in newspapers, and so on. The whole “six degrees of separation” concept. Even the biggest trees nourish themselves through their tiniest roots.

Lastly, there are other reasons, beyond the present ROE in Iraq, for the citizens to check up on and sometimes try to point out “areas possibly needing improvement” even in military affairs. Two examples: When the USS Cole was attacked in port, it was revealed that the sailors guarding it had not been issued ammunition for their rifles, because of fears of an “accidental incident.” On 9/11, at least one of the four fighters that were initially scrambled was likewise not even carrying any missiles or ammuniition. In neither case did these facts make a difference. But they revealed a level of cautiousness that may have become excessive, disproportionate cautiousness relative to the threats faced. We can support reasonable, proportionate cautiousness in all areas. But seeing examples of cautiousness which border on ineptitude, or which reveal a pervasive mistrust of the judgement and abilities of our front-line fighters by the people commanding them, is disturbing. That is what drives my concern about the ROE.

Dave N, the first thing that popped into my mind when I read your point about binary logic is that you have obviously not been in a “fluid combat situation”. This is not a slight against you, but when things start to get loud and the lead-air density ratio begins to climb dramatically, ROE decisions must be made employing binary logic – i.e. shoot or don’t shoot. Fleeting targets don’t allow for more in-depth analysis. That is why we try to boil the ROE down to a binary level for the troops.

The Rules of Engagement are becoming a scapegoat for bad decisions made at all levels, all the way from junior enlisted soldiers and Marines to field grade officers. I am telling you, as someone who has had to make ROE decisions in a complex environment, that the Theater Rules of Engagement themselves are not the limiting factor.