Comments on: Concerning the Failure of Counterinsurgency in Iraq http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/ News & Commentary on Warfare, Policy and Counterterrorism Fri, 12 Mar 2010 18:42:55 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Wolf Pangloss http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-7917 Wolf Pangloss Fri, 26 Jan 2007 03:31:22 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/#comment-7917 <strong>Insurgency or Counterinsurgency?...</strong> ... Insurgency or Counterinsurgency?…

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]]> By: Blogs of War » Rules of Engagement Wrap Up http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-7612 Blogs of War » Rules of Engagement Wrap Up Mon, 22 Jan 2007 12:58:53 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/#comment-7612 [...] Herschel Smith wraps up his extended look at rules of engagement and our broader war plan for Iraq: U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq have failed, but not for lack of capabilities of the U.S. forces. A new strategy is needed, and this new strategy requires an overhaul of the rules of engagement from top to bottom, macroscopic to microscopic. The approach to success in the coming months is likely to be more population-centric. But the softly-softly approach of General David Petraeus might not be strategically robust enough to carry the day in Iraq. Petraeus introduced the “cordon-and-knockâ€? approach in Mosul, but it seems a dubious proposition that the Sadrists who have promised to send U.S. reinforcements home in coffins will be persuaded to give themselves up because an invitation was extended (and if they succeed in melting into the population, there is no incentive to give themselves up). [...]

]]> By: Herschel Smith http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-6185 Herschel Smith Mon, 08 Jan 2007 20:28:02 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/#comment-6185 Chris, I think you somewhat mischaracterize the Galula model. If it were that easy, our boys would all be home now. It is a point of his doctrine that to clear an area of all insurgents requires the assistance of the population, and their assistance can be obtained via these heart-winning actions. In his view, it is an ongoing, symbiotic relationship between population, insurgents counterinsurgents, politics, and social infrastructure. The insurgents and counterinsurgents are competing for the approval of the population. I disagree. They have tried the Galula model and it has failed. However, I agree with your suggestion that clearing insurgents, i.e., the clear, hold and rebuild philosophy, requires more troops. I have argued this from the beginning. No matter whose approach you use, we needed more troops to do COIN. However, there is another issue, that of force projection. Galula favors a small footprint and minimum force. I argue elsewhere for maximum footprint and force projection, with force projection NOT being equivalent to the actual exercise of that force. To explain this would require a rundown of the Marines and their presence in Somalia (before the Army) versus how the Rangers and Delta Force (and 10th Mountain) did it. I don't have time now to go into this. Perhaps later. Chris,

I think you somewhat mischaracterize the Galula model. If it were that easy, our boys would all be home now. It is a point of his doctrine that to clear an area of all insurgents requires the assistance of the population, and their assistance can be obtained via these heart-winning actions. In his view, it is an ongoing, symbiotic relationship between population, insurgents counterinsurgents, politics, and social infrastructure. The insurgents and counterinsurgents are competing for the approval of the population.

I disagree. They have tried the Galula model and it has failed. However, I agree with your suggestion that clearing insurgents, i.e., the clear, hold and rebuild philosophy, requires more troops. I have argued this from the beginning. No matter whose approach you use, we needed more troops to do COIN.

However, there is another issue, that of force projection. Galula favors a small footprint and minimum force. I argue elsewhere for maximum footprint and force projection, with force projection NOT being equivalent to the actual exercise of that force. To explain this would require a rundown of the Marines and their presence in Somalia (before the Army) versus how the Rangers and Delta Force (and 10th Mountain) did it. I don’t have time now to go into this. Perhaps later.

]]> By: chr http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-6183 chr Mon, 08 Jan 2007 20:13:09 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/#comment-6183 The Galula model has not failed in Iraq, it has not even been attempted. The Galula model states that an area be cleared of insurgants first by military force then held by civil athorities. Once American Forces clear an area, they leave to quell another hot spot. The vacuum created by departing US troops is filled by the bad guys. Its whack-a-mole. This will continue until there are either enough Iraq troops and police to police an area or enough US troops to fully occupy the country (which will never happen). The Galula model has not failed in Iraq, it has not even been attempted. The Galula model states that an area be cleared of insurgants first by military force then held by civil athorities. Once American Forces clear an area, they leave to quell another hot spot. The vacuum created by departing US troops is filled by the bad guys. Its whack-a-mole. This will continue until there are either enough Iraq troops and police to police an area or enough US troops to fully occupy the country (which will never happen).

]]> By: dw http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-6175 dw Mon, 08 Jan 2007 17:37:14 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/#comment-6175 Excerpt:  <blockquote>Our past errors were not so much dissolving a scattered Iraqi military or even de-Baathification, but rather giving an appearance of impotence, whether in allowing the looting to continue or pulling back from Fallujah or giving a reprieve to the Sadr militias.</blockquote> Excellent summary Herschel. I don't know if anyone is listening. I hear GW Bush asking for ideas as to what to do, but "kill a hundred thousand bad guys" seems to be thinking outside the box. Excerpt: 

Our past errors were not so much dissolving a scattered Iraqi military or even de-Baathification, but rather giving an appearance of impotence, whether in allowing the looting to continue or pulling back from Fallujah or giving a reprieve to the Sadr militias.

Excellent summary Herschel.

I don’t know if anyone is listening. I hear GW Bush asking for ideas as to what to do, but “kill a hundred thousand bad guys” seems to be thinking outside the box.

]]> By: Blogs of War » A New Way Forward - Waiting on Bush’s Plan for Iraq http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-6159 Blogs of War » A New Way Forward - Waiting on Bush’s Plan for Iraq Mon, 08 Jan 2007 13:26:19 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/#comment-6159 [...] Everyone is focusing on the minor troop increases but it’s what they’re doing, how they’ll be used, that counts. Herschel Smith is not optimistic: A moderate troop size increase coupled with the same strategy and tactics will be likened - and properly so - to Olmert’s last desperate battle with Hezballah where, in order to save face and make the war effort appear as a victory for Israel, he sent more IDF troops to their deaths and then retreated. It will neither appear as a victory nor accomplish anything good. More Blogs of War: President Bush’s Statement on Execution of Saddam HusseinPresident Bush’s Remarks from BaghdadIraq: Civilian Convoy Hijacked - Americans KidnappedPresident Bush’s Radio AddressBBC News: President Bush to Boost Troop Levels in Iraq - Focus on Security                [...] [...] Everyone is focusing on the minor troop increases but it’s what they’re doing, how they’ll be used, that counts. Herschel Smith is not optimistic: A moderate troop size increase coupled with the same strategy and tactics will be likened – and properly so – to Olmert’s last desperate battle with Hezballah where, in order to save face and make the war effort appear as a victory for Israel, he sent more IDF troops to their deaths and then retreated. It will neither appear as a victory nor accomplish anything good. More Blogs of War: President Bush’s Statement on Execution of Saddam HusseinPresident Bush’s Remarks from BaghdadIraq: Civilian Convoy Hijacked – Americans KidnappedPresident Bush’s Radio AddressBBC News: President Bush to Boost Troop Levels in Iraq – Focus on Security                [...]

]]> By: Cop The Truth http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-6146 Cop The Truth Mon, 08 Jan 2007 06:58:23 +0000 http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/01/08/concerning-the-failure-of-counterinsurgency-in-iraq/#comment-6146 <strong>Last chance in Iraq...</strong> Being a fan of Westerns, I caught an old one this afternoon: High Noon. The synopsis of the movie is simple: a small town, with the help of a new Sheriff, finally stands up to a group of thugs, sending... Last chance in Iraq…

Being a fan of Westerns, I caught an old one this afternoon: High Noon. The synopsis of the movie is simple: a small town, with the help of a new Sheriff, finally stands up to a group of thugs, sending…

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