The Administration Implementation Of The Cloward-Piven Strategy

Herschel Smith · 29 Jun 2014 · 39 Comments

The setup for this has been occurring for quite a while.  The collectivists on the right have helped the leftists gain strength, but the rate and fury of activity that has been consequential in destabilizing the United States has increased almost beyond comprehension. The long term evolution of America to a position where such a strategy might stand a greater chance of success began long ago with the move towards urbanization.  The flight from rural America was helped along with family…… [read more]

General David Petraeus: Softly, Softly?

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

It is important to understand just what the would-be savior of Operation Iraqi Freedom will do in Iraq. What is our way forward? In an important and provocative article on Petraeus, the Times Online gives us some insight into the man and his philosophy:

Having co-authored the US military’s counter-insurgency manual, General Petraeus believes that only by combining military strength and sensitive interaction with locals can an insurgency be defeated. He has been influenced by a study of the British in Malaya during the 1950s by John Nagl, a Pentagon official.

Colonel Nagl compared Malaya to America’s failure in Vietnam, where the US Army approached the conflict as a conventional war. The British defeated the insurgency in Malaya, he writes, because of a “civil-military strategy based on intelligence derived from a supportive local population?.

A key lesson General Petraeus draws from Vietnam, compared to Malaya, is that the US Army is historically unprepared to fight insurgencies. The American military has overwhelming force for conventional combat but, without the British experience of empire, is intellectually unequipped to deal with the subtleties of guerrilla war.

The British, with their colonial history, are far better at combining local diplomacy with military force, a model General Petraeus wants to emulate.

Under his command, US forces can be expected to take up positions in Baghdad neighbourhoods, instead of limiting themselves to raids from large, fortified bases. Units will set up street patrols and strive to involve local religious and political leaders in reconstruction and employment projects, heavily funded from Washington.

General Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq in 2003, is largely credited with being one of the only US officers who succeeded in bringing order to his region of Iraq by establishing a British colonial model of civil-military interaction.

In Mosul he entered an area with 110,000 former Iraqi Army soldiers and 20,000 Kurdish militiamen. But unlike the tactics in much of Iraq, General Petraeus took pride in conducting raids with minimum violence. He introduced “cordon and knock?: Houses were surrounded, but not entered, and suspected insurgents were invited to turn themselves in.

Will this ‘softly-softly’ approach work?  Bill Ardolino, writing recently from Iraq, gives us a glimpse into the soul of the local Iraqi, attempting to survive the brutality of western Iraq:

The radio crackled: a M1A-1 Abrams tank was hit by a large IED while patrolling a notoriously active downtown street. The typically invulnerable behemoth was immobilized and set afire by a bomb laden with fuel accelerant, a fiery addition to the explosive arms and tactics race between terrorist insurgents and Coalition forces. The crew escaped the vehicle and made it safely to other tanks before getting burned or sniped in the ambush.

Updates poured in to the JCC: the rest of the patrol’s tanks set up a perimeter around the burning vehicle. Iraqi Army units from the 1-2-1 (1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade 1st Division) moved in to set up an outer cordon and evacuate the heavily populated area, lest the tank’s ammunition ignite and kill civilians. The Iraqi army units were hit by a second bomb while en route, killing an Iraqi lieutenant and his American Military Transition Team advisor, U.S. Army Major Mike Mundell. The Iraqi Army unit pressed on. With a cordon established and satisfied that the tank’s ammunition would not explode, Marines at the JCC radioed the Fallujah Fire Department to put out the remains of the blaze around 12:30.

But with the scene a mere 800 meters from the fire station, the Iraqis refused.

The firemen had heard reports of anti-Iraq forces in the area, and were afraid that insurgents would kill them at the scene or later retaliate against them for working with American and Iraqi government forces.

Even though the firemen were eventually persuaded to put out the fire, the fear of violence is as a norm, determinitive in the actions of the locals.  Why would it be any other way?  Michael Yon gives us a horrifying account of what one Iraqi went through for supporting U.S. forces and the fledgling government of Iraq:

The enemy follows different rules. Any attempt to explain the fate of two of our soldiers who were captured by terrorists in 2006 south of Baghdad would defy decency. It should suffice as coda that the enemy rigged their tortured and mutilated bodies with explosives. CSM Mellinger said that Iraqi forces had just caught one of the perpetrators and handed him over to our people. I asked if we were going to turn him back over to the Iraqis. The CSM said firmly, “We don’t give back people who kill Coalition Forces.?

Then he told me a story about a courageous and respected Iraqi commander who’d accompanied his patrols all over Iraq for nearly a year. When the dead body of this same Iraqi commander was brought into the morgue, doctors found gruesome signs of torture. His legs were beaten by planks of wood. A drill had been used to bore holes into all of his ribs, his elbows, his knees, and into his head. Doctors estimated the man endured this torture for days. Apparently when the fun was over, or they’d extracted what they needed, or the terrorists were worried about being discovered, or they had another victim waiting for their attentions, they shot him.

In my article The Broader War: Redefining our Strategy for Iraq, I said “the customary understanding of Galula’s COIN doctrine has the insurgent attempting to win the population, with the government forces attempting to hold them in submission. The Iraq model has this turned entirely on its head. The insurgents are holding the population in submission while we are attempting to win them, with insurgent terror proving to be more compelling than our so-called “nonkinetic? operations.”

In sentiments analogous to my own, Ralph Peters makes the following observation concerning General Petraeus:

Petraeus is the sort of soldier who would have stayed on indefinitely in Iraq, setting aside all personal concerns in the interests of the mission. President Bush respects him and even the media admire him.

So what could possibly be doubtful about the choice of Gen. Petraeus to take over the leadership of our forces in Iraq?

Having known him – a bit – for years, I have unreserved respect for his talent and dedication, his quality of mind and selfless service. He’s the greatest peacekeeping general in the world. But I just don’t know if he can win a war.

Regaining control of Baghdad – after we threw it away – will require the defiant use of force. Negotiations won’t do it. Cultural awareness isn’t going to turn this situation around (we need to stop pandering to our enemies and defeat them, thanks). We insist it’s all about politics and try to placate everybody, while terrorists, insurgents and militias slaughter the innocent in the name of their god and their tribe.

Meanwhile, we’ve been pretending we’re not at war.

Our enemies aren’t pretending. They’re not only waging war with everything they’ve got, but reveling in breathtaking savagery. They’re no longer impressed when an American patrol zips by. They know they own the streets, not us. To them, we’re just military tourists anxious to go home.

In my contacts with Petraeus, we’ve sometimes agreed and sometimes argued. But we diverged profoundly on one point: The counterinsurgency doctrine produced under his direction remains far too mired in failed 20th-century models. Winning hearts and minds sounds great, but it’s useless when those hearts and minds turn up dead the next morning.

The Iraqi government has vowed a crackdown on all violence, including that perpetrated by the Sadrists.  The militias will be disolved, they claim.  Yet the Sadrists have said that they will send home U.S. reinforcements in coffins.  On the one hand, Maliki claims to understand that the Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs must stop, but on the other hand, Iraqi leaders (even the Kurds) support the release of the recently captured Iranians inside Iraq.

The open duplicity continues unabated.  We have been in Iraq for four years now, and more than three of them have been a counterinsurgency campaign.  Does it seem that the ‘softly-softly’ approach is the right one to take at the present time?

More Hate Mail

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

Regarding one post to which one particularly irrelevant comment was appended, I responded to Rod ‘Breaker’ McCoy that while I appreciated his comments to previous posts, I do not allow people to use the courtesy I allow to make comments on my website for the purposes of advertising their services. I also contended that comments should be relevant to the content of the post rather than discuss other, unrelated issues. To this, Mr. McCoy responded the following:

I object to your attitude. You dont (sic) anwer (sic) questions. Your site is organized to discuss only your opinions. You are arrogant and afraid to hear other better informed opinions.

You are the enemy of people who seem to have the same cause.

However, you are weak and spiteful towards people who want to do more than whine.

You only want to publicize your own drivel and keep others from getting ahead or stating their views.

I consider you as bad as a leftist or a muslim (sic) imperialist., (sic) only to you the objective is to vent only! (sic)

Do not contact me again ! (sic)

Smith responds:

You should give up caffeine and use the money you save to purchase a spell checker. Beyond this, I suppose that I should recommend that you find a good counselor.

Insurgents using Google Earth

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

From the Telegraph, we learn that the insurgents are learning information mined from the internet to target British bases in Iraq.

Terrorists attacking British bases in Basra are using aerial footage displayed by the Google Earth internet tool to pinpoint their attacks, say Army intelligence sources.

Documents seized during raids on the homes of insurgents last week uncovered print-outs from photographs taken from Google.

The satellite photographs show in detail the buildings inside the bases and vulnerable areas such as tented accommodation, lavatory blocks and where lightly armoured Land Rovers are parked.

Written on the back of one set of photographs taken of the Shatt al Arab Hotel, headquarters for the 1,000 men of the Staffordshire Regiment battle group, officers found the camp’s precise longitude and latitude.
“This is evidence as far as we are concerned for planning terrorist attacks,” said an intelligence officer with the Royal Green Jackets battle group. “Who would otherwise have Google Earth imagery of one of our bases?

“We are concerned that they use them to plan attacks. We have never had proof that they have deliberately targeted any area of the camp using these images but presumably they are of great use to them.

Anyone who has used Google Earth knows how dated the satellite information is.  For instance, if you pull up the information on your home, you will probably see a photograph from months ago, and more than likely so many months that it is a different season of the year.

In conventional war (e.g., WWII), where forces are fairly mobile and pressing a known enemy towards a known end, months-old intelligence would be meaningless.  This is the advantage of the fighter in an insurgency and the disadvantage of the counterinsurgent.  The insurgent is mobile, and the counterinsurgent is not.

Sand Berms Around Haditha

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

I have previously argued that the mobility of insurgents in Anbar challenges U.S. abilities to maintain security; that the constant resupply and safe haven across the Syrian border makes the battlefield dynamic to the point of making standard counterinsurgency tactics inapplicable.  From Haditha, we learn that tactics are being used to seal off insurgents.  Non-human resources are being used as a force multiplier in this region.

Adapting ideas tracing back from ancient history to modern Israel, US Marines have sealed off flashpoint towns with sand walls in a new counter-insurgency tactic to quell the wilds of western Iraq …

When 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines deployed to western Al-Anbar from Hawaii in mid-September they sustained casualties in Haditha every day for 45 days. Then on November 10, gun battles in the town stopped.

Captain Matthew Tracy, whose marines patrol Haditha, attributes the lull to a local strongman, a former officer in the Saddam Hussein army known simply as Colonel Faruq, with the power and charisma to bring the town to heel.

Provided, that was, the Marines built a defensive sand wall sealing off Haditha from the porous desert, with checkpoints and traffic restrictions.

So last month, “berms” stretching 20 kilometres (12 miles) were built around Haditha and two neighbouring towns to cut off insurgent supply lines. A simultaneous US-led raid left dozens of insurgents dead or captured.

Ultimately, the borders with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran will have to be completely sealed, and safe haven denied to would-be insurgents inside Syria.  The vulnerability of the tactic described above is that it relies on a local “strongman.”  Assassination of this strongman might cause a problem, so the ability to resupply elements of terror across the border must be stopped.

This article has been updated with Security and WHAM: Getting the Order Right

“Secret War” Against Syria and Iran?

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

According to The Washington Note:

Washington intelligence, military and foreign policy circles are abuzz today with speculation that the President, yesterday or in recent days, sent a secret Executive Order to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director of the CIA to launch military operations against Syria and Iran.

The President may have started a new secret, informal war against Syria and Iran without the consent of Congress or any broad discussion with the country.

Adding fuel to the speculation is that U.S. forces today raided an Iranian Consulate in Arbil, Iraq and detained five Iranian staff members. Given that Iran showed little deference to the political sanctity of the US Embassy in Tehran 29 years ago, it would be ironic for Iran to hyperventilate much about the raid.

But what is disconcerting is that some are speculating that Bush has decided to heat up military engagement with Iran and Syria — taking possible action within their borders, not just within Iraq.

Is this so strange?  To begin with, the doctrine of dual containment has been in effect since the Clinton administration.

The broad national security interests and objectives expressed in the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Chairman’s National Military Strategy (NMS) form the foundation of the United States Central Command’s theater strategy. The NSS directs implementation of a strategy of dual containment of the rogue states of Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens. Dual containment is designed to maintain the balance of power in the region without depending on either Iraq or Iran. USCENTCOM’s theater strategy is interest-based and threat-focused. The purpose of U.S. engagement, as espoused in the NSS, is to protect the United States’ vital interest in the region – uninterrupted, secure U.S./Allied access to Gulf oil.

Given the state of affairs then and even more so now, it would be irresponsible for the U.S. not to have such doctrine and plans.

But if true, this would follow in line closely with what I suggested in The Broader War: Redefining our Stratety for Iraq.  After calling for an air strike on Syria to remove the propaganda equipment being used by the Iraqi insurgents, I stated:

As a “going forward? strategy, incursions into Syria must be made in order to kill terrorists and deny them safe haven. The border must be absolutely secured with both Syria and Iran, including even incidental traffic. Based on my intelligence source cited above, only after the borders have been secured can we begin to treat Iraq as a nation even roughly amenable to standard COIN doctrine.

The objective is not total war, but rather:

  • intimidation
  • regime destabilization
  • denial of safe haven for insurgents, and ultimately
  • fomenting of regime change

A large scale land war is neither necessary nor even possible.  Given the healthy skepticism by officers concerning the proposed troop “surge,” it is doubtful that such a thing is being planned, and even more doubtful that it could succeed.

But what can succeed is the use of air and naval power, along with incursions by ground forces to accomplish the four points discussed above.  Are there enough infantry to pull this off?

Probably not to any significant extent, at least at the present.  It will require one of two things.  More troops in the pipeline (i.e., an increased in the size of the Army and Marines), or a drastic reduction of the ratio of support to infantry, including those now in Iraq.  I have argued before that this ratio is bloated and needs to be readjusted, but whether it can be done in a timely enough manner to pull off the incursions suggested above, along with dealing with the violence soon to be manifested when we go after the Sadrists, is another issue.

“Secret War” Against Syria and Iran?

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

According to The Washington Note:

Washington intelligence, military and foreign policy circles are abuzz today with speculation that the President, yesterday or in recent days, sent a secret Executive Order to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director of the CIA to launch military operations against Syria and Iran.

The President may have started a new secret, informal war against Syria and Iran without the consent of Congress or any broad discussion with the country.

Adding fuel to the speculation is that U.S. forces today raided an Iranian Consulate in Arbil, Iraq and detained five Iranian staff members. Given that Iran showed little deference to the political sanctity of the US Embassy in Tehran 29 years ago, it would be ironic for Iran to hyperventilate much about the raid.

But what is disconcerting is that some are speculating that Bush has decided to heat up military engagement with Iran and Syria — taking possible action within their borders, not just within Iraq.

Is this so strange?  To begin with, the doctrine of dual containment has been in effect since the Clinton administration.

The broad national security interests and objectives expressed in the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Chairman’s National Military Strategy (NMS) form the foundation of the United States Central Command’s theater strategy. The NSS directs implementation of a strategy of dual containment of the rogue states of Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens. Dual containment is designed to maintain the balance of power in the region without depending on either Iraq or Iran. USCENTCOM’s theater strategy is interest-based and threat-focused. The purpose of U.S. engagement, as espoused in the NSS, is to protect the United States’ vital interest in the region – uninterrupted, secure U.S./Allied access to Gulf oil.

Given the state of affairs then and even more so now, it would be irresponsible for the U.S. not to have such doctrine and plans.

But if true, this would follow in line closely with what I suggested in The Broader War: Redefining our Stratety for Iraq.  After calling for an air strike on Syria to remove the propaganda equipment being used by the Iraqi insurgents, I stated:

As a “going forward? strategy, incursions into Syria must be made in order to kill terrorists and deny them safe haven. The border must be absolutely secured with both Syria and Iran, including even incidental traffic. Based on my intelligence source cited above, only after the borders have been secured can we begin to treat Iraq as a nation even roughly amenable to standard COIN doctrine.

The objective is not total war, but rather:

  • intimidation
  • regime destabilization
  • denial of safe haven for insurgents, and ultimately
  • fomenting of regime change

A large scale land war is neither necessary nor even possible.  Given the healthy skepticism by officers concerning the proposed troop “surge,” it is doubtful that such a thing is being planned, and even more doubtful that it could succeed.

But what can succeed is the use of air and naval power, along with incursions by ground forces to accomplish the four points discussed above.  Are there enough infantry to pull this off?

Probably not to any significant extent, at least at the present.  It will require one of two things.  More troops in the pipeline (i.e., an increased in the size of the Army and Marines), or a drastic reduction of the ratio of support to infantry, including those now in Iraq.  I have argued before that this ratio is bloated and needs to be readjusted, but whether it can be done in a timely enough manner to pull off the incursions suggested above, along with dealing with the violence soon to be manifested when we go after the Sadrists, is another issue.

Military Blog Contest

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

At Blogs of War, John Little gives a link to a new military bloggers contest being run by the VA mortgage center.  In order to keep veterans and active duty personnel better informed about updates to their benefits, they are starting a blog.  They are kicking it off with this contest.  The top Milblog is awarded $3000, with the balance of the top ten being awarded $250.

There certainly are some big players and important folks, and my web site doesn’t deserve to be mentioned with the rest of the list.  Our friend John Little at Blogs of War has been at this since … well … basically since the creation of mankind, or maybe just the computer (the one built by John Von Neumann).  Blackfive has linked me before and is a heavily trafficked website by some ex-military heavy-hitters, and I have a buddy from OPFOR that visits here often.

After you vote for Blogs of War and OPFOR, go to a different computer and vote for me so that my [doubtless] low vote count is not too embarrassing.

Here is the link: VA Mortgage Center Blog Vote Page

If I can make it into the top ten blogs, I’ll use the $250 for ministry.

The Broader War: Redefining our Strategy for Iraq

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

In Concerning the Failure of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, I argued that the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy employed by the U.S. in Iraq has failed. I argued that this failure is not attributable to the warriors in the field, nor is it a detraction from the effort they have expended and the blood and limbs they have lost. Rather, it is due at least in part to the adoption of David Galula’s principles of COIN, coming mostly from the situation he faced in Algeria. To be sure, his book is serious study, and much wisdom can be gleaned from his theories. But the global war on terror is a “horse of a different color,” and requires its own theoretical framework.

While the list isn’t comprehensive, I cited seven reasons that the Iraq situation is not entirely conducive to application of the same COIN doctrine, and gave hints as to things that might be considered in the development of revised doctrine for the war. President Bush will soon announce his strategy for going forward in Iraq, and it seems prudent and timely to pull one thread in the tapestry of a revised strategy, perhaps the most important one. Without this thread, the rest of the fabric unravels.

Pointing to a border with Syria that has not been secured, I said that “The battlefield, both for military actions and so-called “nonkinetic? actions to win the people, is dynamic. As one insurgent is killed, another pops up in his place, coming not from any action the U.S. has or has not taken in Iraq, but rather, coming from hundreds or even thousands of miles away due to a religious hatred that has been taught to him from birth. The war in Iraq is both figuratively and quite literally a war without borders.”

Perhaps the most remarkable failure of the existing COIN doctrine has to do with its assumption that we are working with a static population, that population being the prize for the victor in Iraq. But as Michael Ledeen points out:

” … this war is not like the one Galula waged in at least two crucial respects: It is much bigger than a single country, and ideology is much more important in vital areas of the battlefield. The insurgents in Iraq do not just depend on the Iraqi people for support, as the Algerian revolutionaries did, because the Iraqis have enormous support in Syria and Iran. It is hard to imagine any realistic level of Coalition forces in Iraq that could protect the country from infiltration across the Iranian and Syrian borders.”

I also mentioned that the customary understanding of Galula’s COIN doctrine has the insurgent attempting to win the population, with the government forces attempting to hold them in submission. The Iraq model has this turned entirely on its head. The insurgents are holding the population in submission while we are attempting to win them, with insurgent terror proving to be more compelling than our so-called “nonkinetic” operations.

Iraq is not just a part of the global war on terror. It is very much at the center of the war, with Iran and Syria involved through proxy fighters from Syria, al Qaeda from both Syria and Iran, Ansar al Sunna from Iran, and other terrorist and criminal elements. It is a regional problem, and therefore will require a regional solution.

Saddam Hussein, being the nemesis of Iran and catalyst for the deaths of thousands of Iranian troops, was the only true enemy that Iran had, and while his death marks the end of an ugly era for them, the Iranian regime had plans for more regional influence even before the war began. Iran has designs on regional domination, and has already acted on these designs:

Iran’s paramilitary and intelligence buildup in Iraq would put some members of the “coalition of the willing? to shame. Over the past three years, Tehran has deployed to Iraq a large number of the Revolutionary Guard’s Qods Force — a highly professional force specializing in assassinations and bombings — as well as officers from the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security and representatives of Lebanese Hezbollah.

Iranian personnel have established safe houses throughout southern Iraq. They monitor the movement of coalition forces, tend weapons caches, facilitate cross-border travel of clerics, smuggle munitions into Iraq and recruit individuals as intelligence sources. Presumably, Tehran has recruited networks within U.S. military bases and civilian compounds that could be activated on short notice. Iran is also believed by regional intelligence agencies to have armed and trained as many as 40,000 Iraqis to prevent an unlikely rollback of Shiite control.

Iraq quickly went from being a nemesis to being a pawn in the larger, more regional plan. So it is not by accident that the same IED technology that Hezballah used in its war with Israel is now in use against U.S. forces in Iraq. It all comes from Iran. But if the nuclear problem in Iran is troublesome, perhaps even more immediate problems are the porous borders with Syria and Saudi Arabia. Michael Fumento, reporting from the Anbar Province, noted what he called a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail along which foreign fighters pass. This method has been effective, and as military sources admit:

Saudi Arabia and Syria are the leading sources of insurgents. An Army official provided a list of the top 10 countries to NBC News but would not release the numbers of foreign fighters from each. The top 10, alphabetically, are: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.

The drainage of sewage from surrounding locations into Iraq has its effect, and just today, the Multi-National Force web site issued a press release concerning combat action in Baghdad:

Early today Iraqi Army and coalition forces began a joint operation in Taleel Square.

Soldiers from the 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division with support from Coalition forces are conducting targeted raids to capture multiple targets, disrupt insurgent activity and restore Iraqi Security Forces control of North Haifa Street, said Lt. Col. Scott Bleichwehl, spokesperson for Multi-National Division Baghdad.

“This area has been subject to insurgent activity which has repeatedly disrupted Iraqi Security Force operations in central Baghdad,? said Bleichwehl.

Joint forces reported receiving small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenade and indirect fire attacks during the operation.

The targeted raids have successfully resulted in three arrests this morning. The operation is currently ongoing.

Most interesting is what is missing from this press release. We are told by the BBC that seven Syrian nationals were arrested as part of this operation (Fox News reports that it is three Syrian nationals). As to the U.S. response to this kind of behavior? It warrants a mention to the press: “The U.S. says Syrian President Bashar al-Assad allows weapons and fighters to cross its border into Iraq to support the insurgency.” Based on this observation, I’m sure that they’re shaking in their boots.

One well-placed army intelligence source recently told me that “We knew when we were there that to win in Iraq we had to win in Anbar. And to win in Anbar we had to win in Ramadi. But to win in Ramadi we have to control the border with Syria and Jordan (as well as Saudi Arabia actually).”

Army intelligence knows this, and Syrian intelligence certainly knows that Syria is in the direct supply chain for the rogue elements being funneled through Syria. Of course, this makes Syria complicit in these things, and thus Syria is, by use of proxy fighters and land access, at war with both Iraq and the U.S. The U.S. response so far has been tepid for the same reason that the MNF web site didn’t mention the capture of Syrian fighters. If we openly admit to the scope of the Syrian problem, then logically we must put it into the formula for success – something politically objectionable to a vast audience in America. Don’t mention it, and maybe people won’t notice.

But there is more. Thanks to Politics Central (Pajamas Media), we learn that Iraqi insurgents have successfully launched a 24-hour propaganda television station, located in Syria, and with the help of Egypt. It is apparently primarily aimed at the youth to attempt to persuade them to join the jihad against the Iraqi government and the U.S. forces, and thus it will serve in the future to be a tool of recruitment for the forces of terror.

In Attack Syria, I joined Blackfive in calling for a strike on Syria (primarily with air power), saying “In a time when the entire country, even the world, is watching to see what reaction Bush will have to the Baker report, an attack on Syrian assets along with the destruction of jihadist television would go a long way towards an authoritative answer to this question. In addition to an attack on Syrian assets and jihadist television, the State Department should finally engage in the GWOT (this might require them to pick a side in the war). Assuming that they side with the U.S., Egypt should be our next target for high-pressure diplomacy. The State Department, again assuming that they side with the U.S., should not countenance pretend allies. Allowing an Egyptian satellite to be used for the publication of enemy propaganda should be viewed as aiding the enemy, and Egypt should suffer all of the political and diplomatic pressure that we can bring to bear on them for this act.”

A benefit from this action would be to take two branches of the United States Armed Forces that have been relegated to the state of largely irrelevant in the global war on terror, and utilize them again in a powerful way. And would such an action destabilize the region? Well, it might destabilize Syria, which would be a good consequence, but there is no compelling argument that this action would be detrimental to U.S. interests. I recently had an opportunity to arrange a meeting between James Baker and Sun Tzu, and Baker was reminded from the timeless wisdom of Sun Tzu that in order to intimidate your neighbor, you must inflict injury upon them. Since we must always assume that our enemies will come to fight us rather than make peace (“The Art of War,” Section VIII.16), Syria will only be malleable if she fears us. At the present, it is quite obvious that she does not.

As a “going forward” strategy, incursions into Syria must be made in order to kill terrorists and deny them safe haven. The border must be absolutely secured with both Syria and Iran, including even incidental traffic. Based on my intelligence source cited above, only after the borders have been secured can we begin to treat Iraq as a nation even roughly amenable to standard COIN doctrine. But even this is incomplete and only temporary. What next?

Turning again to Michael Ledeen, a bold strategy is suggested to encourage regime change in both Syria and Iran:

Paradoxically, the Syrian/Iranian involvement in Iraq cuts both ways, for at the same time they are supporting the terror war in Iraq and Afghanistan, they face the very real possibility of insurgencies in their own countries. Indeed, the Iranians have had to contend with a nonviolent insurgency for many years now.

That fact changes things considerably. It means that while we are counterinsurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, we are potential insurgents in Syria and Iran. We should be fighting for popular support in at least four countries, where the people will be evaluating our likelihood of success across the entire battlefield, not just city by city or country by country.

The peoples of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon (as well as those on the margins, who are not yet swept up in the war, but may well be quite soon) are evaluating the battlefield very carefully, for they must be ready to jump on the winner’s bandwagon.

There are certainly changes that need to occur at the microscopic level. The rules of engagement need serious reevaluation, and probably at least some tweaking (including for Marine snipers). On a somewhat larger scale, following the counsel of the Small Wars Manual (Chapter XI), the Sadrists must be disarmed. On a somewhat larger scale still, the U.S. must go on the offensive once again against the insurgents. Most U.S. troops are sitting on well-protected bases that are more safe than major U.S. cities and have never seen combat. More troops to sit on these bases while several hundred are saddled with the responsibility to patrol Fallujah is not, by anyone’s estimation, a robust strategy for defeating an insurgency. So a surge in troops does nothing to determine how these troops are used and how they engage the enemy.

On a larger scale still, the Iraqi borders must be shut down. But on a macroscopic level, Syria and Iran must be dealt with, both as part of the Iraq war and also as subsets of the global war on terror and jihadism. If the deaths of more than three thousand sons and daughters of America are to mean anything, our strategy must outfit our troops to win.

I have done my share of pontificating about force size, nation-building versus traditional war, and Rumsfeld’s views versus those of Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell. And as much as we might like to opine and pontificate about what we should have done four years ago, talk of Eric Shinseki and Anthony Zinni has now become passe. The question now is not whether there should be a troop surge, or even how large it should be if there is one. Increase troops if needed, but the question of the hour is one of strategy. Are we in the global war on terror to win? In September of 2006 I said that “The U.S. will not win in Iraq until Iran is driven out entirely.” We might expand that to say that until Iran is dealt with, we will not win the global war on terror.

America has the most adaptive and innovative boys in the world. One officer used AC/DC’s “Back in Black” to kill Taliban:

After wearing the Taliban down for six days with rock music blaring across the river valley, and artillery and airstrikes, they found a weak spot in the Taliban’s defenses. Playing his favorite music, AC/DC’s “Back in Black,? to hide the sound of the armored vehicles, Williams took the Taliban by surprise, crossing the river and driving through the cornfields from the northeast.

Further east in the Anbar Province, American boys have figured out a way to protect HMMWV turrets which were previously vulnerable to grenades being lobbed in: a hemisphere of chicken wire. There is no paucity of thinking, sweating or bleeding by U.S. troops. Now all they need is a winning strategy.

AC-130 Gunship Targets al Qaeda in Somalia

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

Just reported from Fox News:

The United States launched a strike Monday against suspected Al Qaeda members in Somalia, a senior U.S. official informed FOX News.

The attack by the Air Force AC-130 gunship, capable of firing thousands of rounds per second, left casualties on the ground, but it is not clear if any of the dead were targeted terrorists, the official said.

The U.S. could have been targeting two terrorists — Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Saleh Nabhan — who are connected to the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa that left more than 200 dead. Officials have long suspected those involved in the bombings have taken refuge in Somalia.

There may have been a scent of terrorist movement when Al Qaeda operatives taking cover in the Somalian capital of Mogadishu were likely chased out of their hideouts as Ethiopian forces cleared out Islamists who had taken power there.

The move marks the first time the U.S. has mounted a mission in Somalia since forces pulled out in 1994, two years after entering on a mission to feed starving people there. However, due to the bombings, the U.S. has shared intelligence with allies such as Kenya and Ethiopia and this fresh attack could be part of an ongoing anti-terror operation.

It is about time. More on the AC-130 can be found here.

Concerning the Failure of Counterinsurgency in Iraq

BY Herschel Smith
7 years, 6 months ago

The coming weeks will set the course for the closing of U.S. action in Iraq.  Given the recent flurry of activity to put the final pieces in place, it is wise to reflect on the failure of counterinsurgency thus far in Iraq, and ascertain exactly what more proposed troops will do, how they will do it, and what would demarcate a victory.

There is no doubt that positive reports can be found concerning the state of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and particularly so when the reports come straight from the front by Milbloggers. There is of course progress being made, but this progress may be characterized as slow, arduous and dangerous, whether from Milbloggers or main stream media.

The Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen involved in OIF have performed marvelously, have done everything that has been required of them, and have made progress despite the overly-restrictive rules of engagement, lack of appropriate equipment (e.g., fourteen Marines getting killed by an IED due to driving down a desert road in an Amphibious Assault Vehicle) and lack of adequate forces to do the task at hand.

The emphasis on force protection for U.S. troops has led to low casualties, by design, compared with previous wars.  This is an admirable feature of the war planning for OIF. But it is becoming clear that the application of counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics in Iraq, and particularly for the Anbar Province, have been a dismal failure as it regards effecting the desired outcome.

In Eschatology and Counterterrorism Warfare I discussed the exodus that is occurring from Iraq, with the Anbar and Diyala Provinces being particularly hard hit. There are now 1.4 million displaced Iraqi citizens and every day sees three thousand more who flee the country. Working the back alleys and neighborhoods where there is no constant U.S. presence, the Sunni insurgents are waging a campaign of murder and intimidation to demonstrate that neither the Iraqi government nor U.S. forces can protect people.

It is stylish to cite David Galula and claim that the U.S. approach to Iraq has been too heavy handed. The solution, it is claimed, is to see that 80% of the solution is and will always be political. But just to show how utterly irrelevant Galula’s system is to Iraq, consider a single quote: “The battle for the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war. . . . The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature. . . . And so intricate is the interplay between the political and military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.”

It sounds nice. Now take a closer read: “The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) …,” has exactly backwards what the insurgents and counterinsurgents have been doing.  The U.S. has been trying to win over the population, not keep it submissive, and the insurgents have been trying to keep them submissive, not win them over.   If anything, intimidation has been the one and only tactic of the insurgency.  The premise being false, the system then suffers in misapplication. Perhaps a more poignant example comes from a West Point essay, “Hearts and Minds as a Misleading Misnomer.”

The easiest way to understand legitimacy is to ascertain how or to whom a citizen turns to solve his or her social, political or economic problems. If citizens desire educational reform, and they rely on the government to fix that, then the government’s system has legitimacy … similarly, if citizens have decided that the insurgent’s system will best provide land reform, then the insurgent has captured legitimacy from the regime … in many instances (the Viet Cong was a great example), terror, violence, and coercion are short-term “sticks” that the insurgency employs until the long-term “carrots” (solving citizen problems) validate their proposed system.

This philosophy marks the COIN training in the U.S. armed forces today. Solving social, political and economic problems is the hallmark of successful COIN, it is believed, and hence the U.S. attempts to do it better than the insurgents.  Far from being too late or not vigorous enough in the application of Galula’s views, we have applied his theories with a vengeance.

Yet upon serious reflection, the reader will see that something is deeply wrong. The insurgents in Iraq have never transitioned to the next phase of insurgency, the phase we’ll call “system validation.” The only interest that they have shown in education has been to threaten and kill teachers and professors; in the words of one Baghdad citizen, “I forced my son to leave school. It’s more important that he be alive than educated.”

Among conservative Milbloggers, of which I am one, it is not popular to say that our strategy is wrong in Iraq, perhaps because it is seen as a reflection on the troops rather than of the leadership. But the idea that a failure rests on the shoulders of the troops is surely false and just plain wrongheaded.  With perfect troops, the wrong strategy will doom U.S. efforts. In addition to studying positive reports about the successes in Iraq, it is useful to study contrary viewpoints to round out our understanding of the situation.

Some reports directly from Iraq paint a picture of the nation as a killing field, leading exactly to the exodus we are witnessing.

The last three months have been the worst in Iraq’s history. There have been more killings of innocent people than the worst days and months the country has passed through in the past.

According to official figures at least 100 innocent Iraqis perish everyday. The figures of course cannot be trusted as many more murdered Iraqis are buried as relatives find it unnecessary to report their deaths.

Our municipalities now spend more time collecting human corpses form (sic) the streets of major cities, particularly in Baghdad, than gathering garbage.

Most of these corpses do not carry identity cards and hospitals lack the means to identify them. Many are buried in mass graves.

Closer to home, in testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, Lt. General Michael D. Maples admitted to a badly deteriorating security situation in Iraq.  NCOs who have been to Iraq report stories reminiscent of the wild west: “The locals have repeatedly conveyed to us horrid tales of shop owners being pulled from their places of business and executed directly outside their storefronts, or mysterious uniformed men driving up and snatching people right off the street, never to be heard from again. Most of the wealthy homes now stand empty, their owners having fled to less politically free but certainly less volatile Middle Eastern countries.”  The Anbar Province is described as a wasteland.

Ramadi has been laid waste by two years of warfare. Houses stand shattered and abandoned. Shops are shuttered up. The streets are littered with rubble, wrecked cars, fallen trees, broken lampposts and piles of rubbish.

Fetid water stands in craters. The pavements are overgrown. Walls are pockmarked by bullets and shrapnel. Side roads have been shut off with concrete barriers to thwart car bombs. Everything is coated in grey dust even the palm trees. The city has no functioning government, no telephones, and practically no basic services except sporadic electricity and water supplies. It has been reduced to a subsistence economy.

There are stray cats and wild dogs, but few cars or humans. Ramadi’s inhabitants have either fled, or learnt to stay indoors.

Concerning amelioration of the violence, Maliki stopped the targeting of the Sadrists, and the U.S. is in what is called by the U.N. Security Council a ‘security partnership’ with the Iraqi government.  The U.S. can no longer take unilateral action in Iraq, of course, unless the political will exists stateside to do so.  This is doubtful.

So why the failure of the Galula model for COIN? What is so different about Iraq? Perhaps the following list is a beginning point for what will without a doubt be the subject of many future dissertations at war colleges.

First, treating the disenfranchised sect as if they were “in play.”  Robert Haddick (Westhawk), similar to Michael Rubin, recommending that the U.S. give up on Sunni reconciliation, comments:

As General Abizaid predicted, Iraqi society, at least the Sunni Arab portion, rebelled against the “antibody.” Since then, the U.S. military has attempted to fight a counterinsurgency campaign, using several standard techniques. Mr. Zalmay Khalilzad, America’s very demanding ambassador in Iraq, has forced Iraq’s political elites to form a “national unity” government. He has also worked tirelessly on political reconciliation with Iraq’s rebellious Sunni Arab community. The U.S. has spent the past two years developing and mentoring an Iraqi army and police force. Military operations have been restrained and highly discrete, with the aim of targeting those who might intimidate the population, while also attempting to avoid alienating the population into siding with the insurgents.

These are all classic counterinsurgency gambits, designed to provide an attractive alternative to the insurgency, with the hope of drying up its support. Unfortunately, the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign has failed. The failure rests more with Saddam Hussein’s legacy than it does with American tactics. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs were never “in play,” ready to be talked or bribed into supporting the Shi’ite/Kurdish majority government in Baghdad. As for Iraq’s Shi’ites and Kurds, they have thirty years of very painful memories. And the recent failures at reconciliation have done nothing to improve trust among Iraq’s sects.

If Haddick is right, and I believe that he is, the effort to win the hearts and minds of the Sunni minority was doomed from the beginning.  The overthrown sect had too much at stake simply to crumble and acquiesce to Shi’ite and/or Kurdish rule, or so they thought.  The situation was never conducive to the application of Galula’s principals.  We tried to fit a square peg into a round hole, and all the more so each time it didn’t work.

Second, ignoring the affects of a thousand-year religious war within the population in Iraq.  Sunni-Shi’ite relations constitute a thousand year religious war, and to assume that democracy (or freedom) would heal divisions and become seminal in the region with the overthrow of Saddam’s regime might have been hamhanded and naive.  At the very least, plans to address this deeply held religious divide should have been made, and security in such a powderkeg would certainly necessitate more force projection and quicker response to the initial violence upon toppling of the regime.

Third, failing to recognize the affects of the previous regime having trained the Iraqi people to cower in fear of violence.  American freedom for several hundred years has created an indomitable spirit that would make an occupation of the U.S. impossible for foreign troops, no matter how many there were or how long they tried.  Iraq is the perfect contrast.  Saddam’s secret police created such a culture of fear and treachery that they were ready-made for the brutality employed by the insurgency.  They have decades of simply staying alive under their belt as preparation for the terrorists.  They knew exactly what to do, and it didn’t include sustaining risk to assist the U.S. in hunting down the enemy.

Fourth, oil money.  The scandalous and idiotic oil-for-food program poured money into a region that was otherwise destitute because of sanctions, and this money didn’t go to the people who needed it.  So even sanctions didn’t help to strip the enemy of his funds.  In the broader region, the ready availability of large sums of cash make it easy to hire mercenaries, from both inside and outside Iraq, to battle U.S. troops.  The easy availability of oil money also creates criminal elements when there is no stable government to police them.

Fifth, the nexus of terrorism and technology.  Just forty years ago, an insurgent may backpack a single artillery shell along the Ho Chi Minh trail for months, only to see it used in a second, and then turn around to hike the trail and do it all over again.  Technological advances and the cheap availability of high tech equipment has radically changed the face of terrorism.

The world is now characterized by the near-instantaneous proliferation of information and misinformation, ease-to-use communication systems, and technologies that provide cheap, readily improvised WMD capabilities. At the same time, the development of our cultural, social, economic, industrial, and political structures offers vulnerabilities never dreamed of by earlier terrorists. This presents unprecedented problems for security forces, problems that are neither purely military nor purely law enforcement, but a mixture of both, with a lot of complex intelligence demands. All this places complex strains on governmental jurisdictions, and the intersection of the public and private sectors, not to mention civil liberties, cultural traditions, and privacy.

We were utterly unprepared for the toll that IEDs would take on U.S. troops, and even after it became obvious that this was a leading tactic of the enemy, we reacted with lethargy.

Sixth, not recognizing the dynamic scope of the battlefieldRecently captured intelligence documents show an undeniable link between Iran and the violence in Iraq.  John Little comments that “If these documents actually surprised anyone in our intelligence community we’re in trouble. Finding supporting documentation is a good thing but Iran’s desire to destabilize Iraq, and their willingness to deal with anyone in the process, should have been well understood before these documents were siezed.”  But we may indeed be in trouble, not learning our lessons from years gone by.  Michael Rubin points out that from even before the war began going on into the first months of the war, Iran was training militia and sending huge sums of money and materiel into Iraq.  Their plans have been active for years.  Over to the west, insurgents pour in across a Syrian border that has not been securred.  The battlefield, both for military actions and so-called “nonkinetic” actions to win the people, is dynamic.  As one insurgent is killed, another pops up in his place, coming not from any action the U.S. has or has not taken in Iraq, but rather, coming from hundreds or even thousands of miles away due to a religious hatred that has been taught to him from birth.  The war in Iraq is both figuratively and quite literally a war without borders.

Seventh, the utilization of violence as an exclusive-use procedure by the insurgents.  The insurgents have not yet transitioned from violence to “system validation.”  There is no compelling need to do so, as Iranian influence in eastern Iraq exceeds that of the U.S., many of the Sunnis want nothing of reconciliation, and there is an exodus of refugees from Iraq to other parts of the world.  The success achieved by the insurgents (and Shi’ite militia) ensures the continued use of violence.  There is no need to fix something that isn’t broken.

It has been said that successful COIN warfare takes ten years on average.  Even if this is true, we do not have ten years to perform COIN operations in Iraq.  And the U.S. public is not to blame.  Four years has been given to the administration, and at least the first couple (after the toppling of the regime) were squandered.  This squandering of time and resources, while it affected public sentiment in the U.S., affected Iraq even more.  The U.S. public, even now, is likely to give the administration longer than the situation on the ground in Iraq will allow.  The critical path to solving Iraq doesn’t rest with public sentiment.  If Iraq is a killing field sustaining an exodus of refugees to Syria and Jordan as it appears is the case, we simply do not have ten years.  The basis for this boundary condition is Iraq, not the U.S.  The same COIN strategy, six years from now, will see the annihilation of the Sunni population and rise of Iran as the only true power in Iraq.

I have been vocal in pointing out the effects of inadequate force projection in Iraq.  It appears at the moment that there will be a modest troop increase.  But force projection is not the same thing as force size.  Victor Davis Hanson’s observations point to a different problem than one of force size.  Hanson’s recommendations focus on the what and how of U.S. engagements.

There have been a number of anomalies in this war, as a brilliant American tactical victory in removing Saddam has not translated into quick strategic success. But one of the most worrisome developments is the narrowing of the recent debate to the single issue of surging troops, as if the problem all along has just been one of manpower.

It hasn’t. The dilemma involves the need to fight an asymmetrical war of counter-insurgency that hinges on what troops do, rather than how many are engaged. We have gone from a conventional victory over Saddam Hussein to an asymmetrical struggle against jihadist insurgents to what is more or less third-party policing of random violence between Sunnis and Shiites.

Our past errors were not so much dissolving a scattered Iraqi military or even de-Baathification, but rather giving an appearance of impotence, whether in allowing the looting to continue or pulling back from Fallujah or giving a reprieve to the Sadr militias.

So, yes, send more troops to Iraq — but only if they are going to be allowed to hunt down and kill vicious and sectarians in a manner that they have not been allowed to previously.

This surge should be not viewed in terms of manpower alone. Rather it should be planned as the corrective to past misguided laxity, in which no quarter will now be given to die-hard jihadists as we pursue victory, not better policing. We owe that assurance to the thousands more of young Americans who now will be sent into harm’s way.

Whether we take Haddick’s approach or Hanson’s approach (giving up on the Sunnis and leaving versus forcing their hand by a drastic strategy change), 2.0E4 more troops doing the same things and pursuing the same strategy will bring disrepute to U.S. warfighting capabilities and more U.S. casualties.  It has been said that the difference between the Viet Cong and the jihadist is that the VC didn’t follow us home, and the jihadist will.  And so they will indeed.  Yet we are waging partial war with forty year old COIN doctrine that is more applicable to the VC than the jihadists.  A different paradigm is needed, one that squarely faces the murder and suicide cult that is jihadism; that doesn’t patrol Marines down city streets to get sniped without ever firing a shot at the enemy because we have hamstrung our own snipers with our rules of engagement; that recognizes that mothers don’t care about an education for their children compared to keeping them alive; that recognizes and addresses the dynamic battlefield where borders and foreign fighters are as important as the local government; and that realizes that mutual trust will be difficult, or perhaps impossible, in a land where lies and deceipt are ubiquitous and constant.

A moderate troop size increase coupled with the same strategy and tactics will be likened – and properly so – to Olmert’s last desperate battle with Hezballah where, in order to save face and make the war effort appear as a victory for Israel, he sent more IDF troops to their deaths and then retreated.  It will neither appear as a victory nor accomplish anything good.


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